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Abstract 
Economists interested in the communication of ideas often turn their attention to the 
importance of information to the economic exchange process and in so doing often focus 
on specific aspects of an economy. For example, economists who highlight the importance 
of institutions see information as an institution’s lifeblood, while economists interested in 
technology often see information as key to technological advances and economic 
development. This dissertation takes a broader view of information, by analysing Maynard 
Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of the Peace and focusing on the processes and ways 
in which economists successfully communicate their ideas, especially to non-economists. 
Keynes was particularly effective in communicating his ideas, especially following 
the publication of Economic Consequences in December 1919. At this time Keynes was 
already regarded as an eminent economist and his book helped cement his reputation and 
established him as a public intellectual. Despite its success, the book was a controversial 
work, critics often accusing Keynes of being more a political propagandist than a serious 
economist. Keynes was stung by the criticism and consistently maintained Economic 
Consequences was a serious work of economics. The conclusion of this dissertation is that 
Keynes was correct in his assertion. The key to this understanding can be largely 
attributed to his rhetoric. 
First, he provided a wide range of statistics, many from official sources, to support 
his central argument that if the terms of the Versailles Treaty were imposed on Germany, 
not only would Germany suffer, but all Europe would be reduced to an economic dark age 
and likely face further destructive warfare. Furthermore, his inductive and descriptive use 
of statistics was rhetorically successful as it provided a “factual, objective and neutral” 
authority for his arguments. 
The second way Keynes communicated his economic arguments was with his 
frequent and rich use of metaphors. By using the tools of literary criticism it is 
demonstrated that all Keynes’ arguments have an economic focus. His use of metaphors 
enabled him to reach a wide audience with persuasive rhetoric, unusual in a serious work 
of economics. 
The third indicator that Economic Consequences was a serious work of economics 
can be found in the economic and cultural contexts that surrounded Keynes. His writing 
style was influenced by his friendships in the Cambridge Apostles and Bloomsbury circles, 
especially those of Lytton Strachey and Virginia Woolf. These, and other influences such as 
Eton, Moore’s philosophy and psychological realism, help explain Keynes’ unique style of 
writing and why his explicit attempts at persuasion were often successful. 
The examination presented here of Keynes’ activities as a public intellectual, his 
use of statistics, a literary criticism of his prose, and the influences on his writing style, 
allow a re-reading of Economic Consequences and adds to our understanding of how 
economists can successfully communicate their ideas. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Keynes enjoyed success in communicating his ideas, views and opinions. He worked 
tirelessly to persuade, shape and change opinions at a time of global economic 
uncertainty, which acted as a driver for his passionate calls for reform. He sought to 
explicitly persuade what he called ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ opinion. The ‘inner’ opinion is the 
élites in society who provide leadership and have the power to bring about change. 
However, élites in a democracy need the support of ‘outer’ opinion. ‘Outer’ opinion is the 
educated public who apply pressure to the élites. Keynes directed his communication 
efforts at both as he realised real change would only occur when ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ 
opinion were aligned. 
Publication of The Economic Consequences of the Peace (Economic Consequences) 
in December 1919 brought him to the attention of a wide audience and by the time of 
publication of The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill in July 1925 Keynes had 
become well known in both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ circles for his economic views. Following 
Economic Consequences he increasingly drew on his background, knowledge and 
experience to cement his place as an influential public intellectual. 
Economic Consequences was written following Keynes’ attendance at the 
Conference of Versailles as an official with the British Treasury. However, he resigned 
before the conference ended and returned to Britain in a state of exhaustion and 
bitterness at what he judged was a serious failure of leadership, believing Europe to be on 
the brink of economic disaster. Within six months of returning home he had written 
Economic Consequences. Publication, when it came, was surprisingly successful, drawing 
condemnation and praise in more or less equal measure and establishing Keynes’ 
reputation as its lasting legacy. First, Keynes became a respected public figure known for 
having important things to say on matters of economic concern. Second, his success in 
communicating economic ideas can be measured from the time of the book’s appearance. 
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Finally, many of his ideas, though not initially accepted, in time have become accepted 
economic orthodoxy.  
He had numerous other books, journal and newspaper articles published during 
the 1920s and 1930s, in addition to making public appearances where he admonished 
politicians, economists, and policy makers for not doing enough to deal with economic 
instability. He saw the long shadow of the Versailles Conference holding back a return to 
prosperity. Some of the issues which concerned him most included inflation, and equally 
damaging, deflation, disparate price levels that proved difficult and often impossible to 
correct and bring into a workable equilibrium, as well as unemployment, which remained 
high in most European countries during the inter-war period.  
The range of channels Keynes used to communicate these messages is of interest 
because they were so broad. Economists interested in the communication of economic 
ideas and the importance of information to the economic exchange process often do not 
concern themselves with such a wide scope, but rather treat the subject as a specific 
element in an economy. For example, North1 and Barnard2 see information as the 
lifeblood of economic institutions that make up an economy. Mokyr3 on the other hand is 
interested in the ways in which information and knowledge lead to improvements in 
technology, in turn stimulating economic development. Casson4 takes a different 
approach and looks at the ways in which information assists intermediaries in an economy 
to drive efficiencies into the exchange process. While all these lines of inquiry are 
important for an understanding of how economies work, there is limited research around 
the broader communication process and how economists can best disseminate their ideas 
                                                             
1
 North, (1990). 
2
 Barnard, (1958). 
3
 Mokyr, (2002 and 2010). 
4
 Casson, (1997). 
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to all participants in an economy. This is not to say economists choose to ignore its 
importance. Quite the contrary; there is an established tradition from Adam Smith 
through John Stuart Mill, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, Alfred Marshall to John Maynard 
Keynes that has explicitly used a variety of methods and media to communicate ideas, and 
in the process establishing these economists as public intellectuals. 
The term public intellectual and the development of a public sphere in which he or 
she operates are both recent phenomena. Most trace the evolution of the public sphere 
from the time of the Industrial Revolution (1760-1830). By examining the activities of 
economists from the time of Adam Smith (1724-1790), whose own activities helped 
contribute to the emergence of the public sphere, we have some way of providing 
explanations for how economic ideas are communicated through their activities as public 
intellectuals. 
The specific focus of this dissertation is Economic Consequences and how it 
established Keynes as a public intellectual, enabling him to successfully communicate his 
ideas. The research undertaken is supported by an examination of a number of 
components important for an understanding of how economic ideas are communicated. 
First for consideration is what constitutes a public intellectual. Second, there is a review of 
the processes that enable information to be disseminated to public spheres. Finally, is an 
examination of the context within which intellectuals operate and a discussion of how 
cultural influences play a part in successful communication.  
The views of Robert Solow are of particular interest in this examination because he 
raises a number of difficulties associated with the communication of economic ideas. 
Outside the community of economists Solow is concerned that most complex economic 
ideas “turn to mush”.5 He argues there are three reasons for this. First, the public wants 
simple, short explanations for what are complex economic problems. For example, when 
                                                             
5
 Solow, (1989). 
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Keynes published A Tract on Monetary Reform, shortly after publication of Economic 
Consequences, he had proposed a set of reforms for the money supply system that were 
largely misunderstood and unacceptable to many economists, who failed to grasp what 
they considered were radical and unworkable ideas. Some ten years passed before 
Keynes’ ideas were accepted by the economics profession, politicians and policy makers. 
What chance then for the lay public to understand Keynes’ arguments?  
The second difficulty Solow has with the communication of “accurate” economic 
ideas is the political process through which ideas are disseminated. People want certainty 
from those who speak with authority but many economic ideas are highly uncertain and 
remain open to considerable debate, especially when economic factors change rapidly 
and without warning. An example is the gold standard, credited with bringing stability and 
prosperity to international trade in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; its 
reintroduction in the 1920s can only be described as disastrous for a world disrupted and 
changed by the events of World War One. Many economists now accept the gold standard 
was a major contributor to the depth and longevity of the Great Depression, although it 
had underpinned the first great wave of economic globalisation from around 1870 to 
1913. 
Finally, Solow argues that problems associated with the communication of 
economic ideas come from within the economics profession itself. Standards other 
disciplines have for developing and testing theories in a robust manner often do not exist 
in the same way for economists. Solow uses the example of the development of 
regression tests, which when applied to economist’s’ models often provide the result the 
researcher would like to see. This is not to imply that the profession is deliberately 
unethical, for there are reputable ways of examining and testing many of its theories.  
Some argue it is not possible to effectively communicate the complex ideas of 
scientific disciplines such as economics. However, this is similar to a doctor telling their 
patients they cannot tell them why they are dying because the explanation will be too 
complex for them to understand. Keynes would have understood the analogy well and 
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would no more accept it than accept the notion there is little point in communicating 
economic ideas to the public. To bring about any real reform or change requires the 
message to be understood by the public, in the same way in which élites need to 
understand the message in order to effect change. 
This dissertation is structured in a way that component parts of the 
communication process are examined before a detailed analysis and literary criticism of 
Economic Consequences is undertaken. In other words an examination of what is meant 
by the communication of economic ideas is undertaken before examining how economic 
ideas are communicated. The first inquiry is a descriptive examination of Economic 
Consequences, including reactions to the book so there is a foundation for an analysis of 
how Keynes communicated his ideas. Second, what is meant by the term public 
intellectual is examined so it can be better appreciated the part they play in the 
communication process. Third, the importance of cultural and environmental influences to 
the communication process is discussed as this involves understanding the audience an 
economist has to reach out and communicate to. Fourth, the variety of ways in which 
ideas are communicated is examined, with an emphasis on literary communication. While 
Keynes utilised any media he found useful, in reality most of his communication was in a 
literary form, which forms the scope for this inquiry. The final component of the 
foundation inquiry focuses on the economic context within which Economic Consequences 
was written. Keynes maintained his book was a serious work of economics and this inquiry 
into the extraordinary set of economic circumstances, which underpins Economic 
Consequences, helps confirm Keynes’ claim and demonstrates that economic solutions are 
dependent on context.  
Following this examination of what is meant by the communication of economic 
ideas, three chapters provide an analysis of what Keynes wanted to communicate so it is 
possible to demonstrate Economic Consequences was, as Keynes claimed, a serious work 
of economics. The first of these chapters, Chapter Five, deals with how Keynes used 
statistics descriptively and rhetorically in Economic Consequences. Chapter Six is a literary 
criticism of Keynes’ prose, confirming that, rather than writing political propaganda as his 
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critics accused him of doing, everything he wrote had a serious economic message. 
Chapter Seven examines a number of influences on Keynes’ writing style as this provides a 
number of clues as to how his unique writing style was so successful. The final chapter of 
inquiry examines the legacy of Economic Consequences and provides a discussion of some 
of Keynes’ selected works from the early 1920s, as he built on his reputation as a public 
intellectual and demonstrated the ways in which he continued to successfully 
communicate his ideas. 
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Chapter 2. John Maynard Keynes and The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace 
Keynes’ attendance at the Versailles Conference as an official representing the British 
Treasury was cut short when he tendered his resignation and returned to England in a 
dispirited frame of mind with what he believed was the failure of the Allied leaders to 
honour pledges made to Germany in return for her surrender. He believed the terms of 
the Treaty to be imposed on Germany and her allies were vindictive and vengeful and 
would mean economic ruin for all of Europe for years to come. 
On returning home he immediately began writing a book of his experiences and 
views of the Conference. It took Keynes six months to write and when it was published 
during December 1919, it immediately became a best seller. While Keynes maintained this 
was a serious work of economics many of his critics judged him to be a pro-German 
sympathiser more interested in writing political propaganda than turning his attention to 
serious economic analysis. Keynes let much of the criticism pass, but he was stung by the 
criticism his book was more about politics than economics. Subsequently he spent the 
next several months responding and defending himself against the more considered 
criticism. 
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2.1. Background 
Since its publication Economic Consequences has attracted controversy ranging from 
extreme criticism to extreme praise.1 However, most acknowledge it has had a significant 
impact on both the events and literature of the twentieth century and is rated as one of 
Keynes’ most important works. For example Skidelsky rates it as his ‘best book.’2 Blaug 
argues this was Keynes’ most carefully constructed and persuasive book and made him a 
household name.’3 The economist and contemporary of Keynes, Joseph Schumpeter 
remarked that the book ‘met with a reception that makes the word success sound 
commonplace and insipid.’4 In Britain and the United States the book sold 60,000 copies in 
the first two months and over 100,000 copies by the end of July 1920. Translations in 
other languages followed: German, French, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Italian, Spanish, 
Romanian, Russian, Japanese, and Chinese. Extracts and abbreviated versions were widely 
available. One historian described its role in the formation of opinion as ‘epoch-making.’5   
Yet despite the widespread acknowledgement of its significance Economic 
Consequences remains controversial as many see its political arguments as more 
important than its economic content. In a review for The American Economic Review in 
June 1920, Clive Day stated that while the book  
is written by an economist on an economic subject, it is not, and 
cannot have been designed to be, a contribution to economic 
literature. It is a political tract like the writings of Daniel Defoe and 
the British Merchant on the Peace of Utrecht, two hundred years ago, 
                                                             
1
 Keynes, (1919). 
2
 Skidelsky, (1983, p. 384). 
3
 Blaug, (1994, p. 1207). 
4
 Moggridge, (1992, p. 335) from Schumpeter, (1946, p. 499). 
5
 Moggridge, (1992, p. 335) from Lentin, (1984, p. 141). 
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it is meant to rouse public interest and to force political action, and to 
reach that end it follows methods, which are far removed from those 
of the strict scientist.6 
Smithies, writing fifty-two years later, also supports the view that the book is ‘an amazing 
polemical performance. One is still almost overwhelmed by the vividness of phrase, the 
biting satire, and the wealth of allusion.’7 Like Day, Smithies takes issue with the book 
being held up as a work of ‘good’ economics. He argues that the book’s appeal is more 
emotive than analytical with ‘most of the analytical structure *being+ implicit rather than 
explicit’ and ‘Keynes’ argument against the Treaty *as+ political and moral, rather than 
economic.’8 While Keynes usually provided well sourced statistics to support his 
arguments, Smithies is critical of Keynes for having no economic analysis to show, though 
harsh, why the terms of the Treaty could not be carried out. 
For other commentators, to treat this work as an economics text is to miss the 
point. For example, Harrod argues that Keynes intentionally designed the book to be 
polemic. He argues, ‘it was composed in two months in a white heat of passion, 
immediately after the events (of the Paris Peace Conference).’ In Harrod’s view the book 
sought to influence public opinion as ‘Europe was disintegrating and *needed to+ be 
saved.’9 Rather than being an analysis of the economics of the Treaty, Harrod argues 
Keynes’ aim was to tell his public, the Peace Treaty was an act of wickedness and folly, 
though not because the main parties to it, Wilson and Lloyd George, were themselves 
wicked. Rather, Keynes’ vivid character sketches were designed to show how personal 
weaknesses lay at the heart of everything that was wrong with the Treaty: 
                                                             
6
 Day, (1920, p. 301). 
7
 Smithies, (1972, p. 471). 
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The disillusion was so complete, that some of those who had trusted 
most hardly dared speak of it. Could it be true? They asked of those 
who returned from Paris. Was the Treaty really as bad as it seemed? 
What happened to the President? What weakness or what misfortune 
had led to so extraordinary, so unlooked-for a betrayal? Yet the 
causes were very ordinary and very human.10 
While many economists share Harrod’s view that Economic Consequences ‘takes its 
place as one of the finest slices of polemic in the English language,’ many of these same 
economists see the book as far more than mere political propaganda. 11 For example 
Moggridge argues it is  
several books in one: a trenchant political pamphlet attacking the 
morality of the Peace Treaty in the light of the understandings that 
had existed at the time of the Armistice; a technical discussion of the 
economic provisions of the Treaty; an illuminating, if nostalgic, 
discussion of relations between nations and classes before 1914; and 
a series of proposals for dealing with European problems as they 
existed in the second half of 1919.12 
The controversy that greeted the publication of Economic Consequences has continued to 
the present day with economists and non-economists remaining divided on the books 
central message. 
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2.2. Economic Consequences of the Peace 
If, as Moggridge argues, Economic Consequences is several books in one, Keynes intended 
the central message be economic. He states, 
my purpose in this book is to show that the Carthaginian peace is not 
practically right or possible. Although the school of thought from 
which it springs is aware of the economic factor, it overlooks, 
nevertheless, the deeper economic tendencies which are to govern 
the future. The clock cannot be set back. You cannot restore Europe 
to 1870 without setting up such strains in the European structure and 
letting loose such human and spiritual forces as, pushing beyond 
frontiers and races, will overwhelm not only you and your 
‘guarantees’, but your institutions, and the existing order of society.13 
Before deciding to write a book about the Peace and the longer the conference went on, 
Keynes became increasingly unsettled about the economic impact of what the Germans 
and their allies were being asked to agree to. This unease prompted him to consider 
leaving the Conference and resigning as a Treasury official. Austen Chamberlain had 
written to Keynes on 21 May 1919 seeking to convince him to remain: 
Bradbury will write to you as to the other members of the staff but I 
could not leave to him the expression of my strong feeling that a 
continuation of your services is for the present of great importance in 
the public interest, nor can I refrain from making my personal appeal 
to you to continue your help until the situation is more clearly 
defined.14 
Following his decision to resign and leave the conference, Keynes replied to Chamberlain 
on 26 May 1919: 
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I appreciate your letter very much, just as I have had good reason to 
appreciate my treatment by the Treasury all through; and if the only 
grounds for leaving were the need for rest and the desire to get back 
to my own work, I could not resist your appeal. But that is not the 
position. I was so anxious to leave this conference on general grounds 
that I did not like to make too much fuss about my reasons arising out 
of disagreement with the policy which is being pursued here. ….. I 
cannot express how strongly I feel as to the gravity of what is in front 
of us, and I must have my hands quite free. I wish I could talk to you 
about the whole miserable business. The Prime Minister is leading us 
all into a morass of destruction. The settlement which he is proposing 
for Europe disrupts it economically and must depopulate it by millions 
of persons. The new states we are setting up cannot survive in such 
surroundings. Nor can the peace be kept or the League of Nations 
live.15 
A month later Keynes was home, writing what was to become The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace. In a letter to his mother he wrote: ‘On Monday *23 June] I 
began to write a new book … on the economic condition of Europe as it now is, including a 
violent attack on the Peace Treaty and my proposals for the future.’16 
Clearly Keynes’ intention was to write about Europe and how the Treaty would 
affect its economic future. His comprehensive analysis of the economic consequences he 
foresaw for Europe, if the terms of the Treaty were imposed, provides a revealing insight 
into how significant he considered economics to be for the future welfare of Europe. 
While he does focus on political issues, especially Chapters I (Introduction), II (Europe 
Before the War) and III (The Conference), each chapter deals with specific economic issues 
that lay a foundation for the chapters that follow, so that a continuous economic theme 
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runs throughout. When raising an economic issue, Keynes supports his argument with 
statistics, figures and financial analysis.  
He finished the book with a set of suggested remedies (Chapter VII – Remedies) to 
head off the economic apocalypse he foresaw. They included a revision of the Treaty, a 
cancellation of inter-Allied debts, an international reconstruction loan for Europe, which 
would assist currency stabilisation and a change in the relations between Central Europe 
and Russia. He did admit that his suggestions were tentative and probably inadequate for 
the tasks at hand.17 His proposals focused on a significant reduction in Germany’s 
economic obligations to the Allies and suggested ‘the amount *of the payments+ to be 
made by Germany in respect of Reparation and the costs of the Armies of Occupation 
*might+ be fixed at £ 2,000 million.’18 To meet this sum, the immediate transfer of ships, 
property in ceded territory and the like should be reckoned at £ 500 million and the 
balance of £ 1,500 million should be paid without interest in thirty instalments of £ 50 
million beginning in 1923. He argued, ‘Germany would meet these instalments as she saw 
fit, any complaints about non-fulfilment being a matter for the League of Nations.’19 There 
would be no further expropriations of German private property except to meet private 
debts abroad, and, as far as coal was concerned, the Treaty revision would eliminate 
German deliveries to everyone except France, where they would be limited and lapse if 
Germany lost Upper Silesia. The costs to Germany of the Saar arrangements would be 
substantially reduced.20 Moreover, Germany, Poland and the successor states of the 
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Austro-Hungarian and Turkish Empires would be required to join a free trade area for a 
decade. Keynes wanted to see Germany’s economic life restored and he called for 
‘Germany to take up again her place in Europe as a creator and organiser of wealth for her 
Eastern and Southern neighbours.’21 
The revision of inter-Allied indebtedness would see Britain renounce her share of 
reparations in favour of Belgium, France and Serbia and the complete cancellation of war-
related, inter-governmental debts amongst the Allied and Associated countries. Under 
such a scheme, the nominal losers would be Britain and the United States, the only 
creditors, with the American losses at around £2,000 million and Britain’s £900 million (of 
which £550 million represented loans to Russia), but as in earlier papers he ‘justified’ the 
result in terms of relative sacrifices incurred during the war itself. Keynes acknowledged 
the loan proposal carried with it a weighty list of objections, given the existing policies of 
the European governments. He argued,  
If I had influence at the United States Treasury, I would not lend a 
penny to a single one of the present governments of Europe. They are 
not to be trusted with resources.22 
Nevertheless, Keynes argued the United States should point the way by having a plan and 
conditions on which the US would give aid for the renewing of economic life to Europe. 
Keynes proposed a loan to Germany of £ 200 million for food and raw materials, plus a 
guarantee fund of a similar size to support currency stabilisation. The United States, 
Britain and the European neutrals would provide the loan, while the guarantee fund 
would be the responsibility of all members of the League. The loan was to carry the best 
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security available and ‘its repayment would rank ahead of all internal or international 
governmental debts or obligations of the recipients.’23 
Keynes’ economic arguments were, argues Skidelsky, ‘a personal statement unique 
in twentieth-century literature’ and in this one work Keynes was ‘staking the claim of the 
economist to be Prince.’ 24 Whether his readers saw it this way and whether he was 
successful in disseminating his main ideas remains controversial. An examination of 
reactions to the book when it was first published highlights just how divisive Keynes’ views 
were.  
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2.3. Reactions to Economic Consequences 
Contemporary reactions to Economic Consequences were immediate, widespread, divided 
in opinion, and with little consensus emerging as to what the core message was. Of the 
books-in-one suggested by Moggridge, only two were of real interest to Keynes’ peers, the 
politics and the economics. Of the two, many concerned themselves with Keynes’ political 
discussion and observations. For example Johnson argues, ‘Keynes’ circle of English friends 
praised the book’s brilliance and with their taste for gossip savoured the personality 
sketches with delight.’25 Carl Melchior, who had refused offers to become Minister of 
Finance in the German Government and returned to banking business in Hamburg, wrote 
to Keynes on 19 December 1919: 
I have read your book right through last night, and I must confess that 
I am still under the profound impression it has made on me. It is not 
only the contents, the relating of material facts, the way you judge 
them and your proposals for healing: it is the refined and magnetising 
art of representation that gave me the feeling of reading lugubrious, 
bewildering and lofty drama of which – fortunately or unfortunately – 
only the first acts may be over. I can heartily wish that your book may 
be a landmark for a new development in the post war history.26 
After receiving a pre-publication copy, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen 
Chamberlain, sent a long letter to Keynes on 22 December 1919, marked ‘Confidential,’ 
which expressed both concern and praise: 
My dear Keynes, 
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..You say that you will be interested to know what I think of [your 
book], so you must not blame me if I obtrude criticism! Frankly I am 
sorry that one who occupied a position of so much trust and 
consequence in the British Delegation in Paris should feel impelled to 
write in such a strain of the part his country played in the peace 
negotiations; and though I readily recognise that you have betrayed 
no confidence in the sense of writing anything which, as far as 
information goes, might not have been written by any intelligent 
observer in Paris, yet I cannot help fearing that our international 
course will not be made easier by such comments from a late public 
servant. 
But having said so much – and I could not say less on this topic – I 
must add that I am full of admiration for a brilliant piece of work. I 
read your description of the conference with malicious pleasure, 
especially what concerned the President, whose picture you have 
drawn with the brush – shall I say? – of a Sargent, who is always 
surprised that his brush reveals secrets which cause the observer to 
dislike or despise his sitter. … 
I wish that I thought your reasoning as to Germany’s capacity to pay, 
and your economic picture of the state of Europe, less accurate than I 
do. I think you a little too pessimistic, but in the main I believe you to 
be right. … I differ from you as to the moral relationship (if I may use 
the phrase) of the Treaty to Wilson’s Fourteen Points and three 
speeches. That Wilson should have submitted this orgy of rhetoric to 
Germany without consultation with his associates was characteristic 
and deplorable … It follows necessarily that Wilson’s declarations 
could not be taken as a legal contract. … Seriously, I am sorry that you 
should impute bad faith to all the Allied negotiators. The position is 
difficult enough, the need for some world agreement as to a solution 
is urgent enough, and I think your argument would have been more 
persuasive and compelling if you could have found it in your heart to 
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base your case entirely on the economic facts and to omit the moral 
denunciations.27 
Chamberlain’s comment that Keynes’ argument would have been more persuasive and 
compelling if he had stuck to economic arguments goes to the heart of how an economist 
can be persuasive and convincing when communicating ideas. For example could Keynes 
have communicated his ideas just as effectively without the political sketches or elevated 
rhetoric that seemed to resonate so successfully with readers? It would have been 
interesting to know how Chamberlain thought Keynes could have been more compelling 
and persuasive if he had just kept to the economic arguments.  
Keynes replied to Chamberlain, ‘apart from the inevitable oppositions, I am 
delighted that you find so little to blame.’ Keynes did, however, take issue with the 
criticism that he should have omitted the ‘moral denunciations.’ He felt it was his 
obligation to tell the truth as he saw it and posed the question, ‘Would you not agree that 
one who holds such a view ought to express it?’28 But this approach did not meet with 
such a balanced response from other colleagues and contemporaries. For example, 
Harrod wrote, the book ‘incurred great odium in official circles’ and lost Keynes influence 
with the Treasury for ten years.29 Two of Keynes’ Treasury colleagues, Leith-Ross30 and 
Grigg,31 subsequently wrote accounts of their Treasury careers and their comments tend 
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to support Harrod’s view. Writing of the reparations terms Leith-Ross maintained that ‘the 
position was not helped by the publication of Maynard Keynes’ vitriolic book on the 
Economic Consequences of the Peace. Britain became enemy No. 1 in the view of the 
French Press and of many French people.’32 Grigg, in his reflections, says of Economic 
Consequences: 
I have often thought – and the view has recently been developed in a 
study by M. Etienne Mantoux – that this book had a great and 
deplorable effect in causing the Americans to withdraw into their 
shell and in creating the legend of the ‘Carthaginian Peace’ which was 
so skilfully exploited by Hitler. And I believe that Keynes himself 
admitted before he died that it, too, had consequences – 
consequences, which he had neither foreseen nor desired.33 
If it was true Keynes later had regrets, at the time of publication Keynes only expressed 
the view he had been misunderstood, especially by many Americans. One American 
Treasury official objected that ‘he attacks everything sound or established or generally 
accepted … he is utterly irresponsible. He doesn’t care how much harm he does.’34 
Expressions such as these took people’s focus from the views Keynes intended. However, 
as Johnson argues, with portraits such as those of President Wilson, Keynes had handed 
the opponents of the President some ‘red-hot political ammunition.’35 Keynes had written 
a longer version of the preface for Economic Consequences in November 1919, which 
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contained a second paragraph acknowledging the mitigating circumstances of the 
President’s illness and emphasising his basic sincerity, which may have served to placate 
some of the more severe reaction to his book, but Keynes had not used it. The appearance 
of the American edition in advance publication of three excerpts in the New Republic, had 
not helped, especially as the first excerpt was of Chapter Three with its account of Wilson, 
the bamboozled Presbyterian. As a result the book was met with bitterness by the 
American press, something Keynes ‘marvelled’ at and put him on the defensive. Keynes 
wrote to Paul Cravath, the American lawyer who had been his colleague on the Inter-
Allied Council for War Purchases and Finance: 
I suppose the American edition of my book has now appeared. I am 
rather sorry in many ways that extracts from it have come out in 
advance, although I dare say it is necessary for publicity reasons. The 
book is intended by its author to be taken very much as a whole, and 
its proper appreciation is very much prejudiced in his humble opinion 
by the perusal of partial extracts. The due and proper balance of the 
feelings and judgments it seeks to convey, are seriously upset by 
undue concentration on the book’s flashier parts.36 
But, as Johnson points out, the ‘flashier parts’ stuck, so in defence of his political and 
economic views, Keynes to some degree moved to qualify and soften his original 
judgment of the President.37 
While reactions in some quarters were hostile and bitter, other contemporaries of 
Keynes were full of praise. Eddie Marsh, private secretary to Winston Churchill, wrote to 
Keynes: 
My dear Maynard 
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Winston asks me to thank you very much for sending him your book. 
…. I got it on Saturday and read it Sunday, I really must congratulate 
you on a most brilliant piece of work. The substance of it filled me 
with deepest gloom, but the treatment is a triumph, it is as easy to 
read as the best novel, and supremely lucid, it never occurs to me 
that the subject is Technical and might in other hands be stodgy.38 
Other politicians, and those who mixed in political circles, also commented on the book. 
What is striking about reactions from within political circles and from politicians 
themselves is the degree to which Keynes’ views carried with them a significant “air” of 
authority, even where there was disagreement with his views. For example, Lord Parmoor 
stated in the House of Lords:  
There is *a+ quotation I should like to make *from+ … Mr. Keynes, who 
is very well known to the Government … *on the subject of] relief 
measures. … “The situation is one which cannot be solved merely by 
measures of relief, by the mere distribution of food to populations 
that cannot pay for it. There is only one adequate measure which will 
meet the menace of the situation and that is to re-establish all the 
processes of normal economic life among the populations concerned. 
They must be enabled to get back to normal work and support 
themselves. No other solution can be adequate.”39  
Herbert Samuel, in a speech to the House of Commons on the question of inter-Allied 
debt, stated that ‘we hear men like Mr. Keynes talking about cancelling the debt of Britain 
to America.’ In this case Samuel used Keynes’ name and reputation to support his own 
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arguments for the cancellation of debts owed to America following the war.40 Reference 
to Keynes’ name and reputation was again made in the House of Commons when George 
Roberts addressed the house: 
High prices, as the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Asquith) has 
stated, is a world phenomenon ensuing from the destruction of war, 
which has occasioned a real shortage. When there is a real shortage, 
as Professor Keynes has put it, the profiteer is a consequence, and not 
a cause, of the high prices.41  
Addressing the House of Lords on the subject of reparations Lord Parmoor explicitly 
referred to the air of authority Keynes’ name lent to the debate: ‘The … authority was [sic] 
Professor Keynes. Everyone knows that Professor Keynes is an authority whose 
moderation is well recognised. It is thought sometimes that he is too moderate.’42 
Other political speeches made explicit reference to Keynes’ book. For example, 
Captain Benn intoned: 
I have had to rely on such sources of information as are available to 
the public, but the charge has been made with greater authority than 
I could make it in Mr. Keynes’ book, and I think it desirable to clear 
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up, once for all, whether, in the view of the Government, the Peace 
Treaty actually carries out the pre-Armistice terms.43  
Esmond Harmsworth, addressing the House of Commons stated: 
I would venture at the outset of my statement very humbly and 
respectfully to warn the House against a certain attitude of mind that 
has been adopted very largely in regarding the Peace Treaties with 
our former enemies. This attitude has been expressed with singular 
literary skill by Mr. Keynes in his well-known book on the Peace 
Conference in Paris, a book which it is possible to read with great 
pleasure, although it is not always necessary to agree with Mr. 
Keynes’ views. The attitude I indicate amounts to this: it is the 
attitude of a man who, surveying the several Peace Treaties so far as 
they have now been drafted, seems to assume that if any of these 
Treaties fall short of what he thinks desirable, the fault lies altogether 
with the high contracting parties who have acted for the Allies.44 
In a similar vein Sir W. Mitchell-Thomson, this time on the subject of what Germany 
should be expected to pay by way of reparations, provided the most detailed summary of 
any sitting Parliamentarian on Economic Consequences: 
With regard to the question of payment, Mr. Asquith, as I say, boldly 
committed himself to two thousand millions as the total expected 
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from Germany, and I am bound to say I have a strong suspicion that, 
although the voice was the voice of Paisley, the inspiration really 
comes from somewhere very close to King’s College, Cambridge, and 
that Mr. Keynes and his book are responsible for rendering vocal this 
sentiment which hon. and right hon. Gentlemen on the Front 
Opposition Bench have hitherto successfully subdued. I am bound to 
say something with regard to Mr. Keynes’ book. I should like to say I 
recognise the sincerity of Mr. Keynes. I was a colleague of his with the 
Noble Lord for months in the Supreme Economic Council in Paris, but I 
would like the House to realise this, that the views which are put 
forward by Mr. Keynes, and which are now accepted as the new 
revelation by the right hon. Gentlemen and Member for Peebles and 
by Mr. Asquith, are not new views. They were held by Mr. Keynes 
months ago, and they were expressed by him months ago, and they 
were considered, weighed, judged, and rejected in Paris. I confess I 
am rather sorry that at this moment Mr. Keynes should have 
produced the book which he has issued. I think it is calculated to 
render the position of the Allies much more difficult than it was, and 
to embroil us in petty strife in America, and I think it is a departure, 
and in my judgment, I am bound to say quite frankly, a regrettable 
departure from the traditions which have hitherto governed the 
public service.45 
Mitchell-Thomson goes on at some length dealing with the substance of the book, 
preferring his own, usually contrary, views. Perhaps it is not surprising that politicians 
freely commented on the book. Not only was it a publishing success among the general 
public, but Keynes had personally sent at least seventy-three copies to members of the 
Asquith and Lloyd George Governments, former Treasury colleagues, European bankers 
and financiers Keynes had met in connection with discussions of an international loan 
scheme in the autumn of 1919, and to Bloomsbury friends and members of his family.46 
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If the views and opinions among politicians were divisive, they were no less so 
among the scholarly community. Hawtrey47 was one of the first to comment and wrote to 
Keynes: 
How many things you have said which greatly needed saying! And 
how well you have said them! I hope you mean to put on record a 
great deal more of the history of the world since 1914, but you will 
hardly find it possible to produce another volume as interesting and 
as vivid as this!48  
Another admirer was Gilbert Murray49 who wrote to Keynes: 
Dear Mr. Keynes 
I dare say your book will bring you many letters and I am reluctant to 
add to the burden of them. But I must write to tell you of the great 
admiration and gratitude with which I am reading it. It is not merely 
admirably done; but it is exactly the thing that needed doing, and I 
cannot help hoping that it may have a great political effect. I have 
been denouncing the Peace Treaty ever since it was made at Liberal 
meetings and elsewhere, and have found no one to defend it with any 
fervour. But all the time we were at great disadvantage because we 
could not speak with knowledge and authority. … It seems to me that 
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the whole nation is suffering from a sort of inhibition of the higher 
faculties, both of thinking and feeling. And it is possible that your 
book may break it.50 
Most contemporary scholars acknowledged the importance of Keynes’ economic 
analysis but tended to devote their reviews to the political players whom Keynes held 
responsible for his pessimistic view of Europe’s future, thus putting more emphasis on the 
politics than the economics. King perhaps expresses it best in his review, ‘the book over-
emphasises the relative power and importance of individuals.’51 But, having made this 
observation, King identifies that Economic Consequences 
has attracted world-wide attention because of its analysis of 
Germany’s ability to pay … two decisions made since the book was 
written bear out the two main theses of the book which are that the 
indemnities were in excess of Germany’s ability to pay and that the 
indemnities should be expressed in concrete terms. … the author’s 
economic analysis is significant.52 
Others who reviewed Economic Consequences during 1920 shared similar views of the 
significance of both the book’s political and economic analysis. For example Taussig,53 
writing a little under two months after the book’s publication, devotes much of his review 
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to the way in which Keynes discussed the ‘dictatorial’ attitudes of the ‘bourgeois French’ 
and the ‘imperialistic Britain.’ Taussig believed Keynes went to ‘great lengths’ to lay the 
responsibility for the Treaty outcome on President Wilson and argues that ‘the high hopes 
inspired in 1918 are contrasted with the distress and heart sinking of 1919.’ Taussig also 
took issue with Keynes’ political observations and argues, ‘*the+ degree of intimacy with 
the characters of the actors is vouchsafed only to writers of fiction.’54 
Taussig, however, devotes as much space to a discussion of Keynes’ economic 
analysis as he does to his political views. While he finds himself in ‘general accord with 
what Mr. Keynes says,’ he does not agree with everything he argues. For example, Taussig 
‘cannot agree with Mr. Keynes in all his conclusions concerning the weakening of German 
industries through the loss of territory.’ Taussig argues, ‘sooner or later I cannot but 
believe that a modus vivendi will be reached between France and Germany under which 
each will supply the materials indispensable to the other.’ But, Taussig goes on, ‘it is true 
that if the extreme policy of industrial imperialism dominates France, an unstable 
situation will remain and the economic and political future of all Europe will be gravely 
imperilled.’ In other arguments Taussig finds Keynes promoting ‘utopian’ solutions. Two of 
these were Keynes’ advocacy of a Free Trade Union for the countries into which central 
Europe has been split up and his proposals on the question of international loans.55 
Robertson,56 who, for much of the 1920s worked in close collaboration with 
Keynes, reviewed the book in March 1920. He acknowledged the importance of Keynes’ 
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economic analysis but also points out how closely linked this is with the political 
discussion, to the point where the politics overwhelms the economics: 
Mr. Keynes’ book is like a banquet of which the more austere and 
filling courses are both heralded and crowned by a number of more 
succulent and alluring dishes. His detailed dissection of the economic 
clauses of the Treaty of Versailles occupies the central tract of the 
work; but the reader is, as it were, lured into the midst of it, and again 
rewarded for the patient attention which it demands, by a series of 
vivid and arresting pictures of men, of institutions and tendencies. 
Indeed the first impression left on the mind is not merely that Mr. 
Keynes has written a very powerful and important book, but that he 
has written two, or possibly three – a mordant political pamphlet, a 
masterly technical discussion of the economic provisions of the 
Treaty, and interwoven with both an impressive and largely original 
philosophical critique of the economic relations of nations and 
classes.57 
Robertson does however see through the ‘flashier parts’ to what he believes Keynes really 
wanted to make clear: First, the sums which the Treaty proposed to extract from Germany 
by way of indemnity are excessive and impossible to obtain; second, the impossibility of 
obtaining them was at least partly due to the cumulative effect of the other clauses of the 
Treaty; and finally, these other clauses, taken in the mass, are in themselves unwise and 
suicidal. 
Max Handman and Charles Bushnell, in reviews of June 1920 (Handman) and 
September 1920 (Bushnell), recognised the importance of the dual nature of Keynes’ 
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book.58 For example, Bushnell states that ‘Keynes’ delineations of the characters and 
circumstances of the chief actors at the Peace Council are picturesque, brilliant, and 
probably about as accurate as the conclusions of any close observer can be expected to be 
at the present time.’59 The remainder of Bushnell’s comments are restricted to the 
economic remedies Keynes proposes. Handman agrees with Keynes that sections of the 
Treaty are ‘immoral’ because they ‘go contrary to engagements solemnly taken and that 
they are absurdly extravagant and impossible and dangerously arbitrary.’ However, 
Handman argues, ‘Keynes understates the ability of Germany to pay, provided she is 
allowed to produce and to sell her products.’ Only when Germany is not allowed to do so 
do ‘Keynes’ calculations assume the shape of irrefutable truths.’60 
For many contemporary lay people it was the rhetorical style of the book, 
particularly the descriptions of politicians and the politics surrounding the Conference, 
that captured their attention rather than anything of note in Keynes’ economic analysis. 
For example Johnson argues, ‘with its under-current of anger and aura of behind-the-
scenes revelation, Economic Consequences transformed a demonstration of economic 
thinking into a sensational publishing success.’ It has been highlighted how in the United 
States it was a political bombshell and Johnson commented, ‘*the book was+ gleefully 
seized upon by the opponents of the President.’ Germany saw a champion in the ‘ranks of 
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the enemy,’ France the ‘perfidy of an ally turned adversary.’ On the Continent it was 
reported that the book was ‘being passed from hand to hand.’ 61 According to Keynes’ 
friends ‘everybody’ was reading the book. For example Lytton Strachey wrote to Keynes: 
Your book arrived yesterday, and I swallowed it at a gulp. … I think it 
is most successful. In the first place, extremely impressive; there is an 
air of authority about it, which I think nobody could ignore. I was 
rather afraid at Charleston that it might appear too extreme, but I 
don’t think this is at all the case. The slight softenings in the 
Clemenceau and Wilson bits seem to me distinct improvements, 
adding to the effect, rather than otherwise. Then the mass of 
information is delightful. I had never, for instance, had any definite 
idea as to what the Provisions of the Peace Treaty really were – it was 
impossible to gather from the newspapers, and the import of the 
Treaty itself would have been clearly incomprehensible – so that your 
exposé, apart from the argument, was most welcome; and of course 
this is only one of a great number of extraordinarily interesting sets of 
facts. As to the argument it is certainly most crushing, most terrible. I 
don’t see anyone can stand up against it … one thing I doubted … 
whether, on your own showing, even your proposed terms were not 
far too harsh. Is it conceivable that the Germany, which you describe 
should be able to or in fact would pay 50 million a year for 30 years?62 
Passing reference was the way most people noted the economic content; most were more 
impressed, as Strachey was, with the overall effect of the book. For example Kenna,63 
wrote to Keynes: 
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My dear Keynes 
I have read and re-read your book. Not until I felt sure of my 
impressions would I write to you. It is indeed a powerful work. I don’t 
know which of its excellences I should place highest – style, vigour, 
reasoning, truth, suggestiveness, power of convincing – they are all 
there in full measure.64 
Written with strong feeling, ‘the book frequently provoked strong feeling’ and was the 
subject of much public debate. As has been illustrated references were made in the 
Houses of Commons and Lords. Mention was also made in church sermons and the 
legislatures from a number of countries. Its thesis was ‘taken up enthusiastically by 
internationally minded and pacifist organisations.’ 65 In addition to scores of 
congratulatory letters from famous people, 
Keynes received many from private individuals who wrote in 
sympathetic response to his message – a Parisian dentist, a Brooklyn 
lawyer, an engineer in Texas, a distant relative in Ohio, a mother in 
Frankfurt, a man in Mainz, to name only a few. In two days, he told 
his mother (11 January), he answered fifty.66 
This response was an indicator that Keynes had successfully communicated beyond a 
select group of élites. 
The response from many of the leading newspapers and periodicals of the day was 
no less enthusiastic. For example, The Economist carried a review of the book and opened: 
Those who agree with Mr. Keynes that “the most serious of the 
problems which claimed the attention of the Peace Conference were 
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not political or territorial, but financial and economic, and that the 
perils of the future lay not in frontiers and sovereignties, but in food, 
coal, and transport,” will perhaps be a little disappointed that the title 
of his book is not more descriptive of its contents. .. [but] problems of 
food, coal, and transport deserve to be considered dispassionately, 
just because they affect, more perhaps than anything else, the lives 
and happiness of millions of our fellow-men. To approach them from 
the point of view of a “cold economist” is not to be blind to their 
emotional significance; on the contrary, the surest way of defeating 
the ends of decency and good sense is to involve their discussion, 
with that of other extraneous issues, racial, political, and moral, and 
this is what Mr. Keynes has chosen to do. 
Nevertheless, the reviewer praises Keynes’ economic analysis and argues the economic 
aspects of the Treaty are ‘brilliantly presented, and closely and lucidly argued in great 
detail, with a mastery over a very wide range of intricate facts, which probably no one else 
has had the opportunity to acquire.’ While The Economist shared the view of many 
commentators that Keynes’ descriptions of politicians and the politics of the Conference 
will ‘prove a source of infinite rage or delight, *the reader should not miss the main thesis 
of the book, which+ is economic, not political or moral.’67 
The Times Literary Supplement (TLS), in its review, chose rather to focus on the 
political and moral content of the book and argued ‘this is not the place to attempt a 
technical analysis of the very complicated economic problems with which the author 
deals.’68 The TLS acknowledged Keynes’ ‘great literary ability, *with his+ clear grasp of 
                                                             
67
 Withers, Hartley, (ed.), (December 27, 1919), “The Peace Treaty,” The Economist, pp. 1192-1193. 
Hartley Withers (1867-1950) was the editor of The Economist at this time, having taken the post in 1916 
where he remained until 1921. He left The Economist to join the Saturday Review from 1921 to 1928, when 
he abandoned financial journalism. Source: Porter, Dilwyn, (ODNB, 2004, 36984). 
68
  The reviewer was James Wycliffe Headlam-Morley (1863-1929), a distinguished historian who had been 
educated in both Britain and Germany and frequently wrote for The Times Literary Supplement. He 
participated in the Paris peace conference and his most notable service was to act as interlocutor between 
the Foreign Office staff and the British prime minister’s secretariat. Following the signing of the Peace Treaty 
…Footnote continued on next page… 
 Page 42 
8-Jun-11 
general principles, *which+ the “non-technical student” can read with pleasure *on+ the 
questions of coal, exchange, and reparation.’ 69 The TLS saves its ‘ultimate criticism’ for the 
‘political side,’ in which Headlam-Morley argued Keynes had ‘little interest or 
understanding.’ For this reviewer political issues were far more important than economic 
ones. Only once questions of territory and government were resolved should economics 
be considered: 
After all, it is surely to them (principles of the Treaty) whether it is 
one to be welcomed or not, that Germany emerges from the war with 
her unity undestroyed and her territorial integrity unhampered, 
except in those districts in which cession of territory was clearly 
enjoined by the principles of the Peace. Mr. Keynes seems to us far 
too ready to bring charges of insincerity; he speaks with scarcely 
disguised contempt of the Danzig settlement; surely he might have 
recognised that here there is to be found for instance, a genuine 
endeavour to solve the very difficult problem presented by the right 
of Poland to have full access to the sea, and the principle that 
populations should not be handed from one country to another 
contrary to their will. …. We may suggest that when the territorial 
settlement is reviewed by historians it is not the German Treaty which 
will be open to the most serious criticism; and it will ultimately be 
recognised that there is much more to be placed to the credit of the 
account of the President and of the Prime Minister than readers of 
Mr. Keynes’ book would imagine.70 
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For Blackwood’s Magazine71 reviewer Keynes’ economics are important but not for any 
positive reason. Rather, ‘when Mr. Keynes drops the role of a man and an observer, and 
takes up that of an economist, he is less amusing and far more dangerous.’ For this 
reviewer Keynes engaged in ‘economic nonsense’ whose one passion was ‘to save 
Germany distress or inconvenience.’ Where ‘reproaches are hurled at the Allies on many a 
page’ Keynes only once had a single reproof for Germany and that is that she actually 
initiated the war. Whether Germany can or cannot pay the ‘just bill that has been 
presented to her we do not know.’72  
What mattered to Blackwood’s was that Germany should be made to pay for the damage 
they alone had inflicted on the world. Because  
Germany has brought the suffering on herself and on the world, and 
she must still bear the responsibility. That the sins of the fathers are 
visited on the children of the third and fourth generation is not a 
piece of rhetoric but rather a stern fact. 73 
For Blackwood’s writers, who it would be safe to assume would be supported by a 
majority of its subscribers, Germany deserved to be demonised. Germany, the ‘rough and 
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greedy’ country needed to be humbled in the way in which the Treaty intended because if 
Germany was not ‘their military expansion would march, as always, with their industrial.’74 
There were many other writers and reviewers who saw in Keynes’ book a pro-
German bias they interpreted as an analytical weakness, albeit not necessarily in the 
extremist way viewed by Blackwood’s. For example, Steed, editor of The Times, wrote a 
long review of Economic Consequences on 5 January, 1920 and ‘marvelled’ at the book’s 
political inexperience and ‘special tenderness’ for Germany.75 The book, argued Steed, 
was an extremely ‘clever’ book on the Peace Conference and its economic consequences. 
Readers ‘are prepared for a critical economic treatise,’ which, argues Steed, they will not, 
in some respects, be disappointed by, but in others they 
will be surprised, amused, shocked, and not a little mystified. How 
came it, they may ask, that the man who could write the pages of 
incisive portraiture, not to say caricature, that fill the chapter on “The 
Conference,” came to hold the position of technical advisor to one of 
the most technical Departments of State? How, unless his bias had 
been throughout akin to that of the conscientious objector, could he 
place the Allies persistently on the same moral level as Germany in 
regard to the war? 
Steed accepted that in many respects Keynes ‘makes a strong case’ against the terms of 
the Treaty but ‘as a whole, his cry against the Peace seems to us the cry of an academic 
mind.’ Furthermore, while acknowledging Keynes’ criticism of the economic clauses of the 
Treaty has ‘real value,’ the book itself is a work of political exposition and 
is little better than propaganda, calculated, though perhaps not 
designed, to help the enemy and to increase his conviction that, far 
from having been guilty of willing and making the war, he was the 
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victim of a deep-laid and envious conspiracy on the part of the Allies 
of which the Peace Conference, with its “breach of faith,” was but a 
final stage.  
Furthermore while Steed acknowledged the ‘many sane ideas’ of Keynes’ book, he argued 
it is ‘so vitiated by a persistent pro-German bias that its value as a contribution to the 
study of the economic consequences of the war is seriously impaired.’76 
Despite charges of a pro-German bias, Keynes had many supporters among the 
general public. For example, Dr. Walter Walsh, delivered his religious address on 18 
January, 1920 praising Keynes’ “literary” work, ‘which pierces the conscience like thorns, 
or grips the mind like a vice.’ It was, he argued, a ‘nobly-conceived’ and ‘nobly-worded’ 
book. While Walsh found it difficult to single out a particular saying for ‘pre-eminence,’ he 
felt that the text which best expressed the spirit of Keynes’ argument was that ‘nations 
are not authorised, by religion or by natural morals, to visit on the children of their 
enemies the misdoings of parents or of rulers.’ But that, according to Walsh, was just what 
the Peace Treaty did and ‘how it came about forms an early, and, in a sorrowful sense, an 
entertaining chapter in the story.’77 
The debates rumbled on throughout the 1920s, played out in all the major 
newspapers and periodicals. Of these The Times probably best highlights the controversy 
his book stirred up. Between 11 February 1920 and 11 December 1920 there were 37 
references in the pages of The Times regarding views put forward in Economic 
Consequences. In one example, The Times correspondent argued, Wilson’s political 
opponents in the United States were using Keynes’ book to try and have the Treaty 
scrapped altogether.78 It has already been highlighted how Mitchell-Thomson gave the 
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House of Commons ‘a good hostile review of Mr. Keynes’ book on the economics of the 
Peace Conference.’79 On the same day, The Times carried, in addition to the review of 
Mitchell-Thomson’s speech, another three separate articles referring to Keynes’ book. The 
first was a report from the American House of Representatives when The Times reported, 
‘the Republican *Party+ “irreconcilables” are disconcerted. They hammered away today at 
the defects of the Treaty as supposed to have been revealed by Mr. Maynard Keynes and 
others.’80 In its editorial of the same day, a review of Balfour’s address to the House of 
Commons had The Times opining that ‘it was easy to show that, if Germany thinks the 
economic terms imposed upon her and her inability to comply with them to be so great as 
does Mr. Keynes, she has her remedy in the provisions of the Treaty.’81 Balfour is again 
quoted: ‘I had some doubt as to whether this was to be a debate on Mr. Keynes’ attack on 
the Conference and his apology for Germany, or rather his plea in favour of it.’82 The 
following day The Times carried an account of a visit from Paul Mantoux (father of 
Etienne) who, in an interview with the Foreign Press Association acknowledged that 
Keynes ‘had written a clever book about the Council of Four, but Mr. Keynes had never 
been present at one of its meetings.’83 The implication that Keynes somehow exaggerated 
his account of the Conference attendees, due to his lack of attendance at some key 
meetings, was subsequently challenged by Keynes as being incorrect while Mantoux’s son 
Etienne went on to write his own book in the early 1940s challenging many of Keynes’ 
figures. 
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However, it was not until a letter from John Foster Dulles, who had been legal 
advisor to the American financial delegation at Paris, was published in The Times that in 
Keynes’ own estimation, the ‘first serious and responsible criticism’ of Economic 
Consequences was made.84 Dulles had taken a major part in framing the reparation and 
financial sections of the Treaty and as a member of the Provisional Reparation 
Commission had observed their practical application. Dulles advanced the idea in his 
letter, ‘the very evils for which Keynes criticised the Treaty were nullified by safeguards 
contained in the Treaty itself.’ Dulles also sought to correct what he considered were 
errors of fact made by Keynes. For example, where Keynes blamed the Americans for the 
inclusion of pensions and separation allowances in the Treaty, Dulles pointed out that this 
was rather included at General Smuts’ prompting. Regarding Keynes’ argument for 
Germany’s reparation liability to be fixed at £ 2,000 million, Dulles argued that:  
Mr. Keynes takes no account of the marked appreciation of values 
which has occurred … the nature of the damage wrought was such 
that enormous sums must be spent in preliminary work (removing 
debris, etc.) … *while+ I do not consider that the damage amounts to 
such figures as has been intimated by some interested authorities, 
nevertheless I believe the amount of material damage substantially 
exceeds Mr. Keynes’ estimate of from two to three thousand million 
pounds. 
From here Dulles moved onto the crux of his argument:  
The Treaty in its present form, while it can by no means be regarded 
as perfect, dealt with an intensely practical problem in what is 
believed to be a practical and constructive way …. The alleged 
excessive powers of the Reparation Commission are restricted to 
powers essential to an intelligent alleviation of terms and modes of 
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payment in the event that they prove to be excessive; the whole 
operation to be akin to that of a settlement in which the creditors 
recognise that their own interest lies in preserving and enhancing the 
economic vitality of their debtor. 
Dulles concluded his letter by acknowledging, if the Reparation Commission were to 
exercise its functions in a spirit obviously destructive to the interests of the Allies, then 
Keynes’ condemnation of the Treaty would be explicable. However, if, as Dulles believed it 
would, the Commission conducted itself with wisdom and ‘in accordance with the true 
interests of the nations it represents,’ then the treaty could be regarded as a 
‘statesmanlike accomplishment.’85 Keynes replied to Dulles’ letter on 19 February. He 
expressed ‘sympathy’ and ‘respect’ for Dulles as a colleague at the Conference and 
acknowledged his efforts to ‘ensure a Peace which should be in accordance with the 
engagements of his country and of mine.’ However, Keynes directly challenged four of 
Dulles’ estimates with estimates of his own, and in an approach similar to that taken in his 
book, provided detailed explanations for how he had arrived at his own estimates.86  
What in summary can we say about public opinion as expressed through the 
organs of The Times and other newspapers and periodicals of the period? Johnson 
comments that the following verses published in Punch on 14 January 1920 perhaps give a 
‘fair impression’ of the reaction of the educated English middle class opinion Keynes 
sought to reach: 87 
THE CANDOUR OF KEYNES 
(Suggested by the perusal of ‘The Economic Consequences of the 
Peace’) 
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There was a superior young person named KEYNES 
Who possessed an extensive equipment of brains, 
And, being elected a Fellow of King’s, 
He taught Economics and similar things. 
On the outbreak of war he at once made his mark 
As a ‘temporary’, but Principal, Treasury Clerk, 
And the Permanent Staff and the CHANCELLOR too 
Pronounced him a flier and well worth his screw. 
So he went to the Conference, not as a mute, 
To act as the CHANCELLOR’S chief substitute, 
And in this extremely responsible post 
He mingled with those who were ruling the roost. 
The Big and redoubtable Three, ‘tis confessed, 
By his talent and zeal were immensely impressed; 
But, conversely, the fact, which is painful, remains 
That they failed to impress the redoubtable KEYNES. 
So, after five months of progressive disgust, 
He shook from his feet the Parisian dust, 
Determined to give the chief Delegates beans 
And let the plain person behind the Peace scenes. 
Though his title is stodgy, yet all must admit 
That his pages are seasoned with plenty of wit; 
He’s alert as a cat-fish; he can’t be ignored; 
And throughout his recital we never are bored. 
For he’s not a mere slinger of partisan ink, 
But a thinker who gives us profoundly to think; 
And his arguments cannot be lightly dismissed 
With cries of ‘Pro-Hun’ or of ‘Pacifist’. 
And yet there are faults to be found all the same; 
For example, I doubt if it’s playing the game 
For one who is hardly unmuzzled to guy 
Representative statesmen who cannot reply. 
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And while we’re amused by his caustic dispraise 
Of President Wilson’s Chadbandian ways, 
Of the cynical TIGER, laconic and grim, 
And our versatile PREMIER, so supple and slim – 
Still we feel, as he zealously damns the Allies 
For grudging the Germans the means to arise, 
That possibly some of the Ultimate Things 
May even be hidden from Fellows of King’s.88 
This review damned the book as ‘clever’ and marvelled at its political inexperience and 
special tenderness for Germany, but acknowledged that as a constructive criticism of the 
economic clauses of the Treaty it had real value. Many English and European critics simply 
accused Keynes of writing pro-German propaganda. 
Keynes let most of the adverse criticism pass him by, responding only to what was 
illogical or a mis-statement of fact, and in general kept silent through a great deal of 
abuse. When he did answer, however, he could be extremely cutting. For example, on one 
occasion he sent a brief reply to Sir Herbert Stephen, who had written a long letter to The 
Times, and accused Keynes of making a ‘virulent attack on the honour of our own and the 
French Governments’ and argued that no legal contract had been entered into by the 
Allies, which bound them to the principles of Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Keynes sent a curt 
reply to The Times dismissing Sir Herbert’s arguments with a final sentence: ‘It is an 
extraordinary commentary on the workings of the human mind that Sir Herbert Stephen 
should believe that he has thus contributed to the establishment of our good faith.’ In an 
earlier draft of the letter, Keynes had written the last sentence: ‘The existence of people 
like Sir Herbert Stephen does, however, render intelligible the present state of the world 
without resort to the hypothesis of moral turpitude.’89
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2.4. Summary – Economic Consequences of the Peace 
The publication of Economic Consequences at the end of 1919 exceeded the expectations 
of Keynes’ publishers, Macmillan & Co., Limited, who did not expect it to be a best-seller 
and were conservative in their proposals to Keynes. This led Keynes to reverse the normal 
author-publisher relationship: he paid Macmillan ten per cent of the production costs as 
well as ten per cent on the sale price, and kept the resulting profits. He used this 
arrangement for everything else he would publish with Macmillan other than How to Pay 
for the War.90 The archives are silent on how Keynes’ saw the likely success of his book 
but Keynes rarely, if ever, suffered from self-doubt, so it is more than likely that he felt 
vindicated by its publishing success. 
But despite the success and the book’s impact on contemporary ‘outsider’ public 
opinion and ‘insider’ élite opinion, Keynes expressed frustration that many readers failed 
to grasp the serious economic intent and message of his book. A number of 
contemporaries judged the book as nothing more than ‘political polemic,’ with economics 
playing a supporting and backstage role. For those who did accept the serious economic 
import of Keynes’ arguments, it was seen as a prescient text that needed to be taken 
seriously if the failings of the Peace Treaty were to be addressed in time. 
This analysis of the success or otherwise of Keynes’ communication of his 
economic ideas highlights how difficult it is to judge communicative success. In Keynes’ 
case there is little doubt that many of Keynes’ economic ideas have become well known 
and understood with many accepted as economic orthodoxy. However, controversy still 
surrounds much of what he argued, even where his views have a ring of prescience about 
them. In their correspondence with Keynes, Chamberlain and Dulles had argued that if 
Keynes had stuck to just his economic arguments he would have been more persuasive. 
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Yet the weight of analysis and opinion tends to suggest that without the ‘flashier’ parts 
that characterised Keynes’ rhetorical style, Economic Consequences may never have been 
a publishing success and consequently would have failed to communicate his economic 
ideas. The question is, then, what forms of communication will best enable an economist 
to have his or her ideas disseminated in ways that minimise distortion and 
misunderstanding? A close and critical examination of Economic Consequences will 
demonstrate that the answer is a mix of scientific exactitude, rhetorical style and 
intellectual public performance.
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Chapter 3 Intellectuals and the Communication of 
Economic Ideas 
There are three sub-sections in this chapter. First, the definition and role of a public 
intellectual is discussed. Second, the place of cultural influences and intellectuals is 
examined. Finally, is an inquiry into the process of communicating and disseminating 
ideas. 
Keynes, by the conventional standards of his day, was well educated at the time of 
writing Economic Consequences. He was a graduate of Eton and Cambridge University and 
a fellow of King’s College. He was actively teaching at the time he wrote Economic 
Consequences and his association with King’s continued for the rest of his life. During the 
war years he worked for the British Treasury and served as part of the official delegation 
at the Versailles Conference. During his time with the Treasury he was considered their 
expert on Reparations. He became editor of the Economic Journal in 1911, a position he 
held until near the end of his life. He also became a part-time journalist for the 
Manchester Guardian shortly after completing Economic Consequences, a role that 
enabled him to promote his ideas to a wide audience. During the first half of the 1920s he 
was better known in some circles for his public activities than for his scholarly works. In 
this regard his activities as a public intellectual are important to our understanding of how 
ideas are communicated. 
In this chapter an examination is undertaken of what constitutes a public 
intellectual. The contention of this dissertation is that a successful public intellectual is a 
person who meets the criteria outlined by Collini in Absent Minds.1 First, Keynes’ 
intellectual achievements were recognised by colleagues, politicians, businessmen, policy 
makers and the general public. Second, Keynes regularly and effectively utilised a variety 
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of communication channels. Third, Keynes addressed general and practical concerns of 
the public. Fourth, he enjoyed a reputation for engaging the public by saying important 
and interesting things directly addressing public concerns. Finally, his success as a public 
intellectual was enhanced through the activities of followers and disciples who shared his 
interest in communicating his ideas. 
The importance of cultural influences in the communication process is examined 
next. Keynes was explicit and often successful in his attempts at communicating ideas in a 
persuasive manner. Many of his ideas were shaped by his environment and he in turn 
helped shape his cultural surroundings. Much of this can be explained by an examination 
of a number of influences, especially when he was a younger man. His early education at 
Eton provided him with an anti-Benthamite sentiment towards capitalism, which never 
left him. His education at Cambridge and his membership of the Cambridge Apostles were 
life-long influences for two reasons. First, Keynes came under the sway of Alfred Marshall, 
his teacher and mentor in economics. Marshall was the first intellectual to seriously work 
for the professionalisation of economics, free from political economy and commerce in 
general in order for economics to be recognised as a legitimate social science. The 
attention to scientific exactitude and the professionalisation this involved came to define 
Keynes’ career. The second way in which his time at Cambridge is significant were the 
influences of G.E. Moore’s views and his lifelong friendship with Lytton Strachey. From 
Moore, Keynes learned to put friendship and community before all else. From Strachey, 
he drew literary inspiration enabling him to develop his own unique and successful style of 
communication. Another critical influence was his involvement with the Bloomsbury set. 
This circle of friends did not operate any form of membership but it did provide a rich 
intellectual environment from which Keynes drew inspiration. 
The third and final sub-section of Chapter Three is an examination of the process 
of communicating ideas. Without an understanding of this, it is difficult to judge what we 
mean by successful communication. There are a number of components to this discussion. 
First, there is the process of information dissemination. Robert Solow’s view that ‘ideas 
turn to mush’ is of particular interest as many readers of Economic Consequences did not 
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grasp the seriousness of the books economic arguments. There were, of course, a number 
of reasons for this, which are examined. One of the more important was the 
dissemination difficulties of an intellectual communicating with a non-specialist audience. 
The second part of the examination of the communication process is the rhetoric used by 
economists. The meaning of rhetoric has changed in the last 100 years from when Keynes’ 
generation of intellectuals were educated in the classics, and the rules of rhetoric were 
taken seriously. A rhetorician in this period was taught to write and present with the 
explicit purpose of persuading an audience, something Keynes proved to be particularly 
skilled at. The final component of an examination of the process of communicating 
economic ideas is a discussion of how economics has been treated as a literary subject. 
This is important because Keynes’ primary communication medium was literary. This 
examination also shows the importance of the nineteenth century for the development of 
economics and literature, a tradition that influenced Keynes and served as a platform for 
him to build on, with new and innovative ways of communicating economic ideas. The 
chapter closes with a discussion of the tradition established by other economists who 
were successful public intellectuals. My selection includes Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marx, and 
Marshall. All were successful public intellectuals and eminent economists who saw their 
ideas spread to a wider audience of non-economists. 
  
 Page 56 
8-Jun-11 
3.1. The Public Sphere and the role of the Intellectual 
3.1.1. The Public Sphere 
The notion that ideas spread through the activities of individuals who act as intellectuals 
in the public sphere is a powerful one. The implication is that we might in some way 
better understand the process of disseminating ideas by studying the views of people who 
devote themselves to the activity of thinking about public concerns. The label often used 
to describe these individuals is public intellectuals, which assumes we know what is meant 
by the term “public.” But, our assumptions need closer scrutiny when questions are asked: 
what is “the public” and what kind of powers does it have in a representative democracy? 
Or: how does “public opinion” shape political power or policy? This test forms the central 
concern of Habermas. Habermas in The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 
(1962) explores the status of public opinion in the practice of representative government 
in Western Europe. In this and subsequent works Habermas argues that 
by “the public sphere” we mean first of all a realm of our social life in 
which something approaching public opinion can be formed. Access is 
guaranteed to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere comes into 
being in every conversation in which private individuals assemble to 
form a public body.2 They then behave neither like business or 
professional people transacting private affairs, nor like members of a 
constitutional order subject to the legal constraints of a state 
bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an 
unrestricted fashion – that is, with the guarantee of freedom of 
assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish 
their opinions – about matters of general interest. In a large public 
body this kind of communication requires specific means for 
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 Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is not to be equated with that of “the public,” ie of the individuals 
who assemble. Peter Hohendahl (in notes attached to the article by Habermas) argues that Harbermas’ 
concept is directed instead at the institution, which to be sure only assumes concrete form through the 
participation of people. It cannot, however, be characterised simply as a crowd. 
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transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today 
newspapers and magazines, radio and television are the media of the 
public sphere. … The public sphere as a sphere mediates between 
society and state, in which the public organises itself as the bearer of 
public opinion, accords with the principle of the public sphere – that 
principle of public information which once had to be fought for 
against the arcane policies of monarchies and which since that time 
has made possible the democratic control of state activities.3 
According to Habermas a public sphere only began to emerge in the eighteenth century 
through the growth of coffee houses, literary and other societies, voluntary associations, 
and the growth of the press. The successful operation of the public sphere depends on a 
number of factors. First, the extent of access to the public sphere should be as close to 
universal as possible. Second is the degree of autonomy within the public sphere. That is 
to say, citizens must be free of coercion. Third, there is a rejection of hierarchy so that 
each individual might participate on an equal footing. Fourth is the rule of law, necessary 
for a public sphere to exist. In particular the state must be subordinate to the law. A fifth 
and final factor is the quality of participation that involves a common commitment to the 
ways of logic. For Habermas the success of the public sphere was founded on rational-
critical discourse since everyone is an equal participant and the supreme communication 
skill is the power of argument. Furthermore he believes the public sphere can be most 
effectively constituted and maintained through dialogue, acts of speech, debate and 
discussion. Habermas claims public debate can be animated by “opinion forming 
organisations.” These could be voluntary organisations, social organisations, churches, 
sports clubs, groups of concerned citizens, grassroots movements, and trade unions, 
usually expressing opinions that counter or refashion the messages of authority. 
Habermas is not convinced, however, that the public sphere has ever been fully 
realised. As ethnic, gender, and class exclusions were removed through the nineteenth 
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and twentieth centuries, and the public sphere approached its ideal more closely, 
Habermas identifies a concurrent deformation of the public sphere through the advance 
of social welfare, the growth of cultural industries, and the evolution of large private 
interests. All three examples in some way involve large vested interests and powerful 
interest groups, subverting an individual’s ability to communicate his or her personal 
opinions. Soules argues that ‘large newspapers devoted to profit, for example, turned the 
press into an agent of manipulation. It became the gate through which privileged private 
interests invaded the public sphere.’4 Others agree with Habermas’ concerns, for example 
Jacques Ellul, Herbert Marcuse and Paul Rutherford,5 but Harbermas himself 
acknowledges it is these very institutions that are important for the formation of public 
opinion. The main concern for Habermas is to ensure ‘undistorted communication’ as this 
is a critical tool for human emancipation. The ideal speech for Habermas has four validity 
claims - comprehensibility, truth, appropriateness and sincerity, and he argues these have 
a social context in which they have to be justified. 
Habermas’ arguments mean the intellectual is an important conduit for the 
communication and dissemination of ideas in the public sphere. For example, while 
Habermas expresses misgivings about the public sphere being compromised with 
“distorted communication,” due in part to the growth of powerful media outlets whose 
ownership is in the hands of privileged private interests, an important role for an 
intellectual is to counter these forces by upholding the ideals of the public sphere. For 
Keynes this required a process for shaping public opinion, which he expounds in A Revision 
of the Treaty.6 Written as a follow-up to Economic Consequences it gives a clear statement 
of Keynes’ views of the role of public opinion in politics.7 Keynes believed reform and 
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change were the products of discussion through which public opinion was formed and 
guided. The political élite of senior politicians, civil servants and ‘higher’ journalists were 
open to two influences, rational persuasion and public opinion. The élite are privy to their 
own ‘inner opinion’ expressed ‘upstairs, backstairs and behind-stairs’ as to what was 
feasible and desirable.8 In public speeches, newspaper articles and other forms of 
comment, however, the political leadership and ‘higher’ journalists were directly involved 
in the public sphere, what Keynes termed ‘outer’ or public opinion. Although in a 
democracy the élite was ultimately subject to public opinion, through its own links with 
that opinion it could significantly shape it. To Keynes, one of the duties of the élite was to 
prevent too wide a gap appearing between inner and outer opinion on any issue. If the 
gap became too wide, as it had become, in Keynes’ opinion, over the treatment of 
Germany in 1918-19, the process of returning to sensible or feasible proposals could be 
lengthy and costly. What was needed was ‘a concentrated assault on inside opinion *as a+ 
necessary prelude to converting outside opinion.’9 This is best illustrated by the first 
words in his preface to The General Theory: ‘This book is addressed to my fellow 
economists. I hope that it will be intelligible to others.’10 
One complication Keynes saw was that ‘outside’ public opinion is never as 
dogmatic or definite as it appears in the press. For the wider public there is always an 
element of doubt, which leaves views vulnerable to changing events and open to 
persuasion, a view Keynes had dealt with in A Treatise on Probability. 11 A further 
complication for Keynes in the process of shaping both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ opinion was 
how long it seemed to take to persuade and mould opinions. Keynes’ objective after all 
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was to see public opinion eventually aligned with his own views because only then did he 
believe the élites (insiders) would be swayed and take action. The time it took, however, 
did not greatly trouble him. In 1934 he was asked why he had so far been largely 
unsuccessful in aligning public opinion with his own views, to which he replied: ‘Because I 
have not yet succeeded in convincing either the expert or the ordinary man that I am 
right. [But] it is, I feel certain, only a matter of time before I convince both; and when both 
are convinced, economic policy will, with the usual time lag, follow suit.’12 The reason the 
time lag did not bother him was that, as important as persuasion was, it was equally 
important to ensure his ideas were ‘scientifically’ correct if they were to be rhetorically 
persuasive. Clarke argues, ‘*no matter how] attached he was to the method of rational 
persuasion, he had few illusions about the bloodless triumph of ideas as such.’13 
Keynes, then, saw persuasion as encouraging the formation of ‘outside’ opinion as 
well as altering the views of the élite. His own activities were directed at this development 
and alignment of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ opinion. This usually meant old habits of thought or 
prejudices were, as a result, removed or undermined and the ground prepared among the 
public at large, ‘so that the élite, once persuaded, could successfully lead rather than 
follow.’14 In such a process, meetings with officials, ministers and MPs, public speeches, 
articles in the quality and popular press all played their part. In the early 1920s, Keynes 
was only beginning to learn how to use them to maximum advantage. He had been 
unsuccessful in changing opinions over the Peace Treaty but ‘by the outbreak of the 
Second World War, he would be much more skilled – and perhaps more immediately 
successful.’15 
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3.1.2. Towards a Definition of the Public Role of the Intellectual 
The activities of an intellectual performing a public role require a definition, although 
there is a wide divergence of views on what defines a public intellectual. The term is so 
troublesome for some they prefer to drop the label ‘public’ altogether and rather focus on 
the activities of intellectuals, operating in the public sphere. Stefan Collini is among this 
group and he provides a definition broad in scope.16 He argues, an intellectual playing a 
public role is any leading cultural figure who is a creator of ideas and shaper of public 
opinion, avoiding a definition that rests on measurement or formula. He also avoids a 
market-based approach, which means he does not accept an intellectual can claim the 
label public intellectual if he or she works in the public sphere for reasons of monetary 
reward. Collini does, however, recognise that intellectuals, like everyone else, must make 
a living. However, he rejects Russell Jacoby’s argument that being an intellectual from the 
middle-to-end of the twentieth century to present day has meant an intellectual means 
‘almost exclusively *being a+ professor.’17 Jacoby argues, when combined with the 
destruction of the independent intellectual’s urban environment, intellectuals have been 
transformed from critics and bohemians into academics governed by the realities of 
bureaucratisation and tenured employment, and the result has been conformity and 
mediocrity. 
What this difference in views highlights is that scholars have different ways of 
approaching a definition. For example, Posner defines a public intellectual as someone 
who expresses themselves in ways accessible to the public, with the focus of their 
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activities being on matters of general public concern, usually of a political or ideological 
nature.18 The public Posner is interested in is the ‘educated general public’ although an 
‘intellectual who cannot communicate with more than a coterie of specialist readers is not 
a public intellectual however interdisciplinary and politically significant his writings may 
be.’19 Furthermore, for a specialist to be classified as a public intellectual means they 
cannot merely write for the general public in ways that explain their specialty. For 
example, scientists such as Paul Ehrlich, Stephen Jay Gould, Richard Lewontin, and Edward 
Wilson, who write for a general audience about the ethical and political dimensions of 
science, are public intellectuals, while a scientist who writes to explain science cannot 
make the same claim. Finally, Posner argues, a public intellectual is someone who 
undertakes this task because there is a market for his or her views. Individuals who do not 
espouse their views for a general audience but are nonetheless analysed in public do not 
fit Posner’s definition of a public intellectual. 
For Collini, Posner’s demand and supply argument is not helpful. Rather, Collini, 
designates a public intellectual as someone who performs a role. As such it does not refer 
to an occupational category or a defining feature in terms of inclinations and capacities. 
Terms such as ‘teacher’ and ‘writer’ are not useful. Nor are psychological 
characterisations, such as ‘introvert/extrovert’ or ‘verbaliser,’ or evaluative 
characterisations such as ‘great mind’ or ‘genius.’ Rather, Collini argues, a public 
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intellectual performs a role involving the intersection of four elements he calls a ‘grid of 
co-ordinates.’ First, the public intellectual attains a level of achievement in an activity that 
is esteemed for the non-instrumental, creative, analytical, or scholarly capacities it 
involves. Second, there needs to be an on-going availability of media or channels of 
expression that can reach the public unimpaired. Third, the role of the public intellectual 
involves an expression of views on themes, or topics, which successfully articulate or 
engage with some of the general concerns of the public. Fourth, to satisfy Collini’s 
definition, the intellectual must have established a reputation for having important and 
interesting things to say on the general concerns of the public and have the willingness 
and capacities to say them effectively through the appropriate media.20 Individuals who 
perform as public intellectuals work within this grid of co-ordinates at different levels, 
sometimes only temporarily, if and when they have something to say that is of interest 
and addresses public concerns. They play the role of public intellectual permanently if 
they habitually and constantly enter into this role. Finally, ‘how “general” the message 
may be, will always be matters for judgment in particular cases, [especially where] 
questions *are+ not resolvable by measurement or formula.’21 While Collini only describes 
this grid we could view it diagrammatically: 
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Figure 1 : Diagrammatical Representation of Collini’s Public Intellectuals’ 
Grid 
  
In this representation the further the intellectual is from the centre signifies a greater 
degree of qualification in each attribute. In this example intellectual B has greater 
credentials/qualifications than intellectual A. However intellectual A has a greater reach in 
terms of media outlets than intellectual B. Intellectual B on the other hand expounds 
views that express public concerns to a greater degree than intellectual A, although 
Intellectual A has a better reputation for addressing the issues than intellectual B. This 
diagram is designed to illustrate the holistic nature of the role of a public intellectual and 
is not meant to imply the role of an intellectual can be reduced to measurement or 
formula. 
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3.1.3. J. M. Keynes – Public Intellectual 
By almost all definitions Keynes was a public intellectual. Trevelyan, a contemporary of 
Keynes, believed Keynes engaged with the world in a serious and responsible way and 
exhibited ‘immense disinterestedness and public spirit’ and was something of an 
exception to other intellectuals whom he generally dismissed as “a decadent class.” 22 
Another contemporary of Keynes, Mackintosh, thought much could be attributed to 
Keynes’ passionate belief in and concern for England. This was in contrast to many of his 
friends who belonged to what Mackintosh labels ‘the rootless intellectuals of the 
nineteen-twenties and thirties.’23 From the Economic Consequences to his last article in 
the Economic Journal, whether he was concerned with the ‘dismemberment of Europe, 
the flexibility of the exchange rates, the relation between investment and income, or 
buffer stocks of food and raw materials, the pattern of his concern was what was best for 
England.’24 While there is no doubt Keynes demonstrated this commitment it would be a 
mistake to say his passion was restricted to England. While much of Keynes’ attention 
during the 1920s was directed at domestic English concerns, Economic Consequences had 
shown a concern for European problems, not just English ones. Nonetheless, his 
passionate calls for economic reform demonstrate how seriously he took public concerns. 
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His writings also addressed immediate practical problems. In Economic 
Consequences he argued that immediately following World War One politicians had 
concentrated so myopically on political solutions they failed to see the only way to build a 
lasting peace in Europe was to usher in a new economic model. Keynes argued the old 
days of laissez-faire were over, with some form of managed economy necessary for 
weathering the difficult days ahead and despite the controversy surrounding it, the 
influence of Economic Consequences was profound, ultimately changing ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ opinion.  
For example, Keynes was among the first to alert the world to the dangers of inter-
Allied war debts and German reparations, arguing they were a recipe for economic as well 
as political disaster. Wilson argues ‘we can now see these factors to be the giant step in 
the descent to totalitarianism and world war.’25 Keynes was also the first economist to 
break the news to a world very unwilling to hear it, ‘that unemployment was unavoidable 
in the current economic situation.’26 In these, as in other matters, Keynes attempted to 
persuade and influence opinion and public policy, which he did mainly through his writings 
and were, ‘in effect “essays in persuasion.” To intellectuals, Keynes was compellingly 
persuasive both as a writer and a speaker. He wrote with great economy, charm and 
vigour.’27 
When Collini’s definition is applied to Keynes there is a clear match to Collini’s grid 
of role co-ordinates. First, Keynes’ intellectual achievements were recognised and highly 
regarded by colleagues, politicians, businessmen, policy makers, and the general public. 
Second, Keynes effectively utilised many channels of communication open to him. This 
ranged from a steady stream of scholarly output, engagement as a journalist for the 
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leading papers of the day, and participation in a wide range of public debates. He also 
used radio broadcasts and the emerging medium of the cinema. In one instance he sought 
to reassure a nervous public that the financial crisis resulting from the suspension of the 
gold standard, would not lead to a collapse of the financial system: 
Suddenly Maynard appeared on the screen enormously big, in a well-
appointed library, blinking at lights and speaking rather nervously, 
and told the world everything was now going to be all right, England 
had been rescued by fate from an almost hopeless situation, the 
pound would not collapse, prices would not rise very much, trade 
would recover, no one need fear anything.28 
The third close match to Collini’s grid of co-ordinates is the ways in which Keynes 
addressed practical problems concerning the public. For example, price instability plagued 
post-war Europe, inflationary and deflationary policies threatened standards of living, and 
the scourge of unemployment, were all economic issues directly affecting members of the 
public. Keynes addressed these issues frequently and directly to the public. Finally, he 
enjoyed a reputation for engaging the public by saying important and interesting things, 
directly addressing their concerns. 
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3.2. Economics and Culture 
Collini’s phrase “cultural authority” implies a public intellectual belongs in a cultural 
environment both as an influencer and as one who is influenced by his or her 
environment. 29 However, the importance of a relationship between culture and 
economics does not enjoy widespread acceptance. Economists who think the link 
important often find themselves defending the notion that economics can be understood 
in cultural terms. Eagleton argues, the term culture is in crisis because we have no 
accepted notion of what it embraces. For some the term is all encompassing and of 
necessity economics is part of a culture. Others, however, take a narrower view and 
divorce reason, and by implication economics, from a definition of culture. 30  
However, Jones’ view that economists do not give the subject of culture much 
thought is difficult to accept given the prominent role scholars of information 
dissemination give to it. Mokyr,31 Crémer,32 North,33 Barnard,34 and Casson35 represent a 
handful of those who give a pre-eminent place to the role of culture in explaining how 
ideas are communicated. Bigelow36 and Klaver37 argue culture is central to our 
understanding of economics and is an influence that is pervasive and without separation 
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from the subject of economics. When examining the works and economics of Keynes, in 
addition to his role as a public intellectual, cultural influences are particularly important in 
providing explanations for many of his views and activities. 
3.2.1. Keynes and his Cultural Environment 
Prior to Holroyd’s first two-part biography Lytton Strachey, published in 1976, few paid 
much attention to Keynes’ cultural environment. Holroyd discussed in some detail Keynes’ 
education at Eton and his friendships in the Cambridge Apostles and Bloomsbury, and 
since then a number of researchers have increasingly argued the importance of these 
earlier influences on his economic ideas. Biographies by Skidelskey (1983, 1992 and 2001) 
and Moggridge (1992) both explained a number of Keynes’ economic ideas and activities 
in the context of cultural environmental influences. Other works by Mini (1991) and 
Taddeo (2002) deal with cultural influences in considerable detail.  
It has been highlighted, one of the most important influences was Moore’s views, 
something Keynes himself acknowledged in Two Memoirs.38 Mini argues Keynes 
appropriated Moore’s method for his own critical purposes, which led Keynes to take 
apart the basic components of the classical system of economics to which most of his 
contemporaries subscribed. Far from being impressed, Mini argues Keynes found the 
structure of the classical system illogical, self-contradictory, and superficial. One example 
is the classical relationship between savings and investment. Known as ‘Say’s Law’ the 
classical economists regarded as practically synonymous the notion that to save was to 
invest. In part, this view of the classicists comes from the writings of David Ricardo and 
John Stuart Mill who rigidly defined the terms of supply and demand in a way that 
supported the definition of Say’s Law as simply ‘supply creates its own demand.’39 
However, Ricardo and Mills were just two economists during the nineteenth century who 
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were part of a process of evolution when the basic terms of economics were being 
debated and continually redefined. While their position may now be judged as simplistic, 
Say’s Law is a good example of a term that has a long history of controversy, which ‘sheds 
light on the enormous difficulties involved when even intelligent thinkers with honesty 
and goodwill try to understand each other’s theories without clearly defined terms and 
without a clear sense of the conceptual framework of the opposing views.’40  
Keynes’ contribution to the debate was to take apart the simplistic conclusion of 
the classicists and to uncover a world of neglected mechanisms. First, he found an 
increase in savings reduces consumption. From this line of thought Keynes discovered that 
a fall in consumption reduces incomes, which has a negative effect on the business 
outlook, on sales prospects, and hence on the marginal efficiency of capital. Thus, if 
anything, an increase in savings means a decrease in investment. What to classicists 
seemed a straightforward flowing of non-consumption (savings) into business 
consumption (investment), is shown by Keynes to hide a world of complex linkages that 
must be analysed and, ‘not taken for granted.’41  
Taking McClelland’s argument, it is the relationship between groups, rather than 
the groups themselves we should be concerned about, and with Moore, it is the method 
rather than the outcome that should be the focus of inquiry. Then we have a way of 
addressing what C. P. Snow saw as the dangers of specialisation. Snow argued that 
specialisation often pursued by intellectuals has, in his words, come to define “two 
cultures” of the scientific and non-scientific world of literature and arts. Snow maintained 
that ‘it is dangerous to have two cultures which can’t or don’t communicate. In a time 
                                                             
40
 Sowell, (2008, p. 3). 
41
 Mini, (1991, p. 71). 
 Page 71 
8-Jun-11 
when science is determining much of our destiny, that is, whether we live or die, it is 
dangerous in the most practical terms.’42 
When Snow’s “two cultures” terminology is applied to Keynes we find that as an 
economist (social scientist) and his association with the Cambridge Apostles and 
Bloomsbury (arts), Keynes spanned the “two cultures” in ways many other intellectuals 
have not done. Alexander argues, Keynes was ‘perhaps the most influential reforming 
public intellectual of the twentieth century ’*who+ sought civil repair through democratic 
rather than revolutionary means.’ Furthermore, Keynes’ performance combined  
brilliant truth telling with commitment to solidarity and repair, and 
the high dudgeon of moral denunciation with ethereal participation in 
an ideal aesthetic world far removed from everyday modern life. 
Keynes condemned capitalists for their demonic and irrational 
“animal spirits,” but he fervently believed in the singular power of 
capitalist economies to provide the material means that were 
necessary, in his view, to facilitate the good life.43 
Marr also believes Keynes played a unique public role and endorses Peter Hennessy’s 
claim that he represented ‘the real purpose of intellectuals in a society, which is to hold up 
evidence and truth to those in power, to provide the inconvenient analysis to those who 
want the swift and meretricious solutions.’44 Once full material prosperity is achieved for 
all, Keynes thought ‘all the unjust aspects of wealth distribution that serve only to inflate 
egos can be dispensed with,’ sounding, argues Nelson, remarkably like Marx but without 
the necessity of violent revolution as the prelude to a new world of peace and harmony. In 
time Keynes came to distrust politicians and ‘sought to influence public opinion directly, 
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which he regularly did with great success.’45 Keynes’ ability to span the “two cultures” also 
helped establish his cultural authority, a process that had begun from when he was a 
young man. 
Mini argues, we can only understand Keynes’ economics by understanding the 
early influences of his youth, first from his education at Eton and its anti-Benthamite 
sentiment. Those in Keynes’ circle rejected the harsh utilitarian views of Bentham, Keynes 
stating in his memoir that ‘we were amongst the first of our generation, perhaps alone 
amongst our generation, to escape the Benthamite tradition.’46 Keynes and his circle of 
friends turned rather to Coleridge’s, and others’, humanistic views. The second important 
influence were his activities with the Cambridge Apostles and the influence of Moore’s 
philosophy. Keynes described that: 
I went up to Cambridge at Michaelmas in 1902, and Moore’s Principia 
Ethica came out at the end of my first year. I have never heard of the 
present generation having read it. But, of course, its effect on us, and 
the talk which preceded and followed it, dominated, and perhaps still 
dominates, everything else … For us, those who were active in 1903 … 
the influence was not only overwhelming … it was exciting, 
exhilarating, the beginning of a renaissance, the opening of a new 
heaven on a new earth, we were the forerunners of a new 
dispensation, we were not afraid of anything.47 
Keynes and his fellow Apostles took Moore’s ethics as the philosophical basis for 
their deep friendship and community. Through his association with the Apostles the bonds 
of community and friendship took precedence over most other values. Others have also 
recognised the influence of the Apostles on Keynes and his friend Lytton Strachey. For 
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example, Taddeo argues, Keynes’ and Strachey’s affiliation with the Apostles provides an 
important chapter in our understanding of the history of sexuality and masculinity in early 
twentieth-century England.48 Both regarded themselves as rebels whose devotion to Plato 
was part of their larger opposition to Victorianism. This generation ‘renounced religion 
and politics, proclaimed the death of God, and declared ‘”love is the only reality.”’49 What 
this also meant was that it was highly unlikely the Apostles would easily lose touch with 
one another. In fact, Moore’s ‘highest good’ proved strong enough to withstand the 
requirements of making a ‘regular’ living. Many of the Apostles of Keynes’ generation 
settled in London in close proximity to each other, and from the original ‘at homes’ of 
some of them a new association eventually sprang up, looser than the Society, but one 
that, in time, would be a very important force in the cultural life of Britain. Those 
individuals who became the core of what is now known as Bloomsbury, were the third 
significant influence on Keynes, which stood for changing the cultural values of the nation 
away from utilitarianism and towards Moorean ethics. They were in the anti-Benthamite 
tradition of writers who viewed themselves as having a mission to teach higher values to 
the masses, and especially to prevent them being swallowed up by the crassness of a 
commercial civilization. In time its members would conquer one field after another, giving 
new directions to art and art appreciation, to the novel, to history and biography and to 
political economy. Rosenbaum argues, ‘the first bastion to fall to this cultural attack was 
aesthetics, the last was economics.’50 
In addition to his rejection of Benthamite utilitarianism, a commitment to 
Moorean ethics of community and friendship, and rebellion against Victorian mores and 
conventions, a fourth influence on Keynes was the application of a psychological mode of 
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thinking about literature. This method relied on psychology as an explanatory tool and it 
will be argued in Chapter Eight that Keynes used this method in Economic Consequences. 
These influences on Keynes were different from the scholarly surroundings of Cambridge, 
and the public policy work of the Treasury, which helps explain why Keynes believed 
economics was more than a science. What is perhaps surprising is that he gained 
acceptance among economists in a way his close friend Strachey did not among historians. 
This was, argues Mini, due less to the broad-mindedness of economists than to the 
superior tactics of Keynes and to the pressure of the times. Before the methods of 
Strachey and his Bloomsbury contemporaries could exercise any significant impact on 
economists, Keynes’ primary works had already been turned into a science. As a result, 
‘neither the Cambridge Circus nor the great Depression could save Maynard’s method 
from becoming substantially warped, as many economists now recognise.’51 
In summary, cultural influences were important in helping explain the 
development of Keynes’ ideas, his activities as a public intellectual, and his efforts at 
changing ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ opinions. The influences of Moore, Eton, the Apostles, and 
Bloomsbury underpinned the ways he viewed the workings of economics. These included 
the rejection of Bentham’s harsh utilitarian views; his lifelong acceptance of Moore’s 
ethics as the preeminent philosophical basis of friendship and community; and the 
application of a psychological way of thinking about literary characters that was innovative 
and helps explain the successful publications of Keynes, Strachey and Woolf. This mix of 
cultural influences also helps explain many of Keynes’ unique and innovative insights, as 
well the success he enjoyed in disseminating his ideas to a wide audience. At times they 
were captivated, often convinced, and at other times captured by the controversy his 
activities as a public intellectual courted. Whether his ideas are judged as right or wrong, 
as good or bad science, balanced or exaggerated, what cannot be easily dismissed is the 
importance and place of culture in shaping and supporting Keynes in the communication 
of his ideas. 
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3.3. The Communication of Ideas 
The discussion above highlights the importance of the public intellectual and cultural 
influences for economic ideas to be successfully communicated. A third factor, the 
dissemination process, is also important for effective communication. The nineteenth 
century was an important watershed for economics and literature, with both having an 
impact on the communication of economic ideas. Briggs argues this period shaped not just 
the way in which economics is now communicated but influenced the very idea of 
knowledge diffusion and the aim of reaching larger and larger numbers of people. 52 The 
1826 foundation of The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge highlights the 
phenomenon of knowledge diffusion. This organisation published inexpensive texts 
intended to adapt scientific and similarly high-minded material for a rapidly expanding 
reading public. The Society was founded three years after the London Mechanics’ 
Institution and both put self-education at the heart of the communication process. 
Whereas the cultural ideal of the nineteenth century ‘spanned arts and sciences, the 
verbal and the visual, factual information and speculation’ by contrast, in the twenty-first 
century, specialisation separates the “two cultures” of the arts and sciences. 53  
This separation between the “two cultures” was taking place at the time Keynes 
published Economic Consequences.54 Briggs argues a cleavage had started by the late 
nineteenth century and marked a shift away from the ‘generalist’ and the ‘integrated’ age 
of knowledge dissemination to the specialised era that continues to the present time. This 
period saw the founding of the Daily Mail, which epitomises the rapid growth of mass 
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media in the twentieth century, the arrival of the young Marconi in Britain with his new 
wireless patents, the first motor race to be held between London and Brighton, and the 
first cinema show in London’s West End. Briggs explains, ‘you can see how the cultural 
bearings were changing. This, indeed, was a hinge [moment in time] between the cultures 
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.’55 When considering the activities of Keynes it 
is possible to see how his works often reflect this transitional period. On the one hand the 
worlds of science and the arts were integrated holistically, as can be seen when closely 
examining Economic Consequences, but on the other hand Keynes embraced his role as a 
professional economist and wrote works for a specialist audience of economists. 
3.3.1. Information dissemination 
Those interested in the role information and knowledge dissemination play are typically 
interested in specific aspects or perspectives of the dissemination process. For example, 
when economists use the term “diffusion” they refer specifically to the spread of ideas 
around technology. Mokyr is one of many economists who focuse attention on the 
contributions of technological progress to the wealth and health of nations. 56 Mokyr takes 
the notion one step further and develops a theory of “useful knowledge,” which he argues 
is the foundation of technological progress. While Mokyr’s analysis of economic exchange 
and performance is based on the central premise that a store of knowledge holds the key 
to explaining the spread of economic ideas, others are interested in how this store of 
knowledge, and the ideas that make it up, are disseminated. For example North places the 
role of institutions at the heart of his analysis of how economic ideas are communicated 
and spread. 57 
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Crémer is another scholar interested in the role of information and knowledge and 
its dissemination, but his approach is different again.58 His interest is in the role played by 
culture, corporate culture in particular, and he argues, the cognition and belief systems 
that constitute culture provide an environment crucial to the efficient flow of information. 
He argues it is the patterns of conditioned thought and ingrained routines that generate 
consistent behaviour and efficiencies in information processing. North and Barnard, who 
both stress the importance of cultural values and beliefs in shaping human activities and 
institutional preferences, share these views.59 Casson also subscribes to the importance of 
culture and argues that the existence of ‘high trust’ culture underpins transaction cost 
efficiencies.60 This is an important element for Casson in understanding the role 
information plays in the process of economic exchange. He argues it is a mistake to think 
of an economy in purely material terms when trying to explain the process of economic 
exchange. What really matters is the information and organisation underpinning the 
material economy. 
While these scholars provide important perspectives and clues for an explanation 
of how economic ideas are communicated and spread, they all define the subject in 
narrow terms: Mokyr as the diffusion of technological ideas, Crémer, Barnard and North 
as the communication and spread of ideas from an institutional perspective, and Casson 
as a way of examining the role of information in the economic exchange process. 
However, the examination of how ideas are communicated and spread from economists 
to the public sphere does not enjoy the same degree of scrutiny and research. Among the 
reasons for this are the difficulties in measuring outcomes from the transmission and 
diffusion process. Most groupings making up the public sphere expect and demand simple 
and short explanations for what are invariably complex ideas. The result often ends in 
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confusion, misunderstanding and incorrect reinterpretation of original ideas. For example, 
a professional economist’s understanding of monetarism is usually different to how a 
member of the public would understand it. A second reason for difficulties of measuring 
outcomes from the communication of economic ideas to the public sphere resides in the 
nature of the political process. Lay publics in particular typically expect a high degree of 
certainty from politicians and the political process. Economic ideas, however, are often 
highly uncertain. Finally, there is the difficulty of measuring communication outcomes. As 
a profession economics has not developed high enough standards of robustness in testing 
theory against application in ways that enable people outside the profession to easily 
comprehend the ideas economists communicate, which is why Solow argues that 
economic ideas often turn to ‘mush.’61 
If this is the case we may be facing a potentially insoluble problem and perhaps the 
public should just learn to trust professionals to get on with the job. But this would mean 
economists could neglect an important professional responsibility, namely the need to 
clearly communicate and inform, no matter how difficult the task, the implications and 
consequences of ideas that have an impact on members of the public. For example, we 
would deem it unacceptable for a medical professional to tell his or her patient they will 
not understand why they are dying. This is no different to an economist refusing to explain 
the consequences of monetary policy on living standards because the public will not 
understand monetarism. 
However, there are difficulties in the transmission of economic ideas from the 
‘professional’ economist to the public. Solow argues that while economic ideas are 
complicated the transmission process is often not designed to interpret complexity and is 
itself imperfect. By the time an economic idea reaches its ultimate destination it has been 
changed and distorted in one way or another. By way of example, Solow states the 
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average person-in-the-street has probably never heard of monetarism and among those 
who have, the picture in their heads is very likely to be quite different from what an 
elementary textbook conveys, and certainly not what any professional economist would 
understand, ‘let alone what a specialist in monetary macroeconomics would teach to 
graduate students.’62 Solow believes there are at least three sources for this debasement 
of economic ideas as they diffuse into the public arena. First, debasement of economic 
ideas is inherent in the diffusion process itself. Economics is a complicated subject, 
whether we are talking about macroeconomics, microeconomics, theoretical economics, 
or applied economics. A meaningful answer to any serious question cannot be accurately 
stated in one or two short sentences. Yet, short answers is what the world wants, and ‘by 
and large those are what it gets.’63  
The second reason for this debasement is inherent in the demands of the political 
process, and its relation to economic thought. In addition to ‘good’ economics being 
complicated, ‘good’ economics is also uncertain. Even when the underlying principle is 
clear its application to particular circumstances is never direct. Too many other things are 
always happening at once. A politician does not need complexity and uncertainty, just the 
opposite. Solow argues, ‘this demand for simplicity and confidence is strengthened by the 
fact that the political process is rarely interested in narrow economic policy for its own 
sake.’64 
There is a third problem and this is the economics profession. Theory tends to 
outrun sound applied economics. Theory is always proposing hypotheses of such a degree 
of fineness that data cannot seriously test them, verify them, or improve them, while ‘we 
[professional economists] propose more and more elaborate ways to exploit the pitifully 
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few real degrees of freedom history gives us.’65 The result is that answers to economic 
questions lack credibility and reliability because it is too difficult to align empirical 
evidence with theory. Having gone so far, we find ourselves forced to pretend to believe 
the answers we get. We have, according to Solow, ways of making the data talk, yes, but, 
‘like any tortured soul they can be made to say whatever the torturer wants to hear.’66 
While Solow, as a professional economist, does not have ready answers to the first two 
problems, he does believe the profession can get its own house in order. Economists need 
to ensure the standards of evidence are made more robust. An honest economist, 
according to Solow, will insist on robust results, which can only be confirmed by consulting 
a wide range of evidence. Unfortunately Solow does not explicitly explain where current 
standards fall short nor does he explain how wider ranges of evidence should be gathered, 
nor the types of evidence that will meet the criteria of robustness. However, we probably 
expect too much, for the very reasons we have the problems associated with the 
transmission of economic ideas. There are no accepted sets of standards or types of 
evidence to enable measurement in a way Solow would like. This in turn highlights that, to 
date there has been little attention paid to the problems associated with the 
communication and spread of economic ideas from professional economists to the public. 
Without further research it is unlikely the standards Solow would like to see will emerge 
any time soon. 
Within these constraints highlighted by Solow, one of the research objectives of 
this dissertation is to determine the degree to which economic ideas, especially those 
outlined in Economic Consequences, were reliably transmitted to the public sphere of 
Keynes’ generation and in what ways his role as a public intellectual helped ease the 
transmission process.  
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3.3.2. Rhetoric and Economics 
To this point it has been argued a public intellectual plays an important role in the 
communication of ideas to the public sphere. Furthermore, to enable the public 
intellectual to successfully communicate requires a cultural environment receptive to their 
views, with suitable media for the communication and dissemination of their message. 
There are numerous means through which communications pass - works of literature, 
newspapers, journals, speeches, magazines, radio and film and all were available and used 
by Keynes to communicate his ideas.  
The scope of this dissertation, however, is limited to literary works. There are 
several reasons for this: it would require a wider scope of inquiry to examine a larger 
range of media; Keynes, while utilising several different media, used literary texts as his 
primary means of communicating; and of the ideas he did communicate these were often 
reworked into subsequent literary texts.67 But accepting the place of literature in itself is 
not enough. The ways in which literature is constructed and the techniques used by 
writers enable ideas to flow beyond the author’s pen. Most literary theorists refer to this 
as a ‘writer’s style.’ We need, then, an explanation for how and why a particular style 
persuades an audience, where other writers’ ideas are not as persuasive. Literary critics 
often examine the rhetorical nature of a text to establish persuasiveness. Furthermore, 
the ways in which metaphors, analogies and allusions are used, can provide important 
clues as to why a piece of literature is persuasive.  
All communication, whether verbal, written, numerical or visual, attempts to 
persuade and can therefore be described as rhetoric.68 Clower argues that ‘all 
communicable knowledge rests in the final analysis upon persuasive rather than 
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demonstrative argument.’69 Rhetoric was part of a classics education at the turn of the 
twentieth century, and generally regarded as a “body of rules,” enabling a speaker or 
writer to “express himself with eloquence” and “to persuade or influence others.”70 
Economists have been somewhat slower than many other branches of the social sciences 
to accept they are rhetoricians. According to Davis such thinking for economists remains 
unfamiliar and uninteresting.71 Instead they cling to the notion their form of science is the 
opposite of the rhetorician’s world-view. In short, they believe the language they use will 
faithfully report on matters of fact uncoloured by any personal or partisan agenda or 
desire. 
3.3.2.1. Rhetoric and Persuasion 
McCloskey argues mainstream economists do not like to think of themselves as employing 
rhetoric; rather they regard themselves as scientists whose methodology insulates them 
from the appeal of special interests or points of view.72 Such thinking imposes significant 
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constraints on matters of economic inquiry. For example, an examination of a work of 
literature such as Fitzgerald’s The Great Gatsby, would pose a problem for mainstream 
economists. The novel, written by a non-economist with no economic agenda, is a story of 
financial loss and ruin that deals with day-to-day consequences of real individuals whom 
Fitzgerald knew during the inter-war period. Such a book would have no value to those 
interested in economic history if they held the view that the discipline of economics does 
not operate outside the field of deterministic science. But, economists such as McCloskey 
argue such a viewpoint is flawed. Whereas many mainstream economists think their 
discipline will produce ‘knowledge free from doubt, free from metaphysics, morals and 
personal conviction,’ no such knowledge, according to McCloskey, is available.73 For those 
who share McCloskey’s view, impersonal method is both an illusion and a danger. 
For literary critics such as Stanley Fish, economists were merely catching up when 
the first conference was called in 1986 to consider McCloskey’s arguments:  
Each of the objections [heard at the conference] had already been 
formulated (or reformulated) in those disciplines that had heard 
rhetoric’s siren song long before it reached the belated ears of 
economists. One needs to go back to the publication of Thomas 
Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolution (1962) for the source of 
revolutionary change in methodological thinking; ‘arguably the most 
frequently cited work in the humanities and social sciences in the last 
[thirty] years.’ 74  
The views expressed in 1986 are now shared by a number of economists working in the 
field of economics and economic methodology. For example Davis argues there has been 
a high rate of change in methodological thinking since Kuhn’s book which, ‘combined with 
the considerable diversity in ideas that now characterise the field, alone justifies our 
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saying that the field is currently in a state of permanent revolution.’75 This is a strong 
judgement but the challenge Kuhn poses for the nature of scientific enquiry is significant. 
McCloskey argues, rather than the notion of the “motor” of science being moved by 
verification or falsification, post-Kuhn science moves by persuasion. What this means is 
that the economist’s mathematical models, statistical tests and market arguments, are all 
‘figures of speech – metaphors, analogies, and appeals to authority.’76  
Why economists have been such reluctant adherents to the notion their discipline 
moves by persuasion is somewhat mystifying. While this reluctance has no doubt been 
based on many economists’ that view theirs is an objective and deterministic science, 
since at least Aristotle’s time most scholars accept any appeal to authority carries with it 
the intention to persuade. For example, in the domain of appeals to statistics, 
mathematics, logic and objectivity Aristotle labelled this particular appeal to authority as 
“logos,” which in simple terms means the use of reasoning, either inductive or deductive, 
to construct an argument. For example, when Keynes claimed, ‘if the loans which the 
United Kingdom has made to her Allies are reckoned to be worth 50 per cent of their full 
value … the operation would involve her neither in loss nor in gain,’ he has made an 
inductive and logical appeal with the use of statistics and he wants to persuade his readers 
the operation would result in ‘neither loss nor gain.’ 77 
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3.3.2.2. Discursive and Non-Discursive Rhetoric78 
Discursive communication is usually associated with verbal and written or printed text and 
includes the kind of language-making in which we “string out” our ideas. It relies on 
language to be ordered, sequential, and adhering to the “laws of reasoning” often 
assumed to be synonymous with the “laws of discursive thought.”79 Discursive texts often 
take the form of the expository essay, the oral presentation, research and argument 
papers, and common modes such as narrative and description. The primary limitation of 
discursive forms of rhetoric is that they assume the word is the only means to articulate 
thought and anything which cannot be conveyed by discursive means is mere feeling, or 
too “fuzzy” for serious study. Murray argues, ‘the discursive, therefore, is commonly 
referred to as “verbal” or “written” communication because, like this paragraph and texts 
[such as Economic Consequences,+ it aims to convey one idea after another.’80 
Conversely, non-discursive communication is free of such ordering. The main 
differences from discursive communication are: it is primarily reliant on image; has an 
immediate impact; and is often employed to symbolise what cannot be said or written 
directly by the discursive ordering of words. Murray argues, rhetoric and the symbols we 
use for purposes of persuasion include more than the ordered, grammatical and codified 
linearity of discursive text.81 While it can be difficult to separate discursive from non-
discursive forms of symbolisation, because the line between the two is often blurry, ‘both 
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have elements of each other to some degree.’82 However, the advantage of considering 
non-discursive texts is that ‘all possibilities of symbolization become tools for the rhetor: 
the symbols of math, music, textiles, food, poetry, commerce, violence, action, and even 
silence.’83  
In Chapters Five and Six it will be demonstrated how Keynes used a variety of 
rhetoric, including conventional discursive writing but also poetry and statistics as explicit 
ways of persuading his readers. As a committed patron of the arts Keynes would have 
understood the difference between discursive and non-discursive rhetoric, and on those 
occasions where he appeared on film or radio, for example, he would have appreciated 
the immediacy with which non-discursive rhetoric could reach an audience.  
3.3.2.3. Metaphor, Analogies and Allusions 
Although Keynes’ primary means of communication was discursive, his regular, and at 
times flamboyant use of metaphors, including analogies and allusions, demonstrates he 
understood the importance of symbolism and images which makes the metaphor, when 
used correctly, a powerful literary tool. According to the Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry 
and Poetics the nature and definition of metaphorical terms and relations between them 
have ‘both been a matter for much speculation and disagreement.’84 The metaphorical 
relation has been variously described as ‘comparison, contrast, analogy, similarity, 
juxtaposition, identity, tension, collision fusion and different views have been held 
regarding nature, operation and the function of the metaphor.’85 In recent years there has 
been a growing acceptance the metaphor is the  
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radical process in which the internal relationships peculiar to poetry 
are achieved; some critics maintaining that metaphor marks off the 
poetics mode of visions and utterances from the logical or discursive 
mode; other; usually anthropological evidence, that all language is 
metaphorical.  
The traditional view of metaphor (in poetics and prose), however, is ‘it is a figure of 
speech, or a family of tropes, involving two (and occasionally four) operative terms, and 
that it is used for adornment, liveliness, elucidation, or agreeable mystification.’86  
Frye refers to this metaphorical process as tapping into the “imaginative cosmos,” 
which is neither the objective environment studied by natural science nor the subjective 
inner space studied by psychology.87 This ‘imaginative cosmos’ is a creation of the reading 
process itself. Frye argues, ‘when we read (or otherwise examine) a verbal structure, our 
attention is going in two directions at once.’88 One direction is centripetal, trying to make 
sense of the words we are reading. The other is centrifugal, gathering up from memory 
the conventional meanings of the words used in the world of language outside the work 
being read. The resulting “imaginative cosmos” in the reader’s mind, is an ‘intermediate 
world in which images of higher and lower, the categories of beauty and ugliness, the 
feelings of love and hatred, the associations of sense experience, can be expressed only by 
metaphor.’89 
This central place of metaphor in literature might best be explained by describing 
literature as the art and content of words. The student of literature might be interested 
primarily in the art of words or in the content of the words themselves. If the interest is in 
the content the student is drawn in the direction of linguistics and semiotics where, ‘the 
                                                             
86
 Preminger, (1974, p. 490). 
87
 Frye, (1990, p. xxii). 
88
 Frye, (1990, p. 3). 
89
 Frye, (1990, p. xxii). 
 Page 88 
8-Jun-11 
ordinary boundary terms that we commonly use within verbal structures begin to 
dissolve.’90 On the other hand, if the art of literature is emphasised, rather than the words 
used, there is a common-sense practical distinction indicating an area of words different 
from other areas so that  
in this distinction Keats, let us say, is a poet and not a philosopher, 
and Kant is a philosopher and not a poet. We recall Magritte’s highly 
representational picture of a pipe, which he called “this Is Not a Pipe.” 
A picture is a picture, and cannot be identified with or defined by its 
representational content. Similarly, a work of literature cannot be 
identified with what it says: whatever is “said” in literature belongs to 
ideology and rhetoric, not to the poetic as such.91 
In simple terms the literary style is of interest to the student of the art of literature 
whereas it is content that interests the linguistics student. For example, we can examine 
Economic Consequences as a body of economic content and treat the book as a text on 
the proceedings and terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the economic consequences. Or, 
we can examine the book’s style and in so doing uncover an entirely different layer of 
meaning, as we will see in Chapter Six. Frye argues that both elements, content and style, 
make up the language that intensifies consciousness and ‘all intensified language sooner 
or later turns metaphorical, and literature is not only the obvious but the inescapable 
guide to higher journeys of consciousness.’92 In simple terms again, the use of metaphor 
gives a literary work a certain ‘style’ but also intensifies consciousness because it gives 
meaning to content. 
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Of course “metaphorical” is ‘as treacherous a conception’ as “truth” or “reality” 
could ever be. 93 Some metaphors are illuminating; some are merely indispensable; some 
are misleading or lead to illusion; some are socially dangerous. For example, ‘Wallace 
Stevens speaks of “the metaphor that murders metaphor.” But for better or worse it 
occupies a central area – perhaps the central area – of both social and individual 
experience.’94 Frye argues it is a primitive form of awareness, established long before the 
distinction of subject and object became normal, ‘but when we try to outgrow it we find 
that all we can really do is rehabilitate it.’95  
3.3.3. Economics and Literature 
It has been highlighted that the nineteenth century casts a long shadow over the 
twentieth as it was a crucial period for both the development of economics as a discipline 
and the first serious attempt at disseminating economic ideas to wider audiences beyond 
scholarly communities, a process closely linked to the development of literature and 
learning. Bigelow argues a major shift in thinking about economics took place during this 
period and modern economic theory was ‘formed not simply in the private studies of 
Victorian political economists, but in a broad matrix of philosophical literary debate.’96 He 
supports this argument by examining a number of literary texts, specifically novels, from 
the Victorian era. These include Dickens’ Bleak House and Elizabeth Gaskell’s Mary Barton, 
Cranford and North and South97. Based on these works Bigelow traces how an idealised 
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view of economics developed into an appreciation by economists of how an economy 
functions. This emerging “romantic” vision of markets and market forces, over time, 
moved from an idealised world to views that ultimately helped shape modern economic 
theory.  
Klaver also recognises the importance of the nineteenth century literary influence 
on the communication and spread of economic ideas. Her analysis attempts to contest the 
traditional histories that trace the progress of economic thought, through the increasing 
rationalisation, mathematisation and specialisation of economic theory from Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo through Jevons and Alfred Marshall. This is because, she argues 
in nineteenth century culture, theories about the social – including 
production, distribution, and consumption of material wealth – found 
little support when they were not embedded in the very discourses of 
morality, providentialism, and nationalism from which, according to 
such histories, economic theory had already been disaggregated.98 
The nineteenth century is, according to Klaver, a complex moment in the history of 
economic discourse with three threads constituting the significance of this complexity. 
First, there is the emergence and convergence of scientific and economic modes of 
thought in such ways that scientific forms of knowledge about the economy began to 
attain a new kind of cultural authority. Second, this convergence took a number of 
material discursive forms from the time of Dickens’ novels, which often contested the 
authority of political economy, through to the time of Jevons’ mathematisation of 
economic theory and to a point at which economics became its own discipline free from 
political economy. The third thread in this critical historical moment is the discourse of 
morality, ethics, and virtue. Klaver sets about her task by laying out the basic history and 
historiography of classical or scientific political economy, beginning with a discussion of 
Ricardo rather than Smith as, she believes, Ricardo more than any of the political 
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economists who preceded him, attempted to separate economic concerns from their 
broader moral, social and political contexts. Klaver shows how John Ramsey McCulloch 
successfully adapted Ricardian theory to more familiar genres and more readable prose 
but in the process altered the content of Ricardian economics. While Ricardo strove to be 
aggressively amoral, McCulloch’s writing relied on large narrative structures that explicitly 
remoralised the stakes of profit and loss and of scientific knowledge itself. McCulloch 
created for economic theory a moral urgency that appealed directly to his reader’s beliefs 
and fears. However, in successfully reaching a non-specialised public, McCulloch 
transgressed ‘Ricardo’s most fundamental economic laws.’99  
Another Victorian contemporary of McCulloch, Harriet Martineau, also had 
ambitions for educating the public. She wrote twenty-five novellas with the aim of 
illustrating the whole science of political economy, beginning with its basic definitions and 
principles and continuing through the more complex permutations of economic law in the 
final volumes. But, like McCulloch, Martineau’s novellas often distorted the underlying 
economic theory. Whereas Martineau’s novellas could appeal to an even wider range of 
readers than McCulloch, ‘their reliance on the conventions of popular narrative fiction 
further complicated the theoretical core of her message.’100 Because the generic 
conventions of such fiction were so far removed from the scientific tradition in which 
Ricardo’s ideas were developed, Martineau’s stories were riddled with tensions between 
the formal demands and expectations of the divergent traditions. Both Martineau and 
McCulloch’s writings also had the effect of placing economic theory back within the moral, 
social, and political discourses from which Ricardo had so painstakingly isolated it. This 
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reinforces Robert Solow’s concern that when attempts are made to spread ideas to the 
public, especially the lay public, they often end up as ‘ideas that turn to mush.’101 
Kaufmann argues, the communication of ideas was directly affected by the rapid 
growth and institutional consolidation of commercial capitalism during the nineteenth 
century.102 Demand for new descriptions and explanations of the economy, state morality, 
and citizenship grew with the increasingly rationalised public sphere. Kaufmann finds it no 
surprise that the 34-year period between the publication of Malthus’s first Essay and The 
Great Reform Act was the same period when economics and the novel gained intellectual 
and critical respectability. The forces that unleashed the demand for literary explanations 
included periodic depressions, the agitation for Catholic emancipation, general 
institutional reform and the later repeal of the Corn Laws. These together questioned the 
legitimacy of existing institutions and helped pave the way for writers such as Keynes to 
continue in the tradition of nineteenth century literary explanations but to also propose 
change and reform in new and fresh ways. 
An examination of the works of Bigelow, Klaver and Kaufmann103 demonstrates 
there is a rich tradition of economic writing that reaches back to professional economists 
such as Ricardo, Malthus, Jevons, Marshall, Malthus and Mill as well as novelists such as 
Dickens, Gaskell, Martineau, Carlyle, and Ruskin. It also highlights how the nineteenth 
century holds an important place for literature and the communication of economic ideas 
to wider audiences. Keynes respected these traditions, which is especially clear when 
examining Economic Consequences. However, as Chapters Five to Seven demonstrate, 
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while Keynes built on this foundation he did so in innovative and new ways of writing 
about economics.  
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3.4. The Tradition of the Communication of Economists’ Ideas 
As was the norm, and highlighted above, Keynes received training in the classics and 
would have been taught the importance of the “rules of rhetoric.”104 That he went on to 
apply what he learned is without dispute. Keynes was explicit in attempts at persuasion 
and “expressed himself with eloquence.” As if to make the point, in 1931 Keynes 
published in one book, Essays in Persuasion, a selection from his attempts at persuading 
public opinion. But Keynes’ training in the classics and use of rhetoric as means of 
persuasion, were not unique for an economist. Keynes stood on the shoulders of some 
important individuals, which raises the question, what can usefully be learnt from 
studying the activities of economists who explicitly sought to communicate their ideas? 
Such an examination also enables us to address one of Collini’s concerns. Unlike some 
scholars who date the activities of public intellectuals to the Dreyfus Affair in France, 
Collini argues, intellectuals often played a public role well before the nineteenth 
century.105 Furthermore ‘there can be no doubt that at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century the term itself is alive and well and living in the English language.’106  
An examination of a selection of Keynes’ predecessors and contemporaries reveals 
at least five who meet Collini’s criteria for a public intellectual: Adam Smith (1724 to 
1790), David Ricardo (1772 to 1823), John Stuart Mill (1806 to 1873), Karl Marx (1818 to 
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1883), and Alfred Marshall (1842 to 1924). All had achieved intellectually; all spoke to the 
publics of their day using the available information channels; all established reputations 
for saying important and interesting things on the general concerns of the public; all 
became leading cultural figures (as far as economics is concerned); all created original 
economic ideas; and all became shapers of opinion.  
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3.4.1. Adam Smith 
The intellectual achievements of Adam Smith are well documented with his best known 
book being An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Wealth of 
Nations). Published in 1776, ‘this book is said to have established economics as an 
autonomous subject and, at the same time, to have launched the doctrine of free 
enterprise upon an unsuspecting world.’107 While this seminal book is viewed as the first 
comprehensive system of political economy Smith could be regarded more as a social 
philosopher than one of the founders of economics. Smith’s economic writings constitute 
only the ‘capstone’ to an overarching view of political and social evolution. When this 
masterwork is viewed in relation to Smith’s earlier lectures on moral philosophy and 
government, to allusions in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) for a work he hoped to 
write on the “general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions 
they have undergone in the different ages and periods of society,” ‘then The Wealth of 
Nations may be seen not merely as a treatise on economics but as a partial exposition of a 
much larger scheme of historical evolution.’108 Furthermore, with the publication of The 
Complete Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith (1976-81) by the University of 
Glasgow new light has been thrown on Smith’s total output, and this suggests he was ‘a 
system-builder on a grand scale,’109 something more than just an economist. 
Nevertheless, The Wealth of Nations is the record of Smith’s most mature thought and 
was the most comprehensive attempt in his lifetime to analyse the workings of 
“commercial society,” as it was then called, or the “capitalist economy,” as it is now called. 
The book laid down a mode of treating questions of value and distribution that shaped the 
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entire course of economic thinking until the “marginal revolution” of the 1870s, ‘founding, 
in fact, a distinct school of English classical political economy.’110 
While this contribution to economics is an important and lasting one, if Smith’s 
role as a public intellectual is to be better understood, an examination of how he was 
received in his own time and what accounted for the popular success he enjoyed, is also 
needed. One of the first instances of his coming to the public’s attention was in 1748, at 
the age of 25, when invited to give a series of public lectures in Edinburgh, with the 
support of three men – the Lord Advocate, Henry Home, Lord Kames, and a childhood 
friend, James Oswald. The lectures, which are thought to have been primarily concerned 
with rhetoric and belles lettres (in today’s parlance, literary criticism), earned Smith £100 a 
year and are thought to have been of a wide-ranging nature. 111 
His reputation as a lecturer soon led to election to the Chair of Logic at Glasgow 
University, again with the support of Lord Kames. According to John Millar, Smith’s most 
distinguished pupil, much of his time was devoted to the delivery of a system of rhetoric 
and belles lettres, which was based on the conviction that the best way of  
explaining and illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the 
most useful part of metaphysics, arises from an examination of the 
several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an 
attention to the principles of those literary compositions which 
contribute to persuasion or entertainment.112 
A set of lectures discovered by Lothian in 1958, relate to a lecture session during 1762/3 
and show the concern Smith had with such problems as the development of language, 
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style and the organisation of forms of discourse which include the oratorical, narrative 
and didactical. Eatwell argues ‘Smith was primarily concerned with the study of human 
nature and with the analysis of the means and forms of communication.’113 Smith’s 
lectures on language were also published in expanded form as Considerations Concerning 
the First Formation of Language, in the third edition of the Theory of Moral Sentiments in 
1767. The first edition of this book in 1759 was well received by both the public and 
Smith’s friends. Hume, a close friend of Smith’s, reminded him of the futility of fame and 
public approbation, and having encouraged him to be a philosopher in practice as well as 
profession, wrote: 
Supposing therefore, that you have duly prepared yourself for the 
worst by these Reflections; I proceed to tell you the Melancholy 
News, that your book has been most unfortunate: For the Public 
seem disposed to applaud it extremely (Correspondence letter 31, 
dated 12 April 1759.)114 
This book was to establish Smith’s reputation with revised editions in 1761, 1767, 1774, 
1781 and 1790.115 
Wealth of Nations was published on 9 March 1776, and once more received a 
warm response from Hume: 
Dear Mr. Smith: I am much pleas’d with your Performance, and the 
perusal of it has taken me from a State of great Anxiety. It was a Work 
of so much Expectation, by yourself, by your Friends, and by the 
Public, that I trembled for its Appearance; but am now much relieved. 
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Not but the Reading of it necessarily requires so much Attention, and 
the Public is disposed to give so little, that I shall still doubt for some 
time of its being at first very popular (Correspondence letter 150, 
dated 1 April 1776).116 
In fact, the book sold well, with subsequent editions in 1778, 1784, 1786 and 1789. Price 
argues that ‘unlike the mass of economic writing *Wealth of Nations] established itself in 
the affections of the layman as well as the expert’ and enjoyed its status as a ‘classic’ piece 
of literature and ‘a crown of abiding glory.’ 117 
Price believes there are two reasons for this. First, the book is a literary text as well 
as a scientific treatise. This approach has its critics and as Price acknowledges there are 
those who say ‘Political Economy in its scientific character has suffered from the literary 
treatment, which it has often received at the hands of practiced writers, who wield the 
effective instrument of a facile pen.’ Such critics argue, the accuracy of reasoning is 
sacrificed to ‘finish of expression’ and has permitted sciolists to enter the domains of 
science. While Price also argues Smith would most likely have shared these concerns, 
nevertheless, Wealth of Nations ‘has a charm in its composition which reveals the literary 
artist, and that the happiness of many of its phrases has aided the recollection of what 
would otherwise have been speedily forgotten.’ Its language is simple and clear with an 
unmistakable reality in his writing. Furthermore, Price argues, despite the drawbacks of 
the literary approach ‘the layman will concern himself more closely and frequently with *a 
well written composition] than with most other sciences, and that he will be attracted by 
grace, and deterred by awkwardness of composition.’ 118 
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Second, despite the temptation to do otherwise, Smith adheres to the principle of 
‘scientific exactitude.’ Smith kept focused clearly on the exposition of the theory of 
economics, which ‘must be carefully distinguished from its application in practice … the 
‘theoretical expositor’ must sternly preserve himself from the dangerous and 
deteriorating influence of motive or purpose of a practical nature. He must pursue truth 
and truth alone, turning neither to the right hand nor to the left.’ Price also argues Smith’s 
‘one dominant motive and one ruling purpose’ was his ‘passion’ for freedom. Not only 
does this, in Smith’s case, ‘render the writer a cogent arguer but means his readers are 
willing listeners which lends a force to his book in the form of accurate reasoning.’119 In 
short, Smith did not compromise his science to literary gimmicks but rather blended his 
commitment to his science with knowledge that good literary technique is essential to 
communicating ideas. 
When comparing Smith to Keynes there are many attributes that ensured similar 
success in the communication of their ideas. First, as intellectuals, both Smith and Keynes 
performed a public role reaching out beyond the discipline of economics. They both used 
available communication channels so as to spread their ideas, especially in the area of 
literary output where their ideas were most effectively disseminated. They also expressed 
views that concerned the general public and both enjoyed a track record of saying 
important and interesting things on the general concerns of the public. Both understood 
the importance of rhetoric as the means for persuading their reading public(s): Smith was 
a teacher of the subject while Keynes explicitly stated its importance in communicating his 
ideas. And, both were criticised for putting literary method ahead of their scientific 
principles, yet were able to demonstrate their commitment to scientific exactitude did not 
come at the cost of communication methods. On the contrary both men found a way to 
span the two cultures of art and science, thus enabling them to spread their ideas beyond 
an élite group of similarly minded economists. 
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3.4.2. David Ricardo 
Whereas Smith won the hearts and minds of contemporaries and the lay public through 
the way his ideas were presented, in language they could understand and through his 
public visibility, Ricardo achieved public fame in quite different ways. This is all the more 
remarkable because ‘among the post-Waterloo political economists the advocates of the 
complete Ricardian case were almost ludicrously few.’ So uphill was the task of 
conversion, Checkland argues, on Ricardo’s death in 1823 James Mill could write to 
M’Culloch that they were his ‘two and only genuine disciples.’120 But he was well known 
during his own lifetime. For example, The Times, reported, shortly following Ricardo’s 
death, ‘Mr. Ricardo was one of the ablest men the country has seen for many years.’121 
Ricardo’s fame from 1815 onwards followed his gradual retirement from his 
position as jobber on the stock market and loan contractor for government stock.122 
Ricardo’s retirement coincided with Britain finding itself the leading industrial power of 
the day. Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo ended a quarter century of civil and international 
warfare and France ceased to be a threat to British leadership, finding themselves a 
diminished power in European affairs. Germany was a semi-feudal state without political 
unity and still half a century away from its own industrial revolution. The United States of 
America remained an economic colony of Great Britain long after it had won political 
independence so that ‘in the century from 1815 to 1914 it was in a true sense a “British 
century” *whose+ hegemony rested upon industrial supremacy [and] England the 
“workshop of the world”’123 
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However, the supremacy of Britain’s lead remained under threat for the three 
decades following Waterloo. This threat to economic development came from within the 
country itself. Despite the Industrial Revolution, the majority of Englishmen still pursued 
rural occupations, and the landowning class still dominated political life. Agricultural and 
commercial interests struggled against the representatives of industrial capitalism 
throughout this period and in 1815 the focus of the struggle was upon the Corn Laws. 
Dillard argues that one of reasons for the popularity of Ricardo’s doctrines ‘lay in their 
practical usefulness to the industrial capitalist class, especially in the historic corn-law 
issue.’124 Ricardo’s views had been set down in a slim tract published in 1815 and entitled 
“An Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock.” Within two 
years he published a more substantial work On The Principles of Political Economy. These 
were not the first times Ricardo had written on economic matters, for he had long been in 
correspondence with leading figures of the day, and as early as 1809 he had written an 
anonymous article on “The Price of Gold” for the Morning Chronicle. But, as Gudeman 
points out, Ricardo’s renown as an economist undoubtedly dates from the period when he 
withdrew from active participation in the City of London and devoted himself more 
intensively to economic problems of the times. 
Ricardo usually linked his theoretical constructions to topical issues, such as the 
price of bullion or taxation policies. Gudeman argues, ‘in the history of economics perhaps 
only John Maynard Keynes rivalled Ricardo in the ability to combine an immensely 
successful financial career with political involvement and contributions to economic 
thought of the first magnitude.’125 Like Keynes he was highly regarded for his work in the 
area of economic analysis. Both Ricardo and Keynes had become well known as a result of 
their writing on topical economic concerns of the day. Whereas Keynes achieved public 
attention following publication of Economic Consequences, Ricardo enjoyed a public 
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profile following his tract of 1815. He also applied himself to the then pressing issue in 
England, the Corn Laws.  
As the Napoleonic War drew to a close, conflict between the landowning and 
manufacturing classes was beginning to emerge. Landowners still dominated England at 
this time, but mechanisation had begun, and the iron, coal, and textile industries were 
growing. In the same period a series of poor harvests and an expanding population were 
combining to drive up the price of agricultural goods. In 1815 Parliament debated and 
passed a bill that put tariffs on the import of corn. Corn, which referred to small grains 
such as oats, wheat, and barley, was used to make bread and though estimates vary, 
bread probably constituted 40 to 60 per cent of a worker’s total expenditure.126 A tariff on 
corn would make bread even more costly and either lower a worker’s real wages or raise 
the wage cost to employers. Tariffs, then, were opposed by capitalists and labourers but 
were supported by landowners. In his essay, Ricardo devised a model to reveal the 
economic basis of this clash, and he used it to justify low tariffs and support for the 
capitalist class. 
The literature on the Essay and its place within Ricardian thought ‘is now 
substantial, and the interpretations are so various as not to admit of compromise.’127 
According to some observers the Essay represents the first time a model was used 
explicitly in economics. However, the success of Ricardo’s Essay is that he drew upon and 
developed certain cultural styles of exposition so as to make the changing British 
experience understandable to his readers. Gudeman maintains, ‘their use allowed him to 
communicate a vision of the economic process to a specific audience.’128 Ricardo, 
however, offered the model as a faithful reproduction of the world, a mirror of the inner 
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workings of the economy. For him the model’s usefulness lay in the precision with which it 
reproduced reality, and because the model was realistic it had a rightful call upon 
behaviour. Gudeman argues Ricardo intended his model to be used and for this to happen 
he needed to ensure it was a persuasive statement or ‘pleasing’ to his audience. He 
achieved this by presenting his model within a known style utilising paradox and in a way 
recognisable to the English public. 
It would, however, be a mistake to leave a discussion of Ricardo with the 
impression that it was through his literary style he came to fame. Most agree with 
Hollander that what he describes as Ricardo’s “mental dissociation” is what marks him out 
as the preeminent economic thinker of his day. Gudeman states, ‘Ricardo was able to view 
– to the extent that no economist before or since has attained – a complex phenomenon, 
to single out therefrom one primary element, and to trace its ultimate course free from 
the modifying or counteracting influence of opposing forces.’129 Hollander argues, the skill 
he brought to bear in his writing was ‘devoid of literary skill either as to plan or style’ but 
it was effective writing because of its compact phrasing and often ‘paradox-like whip.’130 
From James Mill, Ricardo had learned that which Rousseau had confessed to Hume and 
which Hume had repeated to Burke: “The secret of exciting the attention of mankind was 
the employment of paradoxes.” Ricardo used paradoxical phrases such as; “the 
compatibility of a rise of wages, with a fall of prices;” “population always increases or 
diminishes with the increase or diminution of capital;” and “the landlord is doubly 
benefited by difficulty of production.”131 
However, as well known as Ricardo became through his own writing and model 
building, without the ‘intellectual tenacity, the irrepressible enthusiasm, and the 
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propagandist activity’ of the group of friends, disciples and expositors who surrounded 
him, his views may not have become as widespread as they did.132 Whereas Adam Smith 
made political converts and Dugald Stewart aroused student enthusiasm, Ricardo ‘won 
aggressive disciples.’133 McCulloch was one such convert and almost from his first contact 
with Ricardo during June 1816, he became a ‘prolific and energetic expositor.’ From 1817 
to 1827 he wrote economic articles for the Scotsman, and for two years (1818-1820) he 
was editor of the journal. He became principal economic reviewer of the Edinburgh in 
1818, and continued in this role for twenty years. He contributed important articles to the 
“Supplement of the Encyclopaedia Britannica” in 1818-24, and to successive editions 
thereafter. McCulloch conducted classes and gave lectures on the study of political 
economy in Edinburgh and London to ‘large audiences of Noblemen, Gentlemen, 
Merchants, and others.’ In 1824 he was the first Ricardo Memorial Lecturer, and in 1828 
he was appointed to the chair of political economy in University College. He wrote many 
books and pamphlets, compiled useful manuals, and rendered important editorial services 
and ‘for two generations, or certainly until John Stuart Mill’s apogee, McCulloch was the 
veritable keeper of the economic conscience of England; and McCulloch’s exposition was 
dogmatically, aggressively Ricardian.’134 
From this synopsis we once again see influences that were to play a part in shaping 
Keynes’ literary style. For example, Keynes related to both Ricardo’s rigid adherence to 
‘scientific exactitude’ in developing his economic theories, while at the same time 
developing his own style of communication. While Keynes set out a different stylistic 
course, he remained cognisant of the importance of style in developing persuasive 
rhetoric. Furthermore, both men have cemented their places as public intellectuals 
because they both appealed directly to the public sphere by addressing economic 
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concerns of the day. The only contrast between Ricardo and Keynes was that Ricardo’s 
ideas were quickly taken up and disseminated by a group of disciples, something that only 
began to occur for Keynes almost twenty years following publication of Economic 
Consequences. 
3.4.3. John Stuart Mill  
Whereas Ricardo came to the attention of the public primarily through promotion by his 
disciples, Mill, like Keynes, achieved a public persona through his own endeavours. After a 
visit to Paris, during the autumn of 1830, when just 24, Mill became a regular contributor 
to the main periodicals and newspapers of the day. A series of articles on “The Spirit of 
the Age” appeared in The Examiner during 1831. From 1832 to 1833 he contributed many 
essays to Tait’s Magazine, The Jurist, and The Monthly Repository. In 1835 Sir William 
Molesworth founded The London Review, with Mill as editor. It was amalgamated with 
The Westminster, as The London and Westminster Review, in 1836, and Mill continued as 
editor and later as proprietor, until 1840. During and after 1840 he published several 
important articles in The Edinburgh Review. Some of the essays written for these journals 
were reprinted in the first two volumes of Mill’s Dissertations and Discussions (1859), 
which demonstrated the increasing width of his interests.135  
During these years Mill also wrote his great systematic works on logic and political 
economy. His reawakened enthusiasm for humanity had taken shape as an aspiration to 
supply an unimpeachable method of proof for conclusions in moral and social sciences. 
Aside from the influences on him, such as the French positivist philosopher/sociologist 
Comte, the English scientist and mathematician Newton and British philosophers such as 
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Locke, Hume, Bentham, and his own father, James Mill, he was determined the new logic 
should not simply oppose the old. At the age of 36 he made a name for himself with the 
publication in two volumes of A System of Logic, which was published in 1843.136 His 
reputation was further enhanced in 1848 by his treatise Principles of Political Economy.137 
He lived for a further 25 years, during which his authority as an economist was unrivalled 
in his own country. Blaug argues that throughout the last half of the nineteenth century, 
during almost the whole of the Victorian age right up to the publication of Marshall’s 
Principles (1890), Principles of Political Economy was the leading economic textbook of the 
English-speaking world. According to Blaug it drew its enormous appeal from its extensive 
coverage of contemporary economic issues: its judicious blending of economic analysis 
and historical illustrations; from its masterful synthesis of Ricardian doctrine with many of 
the qualifications introduced by Ricardo’s critics; 
its radical tone contained within the orthodox framework; its elegant 
style, and from the reputation of Mill as a logician, philosopher, 
political theorist and belle lettrist. Here was no mere economist but a 
leading Benthamite, a ‘saint of liberalism,’ and a figure that towered 
over the intellectuals of his time in almost every area of debate.138 
Following his retirement from official life, as head of the examiner’s office of the 
British East India Company, until its dissolution in 1858, Mill published a series of books on 
ethics and politics partly written in collaboration with his wife. The essay On Liberty 
appeared in 1859 and the Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform in the same year. In his 
Considerations on Representative Government (1861) he systematised opinions already 
put forward in many casual articles and essays. Mill also began to write again on the wider 
philosophical questions that had occupied him in the Logic. In the same year he entered 
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Parliament, 1865, he published both his Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy 
and Auguste Comte and Positivism. A news item from The Times of the same year 
illustrates how popular Mill had become: 
Last evening the first public meeting called for the election at 
Westminster to hear Mr. John Stuart Mill was held in St. Jame’s hall. 
The spacious hall was crowded almost as soon as the doors were 
open. Mr. Mill, on rising to address the meeting, was received with 
utmost enthusiasm. The people rose en masse, and waved their hats 
and cheered, and again and again renewed the cheers.139 
Mill left Parliament in 1868 and retired to Avignon where he continued to write, with 
influence, until his death in 1873. 
McHenry argues, Mill’s legacy has continued and grown into modern times and his 
‘name continually crops up in philosophical discussions.’ This is partly due to his offering a 
body of doctrine and a set of technical terms on many subjects, notably on induction, that 
have proved ‘extremely useful in the classroom.’ But a more important reason is that he 
has come to be regarded as a ‘sort of personification of certain tendencies in philosophy 
that it is regarded as continually necessary to expound or expose because they make such 
a powerful appeal to serious minds.’ 140 Schwartz argues, as far as studying Mill’s 
economic doctrine is concerned, the best course is to organise it around his theory of 
social and economic policy. Economics had acquired the reputation of being a cruel 
science focused on the acquisition of wealth through hard work and selfishness and ‘in 
Carlyle’s phrase, it was ‘the dismal science.’’ Mill wanted to change it into a doctrine of 
hope, one that was not merely reformist, as with his masters, but progressive in the 
widest sense of the word. His efforts at transforming it centred mainly on practical 
questions involving important theoretical innovations. Schwartz concludes, ‘this attempt 
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at transforming the character of economics must be the centre of any study of Mill’s social 
thought.’141 
Like Smith and Ricardo, Mill also established himself as an influential public 
intellectual who spoke out on numerous occasions on general matters of interest to the 
public. Like Keynes, Mill amassed an impressive literary output, influencing his and future 
generations. Furthermore, his concern and compassion in relation to social issues of the 
day meant he, like Keynes, bridged the cultural divide between science and art when 
communicating his economic ideas. 
3.4.4. Karl Marx 
Of all the economists with a public persona during their lifetime, Marx stands out as the 
most controversial figure. Bronfenbrenner argues, ‘nowhere has he been easily forgotten, 
and Das Kapital (Capital) is still the most influential unread book in existence.’142 
Moreover many know him for his views and writings on philosophy and politics rather 
than economics. Blaug argues, ‘It has become popular to say that Marx was no mere 
economist but an all-round social scientist who integrated economics, sociology, political 
science, history and even anthropology.’143 There are few, if any elements, of his system 
which cannot be found in embryo in one or another predecessor. Marx’s genius lay, ‘like 
Keynes, in synthesis, in combining bits and pieces from one and another system into a 
whole greater than the sum of its parts.’144 There are numerous books about Marx that 
hardly mention his economic ideas. Yet, in comparison to his writings on economics, Marx 
wrote very little on the concept of social class, the theory of the state, and the materialist 
conception of history. He did however write literally 10,000 pages on economics, which 
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was the only social science he professed to have mastered in all its aspects. Blaug argues, 
‘let there be no doubt, Marx was a great economist.’145 Even if we reject his fundamental 
Marxist schema and many, if not all, his central conclusions, Capital, in particular, contains 
much analysis from which modern economists can still learn. For example, Marx’s list of 
economic concerns include: the growth of large-scale enterprise; the separation of 
ownership and control this entails; the functional role of unemployment as a method of 
disciplining workers under capitalism; the significance of changes in money wages in the 
course of the business cycle; the inherent periodicity of the business cycle; and the effect 
of technical progress. This is by no means an exhaustive list. 
Most agree, however, while his writings are prolific and he displays the abstract 
power of economic reasoning reserved for just a few, such as Ricardo, his writing is 
convincing because of ‘occasional flashes of brilliant rhetoric,’ that anticipated Keynes. 
Furthermore, Marx is able in just a few pages to give vivid descriptions of the misery of 
the working classes under capitalism, and the apocalyptic vision that promised the demise 
of capitalism with all the confidence of a prediction in the natural sciences. 146 Like Keynes, 
whose activities as a journalist contributed to his effective communication to the public, 
Marx’s time spent in journalistic activities helped shape and hone the literary techniques 
underpinning his more academic reasoning and analysis. 
While a student at the Universities of Bonn, Berlin and Jena he began to associate 
with the Young Hegelians, a group of intellectuals who were radicalising the philosophy of 
Hegel into a weapon of fierce social criticism. So inflammatory were some of his early 
articles Marx soon lost any chance of an academic career, turning instead to journalism.147 
Forced to flee Germany in 1843 by the suppression of the newspaper he was editing, he 
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settled in Paris, then Brussels, and finally in 1848 in London. He remained in London for 
the rest of his life, turning occasionally to journalism so as to alleviate the material misery 
he and his family lived in as well as trying to maintain his household in the middle class 
comfort to which they were accustomed. Despite the lack of any regular and sufficient 
income, he did have one relatively steady source of earned income in the United States, 
becoming The New York Tribune’s European correspondent in 1851. The newspaper was 
sympathetic towards Fourier’s utopian socialism. From 1851 to 1862 Marx contributed 
close to 500 articles and editorials, in which Engels collaborated in the writing of a 
quarter. 
These journalistic contributions gave Marx a platform for explaining to the public 
his ideas on a variety of topical issues in addition to some of his more abstract and 
theoretical opinions with his contribution as a public intellectual coming primarily from 
the power of his writing. But times change rapidly, even in an author’s own lifetime 
something sometimes conspires to make previous arguments seem out of touch. This is 
Neilson’s argument when comparing Marx and Engel’s pamphlet The Communist 
Manifesto with the appearance of the first edition of his magnum opus Das Kapital 
(Capital). In 1848 the Manifesto appeared at a time of social upheaval throughout Europe 
and its message seemed an appropriate clarion call for change. Manifesto enunciated the 
proposition that all history had hitherto been a history of class struggles and asserted the 
forthcoming victory of the proletariat would put an end to class society All forms of 
socialism were mercilessly criticised as being founded on philosophical “cobwebs” and 
“alienation.” The avenues of “social utopias” were rejected as small experiments in 
community, deadening the class struggle and therefore were “reactionary sects.” Ten 
immediate measures were set forth as first steps towards communism, ranging from a 
progressive income tax and the abolition of inheritances to free education for all children. 
The pamphlet closed with the, now well-known and famous words: “The proletarians have 
nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Workingmen in all countries, 
unite!” 
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These messages resonated with many in 1848 but nineteen years later times had 
changed as the process of industrialisation affected the lives of many who previously 
subscribed to Marx’s views. While Marx and his followers failed to acknowledge this 
process of change and its challenge to the relevance of Marx’s views, the work of reform, 
particularly in Great Britain had undermined some of the theories Marx formulated and 
nearly all the conclusions he had arrived at. Neilson argues, 
the improvement that took place in labour conditions between the 
time when the Communist Manifesto was issued in 1848 and the 
publication of Capital in 1867 made all the difference between the 
prophecies laid down in the former and the declarations he reached 
in the latter.148  
Government statistics showed, and the annals of Parliament revealed, while Marx was 
writing, the conditions of the working classes were gradually improving. Moreover, in 
some areas workers were amassing capital of their own and starting businesses for 
themselves. This change went on fairly steadily for the next two generations, ‘in spite of 
three depressions, [and] made the predictions ventured in the Communist Manifesto 
seem extravagant, if not absurd.’ Co-operative societies, building associations, penny 
banks, and numerous other institutions fostered by the workers themselves were 
‘springing up in every direction.’149 A strengthening and improving British economy was 
evidenced by a number of published statistics. For example, Parliamentary returns show 
the income tax in Great Britain for the year 1854 was 1s 2d in the pound. Twenty years 
later it was 2d in the pound. In 1865 the national indebtedness amounted to over 
£800,000,000; thirty-five years later it had been reduced by £160,000,000. Neither of 
these indicators touched working class individuals directly, because working class people 
did not, for example, pay this income tax but with material improvements it is ‘small 
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wonder that the British working man in those days did not accept the declarations and 
prophecies laid down in the Communist Manifesto.’ This is not to say or infer the working-
man had entered a paradise and was secure from poverty. But Marx had shown the 
working-man by his own efforts, without the cataclysm imagined by the authors of the 
Manifesto, could, if desired, make things better.150 
If it seemed in his own lifetime Marx had failed to change with the times the 
coming conflict of 1914 to 1918 was to change everything and bring Marx a degree of 
popularity in death that he never achieved in life. This is somewhat ironic as Marx had not 
made explicit any prophetic links to war as a consequence of the inequalities about which 
he wrote, although some commentators argue his was a prophetic mission.151 Much the 
same as Keynes was a prophet when he argued further revolution and conflict would 
follow should the terms of the Treaty be imposed on Germany. Furthermore, both men 
used apocalyptic language as a way of presenting their views. Whereas Keynes’ mission 
was to protect and preserve capitalism, albeit with reforms, his apocalyptic warning was 
that capitalism was significantly at risk of collapse due to the economic consequences of 
the Peace. Rothbard argues that Marx, on the other hand, had a vision of a new world 
order that needed to be ushered in through an apocalyptic end to human history, which 
had been a history of suffering, of class struggle and exploitation of man by man. In the 
same way as the return of the Messiah in Christian theology will put an end to history and 
establish a new heaven and new earth, so the establishment of communism would put an 
end to human history.152  
In messianic religious movements, the millennium is invariably established by a 
mighty, violent upheaval, an Armageddon, a great apocalyptic war between good and evil. 
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After this titanic struggle, a new millennium, a new age of peace and harmony and a new 
reign of justice, will be installed upon earth. Marx believed such an age was dawning and 
for him and other schools of communists, mankind, led by a vanguard of secular saints, 
would establish a secularised Kingdom of Heaven on earth. This was the sort of conflict 
and upheaval Keynes did not want but could see as inevitable. Both men had an 
apocalyptic vision of the world which was ultimately played out on the stage of the 
twentieth century, Marx and the success of communism during the inter-war period and 
Keynes who lived to see the unfolding conflict of World War Two. 
Today almost everyone will have heard the name Marx, although he was, states 
Irvine, relatively ‘unknown and unhated’at the time of his death. 153  Compare this to 
Keynes who, following publication of Economic Consequences, became a leading public 
figure but until the recent credit crisis enveloping the global economy was relatively 
unknown outside the community of economists. The two men share in common an ability 
to write for a public audience, most certainly as a result of their journalistic careers. They 
also wrote works that drew on an apocalyptic genre, appealing to the ‘imaginative 
cosmos’ that an effective use of metaphor creates. The dissemination of both men’s views 
owe much to the activities of their disciples as much as anything they did in their own 
lifetimes. Often the words and deeds of writers only remain known or become known 
because others take up their views, even if they may distort them in the process. As has 
been shown, Ricardo owes much of the spreading of his views to a group of dedicated 
followers in his own lifetime. Marx has enjoyed widespread diffusion of his ideas because 
of the dedication of Marxist disciples, although not in his lifetime. Keynes too, was to 
benefit from the work of disciples such as Harrod, Kahn and Robinson, the only difference 
being that, like Ricardo, these disciples took up their cause during the intellectual’s 
lifetime.  
                                                             
153
 Irvine, (1946, p. 54). 
 Page 115 
8-Jun-11 
3.4.5. Alfred Marshall  
Economists interested in Marshall’s contribution to economics often talk of “Marshall’s 
mission,” by which they mean his commitment to social reform. 154 Marshall himself 
explicitly states in his magnum opus, Principles of Economics, ‘the dominant aim of 
economics in the present generation is to contribute to a solution of social problems.’155 
Keynes identified the core challenge for Marshall as being ‘how to get rid of the evils of 
competition while retaining its advantages.’156 Such was the depth of Marshall’s 
commitment to alleviate the misery and degradation he observed among the English poor 
that his ethical speculations on these issues drove him into the economists camp.157 Levitt 
also argues his compassion for those who suffered from the ‘exigencies of the dismal 
science,’ never diminished from the first 1890 edition of his Principles through to its final 
revision in 1920. And he practiced what he preached, serving throughout his years on 
numerous Royal Commissions and for various causes to alleviate the plight of the poor 
and to improve the conditions of commerce that affected them.158 
Marshall’s view that economics could best address the social problems in society, 
also acted as the social reform driver, which defined his rhetoric and how he 
communicated his ideas. Groenewegen argues that, like Keynes, he did this by combining 
the roles of moralist, reformer scientist and even politician. All these roles were ‘always 
combined, constituting the one in many, sometimes the many in one.’159 He could preach 
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on the role of women, for the good of the race, and on free trade. He could moralise on 
the wickedness of gambling, the misplaced conspicuous consumption of the rich or the 
problems associated with alcohol. For example, when Marshall wrote to The Times in 
regard to published statistics on “Alcoholism and Efficiency,” rather than taking an 
economist’s viewpoint that alcoholism is a threat to efficiency, and so drunkards are to be 
avoided by employers, he challenged readers to see the problem as deeper than an 
individual being solely judged on his drinking problem, because people ‘probably did not 
start with equal advantages.’160 These moral campaigns also saw him advising on the 
political expediency of giving outdoor relief to the unemployed and the aged and inviting 
working-class leaders to Royal Commissions and other government advisory bodies.161 He 
could also discourse dispassionately on the difference between the particular expenses 
curve and supply curve, on the irreversibility of increasing returns over time, and on the 
complexities of marginal cost in relation to value. He wrote letters to The Times and other 
newspapers on the role of the post office and on the morality of the blockade against 
Germany during the First World War. Groenewegen argues, ‘in this way, he wished to 
serve his world, his nation, his students and his times.’162 This wish to be of service 
manifested itself in writing for the general public, whether it be theorist, businessman, or 
the philanthropic charity activist among the clergy in parish or bishop’s palace. 
Groenewegen argues this gave Principles the unusual distinction of being extensively 
reviewed in newspapers and periodicals and enabled his astonished publisher ‘to compare 
the sales performance of his Industry and Trade to that of a ‘shilling shocker.’163 For 
Marshall there was one overarching end, which was to elevate individual human dignity 
by lifting society’s standard of living. 
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Marshall, however, was no crusader for “amateur” economics; in fact he turned his 
back on the efforts of many of his “amateur” forebears, such as Martineau who sought to 
explain economic theory via novelettes. His commitment to the professionalisation of 
economics is well known and was itself enough to bring an end to “amateur economics.” 
Yet his ultimate objective was to secure a more humane capitalism and for Marshall this 
had to be undertaken in a manner that did not undermine the scholarly detachment and 
impartiality at the core of the newly instituted British Economic Association (BEA). The 
association represented the infant scientific discipline of economics, in contrast to the 
discipline of political economy of the day, by ushering in an era of scientific exactitude to 
the discipline of economics.  
While, as has been argued, it was his concern for social reform which underpins 
Marshall’s Principles, it was his focus on economics as a profession that led to the 
publication of this influential text. Publication has led many commentators to consider 
Marshall one of the most influential economists of his time, one who largely shaped 
mainstream economic thought for the next fifty years. For example, Marshall strongly 
influenced the codification of economic thought and brought to the attention of the public 
a number of elements that today lie at the heart of economics. He expanded on and 
explained the use of demand and supply functions as tools of price determination, 
previously discovered independently by Cournot. He was also an important part of the 
“marginalist revolution.” His contribution was the idea that consumers attempt to adjust 
consumption until marginal utility equals the price. Marshall extended these ideas with 
the theory of price elasticity of demand. In addition he identified quasi-rents as an 
important economic concept. Another contribution was to a branch of economics now 
called welfare economics where economic welfare is divided into producer surplus and 
consumer surplus. He used this idea of surplus to analyse the effect of taxes and price 
shifts on market welfare. 
While there is little disagreement these are some of Marshall’s major contributions 
to economics, there remains an element of mystery as to why he chose to denigrate, in 
both written and spoken word, his ‘great impersonal ally to which he owed so much, 
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mathematics.’164 After all, as Schumpeter points out, Marshall was not only an 
accomplished mathematician but without mathematical analysis the transformation of the 
Smith-Ricardo-Mill theories into the modern engine of research could not have been 
accomplished. So, despite Marshall’s refusal to admit the essential part a mathematical 
schema played in developing his theories, he ‘hid the tool that had done the work.’165 Of 
course, as Schumpeter argues, he had good reasons for doing this, as he did not wish to 
frighten the layman; he wanted to be “read by businessmen.” He was also afraid, rightly 
according to Schumpeter, of setting an example that might induce people with a 
mathematical training to think that mathematics is all an economist needs. But the 
complication is that readers with no grasp of calculus cannot understand Marshall’s 
economic language, nor can the reality be ignored that a clear understanding of 
economics requires mathematical training. If we try to resist these notions ‘no good 
purpose is served by making *his readers+ think that he can.’166 Ironically, according to 
Schumpeter, it is because of Marshall’s use of mathematics that what first strikes the 
theorist’s eye is the neatness of his prose. Marshall’s writing flows with an easy grace with 
‘all traces of effort disappearing from the highly polished surface.’167 Theorems are 
elegantly put and proofs are simple and concise – in the skeleton appendix at least. 
Furthermore, Marshall’s mathematical training disciplined even his verbal statements and 
also ‘accounts for the charming simplicity of his diagrams.’168 In short, mathematics 
matters if we are to understand why Marshall’s prose was so effective. 
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But Marshall also recognised economics can be a complex subject and he tried to 
make it easier for his students to understand his arguments by using an abbreviated 
method of summarising paragraphs in the margins. In one example Marshall describes 
quasi-rent as  
incomes derived from land as a special instance of the incomes 
derived from the possession of “any differential advantage in 
producing a commodity”; and although we are setting aside those 
aspects of the problem which are peculiar to agricultural land, and 
especially those which depend upon particular forms of land tenure; 
yet there have been so many misunderstandings on the subject, that 
it will be best to say something at once on the difference between the 
mode of action of competition in agriculture and in manufacture.  
The margin summary becomes: ‘Allowance has to be made in its proper place for the 
influence of different forms of land tenure.’169 
While some view Marshall’s economics as extensions and refinements of the works 
of Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and Mill, Marshall extended economics away from its classical 
focus on the market economy and instead put human behaviour at the centre of studies. 
Winch argues this was Marshall’s most important contribution to economics and through 
this emphasis economics was brought into closer contact with major social questions of 
the day, including progressive intellectual tendencies, just as Mill had done before him 
and Keynes was to do later.170 Furthermore, it defined a different form of capitalism than 
proposed by Smith but also a different form of socialism than proposed by Marx. Marshall 
believed human equality can only arise when the spiritual state of human nature has 
significantly improved. The practical reformer sees the answer lies in co-operation, rather 
than socialism, as well as a recognition people in general, and businessmen in particular, 
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once they have earned some basic minimum wage or profit, ‘care for wealth more as an 
indication of successful achievement than for its own sake.’171 In other words, the 
businessman should not be regarded as a “self-seeking outcast from the company of the 
saints,” but rather as similar to other good, but not yet perfect, humans of the present age 
who, having secured the necessities of life, are fundamentally motivated by the desire for 
recognition of their work by their peers. And if businessmen could be characterised as 
seeking wealth merely because it was a mark of their business acumen and hard work, 
then it was not unreasonable to expect they would embrace measures other than money 
as tokens of their success.  
When reflecting on Marshall’s legacy as a public intellectual and an economist, his 
place in the tradition of economic communications can be summarised in the following 
ways. As an economist Marshall set in motion two fundamentally important patterns of 
thought that came to dominate economic thinking during the inter-war period; from 
Marshall onwards economics became a professional discipline, which prefers “scientific-
based” advice as to how economic problems should be addressed; and his commitment to 
social reform has brought about a cleavage among economists that continues to the 
present day. The contradictory views of economics as a deterministic or a social science 
underpinned by human behaviour came to define Marshall’s economics and rhetoric, a 
mix similar to Keynes’, only expressed more cautiously than Keynes’ often flamboyant 
style of presentation. 
Keynes’ own career was strongly encouraged by Marshall and without his influence 
he may not have become an economist. Keynes remained a life-long admirer of Marshall 
and as a fellow public intellectual Keynes adopted similar ways of communicating his 
message. Both men held to the principles of scientific exactitude, as Smith, Ricardo, Mills 
and Marx did before them. As with all these economists Marshall was popular with the 
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public. Keynes wrote about one of Marshall’s books Industry and Trade ‘*that it+ was a 
remarkable success with the public. A second edition was called for immediately, and by 
the end of 1932, 16,000 copies had been printed.’172 Also in common with the other 
economists examined, their success in the public arena owes much to their disciples, of 
whom Keynes was one of Marshall’s more devoted. He wrote: ‘it is through his *Marshall+ 
pupils, even more than his writings, that Marshall is the father of economic science as it 
exists in England to-day.’173 
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3.5. Summary – Intellectuals and the Communication of Economic 
Ideas 
Keynes was explicit in his efforts at persuading others to adopt his views on a range of 
economic concerns. Furthermore he explained in some detail why he considered ‘insider’ 
and ‘outsider’ opinion to be important and why he put so much effort into persuading the 
élites (the insiders), who provided leadership in an economy, and the public (outsiders) 
whose lives were directly affected by the decisions and leadership of the insiders. From 
the time he entered the Treasury during World War One Keynes set about assiduously 
developing contacts with officials, politicians and industry leaders who he considered 
insiders. Rarely did Keynes miss an opportunity to impress his ideas on those he 
considered the élites with influence over economic matters. However, Keynes also 
recognised those on the inside were slow to see or accept the need for change so there 
was also an important place for directly appealing to outside public opinion. Indeed 
Keynes put as much effort into persuading public opinion through his activities as a 
journalist, writer and public speaker as he did to courting insider opinion. 
These activities might suggest Keynes was a public commentator like any other, 
using a variety of media to convey his message. However Keynes’ success in 
communicating his ideas marks him out as unique. Even before publication of Economic 
Consequences, he was an eminent economist and in his activities as a public intellectual 
stood on the shoulders of predecessors who were equally as eminent as himself. Smith, 
Ricardo, Mill, Marx and Marshall had all been successful public intellectuals. Their ideas 
had been communicated beyond the community of economists and they appealed to a 
public sphere, often bringing about fundamental change in how we understand 
economics. There were also important early cultural influences, which determined his 
successful communication style: an education at Eton with its anti-Benthamite views; his 
association with the Cambridge Apostles; the ethical views of G. E. Moore; his 
involvement with Bloomsbury; and the influence of Strachey and Woolf on his writing 
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style – all contributed to his development of a unique, controversial and innovative 
approach to addressing economic issues. 
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Chapter 4: Economic Context 
Economic Consequences dealt with European prosperity and issues of convergence before 
the war, something of the economic dislocation of the war itself and how Keynes believed 
Europe would be affected should the terms of the Treaty be imposed. This provides the 
economic context for the contents of the book, dealing with three sub-periods: 1870-1914 
with what we now term the first period of globalisation; 1914-1918 are the war years, 
which are often studied from a military or political perspective. However, there is a 
growing body of scholarship interested in how relative economic strength was an 
important factor in the war’s outcome; and 1919-1929, which provides the primary 
context for this inquiry. Context is important because, unlike many contemporaries, 
Keynes did not believe the world could be economically restored to pre-war conditions. 
However, he did believe Europe could rapidly be restored to a new prosperity. But 
politicians and leaders of the day, in his opinion, failed to grasp the economic significance 
and consequences of many of their decisions and actions. 
Following the war politicians and economists did, however, often work tirelessly, 
for a return to pre-war economic conditions. But despite all efforts, good and bad, this 
decade was characterised by economic dislocation, turmoil, and instability. Economic 
growth was erratic and sluggish. Price stability had broken down and never satisfactorily 
addressed. Countries found they could not return to the gold standard and the stability of 
trading conditions. Inflation, deflation and in some cases, hyper-inflation, further 
damaged weakened economies. A large debt overhang from the war was exacerbated by 
the inability to get on top of rising deficits. If there was a view that such consequences 
were inevitable, Keynes did not share it. From the time of writing Economic Consequences 
he used every means at his disposal to call for change, reform and leadership. What 
frustrated him most was a conviction that none of the instability was necessary. The 
problems sprang, as far as Keynes was concerned, from a deceptively conceived Peace and 
until this wrong was righted Europe was headed for an economic apocalypse. Despite 
these feelings of pessimism, Keynes remained hopeful when he wrote his book that 
everything wrong with the Peace could be put right, the last chapter of his book 
suggesting a set of remedies he believed could put Europe and the wider world back onto 
the right economic track.  
 Page 125 
8-Jun-11 
4.1. Background 
Most present-day scholars believe that the processes of divergence and convergence, 
associated with the first age of globalisation from 1870 to 1913, provide the best 
explanation for the outbreak of war in 1914. Berend, Craig and Fisher, Daudin, Moryrs 
amd O’Rourke, Federicao, Klovland, Nayar, Ronnback and Williamson all subscribe to this 
viewpoint and provide empirical evidence in support of their arguments.1 The process of 
globalisation can be traced to the industrial revolution (1760-1830) when Europe 
experienced an unprecedented period of economic growth. Adoption and development of 
a laissez-faire economic system was accompanied by the gradual development of a multi-
lateral payments network that allowed the facilitation of trade and economic growth on a 
global scale. With the adoption of the gold standard in the early 1870s, ease of 
convertibility and stability of exchange rates followed. This economic “virtuous cycle” 
continued to encourage material progress. The second industrial revolution of the late 
nineteenth century saw the widespread use of electricity for the first time, development 
and refinement of the internal combustion engine, with the consequent development of 
public transportation, and renewed modernisation of older technologies such as railways. 
Technology was also increasingly applied to agriculture so a well-fed population helped 
underpin economic growth. What is now considered the first period of globalisation (or as 
contemporary commentators labelled it, “internationalisation”) took place during this 
period as national economies around the world became increasingly integrated. 
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However, underlying this picture of growth and stability were cracks that widened 
as the early twentieth century unfolded. Nationalism and a drive for conquest of 
economically underdeveloped countries led to an era of colonisation and imperialism. The 
rich, industrialised countries, along with the rapidly industrialising United States, became 
rivals for world leadership. Inequalities and disparities began to undermine increasingly 
integrated economies because of the competitive drive for political and economic 
domination. The inability of poor countries, such as those in Eastern and South Europe, to 
achieve an industrial break-through added to global tensions.  
The Long Depression, helped widen the cracks. 2  It was so named because in some 
countries, such as Great Britain, it lasted from 1873 to 1896. Rather than being an output-
based depression most modern economists see this as a monetary depression, where 
falling prices had a deflationary effect at the same time as new technologies were 
transforming economies. For example, Kennedy shows how GNP was increasing for most 
of the major European countries at the same time as prices were in decline.3 Some 
researchers, looking for explanations for price falls while improvements in technology and 
economic growth were taking place, often look to the relationships between gold, silver 
and prices, associating variations in the volumes and values of precious metals as 
accounting for the recessionary nature of the Long Depression. Others argue it was the 
process of increasing productive efficiency and economic integration that accounted for 
falling prices at the same time as economies were growing. For example, in the case of 
Britain the ‘competitive efficiency of other countries, itself a function of the 
progressiveness of industrialisation, played its part in the British depression.’4 One of the 
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more significant reactions of nations to the Long Depression was to resort to 
protectionism to protect faltering industries. However, this also had the effect of 
undermining growth, stability and co-operation between nations, ‘because in those years 
Cobdenite free trade was abandoned in one country after another; the futility of the 
Cobdenite vision of universal peace resting on the basis of national interdependence had 
been thoroughly exposed.’5 When war broke out in Europe, a number of these same 
countries had not brought down protectionist barriers. 
While the Allies, led by Britain, France, and Russia, moved to halt what they saw as 
the ambitions of Germany and her allies, a number of factors underpinned these 
European nations’ resort to arms. First, the process of industrialisation and globalisation 
underpinning growth and stability also increased demand for military resources, fuelling 
an armament industry and an unchecked arms race. Demand grew out of the 
development of the nation states that made up Europe and this provides a second 
explanation for Europe’s resort to arms, which Kaldor labels ‘wars of identity.’ She argues 
that warfare since the early nineteenth century had been fought by those powerless to 
control the levers of globalisation and they expressed their reaction to the intrusion of 
new global forces by ‘the invention, re-invention and contortion of identities’ where 
identities are explained in terms of the rise of the modern nation-state.6 A third 
explanation was ‘the fear of the consequences of failure to face the challenge of war 
itself.’7 Britain, France, Germany, Russia and Austria-Hungary all felt their positions 
threatened in some way or other. The three great European empires, Germany, Austria 
and Russia, felt threatened by the national dissatisfactions of their minorities. All three 
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were also troubled by demands for wider democracy. Not that democracy was a problem 
in Britain or France but the burden for them was the administration of vast overseas 
dominions in Africa, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific. While they were a source of 
national pride for both countries they were a ‘spur to aggressive jealousy among their 
European neighbours.’8 A fourth explanation for the view the seeds of war were a result of 
the process of globalisation was the weakness of the process of international arbitration. 
For example, when Britain reacted to what it saw as an unjustified threat to its century-old 
command of the seas, following Germany’s decision in 1900 to build a fleet capable of 
engaging the Royal Navy in battle, an unchecked race to out-build Germany in modern 
battleships began. There had been discussions at the Hague in 1899 around stabilising a 
process for the arbitration of such matters but the great powers of the day made no effort 
to invoke the Hague provisions for international arbitration.9 A fifth explanation came 
from another failure, the failure to utilise important technological advances in 
communication. While modern communication technologies were an important factor in 
the advance of industrialisation and globalisation, Keegan argues ‘the potentiality of 
modern communication failed those dedicated to waging war, [but] how much more did it 
fail those professionally dedicated to preserving the peace.’ This was a tragedy and the 
diplomatic crisis that preceded the outbreak of war was due to  
events [which] successively and progressively overwhelmed the 
capacity of statesmen and diplomats to control and contain them. 
Honorable and able men though they were, the servants of the 
chancelleries and foreign offices of the great powers in the July crisis 
were bound to the wheel of the written note, the encipherment 
routine, the telegraph schedule. The potentialities of the telephone, 
which might have cut across the barriers to communication, seem to 
have eluded their imaginative powers. The potentialities of radio, 
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available but unused, evaded them altogether. In the event, the 
states of Europe proceeded, as if in a dead march and a dialogue of 
the deaf, to the destruction of their continent and civilization.10 
In summary, it was the process of globalisation that helps explain why European powers 
set themselves onto a path of destruction. As the war drew to a close in 1918 a better 
understanding of these forces may have helped avert the Second World War and The 
Economist observed in October 1918, with some prescience as it turned out, that 
we want a clean peace, and we want it not only in foreign but in 
domestic politics. Without such a peace at home and abroad the 
revival of a more terrible war between nations and between classes is 
inevitable, but it can never be achieved if the war’s end is made the 
profiteer’s opportunity, and under the plea of patriotism tariffs are 
introduced to swell the profits of protected manufacturers and 
increase the burden of the harassed consumer. We are coming to the 
great crisis of the world’s history, and whether we take the right path 
or the wrong depends mainly on whether we look forward in a 
sensible or in a narrow and reactionary spirit.11 
Just as economic factors were to determine a peace The Economist was anxious to avoid, 
so too economic factors ultimately dictated the outcome of the war. From the outset the 
Allies had the economic advantage. For example, in 1914 the Allies had a population 5.25 
times greater than the Central Powers. Territory covered was 115 times greater and GDP 
was 2.9 greater for the Allies. By 1918 the gap for all three economic factors had grown 
even wider in the Allies favour. 
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4.2. The European Economy Pre-World War One 
The period from 1870 to 1914 represented the high-water mark of nineteenth-century 
globalisation that involved increasing transfers of commodities, people, capital, and ideas 
between and within continents.12 Prior to World War One, Britain, France, and Germany 
had less than a third of Europe’s population, but produced 72% of the continent’s 
industrial output, 93% of its coal, 78% of its steel, 80% of its engineering, and 74% of its 
chemical products, and consumed 73% of its cotton imports.13 Writers and commentators 
of pre-1914 European history paint a nostalgic portrait of the economic status of these 
European countries and its people. Taylor argues  
a sensible, law-abiding Englishman could pass through life and hardly 
notice the existence of the state, beyond the post office and the 
policeman. He could live where he liked and as he liked. He had no 
official number or identity card. He could travel abroad or leave his 
country for ever without a passport or any sort of official permission. 
He could exchange his money for any other currency without 
restriction or limit. He could buy goods from any country in the world 
on the same terms as he bought goods at home.14 
Berend argues, ‘by the early twentieth century, the Western European countries 
essentially ruled the world and forged ahead along their chosen path toward economic 
progress.’15 Keynes observed  
any man of capacity or character at all exceeding the average, into the 
middle and upper classes, for whom life offered, at a low cost and 
with least trouble, conveniences, comfort, and amenities beyond the 
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compass of the richest and most powerful monarchs of other ages … 
He regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, 
except in the direction of further improvement, and any deviation 
from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable.16 
Historians interested in Europe before the outbreak of war often have a tendency to paint 
similar nostalgic pictures of the “average” European to the ones above.  
These nostalgic notions of a prosperous bygone age are supported by some 
compelling economic data.17 For example, by the middle of the eighteenth century Britain 
had achieved the prerequisites for sustained economic growth when British exports 
flourished, increasing 30-fold to 40% of the national income. By 1870 British exports 
reached 40% of the total Western European exports, and by World War One still 
accounted for one-third. During the first four decades of the nineteenth century industrial 
output grew at rates of 23%, 39%, 47%, and 37% respectively. Britain gradually gave up 
agricultural self-sufficiency and from the 1840s it, along with other European countries, 
steadily advanced towards free trade. This became institutionalised in Britain and through 
a series of agreements with Germany, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Holland, 
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Austria, and Portugal, Europe effectively became a free trade zone during the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century.18 
A phenomenon of the industrial revolution was the speed with which it moved 
through other European countries. This contagion of industrialisation quickly developed 
into a process of globalisation, with most economists accepting 1870 to 1914 marks a time 
when there was increasing transfers between and within countries of commodities, 
people, capital and ideas. Nayar argues economic globalisation is the expansion of the 
market to encompass the entire globe within its sphere. In other words, it represents the 
integration of various regional markets into a world market. The resulting divisions of 
labour and resulting specialisation make for greater efficiency and better economic 
gains.19 While there is some scholarly difference over the use of the term globalisation to 
describe the economic integration that took place between 1870 and 1913, what is 
undisputed is that the nineteenth century was marked by a remarkable explosion in the 
integration of the world economy through vastly expanded trade and foreign investment. 
This explosion was spurred on by a series of technological innovations in transport and 
communications, such as the railways, telegraph and steamship.20 
Europe led the way and Craig and Fisher argue that by 1913 the continent, 
especially in the West, was so integrated in most important aspects of economic life it 
could be referred to as the major part of an international economy dealing in agricultural 
and manufacturing products, and experiencing movements of substantial capital and 
labour across borders.21 Later arrivals into the global economy essentially attached 
themselves to the existing European economic structures. An important precursor to this 
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economic integration was national political integration. Craig and Fisher have observed 
that every central European country, except Germany and Italy, was essentially politically 
unified, within its modern borders, by 1850.22 This, however, is a debatable claim as 
central Europe at this time consisted of four empires, Russian, German, Austro-Hungarian 
and Ottoman, which no longer exist, with national unity coming quite some time later. 
However, this aside, an increasing move towards national unity brought with it national 
economic policies of all kinds. For example, banking regulations, international monetary 
policy and political unity followed. National policies towards trade and capital flows in the 
form of regulation, subsidisation, excise and tariffs, all provided major interconnections 
across nations, which in turn meant nations could, to some extent, influence the direction 
and speed of economic growth. 
Daudin, Morys and O’Rourke use a number of measures to illustrate how Europe 
over the period of 1870 to 1914 became increasingly integrated and in turn brought closer 
ties to the rest of the world.23 Their most straightforward measure of integration is the 
growing volume of international flows of commodities, people, capital and ideas. Another 
method used is to measure the cost of moving goods or factors of production across 
boundaries. The discussion below considers five of the more important elements of 
globalisation: trade; the multinational payment network; capital flows; migration; and the 
trade in knowledge. 
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4.2.1. Trade, 1870-1914 
In 1990 prices, European international trade grew at 6.8% a year between 1870 and 1913, 
with growth particularly high in Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and Finland (refer Table 1 
below).24 The European trade to GDP ratio, including intra-European trade, increased from 
29.9% to 36.9%, while excluding intra-European trade, increased from 9.2% to 13.5% 
(refer Table 2 below).  European real trade 1870-1913 
 
Table1 :  European real trade 1870-1913 
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Table 2: Exports plus imports as a share of GDP 
 
 
Daudin, Morys and O’Rourke have also examined price data for the period and find 
evidence for ‘impressive international integration.’25 Between 1870 and 1913, the wheat 
price gap between Liverpool and Chicago fell from 57.6% to 15.6% and the London-
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Cincinnati bacon price gap fell from 92.5% to 17.9%. The same period also saw US-British 
price gaps for industrial goods such as cotton textiles, iron bars, pig iron and copper falling 
from 13.7% to -3.6%, 75% to 20.6%, 85.2% to 19.3% and 32.7% to -0.1% respectively.26 
Prices also converged between Europe and Asia, with the London-Rangoon rice price gap 
falling between 93% to 26%, and the Liverpool-Bombay cotton price gap falling from 57% 
to 20%.27  
International trade grew for a number of reasons. International freight rates 
declined steadily as a result of constant technical improvements and the growth in the 
usage of faster and more regular steamships, especially after the opening of the Suez 
Canal in 1869. However, as overland transport was much more expensive than water 
transport, the reduction of internal transport costs through the development of railways 
was crucial (refer Figure 3 below). As a percentage of the Chicago wheat price, the cost of 
shipping wheat to New York declined from 17.2% to 5.5%, while the cost of shipping it 
from New York to Liverpool fell from 11.6% to 4.7%.28 Declining transport costs were 
particularly good for European workers. In an era where a large fraction of labourers’ 
budgets was still spent on food, cheaper transport meant cheaper food, and thus higher 
real wages. What was bad for farmers was directly beneficial to urban workers. By and 
large this also helps explain why socialist parties tended to support free trade in Europe.29 
British workers should have particularly benefitted from free trade since not only did it 
lower the price of food, but any negative impact on agricultural labour demand would 
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only have a small effect on the overall labour market, given agriculture’s small share in 
overall employment there (just 22.6% in 1871).30 
 
Figure 2: Transport infrastructure, 1870-1913 
 
 
Another reason for trade growth at this time was freedom from hostilities.31 The 
development of European formal and informal empires increased extra-European trade 
through the reduction of trade barriers, the inclusion of colonies in currency unions, and 
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the better protection of European property rights.32 Meanwhile, the gradual spread of the 
gold standard dampened exchange rate fluctuations and reduced uncertainty in trade. 
4.2.2. The Multilateral Payments Network 
An important reason for the increasing economic integration between nations was the 
growth of a multilateral payments network and the facilitation role it played in trade. 
During the period from 1870 to 1913, at least 20-25% of all trade transactions were 
multilateral. This encouraged international trade because countries could offset a trade 
deficit with one partner by a trade surplus with another. This in turn meant less gold and 
hard currency was needed for balanced trade, the scarcity of which often acted as an 
obstacle to international trade. Berend argues this system of multilateral payments was 
the catalyst for Europe’s gradual move to a laissez-faire economic system.33 The crowning 
moment came with the introduction of the gold standard after 1870. Until this time most 
European countries had a bimetallic (silver and gold) system (France), a silver standard 
(Holland, Scandinavia, the German states), or inconvertible paper money (Russia, Greece, 
Italy). Most currencies were not convertible, a major impediment to the expansion of 
foreign trade. The gradual adoption of the gold standard throughout Europe solved this 
problem. Reporting on the proposal to introduce the gold standard The Economist at the 
time had argued the benefits as being: 
First, the losses resulting from exchanges would be greatly reduced, 
for the commission for exchange would represent only the cost of 
carrying specie from one country to another, and even the marvellous 
system of transfers by which bankers of London effected payments of 
250,000,000₣ a day could be established between different countries; 
Second, an international money would render monetary crisis rarer, 
for the banks in the Confederate countries could more easily make 
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payments in international coin than in ingots; Third, England would 
cease to suffer in her commerce from the fact that Belgians, Swiss 
and Italians prefer to make their purchase in countries in which they 
find the same moneys and measures as their own, instead of going to 
England, where exchange causes them loss and trouble.34 
Each currency had a fixed gold content, and thus currencies became easily 
exchangeable and exchange rates stable. The British pound sterling, unchanged in value 
between 1821 and 1914, was practically as good as gold and became the international 
currency with the gradual transformation from protectionism and bimetallism toward free 
trade cum gold standard.  
4.2.3. Capital Flows, 1870-1914 
The integration of capital markets is another indicator the world was becoming 
increasingly globalised. Europe at this time was the world’s banker and those with good 
access to European capital and abundant resources, such as the US, Canada, Argentina 
and Australia, prospered most between 1870 and 1913. 35 There was also a smaller, but 
still important, transfer of capital from the Western European core to the more peripheral 
economies of South, Central and Eastern Europe. 
In their empirical analysis of European economic integration Craig and Fisher 
observed that during this period, financial capital expanded across borders in increasing 
volume, although not in any regular pattern. The most widely studied aspect has been the 
expansion of lending internationally, led by the United Kingdom, but all major countries 
were involved in both absorbing and exporting financial capital in this period, as individual 
investors seized on either local or international opportunities as they arose.36 The main 
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characteristics of these capital flows were that, first, the largest volume of capital tended 
to flow to already-mature economies, and sectors, rather than relatively capital-poor 
countries, such as Spain and Portugal, and, second, all countries relied on their own 
savings pools for most of their capital needs. Even so, the pool of international lending 
was led by the United Kingdom, France and Germany with its expansion augmented by the 
arrival of US capital exports after 1890.37 Similarly, the destinations of these funds were 
other European countries, and the US, until after 1870, when India and the areas of white 
settlement around the world began to attract significantly more capital. Craig and Fisher 
also noticed that a sizeable portion of the capital involved went to governments rather 
than the private sector, ‘although there are so many differences across countries and over 
time that generalizations beyond this are hard to produce.’38 
Successful capital formation also played a decisive role in helping determine the 
rate of absorption of the industrial revolution. Essentially this was a domestic matter, but 
the international pool of capital provided substantial assistance and was part of the 
conduit that also moved labour, products and technical ideas across borders. 
Economists have drawn attention to the way capital market integration has traced 
out a U-shape over the past 150 years,39 with late nineteenth century integration being 
followed by interwar disintegration and a slow move towards reintegration in the late 
twentieth century. According to Obstfeld and Taylor, foreign assets accounted for 7% of 
world GDP in 1870, but for nearly 20% during 1900-14. The figure was only 8% in 1930, 5% 
in 1945, and still only 6% in 1960. However, this rose dramatically to 25% in 1980, 49% in 
1990, and 92% in 2000. On this measure it was not until sometime in the 1970s the pre-
1914 level of integration was recovered. Not that capital market integration was a 
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continuous process. As is the case today, there were reversals, which subjected capital-
receiving countries to sudden stops. For example, a first wave of financial integration 
came to an end with the Baring crisis of 1890 and capital receded dramatically for about a 
decade before massive foreign lending resumed again around the turn of the century. 
Feldstein and Horioka have suggested another measure of integration.40 
International capital mobility breaks the link between domestic savings and domestic 
investment, as domestic savings can be invested abroad and domestic investment can be 
financed externally. Consequently, the weaker the relationship between domestic savings 
and domestic investment, the higher is international capital mobility. The U-shape once 
again emerges from the data. A third measure looks at bond spreads. Bond spreads 
between peripheral economies, be they in Europe or not, and England, France and 
Germany fell, on average from around 5% in 1870 to only 1% in 1914.41 Maruo, Sussman 
and Yafeh have shown that emerging market bond spreads were, on average, less than 
half what they were in the 1990s, which demonstrates just how safe investors perceived 
foreign investment to be.42 
In looking for explanations for late-nineteenth early-twentieth century capital 
market integration, Daudin, Morys and O’Rourke also suggest the absence of military 
conflict, when an atmosphere conducive to foreign lending was created and stabilised.43 
Another political explanation, by contrast, has been highly controversial. Marxists have 
long argued that late nineteenth century capital exports and imperialism are only two 
sides of the same coin. Their argument is that excessive saving at home, generated by a 
highly unequal distribution of income, required outlets in underdeveloped countries, as 
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domestic investment would have been subject to Marx’s law of the falling rate of profit. 
This idea, associated with J. A. Hobson, allowed Lenin to declare imperialism to be the 
highest stage of capitalism. 44 The argument of a connection between empire and capital 
exports has subsequently been discredited by some scholars, although some revisionist 
historians have argued for a more benign interpretation of imperialism. For example, 
Ferguson and Schularick, argue that members of the British Empire benefited from their 
colonial status through substantially reduced interest rates, presumably as a result of 
more secure property rights. 45 However, Table 3 below raises doubts about whether 
colonial affiliation mattered for the size and direction of capital flows. All English colonies 
combined, excluding Canada, Australia and New Zealand, received only 16.9% of English 
capital exports, which is less than what the US alone received (20.5%). The French and 
German experiences suggest the same, with colonies receiving only 8.9% and 2.6%, 
respectively, of the overall capital exports from their respective mother countries. 
Some of the benefits of the gold standard have been highlighted and Daudin et al. 
point out an additional benefit. This was global financial integration, which was fostered 
by adherence to the gold standard because it signalled that governments concerned 
would pursue conservative fiscal and monetary policies and assured potential investors 
that returns were reasonably safe.46 However, while economic institutions can facilitate 
capital imports, they can never attract them if there is no genuine interest on the part of 
investors in what a specific country has to offer. Daudin et al. argue this places a focus on 
economic fundamentals as the main determinant in explaining the size and direction of 
flows.47 Over 50% of British capital exports went to areas of recent settlement (refer Table 
                                                             
44
 Hobson, (1902:1988). 
45
 Ferguson and Schularick, (2006). 
46
 Daudin, Morys and O’Rourke, (2008, p. 6). 
47
 Daudin, Morys and O’Rourke, (2008, p. 6). 
 Page 143 
8-Jun-11 
3 below) where natural resources could be exploited, not to where labour was cheap 
(Africa and Asia). If New World land was to produce food for European consumers, and 
raw materials for factories, railways had to make it accessible, land had to be improved, 
and housing and infrastructure had to be provided for the new frontier communities. 
Clemens and Williamson provide econometric evidence in favour of this view, showing 
British capital exports went to countries with abundant supplies of natural resources, 
immigrants, and young, educated, urban populations.48 While foreign investment in Africa 
and Asia was rather unpopular in Britain, France and Germany, France and Germany sent 
6.1% and 53.3% respectively, of their capital exports to other European countries. 
Investment in areas of recent settlement by contrast, played a substantially reduced role 
for both countries. 
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Table 3: Destination of English, French and German Foreign Investment 
 
 
  
 Page 145 
8-Jun-11 
4.2.4. Migration, 1870-1914 
Williamson argues that the forces of convergence leading to globalisation were due to 
open economic policies of free trade and mass migration.49 Daudin et al. also argue ‘it is in 
the area of migration that the late nineteenth century was most impressively globalised, 
even compared to today.’50 Table 4 below gives an indication of just how large migration 
was for European nations. The figures given are gross, not net, and the extent of return 
migration varied over time and across countries, rising from about 10% of the outflow 
initially to around 30% at the turn of the century.51 For example, while return migration 
was significant among Italians and Greeks it was very low among other groups, such as the 
Irish and Eastern European Jews. In addition to these transoceanic migrations, there were 
significant migrations within Europe, for example from Italy to France, and from Ireland to 
Britain. The average Western European annual outmigration rate was 2.2 per thousand in 
the 1870s and 5.4 per thousand for the 1900s.52 
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Table 4:  European Emigration Rates by Decade (per 1000 mean population) 
 
 
The causes of this mass migration are more clearly understood than they were 
when Dudley Baines examined European emigration for the period 1815-1930. Over these 
115 years more than 50 million people left Europe for other destinations. In his study 
Baines made the point, ‘we have little reliable direct evidence of what is presumably the 
most important question. … why did people emigrate … and why did only some Europeans 
choose to emigrate and not others?’53 Daudin et al. on the other hand, argue, ‘the causes 
.. are by now well understood.’54 On one level, the causes were obvious. The New World 
was endowed with a higher land-labour ratio than Europe, and earned higher wages than 
their European counterparts. British real wages in 1870 were less than 60% of wages in 
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New World destinations relevant to British workers and for Irish workers 44%.55 The gains 
from migration were significant and once the new steam technologies had lowered the 
cost of travel sufficiently, mass emigration became inevitable. Assisting this process were 
liberal immigration policies. 
One issue difficult to explain is what determined the timing of emigration streams 
from different countries. For example, why did emigration from relatively rich countries 
such as Britain take off before emigration from poorer countries such as Italy, where gains 
to migrants were presumably higher? What explains the fact that so few French 
emigrated, while so many Irish and Italians left? What explains the initial rise, and 
subsequent decline, of emigration rates in several countries? Based on Hatton and 
Williamson’s research, they found explanations for migration, although these more 
difficult questions are harder to address. 56 This notwithstanding, Hatton and Williamson 
found that first, would-be emigrants were initially constrained by trans-oceanic transport, 
but as transport costs fell, more migrants were able to leave their homelands. Second, 
once previous emigrants were settled they sent remittances or pre-paid tickets back 
home, thus directly financing the cost of travel. Third, fertility rates were on the rise in 
Europe during this time, which led to an increase in the supply of young, mobile males. 
Finally, the process of industrialisation increasingly detached workers from the land, 
which increased mobility. 
Of all the impacts from globalisation, migration was the one that had the greatest 
impact on European workers’ living standards. For example, between 1870 and 1910 
emigration lowered the labour force by 45% in Ireland, by 39% in Italy, and by 24% in 
Norway.57 During this same period living standards in all three economies rose more 
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rapidly than in Britain. In Ireland wages rose from 73% to 92% of the British level, while 
Norwegian wages rose from 48% and 95%. In Italy there was no convergence until the 
turn of the century, which is when Italian emigration exploded and thereafter real Italian 
wages rose from 40% of British wages in 1900 to 56% in 1913. 
4.2.5. Trade in knowledge 
Economic globalisation involves more than the movement of goods or factors of 
production. Technological transfers and the deepening of other intellectual exchanges are 
just as important in the process. Technology diffusion encountered few constraints in the 
late nineteenth century. Textile mills around the world used similar machines, often 
imported from Britain.58 Shipbuilding, iron and steel, telegraph and telephone 
technologies transferred quickly. Europe was internally exchanging new technologies, 
diffusing them both to European offshoots and to the rest of the world, and receiving new 
technologies, mainly from the United States. Daudin et al. argue that several new factors 
increased the speed and the reach of technological transfers.59 First migration was easy. 
Second imperialism allowed entrepreneurs to invest overseas, taking advantage of low 
wages, with no fear of expropriation by hostile governments. Third the decline in 
transport and communication costs helped the diffusion of ideas, new goods and 
machines. This last effect was important because more and more technology was 
embedded in machines rather than individual know-how, even if training was still 
necessary. Firms could now export capital goods on a large scale. 
This diffusion of technologies was also helped by the creation of international 
scientific and technical organisations. For example, “The Institution of Naval Architects” 
was founded in 1860 in the United Kingdom, but organised meetings in different countries 
and through its membership created an international network of professional and learned 
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bodies.60 As Figure 4 below shows, the number of scientific conferences and organisations 
increased dramatically. Paradoxically, science was also seen as one of the weapons in the 
struggle between European nations. Besides military applications, academic activity was 
used as a diplomatic weapon. Inviting foreign scientists and participating in scientific 
congresses was part and parcel of the rivalry between France and Germany, as each 
hoped to tighten their links with Allied and neutral countries, especially the United 
States.61 
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Figure 3: The rise of the international scientific community 
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4.2.6. Laissez-Faire 
Some economists, seeking to distinguish the period 1870 to 1913 from present day 
globalisation, argue that the earlier period was the ‘golden era’ of international 
integration, due to the greater openness of the world economy.62 Those who accept this 
view attribute this openness to the principle of laissez-faire. The maxim ‘laissez-faire’ is 
commonly attributed to Vincent de Gournay (1712-1759) although it was perhaps most 
clearly stated by the Marquis d’Argenson in 1858.63 To govern better, he stated, one must 
govern less. Adam Smith was a proponent of the laissez-faire principle and he believed the 
wealth of a nation could be increased if the market was free from constraints and 
Government intervention was kept to a minimum. He applied the same principle to the 
relationship between the Government and the individual and he used it to justify 
individualism and self-help. His ideological heirs include Thomas Malthus, Edmund Burke, 
David Ricardo, Harriet Martineau and Jeremy Bentham. 
In his A Manual of Political Economy (1793) Bentham formulated the law: “The 
general rule is that nothing ought to be done or attempted by government.” By the eve of 
World War One the laissez-faire economic system held unchallenged domination 
throughout Europe. Berend argues, ‘under the banner of laissez-faire ideology, 
internationalisation, or the first globalizing trend of the European economy, made great 
progress and became institutionalized.’ 64 The rapid spread of free trade and the gold 
standard created a no- or low-tariff zone in Europe and a convertible currency with 
extremely stable exchange rates during the entire period. Material progress and 
improvements followed and gathered pace. On 31 December, 1910 The Economist 
commented on the system of laissez-faire: 
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The trade boom is still with us, and 1911 should bring few distractions 
to prevent the country from receiving the full benefit of its later 
stages. The prospect tempts us to break our resolution, and to utter 
one prophecy in the style of the almanacs. It is – “In 1911 the 
expression laissez-faire will be less used by politicians and business 
men as a term of economical abuse than formerly.” Realising the 
blessings of freedom from disturbance, the commercial world may 
well begin to wonder why it should be asked to subject itself to the 
greatest of all disturbances, the convulsions of a season of tariff-
mongering. The trade returns are encouraging it to proclaim (what it 
always believes at bottom) that business men know best about their 
own businesses, and that the State, if it meddles with them, is sure to 
make a mess of it. The interpretation of our prophecy is, therefore, 
that with prosperous times the conviction will grow that trades are 
best left free to be conducted by those who understand them, 
without interference, however well meant, by those who do not.65 
The system of laissez-faire The Economist credited as responsible for European 
prosperity was, however, an uneven and often unstable system. In relation to the rest of 
the world, Europe, at the turn of the twentieth century, was dominant in the world 
economy, representing nearly half (46%) of the world’s total GDP. However, from the 
1870s onward other countries emerged as competitors. During the nineteenth century, 
taken together, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand increased their 
GDP by 43 times, reaching 79% of the total West European GDP level by 1913. Taken on a 
per capita basis the picture is somewhat different. In 1820 and 1870, these countries were 
far behind Britain and Western Europe, reaching only 69% and 75% of its per capita 
income level respectively, but by the 1870s they broke through and by 1913 they already 
surpassed Britain by 4% and Western Europe in general by more than 40%.66 
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Yet Europe in 1913 still dominated the world of industry, producing 52% of the 
world’s industrial output. Three European countries, Britain, Germany, and France, 
produced 72% of all European manufactured products. The same three countries bought 
63% of the world’s food and raw material exports and accounted for 62% of world trade in 
1913. Europe also became the world’s banker by exporting more than $US 40 billion, 
roughly 90% of total international capital exports, during the nineteenth century.67 But 
while the world economy was effectively a European world economy, the economic 
system was strongly internationalised and while co-operation was essential for this to be 
sustained, the most powerful players of industrialised Europe became competitive, and at 
times, hostile rivals for world leadership. During the last third of the nineteenth century 
the core countries of Western Europe embarked on a quest for empire, leaving few 
nations of the world without some form of government. Britain alone built an empire of 
345 million people while France controlled 56 million in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific region. 
This expansionism was controversial at the time, and remains so to the present day. 
Colonialism, or “imperialism,” as Hobson’s book of 1902 named the phenomenon, ‘gained 
a new incentive from industrial capitalism.’68 Empire building was closely connected with 
the rapid advance of capitalist economies with strong economic motivations, and also 
became a major status symbol for the great powers. For example, in the case of Germany 
Lebensraum, or “struggle for space” became an ideological base for expansionism. As a 
political phenomenon, however, imperialism did not necessarily equate to economic 
prosperity, as many colonies were to prove unprofitable. 
This added to a picture of growing inequalities and disparities that began to 
undermine the almost century-long unbroken phase of economic development since the 
high levels of prosperity unleashed by the industrial revolution. Keynes, writing in 1919, 
described the previous fifty years: 
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Very few of us realise with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, 
complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic 
organisation by which Western Europe has lived for the last half 
century. We assume some of the most peculiar and temporary of our 
late advantages as natural, permanent, and to be depended on, and 
we lay our plans accordingly. On this sandy and false foundation we 
scheme for social improvement and dress our political platforms, 
pursue our animosities and particular ambitions, and feel ourselves 
with enough margin in hand to foster, not assuage, civil conflict in the 
European family. Moved by insane delusion and reckless self-regard, 
the German people overturned the foundations on which we all lived 
and built.69 
In reality, while laissez-faire policies had meant spectacular economic growth and 
unprecedented rates of industrialisation for most of Western Europe, such was not the 
case for most of the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. Berend argues, ‘globalised 
laissez-faire did not live up to its promise in some of the peripheral countries of Europe, 
and it faced increasing challenges. State interventionism gained ground.’70 
In summarising pre-war Europe, a process of globalisation from 1870 to 1913 had 
brought into existence an integrated and interdependent European economy. On all 
significant measures - trade, financial systems and a multilateral payments networks 
underpinned by the gold standard, capital flows, migration, trade in knowledge, and the 
impact of laissez-faire capitalism - European living standards and economic development 
grew in ways not before seen in human history. During this period Europe also helped 
spread the benefits of industrialisation and globalisation to many other nations around 
the world. Europe and the rest of the world stood to gain nothing by engaging in warfare. 
Yet on the very eve of this economic achievement and development, a war between 
European nations broke out and quickly spread to all developed countries. In seeking 
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explanations for this mutual economic self-destruction, most economists have concluded 
that the same forces of globalisation, which had delivered prosperity and stability also 
nurtured the seeds of divergence. As weaker nations failed to share in Europe’s economic 
prosperity and a spirit of nationalism increased, competitive jealousies and protectionist 
policies fanned the flames of growing discontent. 
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4.3. Economics and World War One 
According to some commentators World War One was the result of intensified 
protectionism leading to the breakdown of the laissez-faire trading system, which was a 
natural consequence of exalted nationalism that equated self-defence and independence 
with economic self-sufficiency.71 Broadberry and Harrison, on the other hand argue that 
the breakdown of the system of laissez-faire is too narrow an explanation for the cause of 
war. Instead they argue it was the process of globalisation, which ultimately led to World 
War One. However, while the process was global, the European dimension was 
fundamental to it. The war was fought primarily by European powers in Europe while 
some non-European participants and colonial polities played a minor role and yet others, 
such as the US, intervened late in the process.72 Nonetheless, this process had unleashed 
a number of forces, both political and economic, with colonial ambitions at its heart. 
Eloranta and Harrison argue that ‘nineteenth century globalization and empires were 
inextricably linked.’73 At first sight it seems competition for colonies was a primary reason 
for European nations going to war as each country’s imperial ambitions ran out of control. 
Broadberry and Harrison argue, European powers did not fight World War One over 
colonies but rather war was a reaction to Germany’s desire for colonies. This stimulated a 
naval arms race. They also argue it was ‘the quest for a German empire *that+ provoked an 
anti-German coalition, the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France (1904) to which 
Russia was also admitted in 1907.’74 Germany had allies of course and had been a friend of 
Russia since 1872, Austria-Hungary since 1879, and Italy since 1882, but Russia and 
Germany had drifted apart and Italy would be an unreliable ally. The increasing 
                                                             
71
 Berend, (2006, p. 47). 
72
 Eloranta and Harrison, (2010, p. 134). 
73
 Eloranta and Harrison, (2010, p. 136). 
74
 Broadberry and Harrison, (2005, p. 3). 
 Page 157 
8-Jun-11 
polarisation of the continental powers shifted attention away from Germany’s original 
aim, which was for ‘an adjustment of the boundaries of the British and French empires 
overseas, towards the balance of power in Europe itself. As a result, the war was largely 
fought on European soil for the control of Europe.’75 When war did break out, it was not 
envisaged economic reasons were that important to an eventual outcome. For example, 
the German war plan for 1914 anticipated victory in the west within six weeks. As such it 
was intended to be a war by military means. However, as time went on economic factors 
became significant determinants of who were winners and losers. A report carried in The 
Times on March 27, 1915 highlighted this realisation early in hostilities. In an interview 
with a “neutral” journalist of two prominent Germans, Herr Witting, a director of the 
Reichsbank and Herr Zimmermann, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr Witting 
commented, ‘we are certainly not making war as we did in 1870. We have met with 
serious difficulties, even suffered reverses, and our idea of finishing the war in a few 
months was a mistake … this war is a war of exhaustion.’76  
As this sense of exhaustion affected morale and economies the war developed into 
one of attrition with the large, rich economies of Germany, France and Britain grinding 
each other down with resources counting for almost everything. It was the greater Allied 
capacity for taking risks, absorbing the cost of mistakes, replacing losses, and 
accumulating overwhelming quantitative superiority that eventually turned the tide 
against Germany. In the east where the economically weaker powers, Russia, Italy and the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires faced off in battles, outcomes, at least in the 
short run, were determined less by economic factors. However, over a period of years 
battles drained the weakest economies first. This was the primary factor leading to 
Russia’s exit from the war in 1917. But at the same time Russia abandoned the Allies the 
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United States entered the conflict. Thus the richest world power stepped into the gap left 
by the poorest, and this led to a further increase in the Allied advantage. Then, the Central 
Powers’ chance for victory in the east was destroyed by Germany’s defeat in the west. 
Ultimately, economics determined the outcome. 
Notwithstanding Singleton’s observation that ‘enough evidence has been 
presented to show that the individual cost of the First World War is beyond calculation,’ it 
is possible to compare and contrast the statistics we do have, although many need to be 
treated with caution. 77  Broadberry and Harrison undertake an analysis by adding up 
populations, territories, and gross domestic products from territories at war. Comparing 
population, territory and GDP between the Allies and the Central Powers in November 
1914 and again in November 1918 the following picture emerges: In November 1914 the 
Allies had a collective population ratio of 5.2 times greater than the Central Powers, that is 
Allies 793.3 million vs Central Powers 151.3 million, the Allies covered a territory 11.5 
times greater than the Central Powers and GDP 2.9 times greater than the Central Powers. 
In November 1918 the population was 8.1 times greater, covering territory 13.5 times 
greater and GDP 4.6 times greater.78 The wartime change in GDP is given in Table Five 
below. These figures show the economic advantage had moved even further in the Allies 
favour by the end of the war. 
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Table 5: The wartime change in real GDP: 1914-1918, by country 
 
 
Behind these figures are the reasons why population, territory, and GDP mattered. 
Greater population numbers translated into more human resources available for the war 
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effort. Territory is an important economic measure with limited breadth and variety of 
natural resources available for agriculture and mining important for total capability. The 
wider the territory, the more varied were the soil types and the minerals beneath the soil 
so that quantity in this case also meant quality. As for the GDPs of countries at war, 
economic capacity limited the volume of weapons, machinery, fuel, and rations that could 
be made available to arm and feed the soldiers and sailors on the fighting front. In short, 
the larger the population, territory, and GDP of a country, the easier it would be for that 
country to overwhelm the armed forces of an adversary.79 
Critics of an economic approach to analysing war argue there are many contingent 
factors, for example, moral, political, technical, and organisational, that outweigh 
economic explanations. For example, Singleton argues,  
the First World War was an economic disaster of the highest order, 
especially in Europe. The greatest impact was felt at the level of the 
individual – millions were killed or wounded and others lost relatives, 
wealth and incomes. While it is not possible to put a dollar figure on 
the ‘cost’ of the war, it begs the question; what is the point of 
bothering with economic explanations? 80  
Because, argue Broadberry and Harrison, ‘other things being held equal, a deficit of 
organisation or morale on one side tended to be overcome through a self-balancing 
process. The one thing that could not be overcome was a deficit of resources.’81 Two 
examples, both German offensives (August 1914 and March 1918), that gave Germany its 
best chances of winning the war, support this view. In the first of these attacks (1914) 
Germany planned to exploit mass and movement to destroy the French army before the 
British could intervene in the west and before the Russians could mobilise in the east. In 
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practice the German army succeeded in many of its planned objectives but failed in the 
ones that were vital. The stalemate of the trenches resulted. Had the German plan 
succeeded, the economic factors on each side would never have been felt. Given that it 
did not, the richer Allies won time to put right their military and organisational failings, but 
they could not have done so without resources on their side. 
In the second example, the spring offensive in 1918, Germany again seemed to be 
on the verge of winning with a purely military advantage. For the first time since 1914 its 
soldiers opened up great gaps in the Allied lines and advanced dozens of kilometres 
towards the Channel ports. The offensive badly shocked the Allies and forced them into 
re-organisation with the Americans, resulting in the acceptance of a unified command. But 
resources ultimately defeated the advancing Germans: their own supplies were lacking for 
they were badly clothed and undernourished even before they began their advance; the 
abundance of supplies they found in the Allied trenches caused many to turn away from 
the attack to eat and drink their advantages away; and the superabundance of war 
materials that enabled the Allies to regroup and go on to inflict a far greater defeat on the 
exhausted enemy - all contributed to the German defeat. 
Other economic factors played their part. For example, those countries most 
advanced in the economics of agriculture enjoyed relatively greater success on the 
battlefield. This helps explain why countries like Russia and Austria-Hungary, while large, 
could not make a difference. With the exception of Russia, these countries ran short of 
food long before they ran out of guns and shells. Russia’s difficulties lay in the chaotic 
transportation system rather than food shortages per se. In the case of Germany, her 
decline in agricultural output during the war and lack of access to food imports is a further 
explanation for her ultimate loss due to economic reasons. Also against Germany was 
modernisation, which was highly unbalanced even though Germany was considered a 
developed economic power. Broadberry and Harrison argue, ‘high levels of productivity in 
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heavy industry co-existed with much lower productivity in light industry, and much of the 
service sector was also characterised by low productivity.’82 However, the most obvious 
sign of Germany’s relative backwardness was the high share of the labour force engaged 
in low-productivity agriculture. When war broke out Germany suffered the consequences 
of its reliance on peasant agriculture and it was essentially a dead weight on her 
mobilisation efforts with the result that ‘the process resulted in the inexorable conclusion 
[of] urban famine, revolutionary insurrection, and the downfall of emperors.’83 
In summary, economic advantage, especially over time, made the difference to the 
final outcome of World War One. At the start of hostilities the Allies had a relative 
advantage in population, territory and GDP. By the end of the war the relative gap had 
widened further, giving the Allies an economic advantage that ultimately meant victory. 
The difference economic advantage played in World War One becomes even more 
significant when making comparisons with World War Two. For some World War Two was 
just World War One with more countries, more soldiers, more time, more money, more 
guns, more death and more destruction. In reality, argue Broadberry and Harrison, World 
War One had some distinctive features. For example, economics decided the outcome of 
the first war in a direct and straightforward sense, more so than in the second. The 
military decision of World War One was expected on the western front, where the richest 
countries engaged most of their forces. Yet the military decision never came. While it is 
true there were victories and defeats, and the front became considerably less stable 
during 1918, military struggle ended in ceasefire, not surrender, with the German army 
still standing on foreign soil. In Austria-Hungary it was also economic collapse that ended 
the military aspirations of the Hapsburgs, just as urban famine and industrial collapse in 
Russia signed the death warrant of the Romanovs. Where the outcome of World War Two 
was different was that it ended in crushing military defeat of the Axis Powers.  
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From an economic perspective, the period between 1914 and 1945 is distinctive. In 
both wars the combatants were able to devote more than half their national income to 
the war effort. This did not happen before 1914, or after 1945, and it seems unlikely to 
ever happen again. Before 1914 it was impossible and after 1945 it is no longer necessary. 
Before the twentieth century, per capita incomes were too low and government services 
too inefficient for society to devote such a large share of economic activity to warfare. Too 
many people were required to labour in the fields and workshops simply to feed and 
clothe the population, and government officials were not up to the task of counting and 
controlling them. After 1945 the destructive power of nuclear weapons meant any rich or 
large country could acquire devastating military capability for a few billion dollars. Hence 
the marshalling of economic resources played a much more vital role in the outcome of 
the two world wars than any period before or since. This is why scholars such as 
Broadberry and Harrison maintain the history of World War One cannot be written 
without the economics.84 
The war also left an economic legacy, which had to be addressed urgently and 
helps explain why Keynes was so adamant Europe’s problems were primarily economic 
ones. Europe had been transformed as a result of the deprivations visited on all sectors of 
all societies, in addition to which there was the physical destruction of land and capital. 
Damage, however, extended well beyond pure economic destruction. There was the 
emotional, psychological and social damage inflicted on many individuals, both 
combatants and civilians, from all countries caught up in the conflict. As a result Europe 
emerged from war weak, divided and unstable. Following hostilities the convergent 
processes of globalisation that had brought prosperity to many before 1914 now veered 
more and more toward patterns of divergence as leaders and politicians looked for ways 
of returning Europe to the relative stability Europeans had enjoyed before the onset of 
war.   
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4.4. The European Economy Post-World War One 
Looking back on just over a year of peace The Economist cautioned that 
with regard to the situation abroad, the best that can be said is that it 
is so serious that it is beginning to attract attention. Prostrate Europe 
cannot recover without help, and the great difficulty to be solved by 
the countries that can give help is how to see that it gets into the right 
hands.85  
Keynes was one of those who sought to ‘attract attention’ and he did so through his 
written works and practical involvement with groups such as the Economic Subcommittee 
of the Fight the Famine Fund, which he joined in July 1919.86 He, along with many of his 
contemporaries, recognised post-war Europe was a vastly changed place from pre-war 
Europe. Pre-war security had given way to disorder. The fear of extremism, including the 
Bolshevik revolution in Russia, was great in many countries. The war had destroyed an old 
order, and a new one was yet to be built, or to grow naturally. There had been a decisive 
shift of economic power from Britain to the US, though Britain retained significant power. 
But the transfer was not smooth. Many Americans feared plans, including Keynes’ for the 
forgiveness of wartime indebtedness, would relieve Britain of responsibilities they should 
carry. Britain in turn feared US leadership would exploit its growing power and was uneasy 
about their growing dependence on America.87  
4.4.1. Social and Cultural Impact 
From the armchair of history it is understandable that a current analysis of World War 
One a hundred years later appears remote from the experiences of those alive at the time. 
For those who were eyewitnesses to the horror and destructiveness of the war, a vivid 
                                                             
85
 Withers, Hartley, (ed.), (27 December, 1919), The Economist, p. 1179. 
86
 Markwell, (2006, p. 91). 
87
 Markwell, (2006, p. 91). 
 Page 165 
8-Jun-11 
portrait resonates through time. Shortly following hostilities, on 7 November 1918, Keynes 
went on a week’s tour through Belgium and Northern France.88 He later provided a 
description of what he saw 
A journey through the devastated areas of France is impressive to the 
eye and imagination beyond description. During the winter of 1918-
19, before Nature had cast over the scene her ameliorating mantle, 
the horror and desolation of war was made visible to sight on an 
extraordinary scale of blasted grandeur. The completeness of the 
destruction was evident. For mile after mile nothing was left. No 
building was habitable and no field fit to plough. The sameness was 
also striking. One devastated area was exactly like another – a heap of 
rubble, a morass of shell holes, a tangle of wires. 
To the British observer, one scene, however, stood out distinguished 
from the rest – the field of Ypres. In that desolate and ghostly spot, 
the natural colour and humours of the landscape and the climate 
seemed designed to express to the traveller the memories of the 
ground. A visitor to the salient early in November 1918, when a few 
German bodies still added a touch of realism and human error, and 
the great struggle was not yet certainly ended, could feel there, as 
nowhere else, the present outrage of war, and at the same time the 
tragic and sentimental purification which to the future will in some 
degree transform its harshness.89 
Keynes reflected a cultural change that had taken place in Britain as the war 
unfolded. However, this change did not take place immediately. During and immediately 
following the war, Robb argues, the ‘need for solace in remembering the war dead 
predominated, and most monuments celebrated the heroism and sacrifice of soldiers.’90 
But by the late 1920s and 1930s a more pessimistic and cynical view of the war had 
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emerged that competed with earlier patriotic interpretations. A spate of war novels, 
especially by veterans, contributed to the mood of disillusionment. Commemorations of 
the war dead increasingly were bound up with pacifist denunciations of the war itself, as 
well as criticism of the social and political order ‘which some people now held responsible 
for so many ‘meaningless’ deaths.’91  
Composers, painters, dramatists, poets, and novelists all produced works inspired 
by the war, some of which continue to shape contemporary understanding of the 
conflict.92 Most authority figures during the early hostilities had promoted the war in a 
straightforward, patriotic manner, portraying the conflict as a just and heroic national 
crusade. However, as the war dragged on doubts grew and these artistic voices, especially 
those who had experienced combat began presenting war in a harsh and unflattering 
manner. This new stance represented a radical change in cultural sensibility. As the 
disillusionment grew the war was increasingly discredited as a barbaric and pointless 
exercise. The war artist Paul Nash had written to his wife during the war 
Evil and the incarnate fiend alone can be master of this war, and no 
glimmer of God’s hand is seen anywhere. Sunset and sunrise are 
blasphemous, they are mockeries to man, only the black rain out of 
the bruised and swollen clouds all through the bitter black of night is 
fit atmosphere in such a land. The rain drives on, the stinking mud 
becomes evilly yellow, the shell holes fill up with green-white water, 
the roads and tracks are covered in inches of slime, the black dying 
trees ooze and sweat and the shells never cease … It is unspeakable, 
godless, hopeless. I am no longer an artist interested and curious, I 
am a messenger who will bring back word from the men who are 
fighting to those who want the war to go on forever. Feeble, 
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inarticulate, will be my message, but it will be the bitter truth, and 
may it burn their lousy souls.93 
During the 1920s it was accounts such as this that publishers drew on more frequently 
against that of the early war and immediate post-war accounts in praise of heroism and 
sacrifice. The many war poets who came after Rupert Brooke, the first British literary 
celebrity to crystallise the early idealism of the war in his poem “1914”, found by 1916, in 
the face of the continuing slaughter on the Western Front, Brooke’s idealism was difficult 
to sustain. Their poetry increasingly presented the war in a harsh and unglamorous light, 
as in Arthur Graeme West’s “The Night Patrol”: 
Only the dead were always present – present 
As a vile sickly smell of rottenness; 
The rustling stubble and the early grass, The slimy pools – the dead 
men stank through all … 
 
Isaac Rosenberg described an apocalyptic scene of battlefield carnage: 
The wheels lurched over sprawled dead 
But pained them not, though their bones crunched, 
Their mouths made no moan. 
They lie there huddled, friend, and foeman, 
Man born of man, and born of woman, 
And shells go crying over them 
From night till night and now.94 
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Poetry was complemented with prose from authors such as Graves, Aldington, Sassoon, 
and Williamson, who depicted the squalor of the trenches and the horrors of frontline 
experience. They savagely debunked the popular romantic image of warfare. For them, 
death was not pretty and these authors had no intention of making it so. Graves recalled 
in his memoir Good-Bye to All That: 
I saw a group bending over a man lying at the bottom of the trench. 
He was making a snoring noise mixed with animal groans. At my feet 
lay the cap he had worn, splashed with his brains. I had never seen 
human brain before; I somehow regarded them as a poetical figment. 
One can joke with a badly-wounded man and congratulate him on 
being out of it. One can disregard a dead man. But even a miner can’t 
make a joke that sounds like a joke over a man who takes three hours 
to die, after the top of his head had been taken off by a bullet fired at 
twenty yards’ range.95 
If the soldiers who fought in the war experienced the worst of it then it was just a 
matter of ‘relatively worse.’ Deprivation extended to all sectors of societies, both for the 
Allies and the Central Powers. In Germany the war had deprived people of sufficient 
quantities of the basic necessities of life, the problem of insufficient food for the civilian 
population arising early. Coal shortages developed in the winter of 1916-17 and in the last 
year of the war there were serious shortages of clothing and housing. The clothing supply 
had deteriorated sharply because of the shortage of raw materials and the use of 
inadequate “substitute” products. Shoes were in particularly short supply. No less serious 
was the shortage of soap. Coal miners could not wash properly after work, and 
housewives were unable to keep clothing clean. Many German workers were being forced 
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to contend with lice. Finally, the flood of workers into the war production centres created 
a housing shortage and a rapid rise of rents.96 
Germany’s domestic problems were because of poor management and 
organisation, farmers and peasantry being the worst affected, with the organisation of the 
food supply system largely ignoring their needs. Feldman argues, the exaggerated 
importance of the industrial workers during the war created a new type of social injustice, 
and the sufferings of the workers, however real, ‘must not be permitted to blind one to 
the extraordinary hardships suffered by other classes.’97 The plight of the farmers was 
‘truly miserable.’ The army had sequestered their best horses. They did not have sufficient 
labour, and the peace with Russia threatened their most important source of prisoners of 
war. They had been forced to engage in massive pig slaughters, and they did not have 
enough fodder for the remaining livestock. They were encumbered by hundreds of 
regulations and victimised by periodic searches for hidden food stores. Their land was 
being ruined by over-cultivation and the storage of artificial fertilisers. 
As bad as these privations were, they at least had farmland untouched by the 
ravages of war. In northern France by contrast, where Keynes had toured and where the 
worst of the fighting had taken place, the landscape as well as the economy and society 
was ‘appalling.’98 After four years of warfare, the battle zone of Pas-de-Calais formed ‘a 
panorama that had never been seen before.’ Weeds flourished among shell holes, 
trenches, barbed wire and concrete bunkers, carpeting the countryside with different 
vegetation from the cereals and lush fodder that it had supported for so long before the 
war. Across some stretches every tree had been felled by gunfire or had been cut down 
intentionally and ‘no bird song was heard; no birds remained.’ Whole villages had been 
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destroyed in the fighting or had been mined as the Germans withdrew. Numerous 
commentators would suggest they resembled a ‘lunar landscape.’ Districts away from the 
battle zone were less affected but they too suffered from damage caused by the enforced 
presence of troops and by the effects of scorched earth policies.99 
4.4.2. Economic Dislocation and Turmoil 
This social and cultural impact was largely attributable to the economic instability 
following hostilities. As has been highlighted, Europe found itself unable to return to the 
laissez-faire system. Contributing to this was the way in which the demographics of 
Europe were affected. Military and civilian death tolls, combined with a fall in the birth 
rate, left Europe (without Russia) facing a 22-24 million population deficit. Another 7 
million people were permanently disabled. Russia lost nearly 16 million people during the 
war, revolution and civil war, and suffered a birth deficit of around 10 million. Between 
1914 and 1921, due in part also to the decline in the birth rate and the “Spanish” flu 
epidemic, Europe had lost 50-60 million people.100 There was also a change in thinking 
taking place among politicians and policy makers, both domestically and internationally 
that increasingly challenged laissez-faire in favour of greater government intervention and 
inter-governmental action in economic affairs.  
The Amsterdam Memorial is an example of these early efforts, which stressed the 
role of business, and sought a liberal trading order with the help of governments.101 
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Despite having left the peace conference early Keynes continued to be involved in 
discussions around the needs of post-war reconstruction, including meetings with a group 
of European and American financiers in Amsterdam during October and November 1919. 
He had earlier agreed, at Norman Angell’s request (July 1919) to join an Economic 
Subcommittee of the Fight the Famine Fund.102 Angell wished to use famine relief as a 
means of getting ‘sounder public opinion on broader issues of international policy.’103 
Keynes, along with a number of financial experts, many of whom had been at Paris, met 
unofficially in Amsterdam and agreed the ‘Memorial,’ which among other proposals 
envisaged renewed international lending, and was submitted to governments in mid-
January 1920. While a number of the proposals received a mixed reception, American 
intransigence was an indicator of how a comprehensive plan of governmental leadership 
was alien to laissez-faire ideas. But Amsterdam proved to be an early exercise in a new 
private diplomacy among the élite of financiers and financial experts that was an 
important initiative as a wide range of individuals looked for ways of bringing stability and 
“normalcy” back to Europe.104 
Another reason for Europe’s economic turmoil and failure to return to “normalcy” 
was the consequences from the physical destruction of the war. This was most 
pronounced in the battlefield countries of Belgium, France, Poland, Serbia, and Russia. The 
Allied Reparation Commission assessed their war damages at £6.6 billion.105 Belgium alone 
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lost roughly 6% of its housing, half its steel mills, and three quarters of the rolling stock of 
the railroads. France came out of the war almost bankrupt, with large debts and some 
10% of her territory devastated. A quarter of French men between eighteen and thirty had 
died in the war, over 1.3 million altogether out of a pre-war population of 40 million. 
Twice as many again of its soldiers had been wounded. In the north great stretches of land 
were pitted with shell holes, criss-crossed by trenches, marked with row upon row of 
crosses. The coal-mines on which the French economy depended for its power were 
flooded; the factories they would have supplied had been razed to the ground or carted 
away to Germany. Six thousand square miles of France, which before the war had 
produced 20% of its crops, 90% of its iron ore and 65% of its steel, were utterly ruined.106 
France was a creditor country before the war but emerged from the war deeply in debt, 
faced with a bill of $US 3.7 billion owed to the United States and Britain. 
Defeated and exhausted, Germany experienced a nutrition crisis. The Times of 
November 19, 1918 carried a plea from the German government to the Allied victors for 
immediate assistance across a broad economic front, especially for transport to enable 
food to be carried to the many who were dislocated and starving. The German wireless 
service claimed,  
we [find] ourselves in such a position that we should not be able to 
guarantee a supply even for a week, and as the conditions in the east 
and west, north and south, are identical, we are forced to the 
conclusion that in all points of the Empire hunger would supervene, 
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owing to the difficulties of transport, the consequences of which 
would be incalculable!107 
The Versailles Treaty cut off 15% of the country’s arable land, 75% of its iron ore, 
and 26% of its coal resources. Iron and steel production capacities dropped 44% and 38% 
respectively. Germany lost 90% of its merchant fleet, its entire navy, a great part of its 
railway rolling stock, and all its foreign investment. By 1919, German industry produced 
little more than one-third of its 1913 output levels. By 1923, industrial production overall 
still had not reached half the pre-war level.108 The reality of physical decline and 
destruction affected surrounding European countries. For example, within the new 
borders of Poland 1.8 million buildings were destroyed. Half of the railway bridges and 
station buildings were ruined. Serbia, also a battlefield, lost half of its animal stocks. 
Bulgarian agricultural output dropped to 57% of the pre-Balkan war levels, while industrial 
production was still 20% lower in 1921. Romanian crude oil output did not reach half the 
pre-war level until 1921. In Austria the effects of war were particularly acute and had been 
since the beginning of 1918. The Times of April 3, 1918 carried extracts from a report 
prepared for the Bureau of Labour Statistics in Washington on social and economic 
conditions in enemy countries. In Prague 
a great part of the population suffers from hunger, and the children 
suffer both physically and morally. The number of child beggars in 
Prague has gone up to several thousands, the death rate among the 
general population increasing daily. Diarrhoea is spreading at an 
alarming rate in Prague.109  
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By the end of 1918 agricultural production had fallen by half, and milk consumption in 
Vienna dropped to 7% of pre-war levels; cut off from former raw material resources, 
industrial output reached only one-third of pre-war levels in 1919.110 
The economic effects of dislocation and disruption show up in the most widely 
used measure of economic performance, GDP (refer to Table Six below). For example, 
Western Europe did not regain its 1913 level of real GDP until 1924.111 Extensive growth 
had been set back in Western Europe by eleven years. Maddison maintains that in the 
case of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 1913 levels of real GDP were not reached again 
until 1923, Hungary in 1925, Bulgaria in 1927 and Russia in 1929. Even in those countries 
where physical damage was minimal, GDP growth experienced setbacks. In Britain’s case 
trade had been an early casualty of war and as a result industrial production declined. 
Output in 1920 stood at 1913 levels, but then fell roughly 20% in 1921, and did not 
recover until 1924. GDP had reached 1913 levels by 1919 but subsequently declined 
between 1920 and 1922 by 16% and did not recover until 1927. Before World War One 
Britain had been the world’s leading foreign investor and financial power. During the war 
her overseas capital holdings declined by 25%, and invisible income from financial 
transactions decreased by 25-33%. Both Alford and Pollard argue, Britain’s prosperity, 
prior to war, had largely depended on her ability to generate large and increasing 
surpluses on international financial transactions. This capability was lost as a result of the 
war.112 
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Table 6: Annual average growth rates of real GDP, 1913-29 (%) 
 
Source: Feinstein, Temin, and Toniolo, (1997, p. 13). 
Unlike the countries at war, most of the neutral states emerged from the war and 
the immediate post-war years with stronger economies and higher incomes. The 
Netherlands, Spain, Norway, and Switzerland increased their per capita GDP by 19,15, 11, 
and 9% respectively, between 1913-14 and 1922-24. At the end of the war, however, 
because of shortages of energy, raw materials, and markets, and because of revitalised 
international competition and sharply restricted export possibilities, the neutral countries 
suffered setbacks. None of the European countries escaped the negative consequences of 
the war. However, economic growth was not as badly affected in other parts of the world. 
The American and Japanese economies forged ahead in the 1920s, seemingly impervious 
to the difficulties in Europe. Levels of GDP in Latin America and Asia continued to expand 
in the same period, despite weaker commodity prices. On the other hand the then 
developing world was not completely insulated from the after-effects of war. For example, 
the price of Malaya’s main export commodity collapsed in the global recession of 1920-22 
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although it did recover to a record high in 1925. In high-income primary producing 
countries, such as New Zealand, the main effect was felt in the fluctuations in world 
demand and prices in the 1920s. Declining real capital outflows from the core European 
countries, including Britain, posed additional problems for peripheral countries, which 
were only partially relieved by increased supplies of American capital.113 
In this story of turmoil, runaway inflation was one of the most frightening 
economic phenomena. This was due to a number of factors, including the financing of the 
war economy, the accumulation of huge debts, severe declines in agricultural and 
industrial production, the heavy burden of reconstruction, and, in some cases, reparation 
payments. Five countries, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Italy, were hard hit by 
hyperinflation with Germany particularly badly affected. On January 17, 1920 The 
Economist reported,  
[the] general inflation of prices counts as a serious danger for 
Germany in the coming year, because it shows no sign of abating. 
Prices of commodities rise so rapidly that no general index can be 
kept. The figures for isolated commodities indicate that the rise goes 
on not in arithmetical, but in something like geometrical progression. 
A single increase in the last few weeks has often exceeded by several 
hundred per cent the whole peace price. A good instance is pig-iron, 
the price of which (haematite) was raised by 436 marks a ton on the 
1st of the month; its price in 1914 was 79.50 marks.114 
 In November 1923 $US 1 attained the rate of 4.2 billion German marks. Thirty paper mills, 
150 printing firms, and 2,000 printing presses worked 24 hours a day to provide valueless 
money. The price of a kilogram of butter reached 5 billion marks and the Reichsbank 
printed 1,000 billion mark notes. The country fell back on barter trade so that the price of 
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a haircut was four eggs, a first-class burial, forty.115 Economists, including Keynes, warned 
that inflation was a serious threat to social cohesion and saw it as a threat to capitalism, 
because it discouraged saving and bred animosity towards entrepreneurs, who were 
branded as profiteers.116 Fuelling the inflationary threat were attempts to block tax rate 
rises. Opposition came from sectional interests, while the appetite of domestic and 
foreign investors for government debt was limited. The Central Powers found it harder to 
borrow abroad than did Britain and France, with all belligerents resorting in some 
measure to the printing press or inflation tax.117 
The leading powers before the war had committed to ensure the spectre of 
inflation was contained. This had been achieved, by and large, through the successful 
operation of the pre-war gold standard. The standard had involved unlimited 
convertibility of major currencies into gold at fixed exchange rates but with inflation no 
longer being able to be contained, rising current deficits and declining investor 
confidence, European countries were forced to restrict or suspend gold convertibility after 
1914, in order to stop the loss of gold reserves. At the end of the war efforts were made 
to restore conditions back to pre-1914 and as many as sixteen countries sought to 
stabilise currencies through restoration of the gold standard between 1923 and 1926, and 
another four in 1927-9. However, by this stage the international economic system had 
been so weakened through a lack of leadership, co-operation was undermined and 
international economic chaos posed increased risk to all countries, thwarting efforts to 
use pre-war methods.118 
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Lack of co-operation and the inability to return the world to pre-war prosperity 
were exacerbated by the continuance of nationalism and great power rivalries. The 
victorious Allied countries sought to strengthen their dominant position while the 
disillusioned, defeated and peripheral countries, and those who believed they had been 
cheated by the victors, revolted. An idealistic President Wilson spoke of “peace without 
victory,” freedom and equal status for all nations without great power interference, 
collective security, guaranteed by a newly established League of Nations, and the right of 
self-determination for all nationalities. However, America soon withdrew from 
international politics and peace-making. Instead of taking the lead and helping to build an 
international world order, the US retreated into isolationism and became preoccupied 
with domestic affairs. 
According to Komlos the most momentous consequence of the war in this new 
nationalistic world order (or, rather, disorder) was the disintegration of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire.119 At the turn of the twentieth century the Hapsburg Empire had been 
economically active, despite being politically moribund. Trade had flourished within this 
Central European customs union but after 1918 trade between the former Hapsburg 
states may have fallen by as much as one-half. Countries that grew out of the old empire 
were economically unbalanced. Czechoslovakia inherited the empire’s most advanced 
industrial region, leaving Austria relatively underdeveloped. Hungary was cut off from its 
main sources of raw materials. High trade barriers were erected as each country sought to 
develop a distinct national economy. Hungary was on particularly bad terms with its 
neighbours. Bad blood stretched back into the war years when Hungary was accused of 
profiteering at the expense of countries such as Austria, who were considered worse 
off.120 Singleton argues, ‘financial and commercial networks in Central Europe were 
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shattered and the gains from regional specialisation were lost. Intra-regional trade 
declined relative to trade with Western Europe.’121 Added to the negative consequences 
of Austro-Hungary’s collapse was resentment of the peace settlement, which created new 
territorial grievances. 
Poland, and what would become Yugoslavia, faced problems of a different, but 
equally disruptive, nature. Their task was to integrate regions, transport systems, and 
business networks that had until recently been in separate states. Yugoslavia inherited 
five practically unrelated railway systems, and four gauges of track.122 Stimulated by 
protectionism, industry expanded rapidly in most parts of Central and Eastern Europe 
during the 1920s but it is doubtful that many countries, with the exception of 
Czechoslovakia, were internationally competitive. The new states of Central and Eastern 
Europe obtained relief and reconstruction loans from the Allies and the League of Nations, 
but the amounts were, argues Singleton, too small to have more than a moral effect.123 
On the other hand, inflows of foreign investment were considerable, especially into 
extractive industries such as mining and oil production and into the Czechoslovakia 
manufacturing sector. 
4.4.3. The Issue of Reparations 
But this inflow of foreign investment was a bright spot on an otherwise gloomy picture of 
economic struggle and turmoil. The Conference of Versailles and the resulting Peace 
Treaty were symbolic of everything wrong economically and politically with Europe. An 
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editorial in The Times on November 19, 1918, written in response to German requests for 
help reflected the unhelpful mood and attitude of the victorious Allies. 
The German Government … must really accommodate itself to the 
fact that it speaks for a defeated nation. These daily whines about 
“the menace to economic conditions” come with singular ill-grace 
from the people who ravished Belgium and Northern France, and 
boasted joyfully that they would starve this country into submission. 
The Allies have declared themselves bound by the common appeals of 
humanity, but they will not be moved from conditions of armistice, 
which guarantee their own security against a repetition of these 
crimes.124 
To many contemporaries the peace was nothing more than the continuation of 
war by other means. For example, they pointed out how France’s plan was to weaken its 
arch-enemy, Germany, as far as possible. Article 233 of the Versailles Treaty declared 
Germany would have to pay for the destruction and damage of the war, and the amount 
“shall be determined by an inter-Allied commission, to be called the Reparation 
Commission.” The Commission, under strong French pressure, decided on a $33 billion 
reparation obligation for Germany in April 1921. Even Lloyd George, no saint when it came 
to British intentions to constrain Germany economically, wrote later that ‘French claims 
were at the outset of a most extravagant character.’ France had demanded 75 billion 
francs for devastation of buildings in northeast France, which represented 4% of the 
territory of the country, while official French statistics in 1917 had valued the housing 
properties of the entire country at only 59.5 billion francs.125 
These demands now appear to have been opening gambits as reparations 
extracted were far more modest. Furthermore, revisionist history has sought to redeem 
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the French as “rather hard done by.” For example, Trachtenberg argues, ‘the old idea of a 
vindictive French reparation policy, and more generally the idea of a vengeful France 
intent on destroying the German Reich, no longer seem tenable. France appears, not 
forceful and violent, but rather weak, too weak to stand by herself … the Clemenceau 
government sought salvation not through the crushing of Germany but rather by linking 
up with the British and the Americans.’126  
Singleton argues the roots of the reparations issue are to be found in the ways in 
which the war had been financed. Taxing, borrowing and printing money financed war-
related expenditure.127 After the war, governments had to decide what to do about their 
vast accumulated debts. While higher taxes or levies, more inflation and default were the 
main options, Allied politicians aligned themselves against the defeated powers and 
insisted they should reimburse the victors for at least some of the financial costs of the 
war, including war pensions. 
Trachtenberg argues that the reason for the Allies seeking reparations was 
primarily due to the ungenerous policy of the United States, which was unwilling to accept 
any substantial share of the burden of reconstruction. He also argues that France would 
have preferred an inter-Allied solution to the one elaborated in the Treaty, something 
they continued to press for into the early 1920s as ‘they had no desire to use reparation as 
a way of crushing Germany, as the moderation of their policy demonstrates quite 
clearly.’128 There is a view that even the British could have been brought around to a mild 
reparation settlement if it had been linked to a generous American policy of economic 
assistance to Europe, evidenced by Lloyd George’s awareness of the need to face up to 
the wider problem of European economic recovery. But Trachtenberg is not so convinced, 
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and does not accept the view held by some that Lloyd George was an appeaser in 
temperament and outlook. In private he repeatedly expressed his preference for a harsh 
settlement, an attitude that reflected liberal thinking on international politics. 
Trachtenberg argues of Lloyd George’s views, ‘if the natural order of things was peaceful, 
it followed that only aggression could cause wars; to establish peace, to satisfy the 
demands of justice, to introduce the rule of law into the international sphere, aggression 
had to be punished.’ 129 
This was the attitude against which Keynes was so vehemently opposed. He 
predicted in Economic Consequences demands for reparations would lead to economic 
disaster in Germany and a lengthy period of international economic instability. As has 
been highlighted, a number of contemporary commentators saw these arguments as the 
views of a pro-German sympathiser while many later economists judge Keynes as having 
exaggerated both his argument on Germany’s capacity to pay and the figures he used to 
make his case. On the first of these points Singleton makes the argument that it was 
doubtful whether the Allies ever expected Germany to pay more than the first 50 billion 
gold marks, itself not excessive, of the 132 billion gold marks outlined in the 1921 London 
Schedule of Payments. 130  Furthermore Germany’s allies were treated leniently and ‘the 
states of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire were asked for token reparations, and 
Turkey was pardoned.’131 
The 1921 London Schedule of Payments marks an important cross road in the 
reparations issue. The Versailles Conference had deliberately kept open the actual size of 
the final reparation bill and it was not until May 1921 final figures were agreed upon and 
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accepted by Germany, albeit under threat of occupation of the Ruhr. There was also the 
start of much of the confusion that developed around what the reparation figures actually 
meant, a confusion which continues to the present day, as Sally Marks makes clear in “The 
Myths of Reparation.”132 While historians have focused upon the figure of 132 billion gold 
marks, the London Schedule of Payments of May 5, 1921 ‘both enshrined this sum and 
demolished it.’ The full liability for all the Central Powers combined, not just Germany 
alone, was set at 132 billion gold marks, subject to certain arithmetic adjustments.133 The 
German debt, however, was to be organised in three series of bonds, labelled A, B, and C. 
Of these, the C bonds, which contained the bulk of the German obligation, were 
deliberately designed to be chimerical. They were entirely unreal, and their primary 
function was to mislead public opinion in the receiver countries into believing the  
132 billion gold mark figures was being maintained. Allied experts knew Germany could 
not pay 132 billion gold marks and the other Central Powers could pay little. Thus the A 
and B bonds, which were genuine, represented the actual Allied assessment of German 
capacity to pay. The A bonds, amounting to 12 billion marks, constituted the unpaid 
balance of the interim 20 billion, while the B bonds represented German reparations 
liability to a face (or nominal) value of 50 billion gold marks or $12.5 billion, an amount 
smaller than what Germany had recently offered to pay. The London Schedule also 
established modalities of payment toward redemption of the A and B bonds, including 
two schedules of quarterly deadlines for fixed and variable annuities.134 
Keynes was deeply hostile to this agreement because it carried ultimatums for 
Germany that involved sanctions, territorial incursions and discriminatory tariffs, if used. 
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He believed it displayed ‘contempt for the due form and processes of law,’ and would not 
raise any money from Germany.135 These became his familiar themes of criticism up until 
the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. He did, however, applaud the Reparation 
Commission’s determination of Germany’s liability on 27 April as being lower than his 
estimates in Economic Consequences and this, in his opinion, was a ‘signal triumph for the 
spirit of justice.’ The London Schedule was the scheme for the payment of this liability. 
However, even though Keynes saw the 1921 Schedule as a return to the Treaty, he held to 
his previous position that the Treaty itself remained impossible to fulfil as he still believed 
the reparations imposed were beyond Germany’s capacity to pay.136 
The actual total amount paid by Germany of 20.598 billion gold marks would no 
doubt have been seen by Keynes as a vindication of his views, although most economists 
are not persuaded that reparations imposed were beyond Germany’s capacity to pay. 137 
Ferguson argues, the actual amount of reparations paid by Germany during the early 
1920s was equivalent to between 4 and 7 per cent of national income, hardly a crippling 
burden, especially in comparison with the material losses borne by the German 
population during the war itself.138 When Germany descended into hyperinflation, the 
Weimar government said it could no longer meet the London Schedule of Payments and in 
1924 Germany obtained the rescheduling of its financial obligations under the Dawes 
Plan. Contrary to the argument that it was America’s lack of generosity that inflamed the 
reparations issue, German payments following the Dawes Plan were actually facilitated by 
a large inflow of US private capital. These hardly seem the actions of an ungenerous 
nation, although investors were private citizens driven by commercial imperatives. But 
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Germany did finally default in 1932 during the Depression. Some estimates suggest as 
little as 17 billion gold marks were paid in reparations, although this figure is disputed. 
Despite the dispute around the actual final sum paid, it was nevertheless a fraction of the 
original bill.139 
David Felix takes issue with both the estimate of 17 billion gold marks and with 
those who argue that Germany was “let off lightly.” As long as there was an insistence on 
the repayment of the large debts incurred during the war, any further debt was added to 
an accumulating deficit, which in turn meant any subsequent amount of economic growth 
would be lost on debt repayments when economic restoration was badly needed.140  
Arguing that Germany was unable to pay for war damages, Felix addresses the issue of 
statistics. Students of the war often draw on a selective range of numbers to support the 
view Germany was capable of meeting reparation amounts imposed by the Allies. Felix’s 
assessment is that ‘the statistics lie.’ Using an estimate of 22.9 billion gold marks Weill-
Raynal argues was paid by Germany,141 Felix maintains this figure conceals innumerable 
questionable decisions about the valuation of goods, interest payments, and other items. 
For example, it does not credit Germany with many transfers of wealth it made, including 
the mines of the Saar, and public works and steel mills in Lorraine. Also ignored are the 
malformations in the German economy and the costs, perhaps 3.5 billion gold marks, of 
the Ruhr occupation.  
Often the counter argument to this is that, in any event, the Allies wholly funded 
actual reparation payments and it achieves nothing to add back the amounts Felix 
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identifies. Compared to the figure of 22.9 billion gold marks, foreign investors, after, and 
despite losses of 7.6 to 8.7 billion gold marks invested from 1919 to 1923, sent still more 
money, the equivalent of 25.5 billion gold marks, into Germany from 1924 to 1930. This 
was the source of revenue Germany used to pay reparations under the Dawes and Young 
Plans. When Germany slid into acute financial crisis on the heels of the September 1930 
election, German leaders began to seek reparations relief, although the initial credit crisis 
was caused primarily by a dramatic flight of capital in response to Hitler’s electoral 
success, not by reparations. Hoover had reacted to American investor concerns by 
proposing a year-long moratorium on reparation payments but when he found it 
impossible to extend this, through internal political pressure, Britain and France called the 
Entente powers and Germany together at Lausanne in June 1932 to effect a “lasting 
settlement.” When it became clear nothing would come of inviting Hitler to discuss 
payment ‘reparations were never formally cancelled, but fell into limbo as they became 
increasingly unrealistic.’142 
Felix asks the question: why had the Allies let Germany cheat them so completely? 
In answer to his own question he argues, rather than having any plan to deliberately 
cheat, both the Germans and the Allies were doing what had to be done. Germany could 
only pay in one of two ways; either by handing over part of her national wealth; or by 
drawing upon revenues produced by current income, the latter from returning a trade 
surplus. But, he argues, the national wealth, estimated at 250 billion gold marks, ‘resisted 
exploitation’. The most negotiable part was represented by the great industries, and 
taking them over would have meant nationalisation, and, more than that, possible 
revolution. The Allies did not want a German revolution. Furthermore, it was the great 
industries that were attracting foreign funds with any moves to nationalise most likely 
resulting in foreign funds drying up. Had these arguments been ignored it would have 
been necessary to sell securities on the Allied money markets so as to transform German 
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property holdings into cash. In Great Britain the fear was, if this were to occur such sales 
might lead to speculation and give German industry a preference over Britain, thus giving 
foreign countries an interest in German domestic affairs.143  
The argument that Germany could have funded payments from current income 
also has a complication as Germany’s trade was static over the 1920s.144 In reality the 
entire German economy was weak in the 1920s. Industry was short of capital, the financial 
markets were disorganised, the savings of countless Germans had been obliterated as a 
result of inflation, there was a chronic current balance-of-payments deficit at every level 
of activity, and agriculture, an important sector of activity, was in a critical condition. In 
short, Germany was on the cusp of severe depression.145 Contributing to Germany’s woes 
was the resistance from Allied leaders to let her build up surpluses because this would 
have reduced employment in their own countries. As it was, Britain was under intense 
competition from a number of directions. Japanese and Indian competition, plus an over-
valued pound and pressure from German exports meant Britain experienced an 
unemployment rate averaging 10 per cent during the decade. In effect, the Allies, while 
pressuring Germany to get extra payments out of her, were refusing her the means of 
earning or paying money. 
With no effective means of Germany earning her way out of reparation demands 
and with the only way to pay being from fully funded foreign loans, meant that Germany 
had no economic capacity to enable any form of reparations to be made. Felix argues ‘in 
the spring of 1921, when the reparation debt was determined, Germany was in deep 
economic difficulty.’ This was primarily due to Germany’s level of indebtedness and 
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inability to get into a position where the Germans could get the situation under control.146 
For the financial year from April 1, 1920, to March 31, 1921, just before the London 
Payments Plan went into effect, the German government had a general operating deficit 
of 6 billion gold marks. Income of 3,178.1 million gold marks had been derived from taxes 
and 97 million gold marks in other receipts. But, expenditures had been 9,328.7 million 
gold marks. The deficit was a sixth of annual national income, then about 35 billion gold 
marks.147 The German government had escaped bankruptcy only by inflating the currency 
and debts were piled upon previous deficits. According to Felix, it is not surprising the 
London Payments Plan broke down within a few months, even if the debts taken on their 
own seemed modest figures.  
When Germany did remit a billion gold marks under Allied orders they got the 
money by selling paper marks on the foreign-currency exchanges. However, the paper 
mark fell to a fifth of its value in half a year, going from 60 to 310 by November 8, 1921 
and setting in motion a slide into a set of inflationary pressures Germany found they could 
not get out of. The Allies attempted a succession of other plans and in January 1922, the 
first one, called for somewhat lower payments and the transforming of some of the cash 
requirements into payments in kind. This new arrangement, however, was permitted to 
disappear in August 1922 when, the mark went from 643 to 1,725 to the dollar. At the 
same time, Raymond Poincaré, France’s hard-line premier, ‘participated in still another 
saving deception’ by permitting the acceptance of German treasury notes in lieu of cash as 
reparation payments, although he knew the notes, without the backing by gold or foreign 
currency, were worthless. Driven by angry French public opinion, Poincaré sent troops 
into the Ruhr on January 11, 1923. This occupation failed to produce the cash France was 
demanding but it destroyed the mark, which went from 7,260 on January 2 to 4 trillion on 
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November 20, 1923. The mark was withdrawn from circulation at this point. These events 
played back on France, with the franc falling precipitously and the French economy 
suffering ‘incalculable losses.’148 
Reparations dominated the political life of the Weimar Republic in Germany until 
its breakup. After the occupation by the French and the disorder and insecurity created by 
inflation, the Dawes Plan, permitted Germany to recover along with the rest of the world. 
The Dawes Plan had begun with a virtual moratorium, assisted by a loan of $ 200 million 
to Germany, for the first year, and a partial moratorium for the next two years. The 
problem was not solved, just postponed, and the yearly payments kept increasing. Despite 
making slow progress economically for the rest of the decade, the Depression 
overwhelmed whatever relief Germany might have enjoyed. At the time of his death in 
1929 Gustav Stresemann, the German foreign minister since August 1923, had been 
working with the Allies on replacing the Dawes Plan with the Young Plan. But, with a 
mounting propaganda campaign from the Nationalists, with Nazi support and the collapse 
of the government under the weight of reparations and the Depression, the plan 
collapsed. The policies of the government had driven up unemployment to a third of the 
work force, due in large part to efforts at reducing the trade deficit and government’s 
deficits, in the hope that the Allies would relent on reparations. Felix argues, ‘the Hoover 
Moratorium of July 1931 and the Lausanne Conference of June-July 1932 did, at last, 
permit reparations to disappear, but it was too late. The unemployment and despair had 
given Hitler ‘the last materials he needed for gaining power.’149 
4.4.4. The Debt Burden and Wealth Effects 
Despite the seemingly complex nature of the reparations issue, it was primarily the debt-
upon-deficit issue that lay at the heart of the Allies’ inability to restore economic stability. 
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Reparations grew out of a larger debt problem the countries of Europe faced at the 
conclusion of the war. Aside from the debts of the belligerent countries, the Allies faced 
significant indebtedness, commonly termed inter-Allied debt. The problem exercised 
policy-makers and journalists for the rest of the 1920s. Allied intergovernmental 
indebtedness stood at $US16.4 billion at the Armistice. The European Allies, including 
Britain, were indebted to the United States to the tune of $US 7 billion. Britain lent more 
to her European Allies than it had borrowed from the United States. While the Americans 
made new loans to Europe in 1918-20 inter-Allied debt soured relations between the 
United States and Europe until the 1930s. The European Allies argued they could not 
afford to repay the United States, and any attempt to do so would intensify the post-war 
financial crisis. Singleton maintains this was an exaggeration and the sum involved  
($US 7 billion), was small in relation to the sum demanded of Germany.150 European 
governments also offered to cancel all intra-European war debt, and treat Germany more 
leniently, if the US agreed to write off transatlantic debt. The United States did proclaim a 
three-year moratorium on interest charges in 1919, and later substantially scaled down 
demands for repayment. However, due to resistance from the United States Congress, the 
US would not cancel inter-Allied debt, as Keynes had urged them to do in Economic 
Consequences, and debt repayments only ceased during the Depression. 
As has been highlighted, some remain critical of the United States for not being 
more generous in forgiving war debts but Singleton points out, the Americans were 
perfectly entitled to limit their post-war commitment to Europe and to capitalise on the 
weak bargaining positions of Britain and France. He argues that, ‘perhaps they would have 
acted differently if they could have foreseen the events of the next two decades, but of 
course they could not. There was no precedent in 1919, but there would be one in 
1945.’151 Furthermore, as has been argued, with most other economic issues of the post-
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war period, reasons for failure, turmoil and lack of co-operation were complex and almost 
impossible to deal with on their own. Four years of war had unleashed powerful social 
forces and caused massive economic disruption. Empires had fallen with property rights in 
Russia overthrown. Money wages and benefits, but not real working class incomes, had 
risen substantially. After 1918 working class parties and the trade unions fought attempts 
to transfer some of the financial burden of the war away from the holders of paper assets 
and onto the working class sector. Maier argues this resistance was relatively successful 
and while capitalism survived, significant concessions were made to the working class in 
order to restore stability and safeguard the fundamental interests of property owners.152  
The relative changes to the distribution of wealth in this period can be seen in the 
statistics. Between 1911-13 and 1924, the share of the richest 5 per cent of adults in the 
aggregate net marketable worth of England and Wales fell from 87 per cent to 81.5 per 
cent. The share of the poorest 60 per cent of taxpayer households in Germany’s taxable 
income rose by 4.8 percentage points between 1913 and 1926, while the share of the top 
10 per cent of households fell by 5.5 per cent. Earned income as a share of total income in 
Germany rose from 50 per cent to 65 per cent between 1913 and 1925. In France, 
dividends, interest and rent as a share of household primary income fell from 26.8 per 
cent in 1913 to 18.3 per cent in 1926. The war and economic downturn in the early 1920s 
also tended to have an egalitarian impact in the United States. Singleton argues, 
modern readers are likely to view the redistribution of income and 
wealth in a positive light. However, the process by which the financial 
burden of the war was reallocated was intensely disruptive to 
economic activity. Currencies rose and fell, savings were destroyed, 
businesses collapsed and millions of jobs were lost. Failure to resolve 
the distributional questions arising from the war was a major cause of 
uncertainty and instability within nations and internationally.153 
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4.5. Summary – The European Economy Post-World War One 
This chapter outlines the context of Keynes’ book and the messages he sought to 
communicate. He saw the problems of the world as fundamentally economic ones and 
believed that if his contemporaries understood this there would be a will and 
determination to find solutions for returning the world to economic stability and 
prosperity. 
In the fifty years leading up to World War One, Europe had experienced continual 
economic growth, stable monetary and trading conditions, and an economic system of 
laissez-faire that contributed to increasing prosperity. However, with the cessation of 
hostilities in 1918, Europe found it was not possible to return to pre-war economic 
conditions. The next decade was marked by dislocation, turmoil, and instability. The forces 
of globalisation that had delivered prosperity and economic convergence to Europe first, 
and then gradually to other parts of the world, also contained seeds of divergence which, 
as time went on, eroded the forces of convergence to the point where economically 
interdependent and integrated nations went to war with one another. 
A combined result of war, population displacement, accumulating deficits and 
wealth re-distribution conspired to undermine attempts at restoring the industrial 
productivity levels to pre-war levels. Some 50-60 million people had either lost their lives 
or been displaced between 1914 and 1918. In addition, physical destruction had been 
acute in some countries. France emerged from the war almost bankrupt. Germany faced a 
nutrition crisis and significant decline in industrial capability. Russia had lost an empire 
and the loss of property rights. While Britain did not suffer direct physical destruction, it 
lost its place as the financial powerhouse behind world trade and prosperity, and was 
superseded by the United States as the leading global economic power. With the 
exception of the US and Japan, GDP levels in all countries did not recover their 1913 levels 
until at least 1924 and in many cases it took the full decade of the 1920s to reach pre-war 
levels, only to be pushed further back with the events of the Depression from 1929 to 
1933. Furthermore, internal price stability had broken down by the end of the war. 
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Countries found they could not return to the system of gold convertibility, and inflation, 
and in the case of Germany, hyperinflation, was difficult to control. Rising deficits, and 
declining investor confidence added to the risk of social collapse, which posed a threat to 
capitalism itself. 
A lack of both economic leadership and co-operation added to the instability and 
led to international chaos, adding to the risks already faced by countries struggling with 
accumulated war debts, declining agriculture, and in some cases, a heavy burden of 
reconstruction. The Allies’ failure to deal with the burden of inter-Allied debt typified the 
lack of leadership and co-operation. For the belligerents the issue of reparations, 
especially in the case of Germany, added to increasing frustration and resentment, which 
may have been overcome if all nations had been able to co-operate. 
Globalisation as a force of divergence also typified the lack of co-operation as 
global rivalries, associated with fervent nationalism, failed to abate after the war. The 
United States retreated into isolationism, the Austro-Hungarian Empire disintegrated, only 
to be replaced by an economically unbalanced group of Central and Southern European 
nations, which in turn saw the decline of intra-regional trade. The Conference of Versailles 
had been designed to put Europe back onto a path of prosperity and a return to pre-war 
stability. Instead it was a continuation of war by peaceful means. The participants failed to 
address, and come to terms with, the accumulated debt and destruction of the war years. 
Of most significance was the failure, above all things, to address the urgent need for co-
operation and economic leadership so desperately needed after the disaster of the war 
years. 
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Chapter 5. Keynes’ Use of Statistics in The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace 
As has been argued, Keynes enjoyed success in communicating his ideas although many 
readers did not grasp the central argument of Economic Consequences. The next two 
chapters examines Keynes’ claim the book was a serious work of economics. While he 
used a tightly integrated mix of prose and statistics it is difficult to appreciate how 
important Keynes’ statistics were without separating and examining them in isolation 
from the prose. There is a danger that by doing this Keynes’ style is overlooked; the more 
important because it was often his successful integration of prose, poetry and statistics, 
which explains his communication success. However, unless we examine Keynes’ statistics 
in isolation it is difficult to appreciate how important they were as elements of his 
arguments. Furthermore we can better decide whether Keynes’ claim Economic 
Consequences was a serious work of economics is correct by examining the numbers and 
statistics he used. 
Many of the statistics in Economic Consequences came from Treasury memoranda. 
This helps explain the unsystematic presentation in places as memoranda normally follow 
more informal conventions of communication. However it also demonstrates Keynes had 
a rhetorical advantage by drawing on a trusted source and one least likely to be 
challenged. The veracity of his numbers and statistics were more likely to be accepted if 
they came from an official source. In comparison to reactions Keynes received to his 
prose, reaction to his numbers was relatively muted, an indication of critics’ willingness to 
accept the authority of his statistics. Even when Mantoux, the first serious challenger of 
Keynes’ numbers, published his critique 27 years after the publication of Economic 
Consequences, his criticisms were more to do with hindsight than focusing on the context 
of 1919. While such an approach adds to our knowledge of history it does little to explain 
why Keynes used the numbers he did and why they seemed to be accepted almost 
without challenge during the 1920s. 
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 5.1. Statistics from Economic Consequences 
Provided in this section is a set of tables that lists all statistics and numbers, with 
supporting comments, that Keynes included in his book. Another way of viewing these 
tables is to see them as a presentation of Economic Consequences, with all prose not 
directly linked to Keynes’ statistics and numbers, stripped out. There are disadvantages 
and advantages in this approach. Among the disadvantages is the danger that by focusing 
exclusively on Keynes’ statistics and numbers we fail to comprehend the unique and rich 
style of the book. 
However, the advantages of such an examination outweigh the disadvantages for a 
number of reasons. First, Keynes was adamant that Economic Consequences was a serious 
economic text, rather than a book of political propaganda. By taking away much of the 
prose, which can be judged as political, the numbers and statistics can be better analysed 
in economic terms. Second, statistics and numbers are often not associated with rhetoric 
and persuasion but rather are provided by economists in the belief numbers are more 
objective than discursive prose. There is also a view the use of numbers brings greater 
precision and clarity to an understanding of economic issues. For Keynes it was all about 
persuasion and he was just as likely to use statistics and numbers as prose in order to 
achieve his ends.  
While the form of presentation below is not considered ideal, a number of 
approaches have been tried with this approach proving to be the most workable. The 
tables that follow immediately provide all the statistics, numbers and relevant 
explanations in the same sequence as they appear in Economic Consequences. It also 
needs to be noted that analysis is undertaken following some preliminary sections. 
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Table 7: Europe before the War 
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Table 8: The Treaty, Shipping and Coal 
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Table 9: Reparations, Belgium and French Claims 
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Table 10: Reparations; British and Other Country Claims; Summary of 
Claims 
 
 
  
 Page 200 
8-Jun-11 
 
Table 11: Reparations; the Conference and Treaty Terms 
 
 
 Page 201 
8-Jun-11 
Table 12: Reparations; Germany's Capacity to Pay; Immediately 
Transferable Wealth 
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Table 13: Reparations; Germany's Capacity to Pay; Property in ceded 
Territories or surrended under the Armistice 
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Table 14: Reparations; Germany's Capacity to Pay; Annual Payments spread 
over Ten Years 
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Table 15: Reparations; Germany's Capacity to Pay; Annual Payments spread 
over ten years; Exports and Imports 
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Table 16: Reparations; Germany's Capacity to Pay; Annual Payments spread 
over Ten Years; Summary 
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Table 17: Reparations; Germany's Capacity to Pay; Annual Payments spread 
over Ten Years; Proviso's 
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Table 18: The Reparation Commission and the German Counter-Proposals 
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Table 19: Europe after the Treaty 
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Table 20: Remedies: The Revision of the Treaty 
 Remedies 
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Table 21: Remedies; Settlement of Inter-Ally Indebtedness 
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Table 22: Remedies; International Loan and Russia 
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5.2. Rhetoric and Keynes’ Statistics 
Keynes needed to persuade and convince his readers his statistics were legitimate if his 
claim that Economic Consequences was to be a serious work of economics was credible. 
The best evidence he succeeded is, whereas Keynes is often criticised for his rhetorical 
prose, few mount a similar challenge to the credibility of his statistics. For example, 
Keynes used numerous sets of statistics to support his argument the Treaty and its 
Reparations clauses (refer Tables 8 to 18 above), as proposed at the Conference of 
Versailles, would place an excessive burden on Germany, destroying not only German 
industry but putting at risk the economies of all European nations. Keynes makes the 
claim, ‘the statistics of economic interdependence of Germany and her neighbours’ are 
overwhelming.’1 This was just one of many statistical claims not contested by his 
contemporaries.  
According to Keynes economic interdependence came down to three parts of the 
economy that really mattered: food, coal, and transport. Table 8 lists the statistics for 
coal, taken from the Treaty, and used by Keynes to claim that the fatal consequences of 
the Treaty, should its terms be imposed, were economic. While food and transport were 
just as important economically for Europe, coal was a pivotal economic resource in post-
war Europe, as it provided energy for industrial purposes and private consumption. 
Keynes argued, ‘the German Empire has been built more truly on coal and iron than on 
blood and iron.’2 Any adverse impact on supply directly affected economic growth and 
development potential, in addition to meaning individual deprivation. Furthermore, when 
considering the example of coal Keynes was interested in the rhetorical use of statistics in 
two ways: first were statements given as facts and then suggested consequences. The 
facts for Keynes were, the coal mines in the Saar Basin were to be ceded to France 
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2
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absolutely (refer the Treaty); the Saar district, Keynes points out, had been part of 
Germany for 1000 years (he assumed this to be common knowledge); Upper Silesia had 
23% of the total German output of hard coal (from German statistical sources), yet would 
be, following a plebiscite, ceded to Poland (refer the Treaty). But, argued Keynes, Upper 
Silesia had never been part of Poland and ‘economically’ was ‘intensely’ German (his 
source here was from a German representative at the Conference). Out of the coal that 
would remain to her, Germany was obligated to make good year by year the estimated 
loss, which France had incurred by the damage and destruction in the coalfields of her 
northern provinces (again, from the Treaty). Sums due for Reparation were to be partly 
paid in kind rather than cash. To a number of Allied countries Germany was to provide 
40,000,000 tons, leaving 60,000,000 tons against a pre-war consumption of 139,000,000 
tons (the Treaty). For example, a number of other Treaty provisions would add to this 
burden daily shifts were to be reduced from 8.5 to 7 hours (the Treaty).  
Having given the reader a set of statements presented as facts, Keynes then 
painted his picture of consequences. The mining plant, due to the Allied blockade, is in 
bad condition; the physical efficiency of the men impaired by malnutrition, ‘made worse 
by a lowered standard of living because of the reparation demands;’ and one of the 
casualties of war was diminution of the number of efficient mines. Taken together Keynes 
argued that only 60,000,000 tons of coal would be left for local consumption, based on 
the hypothetical calculation of there being only 100,000,000 tons available per annum, of 
which 40,000,000 were to be mortgaged to the Allies. Added to the likelihood German 
industry would be destroyed as a result of these terms, the situation in other countries 
would only add to a burden for all European nations. France’s own output had diminished 
through the war’s destruction. In the UK and Italy a secondary cause of inadequate coal 
supplies to enable industry to recover and provide for the population was organisational 
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breakdown and inefficiencies of new governments. Keynes argued, ‘the coal position of all 
Europe [was] nearly desperate.’3 
These statistics are an example of how Keynes used numbers that seemed “factual, 
objective, and neutral” and would be difficult to refute. In other words, if the Treaty says 
it, this makes it factual. He then moved on to describing the consequences revealed by 
these statistics in a way that, again, would be difficult to contest. They were officially 
documented consequences from the conference proceedings, which had the effect of 
making them factual. 
Writing twenty five years after the publication of Economic Consequences Mantoux 
challenged many of the statistics Keynes had used, arguing that contrary to Keynes’ own 
assessment of the ‘general accuracy’ of his figures, they were anything but accurate and, 
according to Mantoux, Keynes had used statistics in a way that were either out of context 
or deliberately exaggerated so as to persuade his readers the central arguments of 
Economic Consequences were supported by the authority of statistics. To the present day 
there are divergent opinions as to which numbers, Keynes’ or Mantoux’s, better represent 
what was taking place in 1919. That is to say, can we rely more on Keynes’ numbers 
because he understood the context from which he sourced many of them? Or, does 
additional knowledge gained from hindsight mean Mantoux was able to better judge the 
veracity of the numbers Keynes used? Whoever we choose to agree with, this debate 
supports McCloskey’s argument that economists use numbers rhetorically arguing that 
‘the economic conversation has heard much eloquent talk, but its most eloquent passages 
have been mathematical.’4 It is almost impossible to make a reasoned judgment on the 
‘accuracy’ of the statistics used by Keynes or Mantoux, such are the difficulties associated 
with source accuracy, methodologies used to arrive at the numbers, the actual relevance 
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of the statistics to the argument being made and how Keynes or Mantoux might have 
subtly chosen one set of numbers over another in order to strengthen their respective 
arguments.  
In reality both Keynes and Mantoux use statistics to, in McCloskey’s words, ‘make 
conversation.’ In McCloskey’s terminology both men did not use statistics to deal with 
truth directly. Furthermore, while Mantoux disputed many of Keynes’ numbers he 
acknowledged that Economic Consequences had been most successful in persuading 
public opinion as to the veracity of Keynes’ economic conclusions. Mantoux cites Winston 
Churchill who wrote in 1929, ‘Mr. Keynes, a man of clairvoyant intelligence and no undue 
patriotic bias [was] saturated in the Treasury knowledge of the real facts [and] revolted 
against the absurd objectives which had been proclaimed, and still more against the 
execrable methods by which they were achieved. [Keynes] showed in successive chapters 
of unanswerable good sense the monstrous character of the financial and economic 
clauses. On all these matters his opinion is good.’5 
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 Page 216 
8-Jun-11 
5.3. Present-Day Assessments of Keynes’ Use of Statistics in 
Economic Consequences 
During the last few decades economists have tended toward the view Keynes exaggerated 
both his argument concerning Germany’s capacity to pay and the figures he used to 
support those arguments, which are presented in Section 5.1. above. However, many of 
these arguments suffer the same fate as Mantoux’s analysis; while it is easy with hindsight 
to point out where Keynes was wrong, few have successfully challenged the statistics 
Keynes used from within the context of 1919. For example, as has been stated, Singleton 
argues it was doubtful the Allies ever expected Germany to pay more than the first 50 
billion gold marks of the 132 billion gold marks handed down in the 1921 London Schedule 
of Payments. But, this judgment has the benefit of hindsight; there is no explicit archival 
evidence to substantiate the claim this is what the Allies intended in 1921.6  
Ferguson also argues Keynes’ arguments and figures were exaggerated and to 
make his point he makes four statistical comparisons between Britain and Germany of 
events that followed the war. However, it is not clear why Ferguson chooses these 
particular figures in preference to others as they really say nothing about his central claim 
of exaggeration. In the first example, he contends that some 2.4 million British workers 
were involved in strikes in 1919, 300,000 more than in revolutionary Germany. Second, in 
1921 86 million days were lost in industrial disputes; the German figure was 22.6 million. 
Ferguson’s third example is an electoral increase from 7.7 million to 21.4 million by the 
1918 Representation of the People Act, more or less giving Britain the franchise Germans 
had enjoyed since 1871 (universal male suffrage). In the final example, only in the 
inflationary stakes did Germany fare worse, having run completely out of control, so that 
the Reichsmark was worth virtually nothing by the end of 1923.7 In reality, argues 
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Ferguson, the peace terms were not unprecedented in their harshness and the German 
hyperinflation was mainly due to the irresponsible fiscal and monetary policies adopted by 
the Germans themselves. Ferguson believes the Germans thought they could win the 
peace by economic means and points out they were more successful than any other 
country in defaulting on their debts, including the reparations demanded from them by 
the Allies. But, argues Ferguson, ‘this victory was pyrrhic: democratic politicians at the 
expense of democracy and their own power won it.’8 
Moggridge avoids the issue of the accuracy of Keynes’ numbers and does not give 
a view one way or the other as to whether he thinks Keynes exaggerated his figures. 
Rather he chooses to focus on what he sees as Keynes’ vision in Economic Consequences 
against how things played out. For example, he argues that in 1919 Keynes probably 
underestimated the recuperative power of capitalist economies after major wars. German 
recovery after 1918, as after 1945, was substantial. By the mid-1920s at the latest, output 
levels exceeded pre-war levels – as did real wages.9 Germany’s manufacturing exports did 
not return to pre-war levels. On the other hand the decline was not as severe as 
Britain’s.10  According to Moggridge, it is also the case that Keynes’ long-standing worry 
about the tendency for the terms of trade for primary products, especially foodstuffs, to 
automatically turn against manufacturers’ terms of trade to the detriment of European 
standards of life, was misplaced, as well as ‘theoretically incorrect.’ However, Keynes was 
correct about the importance of frontiers, as the economic disintegration of the inter-war 
European economy was to demonstrate.11 
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Moggridge argues, the most important thing Keynes missed was the significance of 
French concerns about security from future German attack. Keynes acknowledged 
Clemenceau’s ‘vision’ of a secure Europe but begged to differ over the wisdom of 
weakening the German economy over the longer term. In disagreeing, he ignored the 
political dimension of such worries and as a result his success in Britain in making the 
moral and economic case against the Treaty left France feeling more isolated and more 
prone to use the reparations issue as the vehicle for prolonging conflict. If he had allowed 
for French concerns he would have recognised that in place of the softening of the 
Treaty’s terms on reparations, France required other guarantees from her allies. 
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5.4. Statistics and The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
Some economists believe Keynes objected to the general use of quantitative methods in 
economics, but this argument does not stand up to close scrutiny.12 In places he draws 
heavily on statistics as a means of description, clarification and verification for his 
arguments. For example, reference to Tables 7 to 22 above show in considerable detail 
how heavily Keynes’ arguments around reparations and Germany’s capacity to pay rested 
on statistics. As has already been argued, Keynes was conscious of the persuasive and 
rhetorical impact of his use of statistics. Rather than object to the use of quantitative 
methods in economics, Keynes objected to the particular misuse of methods developed to 
investigate phenomena that differed fundamentally from the economist’s field of inquiry. 
Keynes, himself a trained mathematician and author of an important work on probability, 
was nevertheless hostile to the extensive use of mathematics and regression analysis in 
economics, which is today an important part of the discipline of econometrics. At the time 
of writing Economic Consequences the discipline of econometrics, insofar as it brings 
together a theoretical and statistical framework for the analysis of economic data, was in 
its infancy. However, by the 1930s econometrics had been accepted, as a branch of 
economics and Keynes himself was one of thirty economists from all over the world 
selected by the Council of the Econometric Society to constitute the first group of Fellows 
of the Society. In 1944 he was elected President of the Econometric Society, serving in the 
role for two years.13  
Yet Phelps argues Keynes rejected the extensive use of econometrics largely 
because he viewed the future as being essentially different from the past and because he 
believed the extensive use of mathematics encouraged economists to turn from the 
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important question of choosing which among many economic models is appropriate for a 
particular situation, to the intellectually taxing, but practically unimportant, manipulation 
of a single economic model.14 While Keynes stated these views explicitly, it would be a 
mistake to say he did not accept the importance of quantification for economic analysis. 
On the contrary, as already stated, Keynes drew on “descriptive statistics” heavily in most 
of his written work. Reference to Section 5.1. above shows how extensive his use of 
statistics was. Keynes would most likely have agreed with Bartholomew who argues, ‘a 
prime role of statistics in social science is to provide a quantitative framework within 
which *questions such as “the quality of life in Britain is worse than 20 years ago”+ can be 
precisely framed and scientifically answered.’15 For Keynes it was not so much a need to 
create new concepts as to understand precisely those numbers which already exist and 
thus ‘render the theorising of the social scientist precise and testable.’16 In Economic 
Consequences Keynes methods were those of an empiricist and inductivist, and in this 
regard he adopted the legacy left by the first acknowledged individuals, William Petty 
(1623-87) and John Gaunt (1620-74), to seriously draw on quantification methods in order 
to gain a better understanding of economics. 
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5.5. The Origins of Quantification in Economics 
Most economists credit Petty with being the first to take economic quantification 
seriously. Maddison argues macro-economic analysis began with Petty’s aggregate 
accounts’ of property and labour income, population, labour input, and capital stock for 
England and Wales in Verbum Sapienti (1665). In addition to his pioneering work of 
macro-economic measurement Petty also engaged in a wide range of activities – 
intellectual, entrepreneur, physician, social engineer, inventor, and confidant of kings. He 
was ‘an exemplar of a new kind of cosmopolitan western intellectual, one of the finest 
examples of the English enlightenment.’ 17 As with virtually all subsequent analysts in the 
field of macro-measurement and analysis, Petty’s approach was inductive, trying to 
interpret the world by close study of the facts and systematic quantification. He adhered 
to the precepts of Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and is considered the founding father and 
ideas man of a group with several members. John Gaunt, the first demographer, 
developed procedures that foreshadowed modern historical demography and was a close 
friend of Petty. The third member was Gregory King (1648-1712) who systematised and 
extended Petty’s macro-economic accounts and developed Gaunt’s demographic analysis. 
A fourth member, Charles Davenant (1656-1714) was an analyst of fiscal policy and war 
finance options, problems of colonies and foreign trade, who interacted closely with King 
and used his estimates in assessing the costs and benefits of policy options. Maddison 
argues, ‘the most striking thing about these political arithmeticians’ is the modernity of 
their macro-economic approach and anticipation of concepts and methods, which now 
characterize national accounts’ and historical demography.’18 
If, as it appears, Petty was the first ‘economist’ to take quantification seriously, an 
obvious question is, why were Petty and his contemporaries the first to gather data in 
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ways not previously attempted? Cullen’s view is these men were reformists looking for 
solutions to complex social problems. He argues Petty’s vision was the ‘first expression of 
a type to be found repeatedly in the history of social statistics, the reformer who saw the 
collection of facts as an indispensible preliminary to practical and effective reforms.’19 The 
facts Petty and his contemporaries chose to collect, as with later statisticians, were 
designed to demonstrate the necessity and desirability solely of those reforms, which he 
desired, thus establishing a long tradition of the rhetorical use of numbers. Furthermore, 
Petty not only believed the role of political arithmetic as a science of society was 
dependent upon “number, weight, and measure” but he also subscribed to the view that 
for the science to be successfully studied it was necessary the raw data should be greatly 
improved. In numerous papers Petty argued for the creation of a central statistical office 
and often saw himself in the role of chief statistician. 
But it was not until the nineteenth-century, with the establishment of the 
Statistical Department of the Board of Trade, founded in 1832, that real improvement in 
macro-economic measurement took place. Statistical offices collected data on trade, 
transport, fiscal and monetary matters, employment, wages, and prices. There was an 
increasing array of information on commodity output in agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing. Index number techniques were developed, which made it possible to 
measure temporal changes or interspatial variance of complex aggregates. However, as 
Maddison points out, while data collection and analysis techniques had improved since 
Petty’s day, ‘there was little improvement in *the quality or comparability of national 
income estimates for individual countries] over those of the seventeenth-century.’20 
Statistics that were gathered generally concentrated on the income dimension with no 
crosschecks on the expenditure and production side. They provided little help for serious 
analysis of economic growth and were generally spot estimates for a given point in time, 
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with significant inter-country variance in coverage and methodology. Cullen argues, the 
problem did not lie with accepted theory that argued the fundamental importance of 
gathering statistical data, but rather the theory masked the true intention of the 
statisticians. Cullen argues, ‘time and again, the statisticians embarked upon surveys, the 
major conclusions of which were anticipated or preconceived.’21 
Significant improvement on the work of the Statistical Movement in early Victorian 
Britain began later in the nineteenth- and into the twentieth-century, and then because of 
the work of two economists, Michael Mulhall (1836-1900) and Colin Clark (1905-89). 
Mulhall made a major contribution to international comparison of data by providing 
standardised estimates of 22 countries representing about 60% of world product in 1894-
5. He measured value added items for each country and divided their economies into nine 
sectors, estimated gross output in each sector, and made an adjustment to deduct inputs 
so as to avoid double counting. Mulhall was considered by many to be the most 
innovative “economic statistician” since the time of Petty, and was Clark’s hero.22 Like 
Petty, Clark began as a scientist and was self-taught in economics. He also had multiple 
ambitions as a scholar, politician, and public servant. In 1937 he produced the first 
integrated accounts for the United Kingdom, which measured the growth of income, 
expenditure, and production at current and constant market prices. He linked his 
estimates for 1913 with those of Gregory King for 1688 to provide historical perspective. 
He demonstrated the importance of national accounts as a tool of economic policy and his 
work was the precursor of the first official national accounts, created by Meade and Stone 
in 1941. Clark was also the first to present estimates of real income levels across countries 
adjusted for differences in the purchasing power of currencies, which were merged with 
inter-temporal measures of GNP in real terms of the type he had previously produced. 
This created a framework for comparative analysis of performance in space and time, 
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‘which was to revolutionise the possibilities for comparative economic history, and 
analysis of problems of growth and development.’23  
Clark also interacted closely with Keynes, although this was later in Keynes’ career, 
following Clark’s membership of the Economic Advisory Council, which he joined in 
February 1930 when Keynes was already a member. Clark became a Cambridge lecturer in 
statistics in the economics faculty (1931-7) and with Keynes (in 1940) pioneered macro-
economic measurement as a basic analytical tool for policy analysts and economic 
historians. Keynes’ How to Pay for the War demonstrated the usefulness of statistical 
measurement as a tool for macroeconomic management and Clark’s Conditions of 
Economic Progress demonstrated its value in interpreting economic history. 
An important consideration of King’s early empirical work had been the discovery 
of ‘laws’ in economics, similar to those in physics and other natural sciences. While the 
‘physical determinism’ that followed the Newtonian revolution came to have far-reaching 
consequences for the method as well as the objectives of research in economics, the 
uncertain nature of economic relations only began to be fully appreciated with the birth of 
modern statistics in the late nineteenth century and as more statistical observations on 
economic variables started to become available. 
The development of statistical theory gathered pace at this time. Also the earliest 
application of simple correlation analysis in economics was carried out by Yule (1895, 
1896) on the relationship between pauperism and the method of providing relief and by 
Hooker (1901) on the relationship between the marriage-rate and the general level of 
prosperity in the United Kingdom, measured by a variety of economic indicators such as 
imports, exports and the movement in corn prices. Other steps towards what we now 
know as the discipline of econometrics took place around the turn of the twentieth 
century, although many acknowledge it was the work of Henry Moore (1914, 1917) that 
                                                             
23
 Maddison, (2007, p. 288). 
 Page 225 
8-Jun-11 
laid the important foundations of the discipline. Moore was the first to place statistical 
estimation of economic relations at the centre of quantitative analysis in economics. 
Eatwell and Newman argue, ‘Moore *along with his disciples and followers+ in effect laid 
the foundation of ‘statistical economics,’ the precursor to econometrics.’24 Important 
early work in building on this foundation included a unification of theory and 
measurement in demand analysis; research in business cycles that provided the basis for 
later developments in time-series analysis and macro econometric model building and 
forecasting; the investment cycle discovery; the inventory cycle; and the long wave; all 
owe their subsequent work to early business cycle analysis. 
Keynes would undoubtedly have been aware at the time of writing Economic 
Consequences of recent developments in the growing discipline of statistical economics 
but the complete absence from his book of any theoretical discussion or use of economic 
theory indicates Keynes stood firmly in the tradition of the early pioneers in the use of 
statistics for descriptive purposes and insofar as he sought reform through his economic 
arguments, his use of statistics followed the Victorian reformist methods of statistical 
usage. However, his use of statistics to help describe was also done so as to not confuse 
his readers with what might otherwise be an unintelligible inclusion of numbers. By so 
doing his use of statistics was more likely to be persuasive, in the same way in which his 
predecessors used numbers rhetorically. 
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5.6. Keynes’ Use of Statistics in Economic Consequences 
Although Keynes did not embrace the use of econometrics as it emerged as a discipline in 
the 1930s and 1940s the importance he placed on the use of statistics continued for the 
remainder of his life, clearly evidenced by How to Pay for the War.25 However, unlike How 
to Pay for the War his use of statistics in some earlier works appears unsystematic and 
designed entirely for descriptive and rhetorical purposes. While presentation is cogent, 
there is no clear, structured or systematic way in which Keynes deals with his statistical 
arguments. However, as with How to Pay for the War, Keynes always used numbers to 
establish authority, support and verify arguments. Despite the unsystematic presentation, 
Keynes’ use of statistics remained largely unaltered throughout his career. Moggridge 
points out; Keynes’ views on the use of statistics were first formed with his 1907 and 1908 
fellowship dissertation submissions, and subsequently published as A Treatise on 
Probability in 1921. Many of his arguments reappear ‘in his discussions of statistical 
arguments between 1910 and 1940.’26 At the heart of his use of statistics were two parts 
he argued made up the theory of statistics: the descriptive part concerned with 
presenting, describing and summarising series of events or instances; and the analytical 
part that is inductive or inferential and is concerned with extending the description of 
certain characteristics of observed events to those not observed. 
A good example of Keynes’ use of this theory of statistics is his discussion of 
“Germany’s capacity to pay” (refer to Tables 12 to 17 above). This is also a good example 
of his seemingly unsystematic presentation. Keynes maintained the most Germany could 
afford by way of reparations was somewhere between £ 1000 million and £ 2,000 million 
(versus the Committee on Indemnity’s estimate of £ 24,000 million and Treasury’s £ 2,000 
million to £ 3,000 million) but to understand fully how Keynes arrived at these figures 
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takes analysis of 133 pages of integrated prose and statistical arguments, with no easy 
way of arriving at Keynes’ summary figures. 27 Furthermore, when Keynes does provide 
some analysis, for example to justify his maximum figure of £ 2,000 million, we find this is 
just one set of inductive calculations.28 In other words, Keynes used a variety of different 
methods and calculations, drawn from a wide range of statistics, to support his argument 
that £ 2,000 million was the maximum of Germany’s capacity to pay.  
There are four probable explanations for this unsystematic presentation. First the 
figures appear to be drawn together in a hurried and pragmatic manner as part of official 
Treasury memoranda and almost unchanged when presented in Economic Consequences. 
The use of memoranda typically involves a style of writing that is “informal.” The way in 
which prose and statistics in memoranda, attributed to Keynes, are grouped by numbers, 
similar to the use of bullet points, reflects this informal approach. Second Keynes 
incorporates many of the statistics from these memoranda into Economic Consequences, 
in places almost verbatim. Third, he does not seek to restructure the informal approach 
typical of official memoranda, although in Economic Consequences there is a “merging” of 
these informal “notes” into a prose style. A final explanation can be found in the actual 
maturity of the discipline of economics at this time. 
An initial analysis of Germany’s capacity to pay had been undertaken by The 
Treasury during hostilities, with a number of estimates provided in a Treasury 
memorandum dated January 1916, the authors being W. J. Ashley29 and J. M. Keynes. 
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When the Imperial War Cabinet set up the Committee on Indemnity on 26 November 
1918 Keynes was called on to be representative of the Treasury where he used this earlier 
memorandum to warn the committee: ‘*While+ our investigation is not yet complete, but 
so far, it looks very probably that the amount of reparation [calculated by the committee] 
is larger than the amount that Germany can pay.’30 The report of the committee, which 
was never published, came to the conclusion that Germany should pay the whole cost of 
the war, estimated at £ 24,000 million, a figure Lloyd George branded as a wild and 
fantastic chimera, at the same time as the Treasury’s investigations were showing that 
Germany was capable of paying something between £ 2,000 million and £ 3,000 million. 
Keynes thought that without economic growth to stimulate her exports Germany could 
pay £ 1,000 million of moveable property at once and £ 1,000 million additional tribute 
amortised over thirty years. Detailed workings were provided to the committee in a 
memorandum headed: ‘Notes on an Indemnity’ and dated 31 October 1918. According to 
Johnson these ‘appear to have been Keynes’ work alone.’31 In a letter to his mother on 3 
November Keynes remarked, ‘an exciting incident of the week was writing a 
memorandum on indemnities at top speed for an airman to fly to Versailles with.’32 
The final memorandum, the structure of which is followed closely in Economic 
Consequences, was finalised during November 1918 and most probably presented to the 
committee at the meeting Keynes attended on 2 December 1918.33 The verbatim lifting of 
paragraphs into Economic Consequences, from this memorandum, was done, according to 
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Johnson, because Keynes must have felt the final version to be enough of his own work 
without having to formally acknowledge these figures as being Treasury statistics. It is 
fortuitous the original hand-written manuscript of Economic Consequences has survived 
and can be found in the archives at King’s College, Cambridge. Whereas most of the 
manuscript’s prose is hand written, many of the statistics have been ‘cut and pasted’ from 
original Treasury documents into the handwritten manuscript, an example of which is 
given in Figure 5 below.  
In this example everything that is not highlighted in {parenthesis} is the original 
wording from the Treasury memorandum. That is to say, {carried on}, {during the war} and 
so on, have been added to Economic Consequences but do not appear in the 
memorandum. The words in bold italics, such as continuously conducted, in the 
Reichsbank and so on, are in the original memorandum but have been deleted from the 
book. A close examination of these amendments shows that Keynes, in places, relies 
substantially on Treasury statistics in support of his arguments, with changes to ‘cut and 
pasted’ memoranda being relatively minor. 
{1.} Immediately Transferable Wealth 
(a) Gold. After the deduction of the gold to be returned to Russia, the 
official holding of gold as shown in the Reichsbank’s return of the 30th 
November 1918 amounted to £ 115,417,900. This was a very much 
larger amount than had appeared in the Reichsbank’s return prior to 
the war, and was the result of the vigorous campaign which has been 
continuously conducted {carried on} in Germany {during the war} for 
the surrender to the Reichsbank not only of gold coin but of gold 
ornaments of every kind. Private hoards doubtless still exist, but, in 
view of the great efforts already made, it is unlikely that either the 
German Government or the Allies will be able to unearth them. It is 
not known whether the Reichsbank or the government possess a 
secret hoard but, as every effort has been made throughout the war 
to counteract the effect of a largely increased note issue by showing 
as much gold as possible in the Reichsbank’s return, it is extremely 
unlikely that any substantial amount is held by the government 
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outside this return. The return {can} should therefore be taken as 
probably representing the maximum amount which the German 
Government {are} have been able to extract from their people. In 
addition to gold there {was} is {in the Reichsbank} a sum of about £ 
1,000,000 in silver in the Reichsbank. There {must be} is, however, a 
further substantial amount in circulation, {for} the holdings of the 
Reichsbank having been {were} as high as £ 9,100,000 on the 31st 
December 1917, and having stood at about £ 6,000,000 up to the 
latter part of October 1918, when the internal run began on currency 
of every kind. We may, therefore, take a total of (say) £ 125,000,000 
for gold and silver together {at the date of the Armistice}.’34  
Figure 4: Example of how Keynes ‘cut and pasted’ from Memoranda into 
Economic Consequences 
 
A fourth explanation for the unsystematic way Keynes presents his statistics is the 
level of maturity of the discipline of economics in 1919. Although Marshall had chartered 
the way for the professionalisation of economics, in the early part of the twentieth 
century economists had yet to achieve the professional status they were to gain by mid-
century. For example, when Lloyd George wanted economic advice as Chancellor before 
the First World War he turned to a financial journalist, George Paish, editor of the 
Statist.35 Until the 1930s economics was something that government officials who had 
studied philosophy or mathematics at Oxford or Cambridge were expected to be able to 
‘get up,’ if required, and many candidates for the Civil Service examination did so. Keynes 
himself studied mathematics at Cambridge, and his initial training in economics amounted 
to no more than directed reading over a summer vacation. Yet, in 1908, within three years 
of graduation, he was considered to be qualified not only as a lecturer in economics at 
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Cambridge but also as joint editor of the Economic Journal. During the war he was 
recruited into the Treasury, where he became head of a new division dealing with 
overseas finance, but his duties differed only in subject matter from those of other 
officials. 
Another example that highlights the relatively unsophisticated nature of 
economics at this time is the estimates of national income made by the Treasury between 
1914 and 1916. Peden points out these estimates did not represent a serious attempt at 
analysis of the kind made during the Second World War, which required macroeconomic 
concepts developed by Keynes during the 1930s. Peden argues, ‘the use made of national 
income estimates in the First World War was bound to be unsophisticated.’36 Another 
example of the relatively unsophisticated nature of economics was when Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Reginald McKenna used figures in 1916 simply to support his claim that the 
National Debt created during the war would not be an intolerable burden, since the Debt 
to be created by the end of 1916/17 would be approximately the same as a year’s national 
income.37 Influences such as shifting price levels and inflation were not taken into account 
in these estimates and subsequent authors have argued, these unsophisticated 
calculations help explain why taxation levels were insufficient to assist with the financial 
burden created by war. 
In summary, Keynes used statistics in line with the way he understood the theory 
of statistics to be applied. In the first place this meant describing a series of events. In one 
example Keynes presents, describes and summarises Germany’s holdings of gold and 
silver at the date of the Armistice. He reasons inductively to argue that of the 
£125,000,000 of gold and silver he estimates is available to the Reichsbank, just 
£60,000,000 can realistically be made available for reparations (see Table 12). The second 
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thing about his use of statistics in Economic Consequences is, while the figures used follow 
the cogency of his prose, the statistics themselves are presented in an unsystematic and 
informal manner. There are four explanations for this. First the informal way in which 
arguments are made, best evidenced by his use of numbered points, similar to bullet 
points, in earlier memoranda. Second, the statistics pulled together for the memoranda 
that ultimately led to the final memorandum and presented to the Committee on 
Indemnity, were constructed against a background of pressure and expediency. In short, 
there is a clear element of pragmatism over statistical elegance in Keynes’ presentation. 
The third explanation for the unsystematic presentation is the way he brings figures from 
Treasury memoranda into Economic Consequences. There is little effort at amendment or 
tidying up from figures previously gathered under pressure and in a hurry, as is evidenced 
by the large amount of ‘cutting and pasting’ from Treasury documents into his manuscript. 
Finally, the state of economics as a discipline and the more sophisticated attention being 
paid to the use of statistics in the 1930s and 1940s did not exist in 1919 and while it is 
acknowledged Keynes played a major role in the mathematical developments of the 1930s 
and 1940s his unsystematic use of statistics in the war years and immediate post-war 
period reflected the nature of the discipline at this time. 
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5.7. The Challenge to Keynes’ Statistics 
Many modern day economists believe Keynes exaggerated his statistics. This judgment 
can be traced to Mantoux’s critical analysis of Economic Consequences. However, 
Mantoux’s book was published some twenty six years following the publication of Keynes’ 
book and invariably suffers, as has been argued, from ‘the benefit of hindsight.’ There had 
been nothing equivalent to challenge Keynes’ numbers and calculations when he 
published in 1919, which leave us with some important questions. Why did it take so 
many years after the publication of such a plethora of statistics to mount a challenge to 
Keynes’ statistical claims? Why, if Keynes’ figures were so exaggerated so as to border on 
falsity, were they so widely accepted without challenge at the time of publication? And, to 
what degree does it really matter? If Keynes was able to persuade his readers with 
selectively chosen statistics, but careful to draw on reputable sources, is this not a 
commonly chosen path for those wanting to persuade an audience? This line of 
argumentation does, however, raise the question of how far we can trust the veracity of 
numbers used rhetorically, in the same way we might challenge the veracity of prose 
arguments constructed for political purposes. On the other hand it does not follow that 
the use of persuasive rhetoric is by its very nature lacking in truthfulness or credibility. 
Keynes understood the “rules of rhetoric” from the time of Cicero were about the 
persuasive presentation of an argument with the veracity of content uncompromised. 
5.7.1. Contemporary Reaction and the Reparations Debate 
It has been shown reaction to Keynes’ book came from many different quarters and grew 
to a considerable quantity. However, most contemporary reaction was directed at the 
book’s prose with questioning of the veracity of Keynes’ statistics relatively muted. 
Economic Consequences had stirred up considerable controversy around Keynes’ depiction 
of the political leaders, especially Wilson, who attended the Versailles Conference. In 
addition to this Keynes’ views on reparations and Germany’s “capacity to pay” generated 
considerable debate. But, as has been noted, most people seemed to accept without 
challenge the many statistics Keynes presented. Halperin comments, ‘strangely enough, 
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while the politics of Keynes’ book was the object of much controversy, its economics were 
almost never seriously challenged.’38 Moggridge in his discussion of contemporary 
reaction lumps any criticism of Keynes’ statistics as being among ‘other criticisms of 
Economic Consequences *that+ fastened on details.’39 Where, however, Keynes took 
seriously any criticism of his figures and calculations, he was careful to correct his critics’ 
and did not accept any figures as being better than his own. 
Keynes’ exchange with John Foster Dulles is a good example of this ‘fastening onto 
details’ and Keynes’ rigorous defence of his statistics. The fact Keynes considered Dulles’ 
letter the ‘first serious and responsible’ criticism of his book is helpful in shedding light on 
the nature of the contemporary debate around the numbers Keynes used. Putting to one 
side Dulles’ discussion of the inclusion of pensions and separation allowances and what he 
proposes by way of accounting methods, Dulles’s chief complaint was Keynes’ calculation 
of reparation liability.40  Keynes had argued that the reparation liability should 
immediately be fixed at £ 2,000 million but Dulles maintained Keynes took no account of 
the marked appreciation of values during wartime. Dulles maintained that an additional  
£ 2-3,000 million needed to be added to Keynes figure of £ 2,000 million. He also 
challenged Keynes’ figure of £ 1,500 million to be paid over thirty years. Dulles argued this 
amounted to a present capital sum of approximately £ 750 million (that is, only half of 
Keynes figure of £ 1,500 million). 
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Keynes responded to Dulles’ criticisms: 
(1) [That he had not taken account of the marked rise in prices from 
1913 to 1919.+ ‘This criticism is not well founded. My initial allowance 
for increased prices, the wide margin I added for contingencies, and 
the fact that my estimates were in terms of gold and not paper francs, 
result, so far, for example, as the restoration of houses is concerned, 
in my upper limit leaving room for an appreciation in the cost of 
house building, in terms of francs, to nine or ten times the pre-war 
level. (2) My estimate of what Germany could pay – namely £ 2,000 
million at the most. Mr. Dulles does not comment on this estimate. 
The progress of events since I made it has not led me to modify it 
upwards. (3) My estimate of what it would be wise on our part to ask 
from Germany – namely, £ 2,000 million, but with the two important 
abatements of a rather large allowance for ceded property and the 
payment of the balance in 30 annual instalments without interest. Mr. 
Dulles thinks my suggested allowance for ceded property too large, 
on the ground that it would be mainly for war material having little 
value to the Allies. I intended this figure to cover a great deal besides 
war material, as, for example, merchant ships, submarine cables, and 
rolling stock, as well as State property and financial liabilities 
attributed to ceded territory. … (4) Lastly, there was the German 
counter proposal of an alleged sum of £ 5,000 million, which to judge 
from his speech in the House of Commons on February 12 achieved at 
least as much of its object to deceive Mr. Balfour. But of course the 
real value of Count Rantzau’s offer was nothing of the kind, as I have 
explained in detail in pp. 204-209 of my book, and, indeed, as the 
Allies themselves have pointed out in the official reply which they 
addressed to him. ….. Mr. Dulles … does not dispute my estimate of 
the real money value of the offer as being somewhere about £ 1,500 
million. But he forgets that even this figure is not comparable with 
those cited above, since the German offer was conditional on the 
abandonment of most of the rest of the treaty, including all the 
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territorial clauses and those relating to the mercantile marine and to 
German property abroad.41 
Two aspects of this exchange are striking. First, Keynes goes into detail as to how 
he arrived at his figures (refer point 1) and helps explain why there has been considerable 
debate around the statistics he used. In short, statistics can never be taken at face value. If 
we do not have access to source numbers and an understanding of the methodology used 
to derive the statistics, analysis becomes difficult and doubt cast on the veracity of the 
numbers. If Keynes had a methodology for deriving his statistics it is not obvious from the 
archival material, which has survived. However in this letter to Dulles he talks of using a 
contingency factor, allowing for price changes and his use of the valuation of gold rather 
than the exchange rate for francs. This suggests Keynes had some way of calculating his 
numbers. However, if he did there seems little consistency to the way he applied his 
methodology, which means we are left with a high degree of speculation when trying to 
“get behind” Keynes’ numbers. What Keynes did reasonably well was to provide the 
reader with references to many of his sources. But this just adds to what we do know, 
which is that Keynes was interested in statistics as a means of description and 
authoritative support for his arguments.  
The second aspect of importance about this exchange is it is representative of the 
challenge to Keynes’ statistics. Anything to do with the subject of reparations often led to 
debate and disagreement. Moggridge argues critics fastened onto three aspects of this 
debate: the nature of the Armistice contract and hence the morality of the inclusion of the 
claim for pensions and separation allowances; the size of the claims for reparation; and 
Germany’s capacity to pay. On the first, the debate was one of morality and principle 
rather than actual figures. If, as Keynes maintained, it was immoral to even consider 
including pensions and separation allowances then a debate about figures has no 
meaning. On the second, it is important to note Keynes’ 1919 estimate of Germany’s 
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liability for reparations was remarkably close to that of the Reparations Commission. In 
1921 the Commission set Germany’s liability at £ 6,600 million. Keynes’ estimate was  
£ 6,400-8,800 million. But, this misses the real point of the debate. The point is, as 
Moggridge argues, the numbers prove nothing, they establish only orders of magnitude. 
As such they indicate that in terms of ‘normal’ national income42 and late 1920s average 
exports, ‘the Allies’ demands for reparations from Germany were large relative to German 
demands on France in 1871 or to other historically large financial transfers.’43 
Keynes, with Ashley, had foreseen this difficulty as early as 1916 and argued in 
their Treasury memorandum that historical examples are the fairest way to determine 
reparations. They used the most recent example they were familiar with, which was the 
French reparations following their war with Germany from 1870-71. As a proportion of 
national income the annual figure for France (1871-5) was 7.5-12 per cent.44 France’s 
indemnity in 1871, of 5 billion francs, represented less than a quarter of a year’s national 
income. This compared to the Allies’ post-1918 demands of Germany, which represented 
over one and a half times the highest estimates of Germany’s national income in the 
second half of the 1920s. However, as Moggridge points out, and has been argued 
already, the numbers mean very little; they only establish an order of magnitude and as 
such indicate that in terms of ‘normal’ national income and late 1920s average exports, 
the Allies’ demands for reparations from Germany were large relative to German 
demands on France in 1871 or to other historically large financial transfers. Furthermore, 
the German payments were to continue for a much longer period than those of 1871. This 
ruled out the possibility of substantial recycling as had occurred in 1871 because when 
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there is a stream of payments for several decades ahead, ‘borrowing to service or 
anticipate a substantial portion of these payments is hardly feasible.’45 Some borrowing 
might transfer some payments from earlier to later years when incomes and trade would 
be greater, but for payments the size of those demanded in 1919 a large proportion would 
have to come from current international earnings. 
While there was considerable debate at the time around reparation claims, the 
issue which dominated was Germany’s capacity to pay reparations and the economic 
consequences of such payments. One complication in the debate was that the reparation 
sum was set in nominal terms in foreign currency. A worldwide rise in prices would reduce 
the real resource costs of any transfer of reparations, a fall would increase it. During the 
nineteenth century the trend of prices had been flat, but fluctuations around the trend 
were significant and lengthy. Moggridge argues, Keynes having grown up in such a stable 
era, would have been more worried about the risk of a significant fall in prices as this 
would have the effect of paying large nominal sums over a long period more worrying 
than in the present day when we live, comparatively speaking, in an inflationary world. 
When it came to determining Germany’s capacity to pay, most economists were 
interested in Germany’s ability to expand her exports and/or decrease her imports of 
goods and services to effect the transfer. The relevant issues in this debate are the time 
allowed for the changes in question, the magnitude of the changes, and the structure of 
the relevant markets. On the question of time, Keynes conceded that if the Allies nursed 
the Germany economy back to health over a period of five to ten years they could obtain 
larger streams of payments than otherwise. There was little disagreement over this view. 
But there was room for disagreement as to the prospect of such time being allowed and 
the extent of the ‘nursing’ involved. Keynes, looking at the Treaty and the financial policies 
of the Allies, was pessimistic on both counts. 
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On the question of magnitude the question had to be asked, could Germany 
transform her international accounts so as to produce an export surplus of the relevant 
size even if the Allies allowed? Was it possible by appropriate policy measures to reduce 
domestic consumption and raise Germany’s net international receipts? Moggridge argues, 
to a modern economist the answer would be ‘yes in theory.’ A mixture of tax, monetary 
and exchange-rate policies would reduce domestic consumption and raise the output of 
goods moving into international trade relative to those which did not. But in 1919 this was 
not a theoretical question. Keynes was arguing there was nothing to give on the 
consumption side and, especially after the other Allied depredations of the Treaty, 
resources were not available and were not likely to be available in the foreseeable future. 
His opponents took a different view, often arguing that Keynes underestimated the 
recuperative power of the German economy and at the same time the Treaty would in any 
case be modified to ease the burdens. Moggridge argues, ‘certainly, looking at the 
magnitudes involved, the figures above, though high, are not impossible for a more 
normal period. Whether the results would meet the needs or desires of the Allies was 
another matter.’46 However, for any serious attempt by Germany to pay reparations, 
which there never was, as laid down in the Treaty, would have required a substantial net 
increase in her exports of coal and manufactured goods. Such an expansion would have 
inevitably been at the expense of other producers. 
But, the question as to whether or not Germany had the capacity to pay 
reparations on the scale demanded by the Treaty was never put to the test. In the late 
1920s, German reparation payments averaged just over 1.5 billion marks – less than 2 per 
cent of national income or just over 13 per cent of her exports.47 The proportions rose 
with the 1929 slump, but it was only in those years that German’s export surplus was 
actually needed to cover her reparations bill, for prior to 1929 German capital imports had 
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more than offset her reparations payments. The system collapsed shortly after. The 
general consensus is, Germany could have paid more if there had been a willingness to 
pay in Germany, a willingness on the part of the Allies to receive and a willingness to 
tackle associated problems, ‘but whether she could have managed the figures of 1919 
remains an open question.’48 
In summary, the most significant aspect of the contemporary reaction to Keynes’ 
use of statistics in Economic Consequences is that reaction was relatively muted. However, 
this reaction demonstrates how numbers used authoritatively can be used rhetorically.  
5.7.2. Étienne Mantoux: The Carthaginian Peace or the Economic 
Consequences of Mr. Keynes 
As has been shown, the first serious and analytical challenge to Keynes’ statistics came 
from Étienne Mantoux with his book The Carthaginian Peace or The Economic 
Consequences of Mr. Keynes. However, Mantoux’s book was published some twenty-six 
years after Keynes’ book first appeared. Nevertheless, Mantoux’s analysis is systematic 
and thorough and concludes that the economic defects of the Versailles Treaty were 
‘exaggerated and illusory.’ Mantoux argues that in general Keynes overestimated the 
impact of change of the volume of international trade and in particular, the activity of the 
German economy, while underestimating the ability of the post-war German economy to 
produce a national income large enough to raise the revenue necessary to pay 
reparations. An examination of one example of Mantoux’s challenge, the so-called ceding 
of Upper Silesia to Poland, is illustrative of how Mantoux mounted his campaign against 
Keynes. 
Keynes had argued Upper Silesia had been part of Germany for 1000 years, 
produced 23 per cent of the total German output of hard coal and was ‘ essential to the 
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economic life of Germany,’ and without which her industries could not prosper.49 
However, Mantoux argued this was a disingenuous argument because first, the area had 
not been ceded as part of the Treaty but was to be subject to a plebiscite some time into 
the future that would leave it to the people of the region to decide whether they 
preferred to be part of Germany or Poland. But more significantly Germany was to be 
given access to Polish coal, free of all export duties for a period of fifteen years. In any 
event the region was partitioned between Poland and Germany following the promised 
plebiscite in 1921 and by 1925 Germany had notified Poland that they would accept no 
more duty-free consignments of coal from Poland. A tariff war ensued, ‘and in 1926, 
German economists were writing that Germany could henceforward do without Polish 
coal, and had better protect her industry against its invasion. It must be conceded that the 
Treaty makers had shown a poor understanding of ‘economic realities’.’50 
Mantoux’s challenge went to the heart of many more of Keynes’ arguments. For 
example, Mantoux argued, the German economy during the inter-war period disproved 
Keynes’ argument Germany would not be capable of generating an adequate export 
surplus. Furthermore, Keynes had predicted Europe would be threatened with ‘a long, 
silent process of semi-starvation and of a gradual steady lowering of the standards of life 
and comfort, yet ‘ten years after the Treaty, European production was well above its pre-
war level, and European standards of living had never been higher.’ 51 Keynes had 
predicted a decline in the iron output of Europe when in fact output increased almost 
continuously. Mantoux also argued, ‘in 1929 Europe produced 10 per cent more iron than 
in the record year, 1913.’52 Keynes had also predicted a decline in iron and steel output of 
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Germany but by 1927 it was 30 and 38 per cent higher, respectively, than in 1913, within 
the same territorial limits. He forecast a decline of efficiency in the German coal mining 
industry but by 1929 the efficiency of labour was 30 per cent higher than in 1913. Keynes 
also predicted Germany could not export coal in the near future, yet in the first year 
following the Treaty, German net coal exports were 15 million tons and in 1926, 35 million 
tons. He estimated Germany’s national savings for future years at less than 2 billion 
marks. In 1925 the figure was estimated at 6.4 billion and in 1927 at 7.6 billion. Keynes 
also predicted Germany could not afford to pay more than 2 billion marks a year in 
reparations for the next 30 years, yet between 1933 and 1939 Germany spent seven times 
as much a year on re-armament alone. 
Mantoux used these figures to estimate the effect on Germany’s net capital 
formation before 1929 and this, combined with her arms expenditure under Hitler, led 
him to the conclusion that Germany could have easily covered the heaviest possible 
Versailles reparation annuities, which exceeded by four times what Keynes admitted to be 
her capacity to pay. Mantoux also dismissed as insignificant Keynes’ contention that it is 
one thing to raise “unprecedented” reparation sums and another to transfer them, due, as 
has been shown from Moggridge’s arguments, to an inevitable breakdown of the 
mechanism of foreign exchange. He points to the extractions of large contributions from 
the countries occupied by Germany in World War II and the operation of the Lease-Lend 
system to ‘explode the time-honoured myths about the inherent evils of an adverse 
balance of payments!’ Mantoux also argued there was in reality no transfer problem and 
Keynes’ figures were faulty when it came to calculating Germany’s capacity to pay. He also 
attacked Keynes’ contention that ‘the perils lay not in frontiers or sovereignties, but in 
food, coal and transport.’ Mantoux instead argued that it is the reverse which had proven 
to be true, stating,  
the size and shape of nations, and … the problem of frontiers 
“remain,” in the words of Lord Curzon, “the razor’s edge on which 
hang suspended the modern issues of war or peace, of life or death of 
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nations.” Whatever increases the economic significance of the State 
will inevitably increase the economic significance of frontiers. 53 
There were a number of other challenges, including the claim Germany’s so-called 
destitution was by and large an exaggeration and was ‘created by juggling figures in an 
arbitrary fashion;’54 the German inflation was of its own volition; Germany drew far more 
capital from abroad, on the bulk of which it subsequently defaulted, than Germany had to 
pay; reparations received were imports free of charge and as such did not “beggar” the 
receiver; Germany’s ability to pay had been fully proven by the fact of its ability to spend 
on armaments at a higher rate than Germany was ever asked to pay on reparations; and 
the allegedly insoluble problem of transferring payments from one country to another was 
solved by the Nazis who annually “transferred” out of occupied countries ten times the 
reparation annuity. 
Whether we accept these arguments is not as important as the legacy Mantoux 
left. It enables a challenge to Keynes’ claims as well as giving the debate a fresh and 
revised set of views, along with some analytical means for assessing the veracity of 
Keynes’ figures. However, Mantoux’s work suffers from a significant defect. Hindsight, as 
is commonly stated, is “a wonderful thing” and much of Mantoux’s analysis is taken up 
dealing with Keynes’ figures as if Keynes had fixed them as predictors of the future, when 
in many cases he used numbers based on what was known at the time and according to 
assumptions about the future. In a number of cases events turned out far differently than 
could have been foreseen. In the process we are left with statistics, which only have 
meaning at a particular point in time and within a set historical context. A more convincing 
analysis would have been to uncover the methods and reasoning Keynes used in compiling 
his statistics. This would have helped better expose how Keynes used figures for purposes 
of persuasion and give a better idea of whether Keynes deliberately exaggerated his 
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statistics. The other difficulty of Mantoux’s challenge is, Keynes was never in a position to 
respond to Mantoux’s criticisms, having died shortly before Mantoux’s book was 
published. Tragically Mantoux had also died the previous year, killed during the final days 
of World War Two.  
Most subsequent reviews of Mantoux’s book were, however, sympathetic to his 
challenge and most economists since overwhelmingly side with Mantoux in broadly 
criticising Keynes for exaggerating.55 However, as with much of the contemporary criticism 
of Keynes’ figures, it is difficult to assess with any certainty their validity, primarily 
because his critics provide little or no analytical evidence for their views. Rather they are 
happy to accept “Mantoux is right; Keynes was wrong.”  
Hawtrey’s Economica review stands out as something of an exception to this 
overwhelming sympathy for Mantoux’s arguments and in so doing helps explain why 
Keynes may have been as concerned as he said he was with the situation in 1919. It has 
already been argued that other scholars drew attention to Germany’s difficulties and 
Hawtrey is another who agreed Germany had been placed under an impossible burden in 
1919, although figures were not fixed until 1921 when the first cash payment of 
reparations started the collapse of the mark. Hawtrey acknowledges the argument that 
the German government may have been able to avert the result but he points out, with 
the progress, or rather lack of progress, made in restoring German finances, and the 
monetary stability that had been maintained for a full year up to May 1921, ‘I do not think 
that accusation can be sustained. But if it were, the Allies had no means of imposing 
                                                             
55
 A number of reviews of Mantoux’s book appeared shortly after its publication. See, Rappard, (October 
1946), American Political Science Review; Heilperin, (December 1946), American Economic Review; Hillmann, 
(January 1947), International Affairs; Jones, (January 1947), American Journal of International Law; Angus, 
(February 1947), Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science; Viner, (March 1947), Journal of 
Modern History; Warren, (July 1947), Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences; Palyi, 
(July 1947), Review of Politics; Hawtrey, (August 1948), Economica; Albrecht-Carrie, (June 1953), Political 
Science Quarterly; Parker, (June 1954), Journal of Political Economy. 
 Page 245 
8-Jun-11 
financial rectitude on Germany, short of assuming an overriding authority, which would 
have amounted to the supersession of the sovereign Republic by an Allied Military 
Government.’56 Nobody wanted this outcome. Hawtrey also argues, with the inflation of 
1921-3 such payments as Germany made were at the cost of depleting the working capital 
of German industry and trade. It was for the indispensable purpose of reconstituting this 
working capital that Germany borrowed on so great a scale from London and New York 
and other centres in the years 1924-9. 
Hawtrey next addresses the transfer problem and asks, what if transfer had been 
found possible? That, argues Hawtrey, would have brought Keynes’ argument into play 
that Germany had in effect ‘engaged herself to hand over to the Allies the whole of her 
surplus production in perpetuity.’57 The charge of some £40 million a year for thirty years, 
according to Hawtrey, would have deprived German economic life of the essential 
resources of development, or indeed of maintenance, since capital outlay on technological 
improvements ‘is an indispensable condition of competitive power.’58 This was Hawtrey’s 
rebuff to Mantoux’s argument, that ‘it would not have been economically impossible to 
exact payments in excess of what was necessary to maintain Germany’s national capital 
intact.’59 For Hawtrey this supported Keynes’ view that such an imposition on Germany 
would have meant nothing less than long drawn-out ruin, which had always been 
Clemenceau’s aim. This would, of course, have freed France from the German threat but, 
as Keynes had argued, it would have invited their destruction as well.  
Hawtrey also addresses Mantoux’s main argument, that the Allies were in a 
position to make Germany hand over something more than the whole of her surplus, but, 
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owing to the influence of Keynes’ book, they failed to do so. Germany did retain enough of 
her surplus to achieve a rapid and almost complete recovery, and thereafter used her 
renewed economic power to re-arm on a scale almost sufficient for her to subjugate the 
world. But when Mantoux argued ‘that the surplus which Germany yielded to Hitler for 
rearmament and war can be taken as a measure of what could have been made available 
for reparations,’ Mantoux, argues Hawtrey, was making some rather considerable 
assumptions. Was it, Hawtrey asks, conceivable in the Europe of 1919 that anything like 
the savage system of coercion, repression and espionage to which Hitler resorted could 
have been imposed on any human society? And surely, he goes on, even in a world 
habituated to the outrage of totalitarianism, it would have been impossible to extract any 
comparable surplus in opposition to the patriotic sentiments of the community instead of 
with their support. He argues, ‘the German enslavement of populations of invaded 
countries during the Second World War was a desperate throw, and met with very limited 
success.’ Finally Hawtrey points out, even if arguments had favoured emasculating 
Germany as Keynes believed the Treaty terms would do, ‘in the relatively humane world 
of 1919 it was a matter of course that resources would flow to a country reduced to 
urgent need, from more prosperous centres. The idea of destroying German economic 
power by imposing excessive reparation liability was really moonshine from the 
beginning.’ 60 
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5.8. Conclusion – Keynes and Statistics 
Many present day economists argue Keynes exaggerated Germany’s inability to meet 
reparation terms in the Treaty. Typically they point to the way Keynes underestimated 
Germany’s economic restorative capability, ultimately one of the reasons for World War 
Two. Some go as far as to lay the blame for Germany’s rapid ability to rearm on Keynes’ 
publication of Economic Consequences. However, this view enjoys the benefit of hindsight 
and does not sufficiently take account of the context within which Keynes’ statistics were 
drawn. 
I have argued that many of Keynes’ figures were taken, often verbatim, directly 
from Treasury memoranda. While in many cases these figures were undoubtedly the work 
of Keynes himself, as a Treasury official, they are statistics, prior to any form of publication 
that would have been known to those he worked with. It seems unlikely the entire 
Treasury would have been complicit in turning a blind eye to deliberately exaggerated 
figures. However, this does not mean Keynes used statistics other than as a means to 
persuade his readers. Keynes understood the importance and “rules” of rhetoric. There 
are numerous examples in Economic Consequences where he effectively marshals 
numbers and calculations in ways to support his arguments. Keynes believed the terms as 
laid out in the Treaty would not only emasculate Germany economically, but his real 
concern was that the Treaty, if imposed, would, in effect, throw the whole of Europe into 
an economic dark age.  
There is little doubt he was successful in persuading many of his generation. Apart 
from the obvious publishing success of his book, the clearest evidence is the widespread 
acceptance of his figures. Some researchers suggest this is because they were deliberately 
presented in a confusing manner, whereas Keynes’ prose could easily be challenged 
because he wrote with a clear and elaborate style. However, this overlooks that Keynes 
himself saw his book as a serious work of economics and his extensive use of Treasury 
numbers tends to support this argument. It also overlooks that Keynes’ numbers drew 
little criticism at the time and were accepted by many of his otherwise critical and 
knowledgeable audience. To suggest otherwise is to cast doubt on the intellectual ability 
of Keynes’ own contemporaries’ analytical abilities and their understanding of Keynes’ 
statistical arguments.
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Chapter 6. Economic Consequences of the Peace:  
Prose Style 
This chapter highlights the wide range of literary sources, metaphors, analogies and 
allusions Keynes used to describe Europe as it looked into an abyss of economic 
desolation. He placed much of the blame on politicians who came to Versailles and who, 
through weak and incompetent leadership, were ushering in a new world order of 
economic backwardness and negotiating a Peace, which was a continuation of war by 
peaceful means. 
Keynes’ use of metaphors, allusions and analogies were used to capture the 
imagination of his readers, with sources he knew would be familiar to them. For example, 
his descriptions of weak and inept leadership are compared to President Wilson as a ‘blind 
Don Quixote’ and Lloyd George as the ‘Anti-Christ’ (Anti-Christian) whose individual 
scheming and manipulation renders Wilson a hapless and ineffective leader. This means 
disappointment in Wilson, which Keynes accentuates by comparing him to Napoleon, not 
in the victorious sense but in the sense of failure of promise and impotence. Tolstoy, 
Hardy and Shaw all wrote of Napoleon in this way. Keynes is just as critical of Clemenceau 
and refers to the ways he put the interests of France before all other concerns, similar to 
the misplaced love of Pericles for Athens.  
Keynes saw little opportunity for rectifying this weakness of leadership and none 
measured up to the ideal of Plato’s ‘philosopher-king.’ The deliberate manipulation of the 
intent of the Fourteen Points highlighted just how weak the leaders were so that right 
became wrong and wrong became right, illustrated by the witches scene from 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth (‘fair is foul and foul is fair.’) 
This picture of incompetent and impotent leadership created in Keynes a feeling of 
despair as he drew from writers such as Wordsworth and Shelley to prophesy an 
apocalyptic future for Europe. This apocalyptic theme runs through the entire book and 
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there is inevitability about the march towards economic misfortune Keynes believed 
would engulf Europe. This inevitable march echo’s Hardy’s “Immanent Will” that would 
result in yet another European civil revolution and economic dark age, as unavoidable as 
the sinking of the Titanic had been. 
However, despite the dark and persistent tone of Keynes’ central arguments he 
finishes his book on a note of hope the situation can be remedied. He offers a number of 
solutions for replacing the Treaty terms with a set of economic measures designed to 
head off the possibility of civil war and economic devastation. He finishes his book with a 
quotation from Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound, which is telling. While Shelley’s poem is a 
response to the revolutions and changes affecting society in the nineteenth century, this 
work is Shelley’s answer to the mistakes of the French Revolution and its cycle of replacing 
one tyrant with another. In this poem Shelley attempts to show how a different form of 
revolution would break the cycle, in the same way Keynes believed a different approach 
and set of measures for restoring economic prosperity to Europe would address the 
consequences of a Carthaginian Peace. 
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6.1. Prose and Style in Economic Consequences of the Peace 
Keynes’ understanding of the rules of rhetoric and his explicit attempts at persuasion 
meant a heightened awareness of how best to construct his prose. For a book committed 
to serious economics, his use of metaphors is extensive in Economic Consequences. It has 
been argued, a writer’s use of metaphors activates what Fyre calls the “imaginative 
cosmos” in the reader’s mind and enables them to better grasp the message. The 
successful use of metaphors can also have a powerful effect on the way a reader reacts to 
language. For example, when Keynes referred to the Peace Treaty as a “Carthaginian 
Peace” it shocked many readers educated in the history of the ancient and classical 
worlds. The Roman destruction of Carthage had been total and for Keynes to liken the 
economic consequences of the Treaty to total economic destruction was a devastating 
critique from an eminent economist. 
While Keynes understood the power of metaphors he also understood they 
needed to be used correctly and with relevance to have the desired effect. In an early 
draft of Economic Consequences Keynes reveals something of what he means. Writing 
about Lloyd George he commented: 
But lest we lose ourselves in metaphor, we must return to the 
commonplace of the Conference. I will enumerate briefly the chief 
factors influencing the part played by the British Prime Minister. If the 
reader will consider these, still holding the metaphors freshly in his 
mind, he will understand the outcome in such measure as it is in my 
power to convey to him.1 
This section examines the ways Keynes used metaphors to communicate and how this 
contributes to defining Keynes’ unique writing style. 
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6.1.1. Prophetic and Apocalyptic Literature 
Keynes develops a number of themes in Economic Consequences using the genre of 
prophecy and apocalypse to emphasise his arguments. He prophesies there will be 
economic consequences from Versailles which will negatively affect all nations of the 
world. His apocalyptic warning is that all nations will be plunged once again into a 
destructive European civil war should the terms of the Treaty be imposed. Keynes 
provides a number of examples of how words were manipulated during the drafting of the 
Treaty so the original intentions of the Fourteen Points were undermined and a heavier 
economic burden imposed on Germany than was agreed in the earlier Armistice 
negotiations. Keynes wrote,  
So far, however, all this is only a matter of words, of virtuosity in 
draftsmanship, which does no one any harm, and which probably 
seemed much more important at the time than it ever will again 
between now and Judgment Day.2  
Keynes’ prophecy is clear. While the draftsmen’s work seems just a matter of words, 
virtuous even, there is an evil intent woven into those words which will ultimately result in 
a judgment day when those responsible for imposing the Carthaginian Peace will be held 
to account. 
Keynes’ use of biblical references such as this, in addition to his use of references 
from literary figures known to write in a prophetic and apocalyptic style, such as Percy 
Bysshe Shelley and William Butler Yeats, is a good indicator that Keynes intended 
Economic Consequences should be included in the tradition of prophetic and apocalyptic 
literature. Prophetic literature, also called oracular and orphic literature, positions the 
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writer between humanity and another world (supernatural or non-human). The idea is 
found in many ancient cultures.3 Within the European and American literary traditions, 
prophetic speech that links the individual creative artist with forces larger than the 
individual has been part of several movements. For example, the Pre-Raphaelites objected 
to the humanism that was a feature of the Renaissance and looked for an earlier, more 
holistic, art that had a tradition of using prophetic language. The English Romantics, such 
as Shelley, found in nature a prophetic source of inspiration and a model for human 
societies. American Transcendentalists found inspiration in an oversoul4 and Surrealists 
sought to move past the logic of the waking mind and to draw from more universal 
material in the unconscious. Imaginism based art on a deep connection with an object 
outside the self, thus allowing some of its practitioners to develop an art with prophetic 
content. While Modernism generally discouraged writers from employing a prophetic 
voice to connect humanity with the more-than-human, some authors, especially those 
whose work reflects concern for the natural world and/or social justice, such as Keynes, 
embraced the role. 5 
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Apocalyptic literature also has a rich tradition but is not to be compared to 
prophetic literature as it was a new genre of prophetical writing that developed in post-
exilic Jewish culture and was popular among millennialist early Christians. “Apocalypse” is 
from the Greek word for “revelation” which means ‘an unveiling or unfolding of things not 
previously known and which could not be known apart from the unveiling.’6 The 
apocalyptic literature of Judaism and Christianity embraces a considerable period, from 
the centuries following the exile down to the close of the Middle Ages. The origins of the 
apocalyptic genre arise from moments of unfulfilled prophecy. Whereas the message of 
the prophets was primarily a preaching of repentance and righteousness if the nation was 
to escape judgment, the message of the apocalyptic writers was of patience and trust for 
that deliverance and reward that would eventually arrive. The writing itself is often 
fearful, violent, with a vision that reveals truths about past, present and future times in 
highly symbolic and poetical terms. Towards the end of Economic Consequences Keynes 
provides an example when describing the United States impulse to give up on Europe and 
the ‘folly and impracticability of the European statesmen.’ Keynes uses a reference from 
William Wordsworth’s The Excursion Book Third7 to poor scorn upon them all: 
Rot, then, in your own malice, and we will go our way – 
Remote from Europe; from her blasted hopes; 
Her fields of carnage, and polluted air.8 
Wordsworth’s words are from the tale of a wanderer’s sensation, expressing emotions of 
despondency, affliction, dejection and solitariness. Roused by the French Revolution the 
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wanderer leaves to journey to America but disappointment and disgust pursue him. On his 
return he experiences languor and depression of mind, from want of faith in the great 
truths of Religion, and want of confidence in the virtue of mankind. These were similar to 
the “apocalyptic” feelings that gnawed at Keynes as he wrote Economic Consequences. 
While Keynes paints an apocalyptic picture of the failings of the statesmen, whose 
job it was to provide leadership in the restoration of the fortunes of a battered Europe, 
Keynes also turns his apocalyptic words of “chastening” on the ‘great capitalist class’ of 
Europe calling for reform and arguing this is the class that should be taking responsibility 
for restoring European fortunes. Instead of ushering in reform Keynes rather sees the 
capitalist class as contributing to future ruin and muses that ‘perhaps it is historically true 
that no order of society ever perishes save by its own hand.’ In this passage Keynes deals 
with the past, assuming it to be historically true, and the present: 
We are thus faced in Europe with the spectacle of an extraordinary 
weakness on the part of the great capitalist class, which has emerged 
from the industrial triumphs of the nineteenth century, and seemed a 
very few years ago our all-powerful master. The terror and personal 
timidity of the individuals of this class is now so great, their 
confidence in their place in society and in their necessity to the social 
organism so diminished, that they are the easy victims of 
intimidation. This was not so in England twenty-five years ago, any 
more than it is now in the United States. Then the capitalists believed 
in themselves, in their value to society, in the propriety of their 
continued existence in the full enjoyment of their riches and the 
unlimited exercise of their power. Now they tremble before every 
insult; - call them pro-Germans, international financiers, or profiteers, 
and they will give you any ransom you choose to ask not to speak to 
them so harshly. They allow themselves to be ruined and altogether 
undone by their own instruments, governments of their own making, 
and a press of which they are proprietors.9 
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In his concluding discussion of the failure of the capitalist class Keynes hints prophetically 
at the coming apocalypse10, which was to be World War Two:  
In the complexer world of Western Europe the Immanent Will may 
achieve its ends more subtly and bring in the revolution no less 
inevitably through a Klotz or a George11 than by intellectualisms, too 
ruthless and self-conscious for us, the bloodthirsty philosophers of 
Russia.12  
The term Immanent Will comes from the work of Hardy, who is examined below. Hardy 
did not subscribe to the great man view of history but rather fate in the form of the 
Immanent Will dictates how events unfold. 
The prophetic and apocalyptic themes running through Economic Consequences 
are brought to a dramatic conclusion with Keynes’ reference to Prometheus Unbound at 
the end of the book.13 His reference is used to call for the replacement of another 
potentially destructive form of revolution, to the kind just waged, with a constructive 
revolution of economic possibility by restoring Europe to prosperity. Prometheus Unbound 
was a four-part play written by Shelley and Keynes makes full use of the apocalyptic genre 
to reinforce his point the “end times” will descend upon the nations of Europe should they 
not heed the message of his book: 
In this autumn of 1919, in which I write, we are at the dead season of 
our fortunes. The reaction from the exertions, the fears, and the 
sufferings of the past five years is at its height. Our power of feeling 
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or caring beyond the immediate questions of our own material well-
being is temporarily eclipsed. The greatest events outside our own 
direct experience and the most dreadful anticipations cannot move 
us. 
In each human heart terror survives 
The ruin it has gorged: the loftiest fear 
All that they would disdain to think were true: 
Hypocrisy and custom make their minds 
The fanes of many a worship, now outworn. 
They dare not devise good for man’s estate, 
And yet they know not that they do not dare. 
The good want power but to weep barren tears. 
The powerful goodness want: worse need for them. 
The wise want love; and those who love want wisdom; 
And all best things are thus confused to ill. 
Many are strong and rich, and would be just, 
But live among their suffering fellow-men 
As if none felt: they know not what they do. 
We have been moved already beyond endurance, and need rest. 
Never in the lifetime of men now living has the universal element in 
the soul of man burnt so dimly.14 
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The paragraph introducing the extract from Prometheus Unbound uses three forms 
of rhetoric: Keynes’ use of the metaphor “dead season” paints a bleak picture; the 
passage itself could be described as “high rhetoric,” such are the descriptions of despair; 
there is no transition from Keynes’ discursive statement about the despair he sees around 
him and the non-discursive Prometheus Unbound. It also serves Keynes’ purpose that he 
finishes this section of poetry with the words of Jesus Christ on the cross, “they know not 
what they do.” Shelley had left out the first few words used by Christ, “Forgive them, for,” 
that again suits Keynes’ purpose. He has no intention of forgiving the politicians whom he 
blames for the poor state Europe finds itself in but rather damns them for not knowing 
what they are doing. 
The original Prometheus Unbound is a play by the Greek poet Aeschylus concerned 
with the torments of the Greek mythological figure Prometheus and his suffering at the 
hands of Zeus. This inspired Shelley’s play of the same name, first published in 1820. It 
was not intended to be produced on the stage but was in the tradition of Romantic 
Poetry. Shelley wrote for the imagination, intending his play’s stage to reside in the 
imaginations of his readers. Shelley seeks to create in his play a perfect revolutionary in an 
ideal, abstract sense. In the apocalyptic tradition it could be loosely based upon the Jesus 
of both the Bible, Christian orthodox tradition, as well as Milton’s character of the Son in 
Paradise Lost. The portrayal of Jesus from all three literary canons as the Son who 
sacrifices himself to save mankind highlights for Shelley how the perfect revolutionary 
must go through a period of sacrifice before he or she can save mankind. Prometheus 
resembles Jesus in that both uncompromisingly speak truth to power, resulting in a period 
of persecution, after which the truth overcomes tyranny in the same way Prometheus 
overcomes his tyrant, Jupiter. 
There is widespread agreement that Shelley wrote Prometheus Unbound as a 
response to the revolutions and economic changes affecting his society, and the old views 
of good and evil needed to change in order to accommodate the current civilization. The 
Prometheus Unbound quotation used by Keynes from Shelley’s play is also repeated in 
William Butler Yeats’ poem The Second Coming, first published in The Dial (November 
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1920).15 Yeats, by his own admission, was in “religious awe” of Shelley’s play and in The 
Second Coming draws on religious symbolism to illustrate his anguish over the apparent 
decline of Europe’s ruling class, similar to Keynes’ anguish over the timidity of the 
European capitalist class. Yeats also uses this religious symbolism to support his occult 
belief that Western civilization, if not the whole world, was nearing the terminal point of a 
2000-year historical cycle. As with Shelley and Keynes, Yeats was concerned with the 
revolutions that had gone before, including the Irish, German and Russian revolutions, in 
addition to the French Revolution. Of these, the Russian Revolution concerned Yeats and 
Keynes the most. Like Keynes, Yeats believed the world was on the threshold of an 
apocalyptic moment although his vision of destruction rendered by “the beast” differs 
from Keynes’ vision of reconstruction through revolution. Yeats was ambivalent in how he 
felt about the beast but he found it more satisfying, rather than terrifying, and approved 
of its brutality and a period of complete destruction if a new civilization was to arise “from 
the ashes.” Keynes, on the other hand, took no satisfaction from the thought that further 
destruction should precede restoration. 
In summary, we have seen how Keynes used statistics to support his point that 
Economic Consequences was a serious economic text. When turning to an examination of 
his use of metaphor to paint a prophetic picture of apocalypse, we find that rather than 
Economic Consequences being a piece of political polemic, as many of his critics 
maintained, Keynes rather used metaphors of prophecy and apocalypse to reinforce the 
seriousness of his economic arguments. His references to prophecy and apocalypse are 
used first to highlight how the drafting of the Treaty terms were manipulated and would 
put a heavier economic burden on Germany. Second, the failure of statesmen at the 
Conference would have economically destructive consequences for Europe far into the 
future. Third, Keynes called on the capitalist class of Europe to rise to the challenge of 
restoring economic prosperity so Europe would not ‘perish by its own hand.’ Finally, 
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Keynes concluded his book with a quote from Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound as an appeal 
to the Allied leaders to learn from the French Revolution and subsequent European civil 
conflicts so mistakes from these conflicts would not be repeated. 
6.1.2. Themes on the Failure of Leadership 
Keynes’ use of prophetic and apocalyptic metaphors often refers to leadership as a key to 
halting Europe’s march towards economic doom. In Economic Consequences Keynes has a 
great deal to say on the subject of leadership and in particular the failures demonstrated 
at the Conference. He used a number of analogies from the life and times of Napoleon to 
highlight these failures. Before World War One Napoleon’s militarism had caused the last 
“civil war” experienced by Europe anywhere near the magnitude of 1914 to 1918. 
However Keynes does not use references to Napoleon to explain the extent of military 
destruction wrought by Napoleon compared to that of the military leaders of World War 
One, but rather, he wants to draw the reader’s attention to how the impotence displayed 
by Napoleon’s enemies was similar to that of the Allied leaders in 1919.  
Keynes argues, at the turn of the nineteenth century Napoleon posed an increasing 
threat to Europe in the same way the terms of the Treaty posed a threat to the safety and 
stability of all European nations, should the Allies proceed with enforcing them. He 
described ‘the proceedings of Paris,’ as a paradoxical event that 
had this air of extraordinary importance and unimportance at the 
same time. The decisions seemed charged with consequences to the 
future of human society; yet the air whispered16 that the word was 
not flesh,17 that it was futile, insignificant, of no effect, dissociated 
from events.  
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 Giving the effect of an impalpable sense of doom or menace.  
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 From John 1:14 “The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us.” This was the Gospel of Good 
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Paris had the effect of overturning any good news related to cessation of hostilities, such 
as the Fourteen Points, which had been essentially ignored or corrupted. Any saviour 
figure, such as Wilson who had come to the Conference with the hopes of the nations of 
the world vested in his person, had been diminished to the point where Keynes felt there 
was no hope. 
Keynes then elaborates his analogy of Napoleon by quoting from both Tolstoy’s 
and Hardy’s fictionalized accounts of the Napoleonic threat. He explained that 
one felt most strongly the impression, described by Tolstoy in War 
and Peace or by Hardy in The Dynasts, of events marching on to their 
fated conclusion uninfluenced and unaffected by the cerebrations of 
Statesmen in Council: 
Spirit of the Years 
Observe that all wide sight and self-command 
Deserts these throngs now driven to demonry 
By the Immanent Unrecking. Nought remains 
But vindictiveness here amid the strong, 
And there amid the weak an impotent rage. 
Spirit of the Pities 
Why prompts the Will so senseless-shaped a doing? 
Spirit of the Years 
I have told thee that It works unwittingly, 
As one possessed not judging.18 
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Keynes described: the vindictiveness of the Allies (vindictiveness here amid the strong); 
the anger associated with the impotence felt by Germany and her defeated allies (And 
there amid the weak an impotent rage); a feeling of frustration from observers such as 
Keynes at such senseless actions (Why prompts the Will so senseless-shaped a doing?); 
and Keynes’ view that the leaders at Versailles had put together a Treaty more out of 
emotional revenge than considered judgment of the consequences (I have told thee that it 
works unwittingly, As one possessed not judging).  
The sentiments in Hardy’s poem are closely mirrored in the prose from Tolstoy’s 
War and Peace.19 For Keynes this summarised the position Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd 
George found themselves in at the Conference. Tolstoy did not subscribe to the “great 
man” view of history since he believed events shaped themselves and great men take 
advantage of them. While Napoleon was such a man, who took advantage of the French 
Revolution, Keynes saw the “Statesmen in Council” at Paris as taking advantage of the 
events of World War One to exact a “Carthaginian Peace” on Germany. Furthermore, 
Keynes argues that impotence defined the leadership at Versailles and was similar to the 
impotence felt by the five aristocratic families from Tolstoy’s novel who were caught up in 
Napoleon’s siege of Moscow. There are no great men in War and Peace or at the 
Versailles Conference. There is only ‘vindictiveness here amid the strong, and there amid 
the weak an impotent rage.’20  
Keynes’ next reference with Napoleon is again a comparison with the leaders at 
Versailles, this time Napoleon and President Wilson as men of great promise, that is, each 
as ‘a man of destiny from the West.’21 This analogy is from Shaw’s play The Man of 
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Destiny, written in 1898.22 In the play, Napoleon Bonaparte, at 27, is a young man on the 
rise, with great promise and expectations of things to come. Shaw’s play is set on 12th 
May, 1796, in the north of Italy, at Tavazzano, on the road from Lodi to Milan. Two days 
previously, at Lodi, the Austrians had tried to prevent the French from crossing the bridge. 
But, the French, commanded by Napoleon, had rushed the ‘fireswept’ bridge and 
overcome the Austrians. This young commander was ‘an original observer,’ whose 
mastery of cannonading was a ‘technical specialty’ based on a ‘highly evolved faculty for 
physical geography and for the calculation of time and distance.’ Furthermore, this man of 
great promise, ‘had prodigious powers of work, and a clear, realistic knowledge of human 
nature in public affairs, having seen it exhaustively tested in that department during the 
French Revolution.’23 He is, in short, a man with the expectations of an entire nation 
resting on his actions and success. Similarly, Wilson had taken the moral high ground and 
demonstrated strong leadership with his acceptance of the Armistice and the framing of 
the Fourteen Points, thus ending hostilities. When Wilson arrived at Versailles it was with 
great promise and expectations the US and her Allies could rely on his ability to negotiate 
a successful peace.   
According to Keynes, 
when President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige and a 
moral influence throughout the world unequalled in history … with 
what curiosity, anxiety, and hope we sought a glimpse of the features 
and bearing of the man of destiny who, coming from the West, was to 
bring healing to the wounds of the ancient parent of his civilization.24  
But, in the same way the promise and hope Napoleon could heal the wounds of the 
French Revolution ended in disillusion, so too the promise and hope President Wilson 
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could heal the wounds of Europe’s bloody civil war also ended in disillusion, so much so, 
‘that some of those who had trusted most hardly dared speak of it. … What had happened 
to the President? What weakness or what misfortune had led to so extraordinary, so 
unlooked-for a betrayal.’25 
While Keynes’ comparison of Wilson to Napoleon highlights disappointed 
expectations, his later reference to Napoleon is for a different reason. In a section 
devoted specifically to the problems of a weakened Russia as well as Germany, Keynes 
suggested a set of remedies for heading off the apocalyptic doom he thought would result 
from a weakened Germany. Keynes refers to Napoleon and a possible ‘new Napoleonic 
domination, rising, as a phoenix, from the ashes of cosmopolitan militarism,’ should the 
Allies seek to economically weaken both Germany and Russia.26 At the time of writing 
Economic Consequences the Allies had blockaded Russia in the hope this would bring the 
Bolshevik threat to an end. For many of Keynes’ readers, both a weakened Germany and a 
weakened Russia were necessary ways of ensuring the world did not plunge back into war 
and destruction. However, Keynes argued that  
[Spartacism] in Germany might well be the prelude to Revolution 
everywhere: it would renew the forces of Bolshevism in Russia, and 
precipitate the dreaded union of Germany and Russia; it would 
certainly put an end to any expectations which have been built on the 
financial and economic clauses of the Treaty of Peace. Therefore Paris 
[as in the allies at the Versailles Conference] does not love 
Spartacus.’27 
Keynes has two reasons for the allusion to Spartacus. First, was the fresh memory 
of the Spartacus Revolt in Berlin in January 1919. The revolt had taken its name from the 
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Spartacus League, a revolutionary socialist group active in Germany from autumn 1914 to 
the end of 1918. It was officially founded in 1916 by Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, 
Clara Zetkin, and Franz Mehring. The name derived from their illegally distributed 
pamphlets Spartakusbriefen (Spartacus Letters). The League developed as an offshoot of 
the Social Democratic Party, among elements who violently opposed Germany’s role in 
World War One and who called for socialist revolution. The group was transformed into 
the Communist Party of Germany at a party congress held from December 30, 1918 to 
January 1, 1919. Following demonstrations encouraged by the group Luxemburg and 
Liebknecht were arrested in Berlin on January 15 and murdered by members of the 
Conservative Free Corps (Freikorps), who had seized control of the city’s police 
presidium.28  
The second reason for the allusion to Spartacus is the equation of the Allies’ policy 
of economic emasculation of Germany with the Roman slave Spartacus. Keynes by doing 
this suggests the opposite but equally unpalatable idea of an economically strong 
Germany that, for many people, would inevitably mean a new military power ‘establishing 
itself in the East, with its spiritual home in Brandenburg.’29 Historically Brandenburg was 
an independent state, which grew to become the core of independent Prussia and later 
the German state of Prussia and was the site of the kingdom’s capitals, Berlin and 
Potsdam. For those who feared the possibility of a militarily strong Germany re-
establishing itself within the geographical area of historic Brandenburg and giving rise to a 
new Napoleonic domination, this would be like the rising of the mythical phoenix bird. 
Keynes’ allusion to the phoenix is prescient because of the legend it has a 1000-year life-
cycle, the same period of time Hitler attributed to the Third Reich, based as it was on the 
1000-year existence of the combined Roman Republic and Empire, he believed he was 
bringing into being with a new world order and domination. The fears associated with the 
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scenario of a newly independent and militarily threatening Germany gave rise to the 
feeling among the Allies at Versailles that while ‘Paris does not love Spartacus,’ nor does 
‘Paris dare not love Brandenburg.’30 While Keynes expresses sympathy with the opposing 
viewpoints he argues there is only one remedy for the dilemma faced by the Allies and 
that is to recognise an economically strong Germany is in the best interests of all Europe 
just as an economically strong Russia would be. Furthermore, ‘the blockade of Russia *for 
example] is a foolish and short-sighted proceeding; we are blockading not so much Russia 
as ourselves.’31 By this use of personification, that is, depicting countries as characters, 
Keynes is able to portray the situation as dramatic and 
the more successful we are in snapping economic relations between 
Germany and Russia, the more we shall depress the level of our own 
domestic problems. This is to put the issue on its lowest grounds. 
There are other arguments, which the most obtuse cannot ignore, 
against a policy of spreading and encouraging further the economic 
ruin of great countries.32 
In short, because of impotent leadership, the Allies will bring economic ruin not just to 
Germany but also upon themselves and usher in a ‘new Napoleonic domination’ of all 
Europe. 
In summary, Keynes’ references and allusions to Napoleon and Spartacus enables 
him to develop three important themes. First there is the impotence of the Allied leaders 
and their failure to find effective economic solutions to the problems created by World 
War One. The second theme is of disappointed leadership expectations. In the same way 
Napoleon came to the European stage with great promise so too did President Wilson 
arrive at the Versailles Conference with great promise. However, both leaders proceeded 
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to greatly disappoint their followers and supporters. Finally, Keynes uses the person of 
Napoleon to highlight the dilemma of re-building the economies of both Germany and 
Russia as it may lead to another Napoleonic domination of Europe. However, the only 
effective remedy for heading off such a threat was to do the very thing the leaders at the 
Conference feared most, to rebuild the shattered economies of both Germany and Russia, 
a remedy that nonetheless was in the best interests of all European countries. The success 
of this strategy and the way to ensure another Napoleonic era of domination did not take 
place was dependent on strong, effective leadership from the Allies. Instead the failure of 
leadership at Versailles had economic consequences that would put Europe back on a 
path of instability and eventual revolution. 
6.1.3. Other Themes: Allusions to the Classical World 
In addition to using metaphors and allusions focusing on prophecy, apocalypse and 
themes of leadership failure, Keynes also alluded to characters from the classical world to 
support his thesis that the consequences of the Allied leaders’ decisions would be 
economic rather than political. In one example, Keynes refers to Pericles of ancient Greece 
to support his argument that Clemenceau’s love of France was misplaced. When Keynes 
states, ‘he *Clemenceau+ felt about France what Pericles felt of Athens – unique value in 
her, nothing else mattered,’ he does not say it as a compliment to Pericles and his love for 
Athens, which is not disputed, even by Pericles’ critics, but rather makes the point that 
this love was misplaced. 33 Pericles’ critics regarded him as responsible for the gradual 
degeneration of the Athenian democracy, and for the destruction from the Peloponnesian 
War as well as being a prolific spender who effectively bankrupted the Athenian treasury, 
building expensive edifices and artworks.34 Clemenceau, argues Keynes, had ‘no place for 
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“sentimentality” in international relations.’35 Nations are real things, of which you love 
one and feel for the rest indifference or hatred. The glory of the nation you love ‘is a 
desirable end, - but generally to be obtained at your neighbour’s expense’.36 Such 
misplaced love leads to destruction and undermines the very self-interest that motivated 
men such as Pericles and Clemenceau. Rather than being good for France, Clemenceau’s 
politics are really ‘the theory of politics of Bismarck37  .... an ingenious formula for 
rearranging the balance of power in one’s own interest.’38 
Another significant theme Keynes developed in referring to the classical world was 
the “Carthaginian Peace” to be imposed on Germany by the Allies. This peace, Keynes 
argued, would mean total destruction for Germany and in turn the whole of Europe. 
Keynes was responsible for popularising the term Carthaginian Peace,39 which refers to 
the outcome of a series of wars between Rome and the Phoenician city of Carthage, 
known as the Punic Wars.40 At the end of the third Punic War the Romans laid siege to 
Carthage. When they took the city they killed most of the inhabitants, sold the rest into 
slavery, and destroyed the entire city. Some accounts say that the Romans then sowed the 
ground with salt, although this is considered a legend. Tacitus said, “they make a 
wasteland and call it peace.” While this reference to Carthage was a reference to a peace 
that brought total destruction to the enemy, Keynes himself extended the term to argue 
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that a Carthaginian Peace would inevitably swallow up the Allies as well as their enemies. 
The policy of France, Keynes argued, was to set the clock back to the time of the 1870 war 
between Germany and France in which France was humiliated by Germany. The revenge 
France now looked to exact upon Germany would be by loss of territory and destruction 
of her economic system built on the 
vast fabric [of] iron, coal, and transport. [But] you cannot restore 
Central Europe to 1870 without setting up such strains in the 
European structure and letting loose such human and spiritual forces 
as, pushing beyond frontiers and races, will overwhelm not only you 
and your “guarantees,” but your institutions, and the existing order of 
your Society.41  
When writing in 1919 Keynes, despite his apocalyptic vision of an economically ruined 
Europe, held out hope, albeit a fading hope, that it was not too late to avoid the worst of 
the destruction. He argued this could be achieved with firm leadership from the United 
States. He uses the analogy of the “philosopher-king,” which he believed would have been 
enough to blunt the excesses of French revenge.42 The philosopher-kings were the 
hypothetical rulers, or Guardians, of Plato’s Utopian Kallipolis, his ideal city-state that, if it 
was ever to come into being, ‘philosophers *must+ become kings … or those now called 
kings *must+ … genuinely and adequately philosophise.’43 The vision of an ideal city-state 
evoked by Keynes’ philosopher-king had parallels with the thinking of contemporaries 
such as H. G. Wells who had in 1918 been recruited by Lord Northcliff’s Ministry of 
Propaganda. His task was to work on a statement of war aims chief among which was the 
setting up of the League of Nations. Wells had viewed the war as the inevitable outcome 
of rivalries between modern nation-states. Popular nationalism and imperialism reflected 
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the prejudices and misunderstanding sown by the teaching of national history in each 
country. Wells envisaged a new kind of history textbook and at the end of the war 
assembled a team of specialist advisers and wrote his Plain History of Life and Mankind, 
The Outline of History (1920). This brought him new fame and he used this in his activities 
as a propagandist and commentator on world order. His favourite project was an ‘Open 
Conspiracy’ to work towards world peace and global reorganisation. George Orwell and 
others later accused him of political naivety although he had tapped a popular yearning 
for a stable world order not too dissimilar to the philosopher-king Keynes had alluded to.44 
Unfortunately for Europe ‘*Wilson+ was not the philosopher-king’ that was expected and 
needed’ to enable such an order to be established45 
6.1.4. Religious Imagery 
Disappointed expectations in the leader’s performance at the Conference is a theme that 
runs through Economic Consequences. As well as Keynes’ use of metaphors and allusions 
to the classical world and analogies to Napoleon as ways of comparing and contrasting the 
failings and weaknesses of the political leaders at Versailles, Keynes uses religious 
imagery, especially from the Judaeo-Christian tradition, to emphasise his disappointment 
with Allied leadership. Keynes’ use of religious imagery expands on three broad themes. 
First is the confusion among the leaders at the Conference. Second, the deception of the 
leaders, especially during framing of the Treaty. Third the theme of weakness is 
highlighted using religious imagery. 
In the first of these themes (confusion) Keynes alludes to ‘a babel of sound’ that 
left ‘a most vivid impression’ on Keynes during his own attendance at the Conference.46 
The source of the word babel comes from the Book of Genesis and the story of the Tower 
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of Babel, built as the crowning achievement to the city of Babylon.47 According to the 
biblical account Babylon was a city that united humanity, all speaking a single language 
and was the home city of the great King Nimrod and the first city to be built after the great 
flood. Whereas the Tower of Babel’s purpose was for the worship and praise of God, it 
rather became dedicated to the glory of man. God, seeing what the people were doing, 
gave each person a different language to confuse them and scattered the people 
throughout the earth. Similarly the globalised world of pre-World War One Europe had 
diverged into the “worship and praise” of nationalism and imperialism. When world 
leaders gathered at Versailles to attempt returning the world to stability and unity, they 
instead could not move beyond the babel of different languages and competing self-
interests, leaving a vivid impression on Keynes as he observed ‘a surging mob’ crowded 
around Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau offering up ‘a welter of eager, impromptu 
compromises and counter-compromises, all sound and fury signifying nothing, on what 
was an unreal question anyhow, the great issues of the morning’s meeting forgotten and 
neglected.’48 The reference to ‘all sound and fury signifying nothing’ is an allusion to 
Shakespeare’s play Macbeth and Macbeth’s soliloquy in Act 5 Scene 5: 
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
 
Signifying nothing. 
Keynes found religious imagery useful when discussing what he considered the 
most deceptive aspect of Versailles. Scandalously, politicians who had gathered to restore 
stability and prosperity to Europe were doing anything but restoration work. Rather, they 
were going down a path opposite to what could be considered by the average person to 
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be ‘normal, certain, and permanent.’ Many of the decisions taken at Versailles were ‘the 
projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of 
monopolies, restrictions, and exclusions.’ Keynes argued that these projects and politics 
‘were to play the serpent to this paradise of normality, certainty and permanence.’49 
Through the seductive actions of their leaders the innocent ‘average person’ would suffer 
the consequences in the same way Adam and Eve paid the price for eating the forbidden 
fruit from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil when cast out of the Garden of 
Eden (a prosperous and stable Europe). 50   
Keynes extends his criticism of the political leaders deception to those serving the 
politicians - the officials, lawyers, and draftsmen responsible for framing the Treaty. These 
individuals were ‘the subtlest sophisters and most hypocritical draftsmen *who+ were set 
to work, and produced many ingenious exercises which might have deceived for more 
than an hour a cleverer man than the President.’51 Keynes once again used religious 
symbolism to make his point. He used President Wilson as his starting point for criticising 
the politicians ‘servants’ who came to the Conference committed to the Fourteen Points. 
These Fourteen Points, argued Keynes, were as sacred as the Pentateuch is for the Jewish 
people and the legal and ethical principles all Jews are expected to live by. This sacred 
text, known as the first five books of Moses in the Old Testament (Genesis, Exodus, 
Leviticus, Numbers and Deuteronomy) is also referred to as the Torah.  
Keynes’ real issue and criticism was the manipulative interpretation of the 
Fourteen Points. The Fourteen Points (Pentateuch) remained sacred to the President but 
in the hands of the lawyers and officials charged with interpreting the them ‘they became 
a document for gloss and interpretation and for all the intellectual apparatus of self-
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deception.’ It was then just a short step to ‘the weaving of that web of sophistry and 
Jesuitical exegesis that was finally to clothe with insincerity the language and substance of 
the whole Treaty.’52 Here Keynes refers to experts, using the analogy of the Jesuits, who 
gave propagandist treatment to the text of the Treaty (exegesis or critical examination of 
a text).53 By way of example Keynes used the prohibition of Austria uniting with Germany 
to make his point: 
Thus instead of saying that German-Austria is prohibited from uniting 
with Germany except by leave of France (which would be inconsistent 
with the principle of self-determination), the Treaty, with delicate 
draftsmanship, states that “Germany acknowledges and will respect 
strictly the independence of Austria, within the frontiers which may 
be fixed in a Treaty between the State and the Principal Allied and 
Associated Powers; she agrees that this independence shall be 
inalienable, except with the consent of the Council of the League of 
Nations,” which sounds, but is not, quite different. And who knows 
but that the President forgot that another part of the Treaty provides 
that for this purpose the Council of the League must be unanimous.54 
In this example we see two “ugly” aspects of the Treaty’s deception. First, those 
behind the framing of the Treaty have convinced themselves that wrong is right and 
second, because of their actions everything around them is corrupted. Keynes sums up 
the deception with an analogy from Shakespeare’s Macbeth: 
The word was issued to the witches of all Paris: 
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Fair is foul, and foul is fair, 
Hover through the fog and filthy air.55 
Shakespeare’s play highlights how desire can overwhelm people so they become oblivious 
to what may be “foul” or bad. Lady Macbeth’s fair appearance was the exact opposite of 
her intentions and personality. Similarly, the Allies came to the Conference appearing to 
uphold the principles of the Fourteen Points when in fact their intentions were to destroy 
a beaten foe, regardless of the consequences (desire for revenge overwhelmed their 
principles). Desire is also at the root of greed and foulness and nothing is what it seems. 
When the witches chant ‘fair is foul and foul is fair’ similarly the greed and desire of the 
victorious Allies is foul as they sought to impose impossible terms on Germany. 
Furthermore they were foul in their clear deception for saying one thing (to uphold the 
Fourteen Points) and doing another (imposing terms intended to destroy Germany 
economically). Another interpretation of Macbeth involves religious imagery. That is, 
there is a school of thought a Christian interpretation can be put onto the phrase ‘fair is 
foul and foul is fair’ to describe those who worship Satan with the phrase itself describing 
ultimate truth.56 That which makes a human fair (virtue) is foul (vice) and that which 
makes a human foul (vice) is fair (virtue). The witches serve evil and they declare so with 
the phrase. Taking this interpretation Keynes accused all those who were complicit in the 
framing and execution of the Treaty to be serving evil. 
As repugnant as this may seem Keynes argues there is an explanation for the evil 
and deception in Paris. These were the “false idols” of nationalism that possessed the 
European family during the war. Despite the efforts of the President of the United States, 
these false idols had taken possession of the leaders of the European nations in the same 
way in which the Jewish people had started worshipping the false idols of paganism in 
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place of the “truth” of monotheism.57 By likening the European family to worshippers of 
false idols Keynes was pointing out that Europe had turned its back on the “truth” (‘of a 
policy of reconciliation’) that had been embraced by the United States and some 
European countries. He called for the United States to not lend ‘a penny to a single one of 
the present Governments of Europe’ until such time as they gave up the worship of the 
“false idols” of hatred and nationalism.58 
To Keynes it was clear who was responsible for the worship of false idols, just as 
there was an explanation for the deception and the ‘general upheaval and disorder’ that 
found expression in a babel of sound and confusion. All, argued Keynes, were symptoms 
of weak leadership, especially that of President Wilson. Keynes used three unrelated 
examples to support his views. First he focuses on the nature of President Wilson’s 
charisma, or, as in this case, lack of it. Keynes had already stated Wilson was not the 
philosopher-king but does contend that he was a man of force, personality, and 
importance. But, asks Keynes, what of his temperament?  
The clue once found was illuminating. The President was like a 
Nonconformist minister, perhaps a Presbyterian. His thought and his 
temperament were essentially theological but not intellectual, with all 
the strength and the weakness of that manner of thought, feeling, 
and expression. It is a type of which there are not now in England and 
Scotland such magnificent specimens as formerly; but this 
description, nevertheless, will give the ordinary Englishman the 
distinctness impression of the President.59 
In short, Wilson was a rather dour, uncharismatic dogmatic leader, who reminded Keynes 
more of a preacher than a political leader of men who, as a Nonconformist minister could 
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not compromise. Keynes was appealing to a stereotype that associated Scottish 
Presbyterianism with a style of religion which was considered serious to the point of being 
bleak and dull. Furthermore, Keynes argues that Wilson did not grasp European affairs. 
When Keynes says ‘*Wilson+ could have preached a sermon on any of them or have 
addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their fulfilment,’60 he brings to mind 
Abraham Lincoln’s phrase to describe Americans as “the almost chosen people.”61 This is a 
phrase that sums up the uneasy relationship between the American republic and the 
religious spirit of its people. Europeans are often struck by the way in which high church 
attendance, and overt religiosity, coexists with the passionate pursuit of materialism. For 
Keynes this explained why Wilson sounded so plausible in speeches and in his Notes 
before coming to the Conference. He seemed to have a ‘Programme for the World.’ 
However, on setting foot in Europe ‘*Wilson+ had no plan, no scheme, no constructive 
ideas whatever for clothing with flesh of life the commandments which he had thundered 
from the White House.’ The President ‘could not frame their concrete application to the 
actual state of Europe’ because he did not understand Europe as being different from the 
United States.62 
Another use of religious imagery is the sense of unreality defining Wilson’s 
leadership. While Wilson made all the right noises he, in reality, had no idea how to 
address the problems of Europe because, according to Keynes, he had no capacity to 
understand a culture that was not American and he was too dogmatic to know how to 
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seek compromise among fellow statesmen. Keynes once again uses a metaphor to explain 
what he means: ‘*Wilson+ could write Notes from Sinai or Olympus. But if he once stepped 
down to the intimate equality of the Four, the game was evidently up.’63 The phrase 
‘notes from Sinai or Olympus’ relates to an ancient view of human civilization that 
believed flight was a privilege reserved only for the gods whose abodes were in “high 
places.” The Greeks placed their pantheon on Mt. Olympus and warned of the hubris 
mere mortals displayed in attempting to go there. Thus, Icarus soared on the waxy wings 
crafted by Daedalus until he dared approach the Sun and fell to his death.  
In reference to Sinai Hebrew texts place the Lord “up there.” He led his people as a 
pillar of cloud or light and met with Moses on the top of Mt. Sinai. On descending from 
the heavens Moses found his followers had turned to worshipping a golden calf (false 
gods). What this says of Wilson, according to Keynes, is that Wilson seemed at home in 
the ideal world conversing with ‘the Lord’ on Mt. Sinai and could preach on the abode of 
the gods on Olympus but when he had to deal with the concrete realities of leadership 
‘the game was effectively up.’ Like Icarus, Wilson’s hubris brought him crashing back to 
the realities of the earthly world and like Moses, Wilson was so wrapped up in the ideals 
of the Fourteen Points, he failed to see those that he was appointed to lead were 
worshipping the false gods of nationalism and self-interested revenge. 
Keynes came in for considerable criticism for his unflattering portrait and judgment 
of Wilson, especially in the US. Certainly Keynes failed to acknowledge the serious political 
difficulties Wilson faced back home. Despite winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1919, for his 
efforts at Versailles, Wilson could not win US Senate support for ratification of the Treaty 
and the US never joined the League of Nations, which Wilson had first proposed as part of 
his Fourteen Points on January 8, 1918. After the US elections during December 1918 
Republicans controlled the Senate but Wilson refused to agree to proposed changes put 
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forward by the Republicans in regard to the Fourteen Points. He also became less trustful 
of the press and stopped holding press conferences.64 Following Wilson’s serious stroke 
on October 2, 1919 Keynes heeded the advice of friends and toned down his portrayal of 
Wilson. However, it was still highly critical of Wilson and Keynes’ flamboyant style no 
doubt fanned the flames of criticism. 
6.1.5. Referencing Other Literary Sources 
In addition to using religious imagery when discussing Wilson, Keynes also likens Wilson to 
a ‘blind and deaf Don Quixote,’65 the reference intended as something more than just a 
comment on Wilson’s incompetence. By referring to Don Quixote Keynes is referring to 
the theme of deception, bringing this and weak leadership together as the twin evils of 
the Conference. Keynes does this by comparing the behaviour of Lloyd George to that of 
Wilson. Keynes argued that ‘*Wilson] was not only insensitive to his surroundings in the 
external sense; he was not sensitive to his environment at all. What chance could such a 
man have against Mr. Lloyd George’s unerring, almost medium-like, sensibility to 
everyone immediately round him?’66 Whereas Wilson had come to Versailles to build on 
the principles of the Fourteen Points Lloyd George played the part of the consummate 
politician who, on the one hand appeared to support Wilson’s principled approach but in 
reality was playing to an electorate audience back home in Britain. Lloyd George had 
taken a mental note of the anti-German sentiment summed up in the words ‘we will 
squeeze Germany like a lemon until you can hear the pips squeak’ and did not plan to lose 
an election when he got home by being judged as being ‘soft’ on Germany. 67  But his was 
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a personal dilemma. He had been a key partner in drawing up the Fourteen Points, 
persuading Germany to lay down arms and enter negotiations for Peace on a good faith 
basis. But if it troubled Lloyd George the leaders had deceitfully broken their promises 
outlined in the Fourteen Points it did not show. Keynes argued, he was able to outwit the 
other leaders at the Conference by, on the one hand, appearing to side with Wilson in 
supporting the Fourteen Points principles while on the other being a party to the 
deception of the Treaty. Keynes argued: 
To see the British Prime Minister watching the company, with six or 
seven senses not available to ordinary men, judging character, 
motive, and sub-conscious impulse, perceiving what each was 
thinking and even what each was going to say next, and compounding 
with telepathic instinct the argument or appeal best suited to the 
vanity, weakness, or self-interest of his immediate auditor, was to 
realize that the poor President would be playing blind man’s buff in 
that party.68 Never could a man have stepped into the parlour a more 
perfect and predestined victim to the finished accomplishments of 
the Prime Minister.69 
Deception came easily to Lloyd George; it might be argued that for a politician it was one 
of his strengths. But, taken together with Wilson’s weakening leadership it meant any 
good intentions were undermined. These were the twin evils of the Conference. 
Keynes deals with these themes of weakness and deception in one of his more 
colourful allusions, this time to the Anti-Christ, when referring to the British election of 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
by her close allies) felt about how revenge through reparations should be exacted on Germany. Keynes 
called it a ‘gross spectacle’ (Keynes, (1920 p. 131)). The actual phrase used by Geddes was, “We will get out 
of her all you can squeeze out of a lemon and a bit more. I will squeeze until you can hear the pips squeak.” 
Grieves, (ODNB, 2004, 33360). 
68
 Blind man’s buff is a children’s game played as far back as Tudor times although it was a popular game in 
the Victorian era. The game is a variant of tag. Buff means small push but it may originate from the older 
sense of bluff meaning to blindfold. 
69
 Keynes, (1919, pp. 37-38). 
 Page 279 
8-Jun-11 
December 1918. He claimed that ‘a vote for a Coalition candidate meant the Crucifixion of 
Anti-Christ and the assumption by Germany of the British National Debt.’70 Lloyd George’s 
National Coalition swept to power on the populist sentiment that the Allies would ‘make 
Germany pay.’ Keynes, however, believed Lloyd George to have deceitfully appealed to 
this populist sentiment because Lloyd George did not believe Germany could pay the 
whole cost of the war. However, the British people, like their European allies, were in no 
mood for showing weakness towards Germany on the issue of making her pay the full cost 
of the war’s destruction. Lloyd George was happy to oblige and during electioneering did 
not provide any public display around doubts about Germany’s ability to pay.  
There are two possible meanings to be taken from this allusion. The first relates to 
the Anti-Christ of the Bible. The name itself is only found in 1 John 2: 18, 2:22, 4:3 and 2 
John 7 and refers to the warnings that many anti-Christ’s or false teachers will appear 
between the time of Christ’s first and second coming. In the last hour one great Anti-Christ 
will arise to power and deny that Jesus is Christ. The Anti-Christ is a liar and deceiver. If we 
apply this to Keynes’ use of the term he would be saying ‘a vote for a Coalition candidate 
meant Crucifixion of the lies and deception around making Germany pay the full cost of 
the war.’ However, Keynes’ gives the reference an opposite meaning. The Coalition, under 
Lloyd George’s leadership, was being deceitful so ‘the Crucifixion of Anti-Christ’ must 
mean something else. The most likely explanation is that Keynes was referring to Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s book The Anti-Christ originally published in 1895. We know the works of 
Nietzsche were discussed by Keynes’ Bloomsbury circle because they are referred to in the 
archives that survive. For example, Virginia Woolf wrote ‘… Nietzsche sent waves of fresh 
thought across the Continent.’71 The title of Nietzsche’s book, from the German title, can 
also be translated into English, as “The Anti-Christian” for this is the subject of his book.  
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Nietzsche argued that Christianity had weakened the human will and his books, as 
with much else to do with his religious thinking, prophesied that as Christianity was 
rejected in favour of secular man, mankind could reclaim a strength of will that 
Christianity had suppressed for so long. The Anti-Christian is the opposite type of person 
to the person who follows Christianity’s teachings. Nietzsche blamed Christianity for 
demonising strong, higher humans. The Anti-Christ had broken free from centuries of the 
christianisation of mankind that had bred weak, sickly humans. Thus, when Keynes refers 
to Crucifixion of the Anti-Christ he is referring to the Crucifixion of the strength of will that 
knew the right thing was not to penalise Germany to the detriment of the whole of 
Europe. Instead, those who voted for a Coalition candidate were supporting the deceitful 
stance that Germany should pay in full and hence Keynes’ words ‘Germany would assume 
the British National Debt.’  
The reference to Nietzsche is an interesting one as Nietzsche’s views, were at this 
time, out of favour with many of Keynes’ intellectual contemporaries. For example, 
Thatcher in his book Nietzsche in England: 1890-1914 cites Leonard Woolf at this time as 
saying “Nietzsche was practically ignored by almost everyone known by me in the last 
seventy years, and I cannot even remember a discussion about him.” On the other hand, 
an older member of Bloomsbury, Desmond MacCarthy, wrote reviews of Nietzsche, 
praising his exultant courage, his buoyant scepticism and his ruthless honesty.72 Not that 
Keynes own views of Nietzsche are relevant for this discussion; what is necessary to 
establish is that Keynes would have been aware of the works of Nietzsche because others 
in Bloomsbury were.  
Taking the two allusions together, Don Quixote and the Anti-Christian, Wilson was 
a weak and incompetent leader, bested by the duplicitous Lloyd George. While Lloyd 
George appeared to Wilson to be an ally in upholding the principles of the Fourteen 
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Points, Lloyd George had in fact been deceitful by undermining Wilson’s views. He had 
also gone a step further than being deceitful by defeating the principled Wilson in a battle 
Wilson had no idea he was fighting for. In this battle ‘the Old World was tough in 
wickedness anyhow; the Old World’s heart of stone might blunt the sharpest blade of the 
bravest knight-errant. But the blind and deaf Don Quixote was entering a cavern where 
the swift and glittering bade was in the hands of the adversary.’73 
The reference to a blind and deaf Don Quixote entering a cavern is itself 
significant. While the structure of Don Quixote is episodic and farcical, in itself a 
commentary of how Keynes felt about the Conference, the second half of the book is 
serious and philosophical about the theme of deception, exactly the theme that Keynes 
argues underpinned the actions of the Allied participants. Furthermore, Quixote’s 
adventures tend to involve situations in which he attempts to apply a knight’s sure, simple 
morality to situations in which much more complex issues are at hand. The very situation, 
argued Keynes, Wilson found himself in. In the same way Don Quixote enters a cavern in 
one of his adventures, without knowing what he is walking in to, makes him figuratively 
blind and deaf. Similarly a ‘blind and deaf’ Wilson enters into the Conference proceedings 
thinking that he was acting as an honourable knight when in reality he is caught up in a 
farcical adventure. 
In the same way Keynes uses phrases from Don Quixote to highlight themes of 
deception, incompetent leadership and farce, he makes reference to another well-known 
literary phrase ‘the Immanent Will’ to argue there are serious consequences resulting 
from the deception, incompetent leadership and farce that came to define the Conference 
and resulting Peace Treaty. The term was first used by Thomas Hardy (1840-1928) in his 
poem of the Titanic tragedy “Convergence of the Twain – Lines on the loss of the 
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Titanic.”74 Kipling had earlier put the word twain75 on the poetic map with one of his 
Barrack-room Ballads in 1892, declaring, “Oh, East is East, and West is West, and never 
the twain shall meet.” Kipling’s use of the word describes an imperial West he cannot 
imagine has any connection with the East. Similarly Hardy’s view of the sinking of the 
Titanic is such an overwhelming and unimaginable possibility that “the twain has 
converged.” The twain for Hardy refers to the “collision” of the Titanic and the Immanent 
Will ‘that stirs and urges everything prepared a sinister mate for the ship: “a Shape of 
Ice.”’76 In Hardy’s world view, the twain meet in time and space when the “spinner of 
Years said ‘Now!’ And each one hears, and consummation comes, and jars two 
hemispheres.” The “Immanent Will” or fate or chance said “Now!” and the Titanic was hit. 
This turns out to be a sinister mate. The extent of the injury from the impact is not 
immediately known (surely, there are 16 watertight compartments?)77 But slowly the 
passengers realise things are amiss, and then rapidly they are sinking. In the same way the 
Immanent Will at play in the tragedy of the Titanic was at play during the Conference 
proceedings. Similarly most of the characters in Hardy’s books fight a losing battle against 
the impersonal forces of fate, the hand of fate may usher in another revolution that no 
statesman, politician or intellectual on their own can do anything about. Nothing could be 
done once fate (the Immanent Will) moved to sink the Titanic. This ‘inevitable’ 
powerlessness of individuals to hold back the tragedy of revolution, just as the passengers 
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on the Titanic were powerless to stop her sinking, is reinforcement of Hardy’s view that 
human downfall is the result of an unwilling conflict with a hostile, meaningless universe. 
Should revolution, as predicted by Keynes, be a result of the Treaty, there is little, if 
nothing, individuals can do to prevent it. 
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6.2. Prose and Style – Summary 
What is striking about Keynes’ prose style is his rich use of metaphors, including allusions 
and analogies, which rarely feature in works of economics. First, the entire book is 
underpinned by a genre of prophetic and apocalyptic writing. Keynes draws on the works 
of Wordsworth’s The Excursion Book Third to paint an apocalyptic picture of the failure of 
statesmen and politicians to grasp the economic destruction they are about to unleash on 
Europe. He uses the same apocalyptic imagery to chasten the “great capitalist class” of 
Europe whom he holds responsible for not doing enough to restore Europe’s economic 
fortunes. Dramatically Keynes finishes Economic Consequences with a lengthy citation 
from Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound. Yeats had also used Shelley’s poem in his The Second 
Coming and with Keynes believed the world was on the threshold of an apocalyptic 
moment. Both had a vision of destruction that would be rendered by “the beast” although 
they differed in their views of how things would play out. Yeats held the view that further 
destruction was necessary to enable proper restoration, whereas Keynes took no 
satisfaction from the thought of more destruction. Rather he believed reform and change 
could overcome the nightmare of a looming apocalypse.  
Within this apocalyptic framework, Keynes draws out a number of significant 
themes. He uses analogies and the allusion of Napoleon and Spartacus as ways of 
developing three important themes of failed leadership. First are the weak and impotent 
leaders who failed to find effective economic solutions. Second, there was disappointment 
in the Allied leaders. Wilson, in particular, like Napoleon, was a leader with great promise 
who ultimately greatly disappointed. Finally, Keynes used the character of Napoleon to 
highlight the problems of re-building the economies of both Germany and Russia in the 
face of the possibility of another Napoleon-like domination of Europe. 
Another effective use of metaphor is Keynes’ allusions to the Classical World. He 
compares Clemenceau’s misplaced love of France to Pericles’ love of Athens. In the same 
way as this spelt doom for Pericles and Athens, Keynes argued that Clemenceau’s desire 
for revenge would spell doom for France. The Carthaginian Peace was a term first coined 
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by Keynes and subsequently has become the term often used to describe the Treaty. The 
destruction of Carthage by the Romans was total and Keynes prophesied Europe’s 
destruction would be equally terminal should the Treaty terms be imposed.78 Finally, 
Keynes argued that such an apocalyptic vision could be averted with strong leadership, 
especially from the United States. His analogy of the philosopher-king, who could ensure 
world order, was still possible, although Keynes had doubts, for Wilson was no 
philosopher-king. 
As well as allusions to the Classical World Keynes used religious imagery, especially 
Judaeo-Christian imagery, to focus attention on the failures of the Allied leadership. First, 
Keynes likens the confusion at the Conference to the biblical story of the Tower of Babel. 
He used this imagery to demonstrate how competing self-interest and the worship of 
nationalism and imperialism are major impediments to the restoration of prosperity. The 
second failure that concerned Keynes was the role deception played in drafting the Treaty. 
He compares the actions of those responsible to the serpent in the Garden of Eden who 
seduced Adam and Eve to deceive God. Europe’s punishment would be a failure to return 
to prosperity and stability in ways similar to Adam and Eve having been cast out of the 
Garden of Eden and destined for a life of hardship. Furthermore, Keynes compares the 
sacred books of the Pentateuch to the sacredness of the Fourteen Points and then used 
the analogy of the Jesuits, scholarly experts and apologists for Catholicism, to argue 
experts who framed the Treaty gave it propagandist treatment. Keynes then deals with 
two ugly aspects of the Treaty’s deception. First, those who framed the Treaty convinced 
themselves that, like the witches from Shakespeare’s Macbeth, right is wrong and wrong 
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is right (fair is foul and foul is fair). Another interpretation is, those who worship Satan 
invert fair (virtue) with foul (vice) so those complicit in framing the Treaty were serving 
evil. This evil and deception, argued Keynes, was due to the worship of the false idols of 
nationalism. 
Keynes has an explanation for the deception, which is the evil worship of false idols 
enabled by weak leaders at the Conference, especially Wilson. Keynes used three 
examples to illustrate what he meant. First, Wilson did not grasp European affairs and as 
an American was blinded by what Abraham Lincoln had called “the almost chosen 
people.” Second, Wilson’s dogmatic personality and lack of capacity to understand 
European affairs is likened to the hubris of Icarus and the unreality of conversing with the 
Lord on Mt. Sinai, while those he should be leading are worshipping the false gods of 
nationalism and self-interested revenge. 
In addition to religious imagery, Keynes refers to other literary sources in support 
of his arguments. He likens Wilson to a blind and deaf Don Quixote. This is more than a 
reference to Wilson’s incompetence; it also refers to deception and weak leadership, what 
Keynes labelled as the twin evils of the Conference. In developing the theme of deception, 
Keynes referred especially to Lloyd George, who had the better of Wilson in a game of 
blind man’s buff. In dealing with these twin themes, Keynes refers to the Anti-Christ, by 
Nietzsche. When Keynes speaks of the crucifixion of the Anti-Christ he means the 
crucifixion of the strength of will that knew the right thing to do was to not penalise 
Germany in ways that would penalise all of Europe. Keynes also draws on Quixote again to 
make his point that deception tainted the entire Conference. Wilson entered Paris 
thinking he was an honourable knight, when in reality he is caught in a farcical adventure. 
Similarly, Keynes draws on Hardy’s concept of Immanent Will to highlight the themes of 
deception, incompetence and farce. He uses Hardy’s poem “Convergence of the Twain – 
Lines on the Loss of the Titanic” to argue that in the same way the Immanent Will meant 
the sinking of the Titanic was inevitable, it was inevitable Europe was marching toward 
further upheaval, instability and revolution that would leave Europe economically 
destitute. This created in Keynes a feeling of despair, yet, despite the dark and ominous 
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tones he finished Economic Consequences on an optimistic note. He offered a set of 
economic solutions to replace the Treaty terms, which could head off the possibility of 
war and economic hardship. Finishing with Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound is a signal that 
in the same way as Shelley saw this as the answer to the mistakes of the French 
Revolution, Keynes believed a different approach and set of measures could restore 
economic prosperity and address the consequences of the Carthaginian Peace. 
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Chapter 7. Influences on Keynes’ Style 
There were two significant literary influences on Keynes’ writing style, his friendship with 
Lytton Strachey and his association with Virginia Woolf. Economic Consequences closely 
maps aspects of both Strachey’s and Woolf’s styles. A comparison of Strachey’s Eminent 
Victorians and Economic Consequences shows how both men often used triplets to 
construct words, sentences and phrases. There is a literary tradition of using triplets 
reaching back to ancient Greece and Rome. Two explanations can be given for its 
popularity with some writers. First, triplets can help clarify an author’s meaning. Second, 
they help elaborate. This enhancement to prose style was something Strachey particularly 
excelled at and Keynes sought to imitate. A primary influence on Strachey had been 
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and Gibbon was also prone to using 
triplets. Gibbon also provided another important influence, which has had a lasting effect 
on all historians and biographers since. He applied a disciplined approach to his research 
and a veracity to his naming of sources not previously undertaken by historians.  
Both Strachey and Keynes owed a great deal to these conventions of the past. 
Nevertheless they were not bound by the past and both pioneered innovative new ways 
of writing biography and economics respectively. Their use of elaboration and 
exaggeration in the hands of lesser talents could easily have become tedious but as skilled 
rhetoricians both men chartered new ways of writing. In looking for explanations, some 
critics argue their homosexuality partly accounts for their unique styles. This is a 
controversial argument and does not enjoy widespread support, but at a time when some 
aspects of sexual orientation were criminalised, a sense of rebellion and elaboration 
permeates literary styles often not found in writers whose sexuality is not suppressed or 
hidden in some way. However, both men enjoyed entertaining their readers and they both 
took pleasure from shocking their readers so it is not surprising they believed their point 
of difference was because they were “rebellious immoralists.” 
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A second important influence on Keynes’ style was Virginia Woolf and her interest 
in psychological realism. Woolf was also an innovator and she developed the inner 
psychology and complex personalities of her characters in ways previously not done. This 
also coincided with a period when there was great interest in the developing discipline of 
psychology by fellow Bloomsberries and a comparison of the three writers’ treatment of 
their characters shows a similarity of style when it came to dealing with the inner 
psychology of their subjects. Such a comparison lacks explicit verification but an 
examination of the archives reveals how important, and with regularity, each author took 
an interest in the other’s writing. For example Keynes and Strachey regularly swapped 
books and manuscripts, also corresponding and commenting on each other’s views. Woolf 
also wrote to Keynes on one occasion commenting on his reading out a portion of his 
unpublished manuscript of Economic Consequences to a group of Bloomsberries. Letters 
also reveal Keynes and Strachey discussed and compared their respective works in 
progress. By implicit methods we can see how important the influences on each other 
were. 
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7.1 Lytton Strachey’s Eminent Victorians 
Quoting David Garnett,1 Michael Holroyd claimed Strachey’s Eminent Victorians ‘was to 
influence the style of Economic Consequences of the Peace …. persuading Keynes to be 
more indiscreet than he was by nature and to have the courage to print what he would 
have said in conversation.’2 Given the close friendship of Strachey and Keynes up to the 
time of publication of both Eminent Victorians (1918) and Economic Consequences (1919) 
Holroyd’s claim would be difficult to refute.3 However, Holroyd provides little material to 
enable judgment on the degree to which Strachey’s style in Eminent Victorians influenced 
Keynes’ style in Economic Consequences. Rosenbaum has no doubt there is a strong 
correlation between both men’s styles, albeit poorly researched to date.4 Furthermore, 
Rosenbaum argues, those associated with the Bloomsbury set and literary works 
produced by Bloomsberries have a close reciprocal relationship.5 Rosenbaum also argues 
that ‘the basic premise of a literary history of the Bloomsbury Group is that their writings 
are historically interrelated in ways important if not essential to their interpretation.’6 In 
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 Garnett, (1979, p. 140) from Holroyd, (1995, p. 428). 
2
 Holroyd, (1995, p. 428). 
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 For a period of time Strachey and Keynes were the ‘effective’ leaders of the Cambridge Apostles and their 
correspondence during this time is voluminous, rich in detail, at times very personal and at other times, 
engaging in gossip that only close friends would exchange. Following graduation from Cambridge Strachey 
and Keynes remained close friends through their association with the Bloomsbury set that continued, albeit 
not as intensely during the Apostle days, up until the mid-1920s.  
4
 Some scholars have looked closely at the prose styles of individuals within Bloomsbury. For example Barry 
Spurr has written a book and journal articles dealing specifically with Strachey’s prose style. Refer: Spurr, 
(1995), and Spurr, (1990). However there is little in the way of comparative analysis between the 
Bloomsbury friends and the degree of influence each other’s writing styles had on the others. 
5
 Rosenbaum, (1981, p. 330). Rosenbaum uses Leonard Woolf as the ‘most detailed and reliable historian of 
the group’ to establish the original members of the Memoir Club (Bloomsbury core members) as Leonard 
and Virginia Woolf, Vanessa and Clive Bell, Lytton Strachey, Maynard Keynes, Duncan Grant, Roger Fry, Mary 
and Desmond MacCarthy, E. M. Forster, Saxon Sydney-Turner, and Adrian Stephen. 
6
 Rosenbaum, (1981, p. 331). 
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commenting specifically on Keynes’ Economic Consequences and Strachey’s Eminent 
Victorians, Rosenbaum claims the entire texts of both works are related to each other and 
adds that ’Bloomsbury’s writings display … similarity *in such a way that+ … literary history 
*calls for a description of+ … this resemblance.’ 7  
7.1.1. Triplets and Style 
Spurr notes that in Strachey’s book there is a persistent use of triplets in words, sentences 
and phrases, something that literary critics of Economic Consequences have also noticed in 
Keynes’ book. Furthermore, there is often a pattern of both writers using a triplet of 
words, followed by a set of phrases in triplet, and finally three sentences that taken 
together form a triplet. Spurr refers to this characteristic of Strachey’s style as his 
‘elaboration of phraseology’ and that his use of triplets of words, phrases, and sentences 
‘in an immense variety of guises is the most extraordinary manifestation of this 
preoccupation.’8 Strachey’s and Keynes’ use of triplets is unusual for writers of the 
‘modernist’ period although it does enjoy a rich history of usage, especially from the 
medieval English and Restoration periods, when writers looked back to a Latin tradition 
for rhetorical inspiration. 
This Latinate influence has not always enjoyed scholarly support. For example, 
Burnley points out it has only been since the late 1970s that literary critics have 
increasingly come to support the view that the use of triplets in prose writing owes more 
to Latin influences than French-Anglo writing.9 Furthermore, Burnley argues, the curial 
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 Rosenbaum, (1981, p. 338). 
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models. However, evidence of Chaucer’s use of the style supports the view that it has Latin roots and Latin 
…Footnote continued on next page… 
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style of prose used in England from the time of Chaucer ‘with its Latinate constructions, 
extensive clausal qualifiers, lexical doublets and triplets, and anaphoric cohesive 
devices,’10 supports the view that triplets were used as rhetorical devices as far back as 
ancient Roman times,11 with a renaissance in their use taking place during the medieval 
English period. Research by Politzer, whose work predates that of Bornstein by sixteen 
years12 supports the view that triplets can be traced to ‘learned Latin rhetoric’ and the use 
of the device ‘mushroomed’ in the early Middle Ages.13 Vos’ study of Ascham’s (c. 1515 – 
1568) prose style supports the view that the use of triplets became popular during the 
Middle Ages, and also notes the important influence of Cicero’s (Latin) style on Ascham.  
From around the time of the Restoration period to the late 1700s use of the triplet 
style was increasingly criticised. For example, Dryden (1631 – 1700) was vehement in his 
objections. Adler argues, ‘ about … triple rimes the critics were apparently unanimous. 
Nobody liked them for serious non-dramatic compositions.’ 14 Ironically this is the period 
that some argue was the time in which use of the triplet flourished in the writing of 
poetry.15 While there is a ‘scarcity of triplets’ in the works of Alexander Pope (1688 – 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
influence. Curial style in English at the time of Chaucer’s death, argues Burnley, was perceived essentially as 
a technical style. Texts which depended upon a fully developed curial style in English can be found in legal 
documents from the early 1380s; English letters modelled on the style of the French appear towards the end 
of the century; and Chaucer in 1391 exploited the style in a technical manual. In more discursive literary 
prose, curial features occur not as a structural foundation but as an occasional connective convenience or a 
stylistic colouring, supported by other rhetorical devices of ordering. (p. 610) 
10
 Burnley, (1986, p. 593). 
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 Although most interest in rhetoric focuses on Cicero, the most well-known triplet is credited to Julius 
Caesar who wrote back to the Senate on conquering the Gaul’s, ‘I came, I saw, I conquered.’ 
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 Bornstein’s research was published in 1977, Politzer’s in 1961. 
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 Politzer, (1961, p. 484). 
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 Adler, (1961, p. 225). 
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 Balliet, (1965, p. 528) argues that the use of triplets in poetry, like some other literary forms, had an 
origin, a period of growth, a maturity, (of around 100 years) and then an end. The triplet, he argues, was an 
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1744)16 Samuel Johnson (1709 – 1784) was still using triplets throughout his prose in the 
mid- to late-1700s, something a number of his critics complained about. Archibald 
Campbell (c. 1726 – 1780) in his booklet Lexiphanes (1774) attacked Johnson’s style (with 
some success it should be noted) as ‘consisting of a mass of polysyllables and triplets, 
mostly tautological.’ Campbell accused Johnson of ‘contaminating the English tongue; that 
his words were hard, his phraseology absurd, and his style affected.’17 Robert Walpole 
(1676 – 1745) described Johnson’s use of the triplet as ‘“ triple tautology, or the fault of 
repeating the same sense in three different phrases.”’18 
Nathan Drake (1766 – 1836, English essayist and physician) undertook an 
exhaustive analysis of Johnson’s style and published his views in a number of 
contemporary periodicals. His arguments are at strong variance with most of Johnson’s 
critics and he stated, ‘Johnson first presented to the public those peculiarities and 
prominent beauties of style which immediately distinguished him, in so striking a manner, 
from all preceding writers and which have made so durable an impression upon our 
language. … Johnson had no equal in harmony, propriety and energy.’19 What is striking 
about Drake’s analysis is that while he gives no opinion, as such, about the use of the 
triplet in Johnson’s prose, in the hands of a master stylist the triplet is as effective as any 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
offspring of the pentameter couplet, but developed in its own way at its own rate. When the couplet was 
loose, open, and unpolished, there was little need for further variety, and poets wrote few triplets. When 
the couplet became tight, closed, and highly polished, as it did with Pope, the triplet was considered a 
violation of the rules. Interestingly, Balliet also argues that while the couplet owes it origins to French and 
Latin poetry, there is nothing in Latin equivalent to the triplet. The triplet (as used in poetry) is an English 
phenomenon whose history has not been written yet (at least not in 1965). If this is correct then the use of 
the triplets by Cicero would have been restricted to prose writing only. 
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 Adler, (1961, p. 226). 
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 Reynolds, (1935, p. 146). 
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 Reynolds, (1935, p. 159). 
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other device used by Johnson. The reason, Drake argues, is Johnson’s attention to 
precision in his writing, with ‘his long words, “abstract, and of classic derivation,” formed 
on native analogies, and despite their heavy effect, they are so clear in their meaning, and 
so appropriate to their respective ideas that they express the author’s meaning with 
complete accuracy.’20 
7.1.2. Triplets – Clarity and Elaboration 
From this brief historical synopsis it is possible to better appreciate why rhetorical writers 
since ancient Greek and Roman times have chosen the triplet style. For some it is a way of 
being more precise. Politzer argues this is why the triplet style has its origins in legal 
documents that need to be as accurate as possible. He argues ‘there is little doubt that 
the legal nature of these documents is responsible for much  ... synonymic repetition. The 
desire to be exact leads to a style in which series of expressions … are used extensively.’ 
Furthermore, the increasing use of synonymic repetition (doublets and triplets) ‘laid the 
foundation’ as a stylistic device. The use of ‘Romance’ Latin words in conjunction with 
‘classical’ Latin words was not only a stylistic device, but has also [been] useful [in] making 
phrase more generally comprehensible.’21 Vos also argues, the desire for ‘neatness’ and 
accuracy explains why Roger Ascham favoured Cicero’s use of the triplet style.22 Burnley in 
his examination of the curial prose style agrees that clarity and precision were desired 
objectives in legal documents.23 
Burnley provides a further explanation for why triplets became popular. He 
examined the Rolls of Parliament from the fourteenth century and argues, ‘in this period 
the history of the curial style illustrates a general tendency towards elaboration at the 
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expense of clarity.’24 In making this argument it would be a mistake to think the one 
(elaboration) takes the place of the other (clarity). As studies of Cicero’s style have shown, 
there was a careful and balanced concern for both objectives in using triplets. For 
example, in Orator, (p. 140) Cicero states that the ornate (ornatus) use of words is the 
aspiration of the perfect orator and ‘springs from the writer’s aspiration to the praise 
which is the reward of all perfect oratical art.’ Furthermore, this ornate use of words can 
be created in one of two ways, ‘through using single words, and through using words as 
they are arranged or joined together (Orator, p. 80),’ … and that ‘units of threes are 
best.’25 In the development of his own style, Roger Ashcam adopted the view, ‘knowledge 
without eloquence is of no value.’26 Balliet, in his examination of the use of the triplet, 
also found the triplet developed from a rather simple device ‘to a complex poetic form 
within a form, that could add intensity, emphasis, and variety to the limited and 
sometimes monotonous pentameter couplet.’27 
A desire for clarity and elaboration are then important for a writer who uses 
triplets. It has already been argued Keynes used a variety of literary devices such as 
metaphors, analogies and allusion to clarify his economic arguments and it seems his 
frequent use of triplets was for the same reason. For example, when Keynes writes ‘the 
Supreme Economic Council received almost hourly the reports of the misery, disorder, and 
decaying organisation of all Central and Eastern Europe,’ he wants the reader to clearly 
grasp the magnitude of the problem, that is to say, while people are living in misery 
because of the destruction from the war, this misery is being added to because of the 
disorder among the countries of Europe and, furthermore the corruption at the heart of 
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the governing and capitalist institutions not only has a decaying effect but piles more 
misery onto the peoples of Europe.28  
In another example Keynes paints a picture of how the average Englishman, at 
least of his own class, ‘regarded his state of affairs’ before the war. The average 
Englishman in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century took for granted he lived in 
an era where goods of all variety could be easily sourced from any part of the globe and 
should he want to, ‘could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means 
of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality.’ But most 
importantly, ‘he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, except in 
the direction of further improvement, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, 
and avoidable.’29  
In addition to using triplets for purposes of clarity Keynes also used triplets to 
elaborate on his arguments. Strachey was also fond of using triplets for clarity and 
elaboration. For example he uses three words to describe Cardinal Manning’s demeanour 
on his appointment to Westminster: “kindness, gentleness, and conciliation.” Strachey 
follows this up with a triplet of phrases: ‘The new archbishop poured forth upon every 
side, all the tact, all the courtesy, all the dignified graces of a Christian magnanimity’ and 
we have an example of how Strachey sought to elaborate on the description already given 
of Manning as kind, gentle, and conciliatory. 30  There are numerous examples in Eminent 
Victorians of such uses of triplets and phrases linking triplets together, just as there is in 
Economic Consequences. For example, when Keynes describes Clemenceau at the 
Conference he uses a triplet of phrases: ‘he closed his eyes often’ and ‘sat back in his chair 
with an impassive face of parchment,’ with ‘his grey gloved hands clasped in front of him.’ 
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This phrased elaboration follows a triplet of words to describe that Clemenceau’s ‘walk, 
his hand, and his voice’ were vigorous.31 In describing Wilson’s performance, Keynes again 
uses a triplet of phrases to elaborate his point that ‘the President would be maneuvered 
off his ground,’ and ‘would miss the moment for digging his toes in,’ then ‘before he knew 
where he had been got to, it was too late.’32  
7.1.3. Other Influences on Keynes’ Prose Style 
In addition to this use of triplets for purposes of clarification and elaboration, Spurr’s 
analysis of Strachey’s style reveals a number of other ways in which he enhanced his prose 
style and we can assume that Strachey’s influence on Keynes was such Spurr’s findings 
have a strong correlation to Keynes. First, Strachey had a conscious desire to entertain, 
‘whether in biography or literary criticism, in the historical essay or private 
correspondence’ and the idiosyncrasies’ evident in Strachey’s works *that+ are a direct 
reflection of the man himself.33 Second, ‘*there was+ the artistic resolution of the sexual 
contradiction that bedevilled Strachey.’34 Spurr argues that Strachey’s homosexuality did 
shape his literary style and in this he believes that Cyril Connolly’s reflection, 
‘homosexuality is not a factor of importance in the assessment of a writer’s style’ is 
completely erroneous. However, Spurr argues, while Strachey’s sexuality did make a 
difference to his literary style it did not do so in any “bold,” “new,” or “fresh” way we 
might expect from someone who had made claims to be a “rebellious immoralist.” Rather, 
and this is Spurr’s third fundamental argument, the individuality of Strachey’s technique 
owes more to the adaption of ‘Augustan and Victorian styles albeit for unconventional 
purposes, than to any stylistic innovation.’ Others have also argued that what is striking 
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about Strachey’s and Keynes’ stated rebelliousness and ideological opposition to 
Victorianism is, while they claimed to be “immoralists” they ‘advocated a version of male 
love that further emphasised class privilege, gender difference, and male superiority.’35 
While Strachey and Keynes thought of themselves as liberals and rebels, in practice they 
struggled to break free from the mores and conventions of their Victorian forebears and 
their own upbringing. While they repudiated entirely customary ‘morals, conventions and 
traditional wisdom,’ they were concerned about being found out by a society whose 
values reached back to the early 1800’s and the ascension of “Victorianism.” 
One of the best indicators for claiming Strachey’s style owed more to his Victorian 
past than his modernist present was the special ‘aesthetic affinity *Strachey had+ with the 
writings of Edward Gibbon (1737 – 1794).’36 Strachey continually placed primacy on the 
importance of historical and biographical prose writers of the past in the development of 
his own literary skills. Foremost amongst these are the combination of Strachey’s control 
over his material and the influence of his personality since ‘one seeks the discipline of art, 
the other enlivens communication of information and deference to the conventions of 
prose composition with the intimacy of individuality.’37 As Strachey grew older and 
matured he strove to develop his own unique style, even attempting to break free of 
these historical influences, with an idiosyncratic prose, which would win the attention he 
always craved and elicit support for the principles he espoused. Spurr argues:  
Yet the individuality of Strachey’s technique owes as much to the 
adaption of conventional styles, Augustan and Victorian, to his 
unconventional purposes as to innovation. Favouring a Latinate 
vocabulary and an elegant cadence, exploiting the intricacies of 
etymology and observing the disciplines of order and balance, 
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Strachey expresses an aesthetic affinity with Augustan procedures 
and especially the writings of Edward Gibbon.38  
Strachey had begun reading Gibbon at school and for literary inspiration was to 
return to The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire many more times in the years ahead. 
So taken was Strachey on the first reading of Gibbon that he composed a parody of 
Gibbonian rhetoric called “The Decline and Fall of Little Red Riding Hood,” written in 1896. 
Strachey’s desire to entertain had begun early, something that studying Gibbon allowed 
him greater ability to do by imitating a style he found amusing. In preparing himself for 
the Christ Church scholarship to enable the furthering of his studies at University he chose 
as his special subject the Early Roman Empire. He wrote to his mother at this time, ‘I have 
been reading the Great Gibbon lately and have just finished the two chapters on 
Christianity. They are the height of amusement – his attitude throughout so 
unimpeachably decorous.’ When writing Eminent Victorians Strachey would read aloud 
sections from Gibbon to Carrington.39 In 1929 he wrote to Roger Stenhouse (his lover at 
the time), ‘I’ve now relapsed into my beautiful new Gibbon’ (September 9 1929) and four 
days later, ‘My laziness is becoming more scandalous than ever. I do nothing but read 
Gibbon – first in the quarto – then in Bury’s edition,’ (13 September 1929).  
As with Eminent Victorians and Economic Consequences Gibbon’s magnum opus 
was a publishing success and remains in print some two hundred years after its initial 
publication. Craddock argues, while this continuing interest is due to the work’s narrative 
style, its world-view and implicit commentary on its own age, the success of The Decline 
and Fall is due to the demands Gibbon placed on treating history in a fresh way, a direct 
result of the influence of the fifteenth century Renaissance.40 When applying research 
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techniques, using general rules for testing evidence, and taking care with annotations, 
Gibbon followed the Renaissance authors in treating history as a craft rather than an art. 
On the care Gibbon exercised Craddock comments:  
Unlike some of his contemporaries Gibbon identified the source(s) of 
every statement he presented as a datum rather than a conclusion or 
interpretation, and he qualified, developed, or provided complex 
contexts for many of his textual statements in his notes. Even when 
the notes were banished to the end of the volume, literally hundreds 
of note numbers warned the reader that the apparent self-sufficiency 
of the text was only temporary.41  
For Keynes as with all historians since Gibbon, attention to craft is clear. For example, 
Keynes carefully keeps a record of the many sources and supporting information by way 
of notes in Economic Consequences.  
Of just as much interest to Strachey and Keynes as Gibbon’s craft, was the 
‘Gibbonian method,’ which means narrative is not merely data and abstractions, but 
people and events. These events, however, are not ‘isolated, inexplicable, random, 
hypothetical, or invented; they are mutually determined, related to psychological and 
political patterns, and subject to our moral and intellectual evaluation.’42 Furthermore, 
Gibbon acted on his own belief the historian must be detailed, accurate, balanced, 
conscious of psychological probability, and desirous of discovering reliable and 
widespread patterns among historical occurrences, ‘for the benefit of his own and future 
ages.’43 Finally, we can see the lasting influence of Gibbon on Strachey and Keynes from 
Gibbon’s contribution to the writing of history in a ‘modern’ way. Gibbon was among the 
first ‘historical’ writers to realise it is impossible to write objective history. When Walter 
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Bagehot quipped that Gibbon ‘did not know the difference between himself and the 
Roman Empire,’ it was the recognition that Gibbon knew all too well that honest 
historians cannot write themselves out of their histories. 44  For Gibbon ‘it was the very 
intervention in the selection and ordering of their material, their subtle splitting of the 
‘splendid and brittle mass’45 of their sources, and, above all, their very participation in the 
construction of a ‘candid and rational inquiry,’46 which makes the past alive and – most 
importantly for their readers – inescapably part of the present.’47 Similarly both Strachey 
and Keynes brought alive the characters they wrote about because they wrote as if they 
were often participants in the scenes they described. 
There were of course influences other than Gibbon that affected Strachey’s and 
Keynes’ styles. These included such nineteenth-century sages as Carlyle and Arnold who 
were more important than the artistic literary experimentations practiced by others of the 
Bloomsbury Group and the Modernists. So, while Strachey and Keynes believed they 
belonged to a generation that renounced ‘religion and politics, proclaimed the death of 
God, and declared that “love is the only reality,” in practice they struggled to break free 
from the mores and conventions of their upbringing.48 For example, when Strachey wrote 
of Cardinal Manning’s doubts: Where was he? Manning asked himself. What had he 
accomplished? Had any of it been worthwhile? Strachey imposed his own rebellion 
against religion and God into the mouth of Manning. In similar vein Keynes sought to 
impose his own dislike of politics onto the minds of his readers by demeaning the 
politicians themselves. For example, when he describes Clemenceau as only having 
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France’s interests in mind, he describes Clemenceau, as already discussed, as feeling 
about France as Pericles felt of Athens – ‘unique value in her, nothing else mattered; but 
his theory of politics was Bismarck’s. He had one illusion – France; and one disillusion – 
mankind.’49 Statements such as this shocked many of Keynes’ readers. Where was the 
verifiable evidence that Clemenceau disliked mankind more than he liked France, and 
France more than the French themselves? This style of prose provided Keynes’ critics with 
the ammunition they wanted. Did this not prove what they were saying of Keynes, that he 
was pro-German and vindictive as well?  
It has been argued Keynes’ reaction to critics of Economic Consequences was to 
accuse them of misrepresenting his intentions. But, what really annoyed his critics was the 
prose style he chose to use, as Strachey had done before him, albeit it is a conservative 
prose style but one that both sought to be ironical and ‘delectably humorous’ at the same 
time50 For example, when Strachey wrote of Florence Nightingale that ‘her conception of 
God was certainly not orthodox. She felt towards Him as she might have felt towards a 
glorified sanitary engineer; and in some of her speculations she seems hardly to 
distinguish between the Deity and the Drains,’ Strachey provided his friends and admirers 
with something to laugh about. 51  After all, in an age where “cleanliness was close to 
godliness” such a witty turn of phrase no doubt was one of those ‘delectably humorous’ 
lines that caused Bertrand Russell to laugh out loud when he first read Eminent Victorians 
in Brixton Goal.52 But, it equally played into the hands of Strachey’s critics, such as the 
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Master of Balliol who has pilloried Strachey as ‘that contemptible sniggerer’53 and the 
reviewer of The Daily Telegraph who says of Strachey’s most famous work, it consists of 
nothing more than ‘sniggering little hatchet jobs.’54 
While Keynes did not fully replicate the deliberately humorous manner of writing 
Strachey so enjoyed, he nonetheless used language in ways that mirrored Strachey’s 
irreverence and often met with similar hostility to that received by Strachey. For example, 
when Keynes used references to Wilson as, ‘his temperament was not primarily that of 
the student or the scholar,’55 ‘the poor President would be playing blind man’s buff in that 
party,’56 ‘this blind and deaf Don Quixote,’57 ‘he was by no means a businessman,’58 ‘the 
President was like a Nonconformist minister, perhaps a Presbyterian,’59 ‘his temperament 
was essentially theological and not intellectual,’60 and ‘the President’s dullness,’61 Keynes 
was surprised at the reaction he received and remained insensitive to the deep offence he 
caused by using graphic descriptions of the then serving US head of state. Moggridge in 
Collected Works summarises: 
Keynes marvelled at the bitterness of the American press. … he had 
handed the opponents of the President Wilson some red-hot political 
ammunition. Although he had written a longer version of the preface 
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for Economic Consequences in November 1919, which contained a 
second paragraph acknowledging the mitigating circumstances of the 
President’s illness and emphasizing his basic sincerity he had not 
made use of it.62 
The French never forgave Keynes his portrayal of Clemenceau nor what they perceived as 
his pro-German and anti-French sentiments.63 
Keynes’ astonishment at some of the reactions to his book may have, to a degree, 
been justified as others clearly felt similarly as he did about the leaders at Versailles. For 
example, Nicolson, who attended Versailles wrote: 
That spiritual arrogance which seems inseparable from the harder 
forms of religion had eaten deep into his *Wilson’s+ soul. It had been 
confirmed in the course of many battles with the Faculty of Princeton. 
His vision had been narrowed by the intensive ethical nurture which 
he had received: he possessed, as he himself admitted, ‘a one-track 
mind.’ This intellectual disability rendered him blindly impervious, not 
merely to human character, but also shades of difference. He 
possessed no gift for differentiation, no capacity for adjustment to 
circumstances. It was his spiritual and mental rigidity which proved 
his undoing. It rendered him as incapable of withstanding criticism as 
of absorbing advice. It rendered him blind to all realities which did not 
accord with his pre-conceived theory, even to the realities of his own 
decisions.64 
Hansen, who attended the Conference as a journalist wrote of Wilson: 
President Wilson is the great tragic figure of the Peace Conference. … 
he demonstrated anew that the fortunes of people in the mass are 
affected by the limitations of the individuals who lead them. … 
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Woodrow Wilson had tenacity, but also stubbornness; vision, but also 
myopia; a sense of personal responsibility for the general welfare and 
a deviant conviction that his judgment was accurate. This made him 
the architect of the League of Nations; this in turn lost him his 
American support, and the peace.65  
7.1.4. Innovation and Style in Keynes’ and Strachey’s Prose 
It has been argued both Strachey and Keynes’ literary style owed a great deal to their 
conventional pasts. However, it would be a mistake to see either man’s style as somehow 
“outdated” or divorced from more popular modernist styles. After all, both Eminent 
Victorians and Economic Consequences were significant publishing successes in the 
modernist era and both attracted a diversity of critical comment, much of which continues 
to the present day. Spurr argues, the answers to this literary success can be found in 
individual and ‘subtle transformation of conventional procedures.’ In other words, while 
both Strachey and Keynes drew inspiration from their literary forebears they nonetheless 
provided an entirely individual and new “pitch.” Commenting on Strachey Spurr argues 
that in his writing he seemed to 
vocalise the many contradictions of his mind and sensibility; its 
passion and detachment, humour and sadness, cynicism and hope, 
solitariness and desire for love. Introducing the vocabulary and 
cadence of Mandarin66, Strachey proceeds subtly and wittily to 
pervert and violate its conventions, manipulating the solemnity of the 
Ciceronian, Gibbonian dialect … it is as much in the manner of 
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Strachey’s prose as in its matter that we discern the fascinating and 
complex personality behind it.67 
A good example of this “new” and individual twist on conventional literary style is 
Strachey’s elaboration and exaggeration. Spurr argues, Strachey’s persistent use of the 
style would render his work predictable and tedious but in the hands of someone as 
accomplished as Strachey the style is successfully subjected to a series of variations.68 
Similarly, as has been highlighted, when critics of Samuel Johnson condemned his 
persistent use of triplets others were quick to jump to Johnson’s defence. What might 
have seemed tedious in other writers was transformed in the hands of a craftsman. In one 
example Strachey vents his anger at the political injustice of the abuses of the French 
judicial system in the eighteenth century – ‘the scandal of arbitrary imprisonment, the 
futile barbarism of torture, the medieval abominations of the penal code.’69 Or in his 
treatment of Creighton, Strachey says, ‘he believed in the Real Presence. He was opposed 
to Home Rule. He read with grave attention the novels of Mrs. Humphrey Ward.’70 By 
descending from humour into pathos Strachey summarises Creighton’s denominational 
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allegiance: the nonsense of its theology, the scourge of its erastianism and the 
Victorianism of its morality ‘to subordinate demerits in the course of celebration.’71 
This “flourish” Strachey used to describe his subjects can be mapped closely to 
Keynes’ own “elaboration of phraseology” as he expressed his frustration with the 
politicians whom he blamed for the Carthaginian Peace. In comparing Wilson’s 
performance to Lloyd George he asks the reader, ‘What chance could such a man have 
against Mr. Lloyd George’s unerring, almost medium-like, sensibility to every one 
immediately around him?’ Having asked the question Keynes uses triplets to answer his 
own question. The British Prime Minister, states Keynes, possesses ‘six or seven senses 
not available to ordinary men … judging character, motive, and subconscious impulse.’ On 
the one hand Keynes exaggerates Lloyd George’s senses beyond the normal to six or 
seven, making them unique to Lloyd George, which allowed him to anticipate what Wilson 
was going to say next and in turn allowed Lloyd George to frame his appeal or argument 
‘best suited to the vanity, weakness, or self-interest of his immediate auditor.’ This meant 
the “poor” President would be playing ‘blind man’s buff in that party.’ Just as Strachey 
moved from words, to phrases, and on to sentences in triplets, so did Keynes. From the 
sentences and phrases used above Keynes rounds out his discussion with a triplet of 
sentences: 
Never could a man have stepped into the parlour a more perfect and 
predestined victim to the finished accomplishment of the Prime 
Minister. The Old World was tough in wickedness anyhow; the Old 
World’s heart of stone might blunt the sharpest blade of the bravest 
knight-errant. But this blind and deaf Don Quixote was entering a 
cavern where the swift and glittering blade was in the hands of the 
adversary.72 
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Spurr argues, for both Strachey and Keynes, the use of triplets to highlight political 
and “polemical” injustices is just as effectively used ‘in the bathos of deflation.’ An 
example of using triplets anti-climatically can be found in Strachey’s summary and 
dismissal of Addison – ‘that charming, polished, empty personality.’73 The third epithet 
laughs at the reader who might have supposed that charm and polish were tending to 
praise. Another example is Strachey’s view of the ‘holiness of the Middle Ages … which 
embodied itself in prayer, asceticism, and dirt.’74 Keynes also drew on bathos, when, for 
example he says of Wilson ‘his head and features were finely cut and exactly like his 
photographs, and the muscles of his neck and the carriage of his head were distinguished. 
But, like Odysseus, the President looked wiser when he was seated.’75 
The use of such words and phrases were intended by Strachey and Keynes to 
harness the humour from a situation, although Keynes never took it to the extremes 
Strachey so enjoyed doing. Commenting on Strachey’s use of humour Spurr argues, 
‘ranging from sarcasm and facetiousness, where laughter is cheaply bought, to the 
elegance of the epigram, Strachey’s manner is a compact comic medium.’76 Epigrammatic 
succinctness and resonance satisfied Strachey intellectually, aesthetically and emotionally. 
This was the perfect verbal medium for Strachey’s desire to justify his separation from a 
hostile world that had decreed that he was immoral, illegal and dangerous to know, views 
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that both Strachey and Keynes shared in their most intimate of documented exchanges.77 
Their own personal sufferings, both considered themselves unattractive, and, at times, 
bitterness, find expression in their epigrammatic humour, a tradition that, some scholars 
argue, belongs to ‘high camp.’ 78  Examples of exaggerated ‘camp’ language are not 
difficult to find in Strachey’s works although less so in Keynes’ writings. Strachey in “Two 
Frenchmen” quips; ‘the greatest misfortune that can happen to a witty man is to be born 
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out of France.’79 In his opening to Eminent Victorians he also quips, ‘the history of the 
Victorian Age will never be written; we know too much about it. For ignorance is the first 
requisite of the historian,’80 Spurr argues, in these two examples we are bowled over by 
the audacity of the statements and we must continue reading in order to discover 
whether the observations are true because ‘the method is as captivating as the 
message.’81 When we examine Keynes’ writing we find the same epigrammatic humour 
that wills the reader to determine if the statement is as preposterous as it seems. For 
example, when comparing Lloyd George’s and Wilson’s intellects, Keynes states: ‘Never 
could a man have stepped into the parlour a more perfect and predestined victim to the 
finished accomplishments of the Prime Minister;’82 On the Fourteen Points that had been 
blatantly manipulated in the framing of the final Treaty; ‘he *Wilson+ could have preached 
a sermon on any one of them or have addressed a stately prayer to the Almighty for their 
fulfilment; but he could not frame their concrete application to the actual state of 
Europe.’83  
In contrast to the originality of the epigrams Strachey and Keynes used, there is, in 
places, the recourse to deliberate cliché and colloquialism. Clichés such as ‘Albert was in 
the habit of playing second fiddle,’84 (to his wife Queen Victoria) and ‘Voltaire kept the ball 
rolling,’ (in his correspondence with Frederick the Great)85 are used by Strachey for 
amusement. In Eminent Victorians he describes the Church of England, prior to the Oxford 
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Movement, as having slept ‘the sleep of the … comfortable,’ the inference being that to all 
intents and purposes, the church was dead. 86 Similarly we find Keynes used deliberate 
clichés such as, ‘on this sandy and false foundation,’ to describe the economic state of 
Europe prior to and immediately following World War One.87 He described the “Devil” of 
Malthusian population growth outstripping the world’s ability to feed it as ‘for the next 
half century he was chained up and out of sight,’ but as a result of the conflict that had 
engulfed Europe ‘now perhaps we have loosed him again.’88 And in describing the 
tensions that had come upon Europe prior to the war, the rivalries, militarism and 
imperialism ‘were to play the serpent to this paradise.’89  
7.1.5. The Influence of Keynes’ and Strachey’s Sexuality 
What is striking about the elaborative styles of both men’s writing are the explicit ways in 
which they described their subjects. Yet this is in contrast to the indirect way both men 
promoted some of their radical views on religion and sexuality. Some commentators 
attribute this contradiction to both men’s homosexuality. Strachey and Keynes lived under 
the shadow of the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act that criminalised homosexuality. 
The “depressing” memory of Oscar Wilde’s trial and rumours of ruined reputations of 
public school masters haunted their daily lives. Yet both men avoided the company of 
those whose reputations were dubious. In a letter to Keynes, Strachey described one such 
incident involving a homosexual: ‘I was dreadfully afraid of his clinging to us (after your 
accounts) and I fear I may have been rude.’90 Keynes reminded Strachey ‘how damned 
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careful one has to be … in this respect one is so hopelessly in the hands of others.’91 Spurr 
argues there is a direct link between Strachey’s repressed sexuality and his literary style. It 
is, he argues, ‘distinctive, an indirect technique that is polished and authoritative, in the 
style of the confident avatars of orthodoxy, but it is animated by a world view and 
directed to conclusions that are markedly heterodox.’92 It humorously exaggerates the 
orthodox while pursuing the artificial and the theatricalisation of experience. Sontag 
identifies these as essential components of the homosexual sensibility and argues, ‘in his 
prose style, Strachey reveals his convoluted sexuality, though cautiously and covertly – 
achieving a consummation in art which life so frustratingly denied him.’93 
Those who have examined the links between sexuality and literary style sometimes 
argue the writings of Strachey belong to a literary history of homosexuality, ‘a story of 
indirection, subterfuge, disguise or outright suppression.’94 Jeffry Meyers identifies 
‘cautious and covert qualities’ in the prose of several authors of Strachey’s generation.95 
Context is important because, as Meyers also argues, the emancipation of the homosexual 
has led paradoxically to the decline of his art.96 Spurr argues this is an indisputable reality 
and homosexual oppression, whatever its other effects, has been productive of literary 
artistry of a high order in the works of Proust, Forster and others. Today, following the 
post-war, post-Kinsey sexual revolution, the “Stracheyian procedure” is deemed 
unnecessary, even reprehensible. The contemporary homosexual author is expected to be 
direct and “unblushingly pornographic.” Spurr believes ‘this gain in frankness … is at the 
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expense of art.’97 When comparing Economic Consequences to Eminent Victorians there is 
not the same intentional camp humour in Economic Consequences but the similarities are 
not difficult to find.  
7.1.6. Summary – Lytton Strachey’s Eminent Victorians 
A comparison of Eminent Victorians and Economic Consequences suggests Strachey’s style 
had a significant influence on Keynes’ writing style. The first important clue to this 
influence is the way in which both men used triplets. Despite triplets falling in and out of 
favour with writers, both men liked the ways in which they could describe their characters 
with greater clarity in addition to being more elaborative with language. They found it 
even better when beginning with word triplets and could move onto phrases of triplets 
and finally conclude with a triplet of sentences.  
Another way in which we see influence at work is the way both men enjoyed 
shocking their readers, Strachey more overtly but both took pleasure in the effect it had. 
After all both men considered themselves “rebellious immoralists,” although as 
highlighted this view of themselves was, in practice somewhat restrained. Some believe 
this is best explained by their suppressed homosexuality at a time when it was a crime to 
be homosexual. But, taken together both men ultimately gave the world new and unique 
forms of literary expression that differed from their parent’s generation. 
However, it is not surprising more conventional influences were also at work. In 
one endearing example from Keynes’ personal papers he had sent his mother a draft of 
one of the early manuscript copies of Economic Consequences to which his mother wrote 
back:  
My Darling Son, I have made many marks on these first 50 pages – 
many of them small points, but some in the interest of cleanliness of 
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expression, and some as matters of discretion. It would be 
unfortunate to subject yourself to criticism for expressions which do 
not affect the argument, and that might put you out of court with 
some people. The points to which I want specially to call your 
attention are the following – probably you have already modified the 
most important. 
p. 4. – omit the “showman” section 
p. 38 – top paragraph as at present, it seems to me to give 
unnecessary offence to both Wilson and Lloyd George – and mixes up 
blind man’s buff, the spider, the fly, and Don Quixote 
p. 41 – I don’t like calling the President ignorant even if he is! 
p. 46 – The Artful Dodger has doubtless disappeared. We couldn’t 
keep him in. 
p. 47 – I don’t like orgy – it is not a nice word and anyhow you can’t 
clothe yourself in it. 
p. 50 – last sentence but one. It isn’t needed and spoils the effect – do 
make away with it.” 
In the next manuscript draft Keynes had made every change suggested by his Mother!98 
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7.2. Virginia Woolf and Psychological Realism 
Keynes’ and Strachey’s friendship was forged at Cambridge when both were 
undergraduates and de facto leaders of the Apostles. Both followed the other’s writing 
careers with interest, regularly asking the other to review drafts of texts they were 
working on. Their subsequent involvement with Bloomsbury meant further and different 
influences on their writing styles, especially from their association with Virginia Woolf. 
Apart from the acknowledged influence Bloomsbury had on early twentieth-century 
intellectual life in Britain, Strachey, Keynes, and Woolf were responsible for fundamentally 
changing the way their own genres of literature are viewed. Strachey pioneered a new 
way of writing biography, Keynes set in train a new way of dealing with economics, and 
Woolf changed the way in which novels were written. Apart from the publishing success 
they each enjoyed they all introduced into their characters a new sense of psychological 
realism. 
Before publication of Eminent Victorians Virginia Woolf had published her first 
novel, The Voyage Out (1915) and by the time Economic Consequences had appeared she 
had also written and published Night and Day (1919). In The Voyage Out the main 
character Rachel Vinrace embarks for South America on her father’s ship and is launched 
on a voyage of self-discovery. The mismatched group of passengers provided Woolf with 
an opportunity to satirise Edwardian life. She also introduced Clarissa Dalloway who 
became the central character in her later, and best-selling novel, Mrs. Dalloway (1925). In 
Night and Day Woolf contrasts the daily lives of Katherine Hilbery and Mary Datchet and 
examines the relationship between love, marriage, happiness and success.  
Researchers often comment on how Woolf develops the inner psychology and 
complex personalities of her characters in ways not previously attempted by novelists. 
Most see this treatment as a reflection of the time period when psychology was an 
emerging discipline. Johnson argues that Woolf in her works reflected this modernist 
trend: 
 Page 316 
8-Jun-11 
Virginia Woolf was the most adamant of the modernists in her claim 
that “we are sharply cut off from our predecessors.” (Essays III, 357) 
However, she also believed in the continuity of culture, and in the 
writers’ role as “receptacle” of cultural currents.99 
Rosenbaum claims Woolf’s ‘writing was shaped by a series of intellectual assumptions 
about reality, perception, morality, government, and art.’100 However, he says little about 
human psychology, which Johnson argues needs to be included because it was an 
important intellectual element in her writing.101 He argues Woolf was influenced by the 
psychologists’ working hypotheses about personality, ‘and her extraordinary sensitive 
antennae picked up psychological ideas in the air.’102 In a draft paper of “Character in 
Fiction” (1924) given before the Cambridge Heretics Society she wrote: 
No generation since the world began has known quite so much about 
character as our generation … the average man or woman today 
thinks more about character than his or her grandparents; character 
interests them more; they get closer, they dive deeper in to the real 
emotions and motives of their fellow creatures. There are scientific 
reasons why this should be so. If you read Freud you know in ten 
minutes some facts – or at least some possibilities – which our 
parents could not have guessed for themselves … There is a … vaguer 
force at work – a force which is sometimes called the Spirit of the Age 
or the Tendency of the Age. This mysterious power is taking us by the 
hand, I think, and making us look much more closely into the reasons 
why people do and say and think things. (Essays III, 504).103 
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It has been noted that Woolf had a problematic attitude with Freud and she only 
read anything of substance from Freud after the outbreak of World War Two.104 However, 
despite her own claim that she knew psychoanalysis ‘only in the way of ordinary 
conversation’ (December 7, 1931) this, argues Johnson, represents a severe 
understatement on Woolf’s part. The conversations she had about psychoanalysis were 
‘far from ordinary’ since they took place with those who were at the forefront of the 
psychoanalytic movement in Britain.105 Furthermore, she was raised in an environment in 
which current psychological, as well as philosophical ideas were regularly discussed. The 
earliest influence was Cambridge thought and according to Johnson: 
*Moore’s presence at Cambridge+ has obscured other Cambridge 
influences on Bloomsbury. When it was realised that Moore’s 
teachers included the most distinguished psychical researcher of the 
day, Henry Sidgwick; an idealist, John McTaggart; and two of the most 
eminent English psychologists of the day, G. F. Stout and James Ward, 
one cannot help wondering to what degree the currents of thought 
expounded by them permeated the Cambridge atmosphere. 
Woolf certainly felt the impact to varying degrees of all these 
thinkers, mainly second-hand, through the friends and relations who 
attended Cambridge and with whom she held numerous discussions 
as a member of the Bloomsbury group.106  
Her own husband Leonard also took a strong interest in Freud from an early stage and 
James Strachey, brother of Lytton, both of who were in turn influenced by Henry Sidgwick, 
Past President of the Society of Psychical Research, had read works by Freud as early as 
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1904.107 By 1924 Freud had a high profile as a psychoanalyst, and his ideas were discussed 
regularly by the Bloomsbury group.108 
An examination of a selected group of character sketches from Keynes, Strachey 
and Woolf show how these influences in the form of psychological realism influenced how 
they developed their characters. While these are small examples, they are not isolated as 
all three writers demonstrate an interest in the psychological motives of their characters 
rather than providing mere descriptions of them and their actions. 
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Table 23: Extracts from the writing of Virginia Woolf, Lytton Strachey, and 
Maynard Keynes from a Psychological Realism perspective. 
 
Virginia Woolf 
The Voyage Out109 
Chapter One 
“It was only by scorning all she met that she kept herself from tears, 
and the friction of people brushing past her was evidently painful.” 
“Mr. Ambrose attempted consolation; he patted her shoulder; but she 
showed no signs of admitting him, and feeling it awkward to stand 
beside a grief that was greater than his, he crossed his arms behind 
him, and took a turn along the pavement.” 
“Yes, how clear it was that she would be vacillating, emotional, and 
when you said something to her it would make no more lasting 
impression than the stroke of a stick upon water.” 
Chapter Two 
“Mrs. Chailey folded her sheets, but her expression testified to flatness 
within. The world no longer cared about her, and the ship was not a 
home.” 
“Lying in the hot sun her mind was fixed up on the characters of her 
aunts, their views, and the way they lived. Why did they do the things 
they did, and what did they feel, and what was it all about?” 
Night and Day110 
Chapter One 
“It suddenly came into Katherine’s mind that if someone opened the 
door at this moment he would think that they were enjoying 
themselves.” 
Chapter Two 
“His thought was so absorbing that when it became necessary to verify 
the name of a street, he looked at it for a time before he read it; when 
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he came to a crossing, he seemed to have to reassure himself by two or 
three taps, such as a blind man gives, upon the curb.” 
Chapter Three 
“The quality of her birth oozed into Katherine’s consciousness from a 
dozen different sources as soon as she was able to perceive anything.” 
Lytton Strachey 
Eminent Victorians 
Cardinal Manning 
“All that was weakest in him hurried him onward, and all that was 
strongest in him too. His curious and vaulting imagination began to 
construct vast philosophical fabrics out of the writings of ancient 
monks, and to dally with visions of angelic visitations and the efficacy of 
the oil of St Walburga; his emotional nature became absorbed in the 
partisan passions of a University clique; and his subtle intellect 
concerned itself more and more exclusively with the dialectical splitting 
of dogmatical hairs.”111 
Florence Nightingale 
“Yet the want, absurd, impracticable as it was, not only remained fixed 
immovably in her heart, but grew in intensity day by day. Her 
wretchedness deepened into a morbid melancholy. Everything about 
her was vile, and she herself, it was clear, to have deserved such 
misery, was even viler than her surroundings.”112 
Dr. Arnold 
“His prayer was answered: Dr. Arnold was never in any danger of losing 
his sense of moral evil. If the landscapes of Italy only served to remind 
him of it, how could he forget it among the boys at Rugby School? The 
daily sight of so many young creatures in the hands of the Evil One 
filled him with agitated grief. ‘When the spring and activity of youth,’ 
he wrote, ‘is altogether unsanctified by anything pure and elevated in 
its desires, it becomes a spectacle that is as dizzying and almost more 
morally distressing than the shouts and gambols of a set of lunatics.’ 
One thing struck him as particularly strange: ’it is very startling,’ he 
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said, ‘to see so much sin combined with so little sorrow.’ The 
naughtiest boys positively seemed to enjoy themselves most.”113 
The End of General Gordon 
“In his solitude, he ruminated upon the mysterious of the universe; 
and those religious tendencies, which had already shown themselves, 
now became a fixed and dominating factor in his life. His reading was 
confined almost entirely to the Bible; but the Bible he read and reread 
with an untiring, an unending, assiduity.”114 
 
Maynard Keynes 
The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
Chapter Three - Clemenceau 
“… and Clemenceau, silent and aloof on the outskirts – for nothing 
which touched the security of France was forward – throned, in his grey 
gloves, on the brocade chair, dry in soul and empty of hope, very old 
and tired, but surveying the scene with a cynical and almost impish 
air; and when at last silence was restored and the company had 
returned to their places, it was to discover that he had disappeared. 
 He felt about France what Pericles felt of Athens – unique 
value in her, nothing else mattered; but his theory of politics was 
Bismarck’s. He had one illusion – France; and one disillusion – mankind, 
including Frenchmen, and his colleagues not least.”115 
Chapter Three – Wilson 
“Yet the causes were very ordinary and human. The President was not 
a hero or prophet; he was not even a philosopher; but a generously 
intentioned man, with many of the weaknesses of other human beings, 
and lacking that dominant intellectual equipment which would have 
been necessary to cope with the subtle and dangerous spellbinders 
whom a tremendous clash of personalities had brought to the top as 
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triumphant master in the swift game of give and take. …. His 
temperament was not primarily that of the student or the scholar, but 
that he had not much even of that culture of the world which marks M. 
Clemenceau and Mr. Balfour.”116 
Chapter Three – Lloyd George 
“Mr. Lloyd George’s unerring, almost medium-like, sensibility to every 
one immediately around him? To see the British Prime Minister 
watching the company, with six or seven senses not available to 
ordinary men, judging character, motive, and sub-conscious impulse, 
perceiving what each was thinking and even what each was going to 
say next, and compounding with telepathic instinct the argument or 
appeal best suited to the vanity, weakness, or self-interest of his 
immediate auditor.”117 
 
These examples show how each writer speculated on their character’s 
psychological states of mind. Although it is not explicit how they influenced each other 
Skidelsky argues, ‘something had to have changed in people’s attitude to themselves and 
to the world for such *books+ to have been conceived and written.’118 This change was a 
transitional one that saw the rise of the twin movements of modernism and 
collectivism.119 Strachey had successfully used G. E. Moore’s refutation of idealism to 
write a different style of biography that in turn was a criticism of Victorian ideals and was, 
argues Holroyd, to influence the style of The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
persuading Keynes to be ‘more indiscreet than he was by nature and to have the courage 
to print what he would have said in conversation.’120 According to Mini these texts almost 
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certainly sharpened Keynes’ belief – to which his own personal, Moore-inspired 
experiences were also leading him – that logic plays a limited role in human affairs.121  
Virginia Woolf was also influenced by Moore and, arrived at the same conclusion 
that she too was trying to escape from customary modes of expression; hence her new 
mode of expression; ‘psychological realism.’ In her novels and essays she finds 
consciousness is a very elusive element to discover and expose and argues: ‘It is no use 
trying to sum people up. One must follow hints, not exactly what is said, not yet entirely 
what is done.’ People are organic and complex unities and ‘of all futile occupations this of 
cataloguing features is the worst.’ There is no essence of character, no unity, no ‘basic 
flaw’: everything is uncertainty and inconsistency. Everything is also unstable, the 
apparent calm may be shattered at any moment. Time is discontinuous, not 
homogeneous, and the controlled psychic state of Monday may give way to the horror 
and sudden crash of Tuesday. Keynes shared this ‘catastrophic-view’ of time, of its 
essential discontinuity and near-unintelligibility. A sudden ‘outer’ occurrence, that is, one 
‘exogenous’ to the psyche of the character, a mark on the wall, is what jolts the mind into 
self-consciousness. These changing outer events in Woolf find their equivalent, according 
to Mini, in the unexamined events of The General Theory, such as a political speech, an 
unexpected bankruptcy, a rumour that sets off an irrational flight into liquidity, that cause 
the descent into depression by shaking the fragile psychological foundations of economic 
relations.122 
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7.3. Influence and Bloomsbury Friendships 
Although the surviving archives are silent on exactly how each writer influenced the other, 
what we know is that friendships were close, forged from regular contact with other 
Bloomsberries. We also know that among the literary set material and manuscripts were 
freely shared and circulated, each person seeking and incorporating feedback into their 
own works. For example, when Keynes was preparing for his follow up to Economic 
Consequences, A Revision of the Treaty, he had read sections to his friends, as he seemed 
to do quite often when preparing a manuscript. Virginia Woolf wrote to him: 
Dear Maynard 
Would you let us have your manuscript in order that we may read 
what we missed last night? It will be kept private and returned 
instantly. We think it just magnificent, and I can’t say how much I 
envy you for describing characters in the way you do.123 
Leonard Woolf also wrote to Keynes later in the same year: 
Dear Maynard 
I think this first rate and most amusing. I expect your psychological 
analysis of Wilson is absolutely correct. It explains everything. I hope 
you’re doing Lloyd George.124 
Keynes had written up a psychological profile of Lloyd George for Economic Consequences 
but had decided to omit it from the final publication. Only with his later publication of 
Essays in Biography (1933) did he provide a full character sketch of Lloyd George. It was 
worth the wait as Keynes painted the following picture: 
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How can I convey to the reader, who does not know him, any just 
impression of this extraordinary figure of our time, this syren, this 
goat-footed bard, this half-human visitor to our age from the hag-
ridden magic and enchanted woods of Celtic antiquity? One catches 
in his company that flavour of final purposelessness, inner 
irresponsibility, existence outside or away from our Saxon good and 
evil, mixed with cunning, remorselessness, love of power, that lend 
fascination, enthrallment, and terror to the fair-seeming magicians of 
North European folklore.125 
Perhaps it was once again feedback from his mother that led to his decision not to include 
the fully prepared character sketch in Economic Consequences. In reviewing one of his 
draft manuscripts she had written: 
My dearest John 
Here is the remainder – on p. 188 your references to Sir S. L. won’t do 
– it is rude. And on pp. 203,4, your remarks on Lord Summer 
approach libel – don’t they? You really must be more careful. In 
looking back, I cannot feel quite sure that I eliminated all the nasty 
bits about Lloyd George – I hope I did, or that you will. You owe some 
loyalty to your Chief, even if you don’t agree with him, and I am sure 
you will be happier afterwards if you keep within the bounds. Also 
spare the President where you can – I wish I could see the chapter 
again. Don’t call him “poor” – and I am doubtful about the taste of 
the Nonconformist Minister comparison. Broadly speaking it is really 
important to be careful about international susceptibilities – so don’t 
call the French preposterous – or call any “great” man wicked or 
wanton. The work will gain – not lose – by restraint.126 
Although this advice did not stop Keynes publishing his character sketches his mother’s 
advice once again had the effect of his toning down the more ‘nasty bits.’ 
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But, as important as the feedback was from friends and family the one friend who 
exercised the greatest influence on Keynes was Strachey. This had begun from the time of 
Keynes first serious work on Probability and continued to time of Strachey’s death in 1931. 
In 1907 Strachey wrote to Keynes on his work on Probability: 
I’m glad Probability is progressing. It certainly will be of immense 
importance when it is done. I talked about your theory of “self 
evidence” to Horon and became rather perplexed. He denied there 
was any such thing. Your simile of Berkley; dungheap really doesn’t 
quite do because even you admit that when the mind isn’t there 
some sort of a dungheap still exists, which I don’t think Berkley would 
allow.127 
Both men reciprocated the habit of reading selected portions from manuscripts and 
sending each other drafts of books intended for publication and on matters related to 
literature in general. For example, Keynes wrote to Strachey in 1920: ‘My experiences 
with a variety of translators have given me some reflections on English style I should like 
to talk about.’128 They also followed and commented to one another on critical reviews of 
each other’s works. Following the publication of Economic Consequences Strachey wrote 
to Keynes: ‘I saw the translation of the Wilson part of your book in the Lowell Review. Not 
so bad, but the poor good man got it quite wrong once or twice. And how tame it is! Is 
that because it’s in French, or because it’s a translation?’129 
Then there was the habit of sending a copy of each other’s texts as soon as they 
were being readied for general publication. On receiving an advance copy of Treatise on 
Probability, Strachey wrote to Keynes: 
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I am delighted to get the Treatise on Probability, which I have 
perused, minus the symbols, with a pleasure apparently independent 
of comprehension. I thought it full of interest – and so much of the 
incidental kind that really I believe even the absolutely “general 
reader” would enjoy it and be all the better for it. So far as I can judge 
the main conceptions are true and important; but my judgment is of a 
curiously theoretical one – I have “thoughts of things, which my 
thoughts but tenderly touch.” I was pleased to see Karl Pearson 
severely lauded. Also it is gratifying to know that a formula reduces 
the argument from Design to ashes: an absurd thing I always thought 
it. Perhaps you might have referred en passant to Pascal’s argument 
that it is worthwhile to believe in God because there is always a 
chance of exiting, as you do mention some analogous theories. The 
note on Lord Lister’s treatment a priori and the “inevitable 
assumption about the wages” made me laugh. Dear me! The 
assumption is indeed all too inevitable. I note 4 misprints which may 
have escaped you … I presume that 1000 years hence the manuals on 
English Literature will point out that it is important to distinguish 
between the two entirely distinct authors of the same name, one of 
whom wrote the Economic Consequences of the Peace, and the other 
a Treatise on Probability.130 
Four months later Keynes had also sent Strachey a copy of the Revision of the Treaty, 
sections of which Keynes had read out loud to his friends. Strachey wrote: 
Dearest Maynard 
I ought to have written days ago to thank you for the Revision of the 
Treaty. It is a great pleasure to have it, and it seems to me a second 
reading quite as good as I thought it when you read it aloud. It came 
out at a very opportune time!! But to judge from George’s dreadful 
remarks about Reparations it doesn’t seem to have produced an 
immediate effect! Or perhaps it has – perhaps he regards it as an 
encouragement to him to continue in his wicked ways. 
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I gather, rather indirectly, that you’re going to India pretty soon. I 
hope this will reach you before you depart, as I want to ask whether 
you think it would be suitable for me to dedicate my next production 
(such as it is) to you? I should like to, and will, unless you forbid it. I 
enclose a little work of the South Sea Bubble, also a note from 
Carrington.131 
Keynes replied three days later to say he would be ‘honoured and delighted by the 
dedication,’ also informing Strachey his trip to India had been cancelled. Keynes never did 
make it to India, despite having worked in the India Office at the beginning of his career. 
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7.4. Summary – Influences on Keynes’ Style 
Friendships forged in Bloomsbury acted as a life-long influence on Keynes. These friends 
kept up a continual cycle of sharing their work before and after it was published, inviting 
feedback and taking note of the respective success of each other’s ventures. It should be 
no surprise, then, that aspects of each other’s literary styles would have influenced the 
other. As far as the influence on Keynes and Economic Consequences was concerned there 
were to be important implications for how his book was received. For example, Keynes 
would have already taken note of how Strachey’s use of triplets in his prose lent a degree 
of elaboration his book may not have otherwise had. Their friends and intellectual peers 
also undoubtedly influenced both men by the way in which psychology as a science and 
emerging discipline was being embraced. That Virginia Woolf had successfully pioneered a 
form of psychological realism in describing the characters in her novels seems to have had 
a direct influence on the ways in which both Strachey and Keynes wrote about the 
characters in their books. Ultimately, all three enjoyed publishing success and all three are 
considered as pioneers of original and new ways of writing in their respective genres: 
Woolf; the novel, Strachey; biography, and Keynes; in the field of social science generally 
and economics specifically. 
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Chapter 8. The Legacy of Economic Consequences and 
Other Selected Works from the Early 1920s 
Following Economic Consequences Keynes came to play a public role he never downplayed 
or discouraged. He had a platform from which to share his views, theories, ideas and 
works. All were received with keen anticipation and analysed with interest by individuals 
outside the close-knit community of scholars and economists with whom Keynes shared 
professional interests, and among whom he became regarded as eminent. 
The first significant work following Economic Consequences was A Revision of the 
Treaty. It was a sequel to Economic Consequences and brought up to date what had 
occurred in the continuing reparation debates and the workings of the commission set up 
to oversee implementation of the Treaty. While not explicitly dealing with the transfer 
problem, Revision was part of an evolving discussion around the theoretical nature of the 
reparations debate. The book also provided additional legal material about the Treaty. 
However, Keynes’ core arguments remained. As far as Keynes was concerned the 
imposition of the reparation terms was morally, legally and economically wrong. 
Furthermore, Germany did not have the capacity to pay and by attempting to 
economically weaken Germany, all Europe faced an economic dark age. There was not a 
lot new in this, but what was new was Keynes’ opening chapter and explanation of the 
importance he attached to public opinion (‘outer’ opinion) and how political and 
journalistic processes were necessary for shaping ‘inner’ opinion and why this was 
important for providing leadership in society. 
The year following Revision, Keynes drew together a number of Manchester 
Guardian articles previously published as part of the “Reconstruction Supplements” and 
published them in book form as A Tract on Monetary Reform. For some time Keynes had 
believed money supply reform to be essential for stabilising the economy and this early 
prescription is of interest for a number of reasons: it shows the state of Keynes’ thinking 
about monetary problems and the causes of inflation in the 1920s, providing a foundation 
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for his later more theoretical work Treatise on Money; it demonstrates how technically 
good Keynes could be and provides one of the clearest explanations written of the 
determination of forward exchange rates; it shows Keynes already favouring flexible 
exchange rates as a means of independence in national economic policy; and, it 
demonstrates how Keynes developed his role as a public intellectual, always looking for 
ways to persuade and influence public opinion. 
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8.1. The Legacy of The Economic Consequences of the Peace 
As debate cooled during the 1920s, although briefly reignited with his 1922 Revision of the 
Treaty, it became clear Economic Consequences had established a legacy. Despite Keynes’ 
claim this was a work of economics, debate still continues as to what his central message 
was. On close examination it is clear a number of the concerns outlined in Economic 
Consequences were the very issues that were to preoccupy him and his contemporaries 
throughout most of the 1920s. One of these was Germany’s capacity to pay any form of 
reparation imposed on her. At the heart of this issue is what became known as the 
transfer problem. Keynes was the first to use the term but not until ten years following 
publication of his book. Thus begins the theoretical literature on the problem that 
continues to this day.1 Although Keynes’ theoretical paper on the transfer problem was 
not published until 1929, the historical context is firmly grounded in the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles. The international commission established as part of the Treaty arrangements 
was made responsible for determining the magnitude of German reparations. However its 
proceedings were marked by continuous dispute over Germany’s willingness and capacity 
to pay. The initial figure settled on by the politicians was repeatedly revised downward, 
‘reflecting new realities and changing perceptions of economic and political conditions in 
Europe, until German reparations were all but eliminated following the Hoover 
Moratorium of 1931.’2 Keynes’ theoretical position outlined in his 1929 paper was that a 
country required to make a fixed transfer of purchasing power to another would suffer a 
secondary burden in the form of a further decline in its purchasing power due to an 
induced deterioration in its international terms of trade. The secondary burden might be 
so large as to reduce the value of traded-goods production in the transfer-making country 
to an amount less than the required transfer. Samuelson argues, ‘if the international 
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demand curve of the receiving country were of elasticity of unity or less, there were fears 
that it would be quite impossible for the paying country to make the transfer – 
competition would tend to turn the terms of trade indefinitely against her.’3 
Keynes’ article resulted in extensive correspondence, comments and rejoinders in 
the Economic Journal. The most important exchanges were with the Swedish economist 
Bertil Ohlin.4 Ohlin responded to Keynes and argued that a secondary benefit, or terms of 
trade improvement, was as likely to occur. Whereas Keynes argued the terms of trade 
would deteriorate, Ohlin’s and his followers’ view was that a transfer implies no change in 
the terms of trade once income effects and purchasing power passing between the two 
countries is taken into account. As the debate matured during the 1930s and 1940s those 
who had previously thought a deterioration of the terms of trade was inevitable dropped 
this view in favour of a more careful formulation. Samuelson argues: ‘A deterioration of 
the terms of trade of the paying country is not inevitable, but there is a strong 
presumption that the income elasticities of the different goods in the different countries 
will be such as to create some deterioration in the terms of trade.’5 At the same time 
holders of Ohlin’s views admitted that a change in the terms of trade might take place, but 
argued it could be in either direction and there was no presumption as to its direction. 
As important as the transfer problem is for our understanding of the difficulties 
surrounding the reparations issue, Kent points out we should not allow ourselves to be 
distracted from what Keynes was really stressing. Keynes himself states, even before the 
Treaty was ratified, he was ‘only concerned with tracing the consequences, per 
                                                             
3
 Samuelson, (1952, p. 279). 
4
 Ohlin, (1929). 
5
 Samuelson, (1952, p. 280). 
 Page 334 
8-Jun-11 
impossible,6 of carrying out the Treaty au pied de la lettre.’7 Although A Revision of the 
Treaty, the sequel published early in 1922, summarised developments up to 1921, it was 
similarly intended to deliver what Keynes hoped would be ‘the coup de grace to the 
problem’ of the reparation issue. 8  Keynes only became interested in serious economic 
analysis of the transfer problem some ten years following the events dealt with in  
Economic Consequences because his central message was unaffected; if the terms of the 
Treaty were imposed on Germany as set out in the Treaty then not only would Germany 
be economically destroyed but so too the rest of Europe, thus setting the scene for further 
European civil revolution and disruption.  
Kent argues, rather than economic analysis and theory, Keynes was far more taken 
up with the politics surrounding the terms of the Treaty and this is what lies at the heart 
of his book. Kent argues,  
scholars of one or other persuasions have regarded reparations as a 
pawn in a wider power struggle between the victors and vanquished 
and have not therefore been concerned to subject the origins and 
development of the reparation dispute to rigorous historical scrutiny.9 
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Skidelsky also argues that the book is no mere technical treatise, stating: ‘The writing is 
angry, scornful and rarely for Keynes, passionate: never again were his denunciations of 
bungling and lying, or his moral indignation, to ring so loud and clear.’10 But to focus on 
the polemic is, for Skidelsky, to miss the purpose and point of the work. In short, Economic 
Consequences is a lucid account of the reparation problem through which Keynes is 
making a personal statement unique in twentieth century literature. He was, as has 
already been discussed above, staking a claim as the ‘economist to be Prince’ with ‘all 
other forms of rule bankrupt.’ The economist’s vision of welfare, conjoined into a new 
standard of technical excellence, was to put up barriers to ‘chaos, madness and 
retrogression.’11  
While Skidelsky has some sympathy with the critics of Keynes’ book, after all, the 
Treaty did accomplish some things of which a liberal would approve - the League of 
Nations, freedom of subject nations from autocracy, the dismemberment of Germany, he 
argues, we must understand the central theme of the book if we are to keep our judgment 
of the work in perspective. The theme was about how the war had damaged the delicate 
economic mechanism by which the European peoples had lived before 1914, and how the 
Treaty of Versailles, far from repairing this damage, had completed the destruction. Thus, 
as Keynes argued, the central theme is economic, not political. The war had destroyed 
Europe’s economic organisation and with it shaken the social order by disclosing the 
‘possibility of consumption to all and the vanity of abstinence to many.’12 For Keynes, the 
Malthusian devil had been set free, especially in Russia where famine killed many.13 
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Furthermore, all the belligerent governments had been forced by the war into a ruinous 
course of inflation, which was potentially fatal for capitalist economies. Keynes invoked 
Lenin who had said ‘there is no subtler, nor surer means of overturning the existing basis 
of society than to debauch the currency.’ For Keynes, a ‘good peace’ should have 
addressed these issues directly, which affected European victors and vanquished alike. 
Instead the treaty-makers produced what he called the Carthaginian Peace, whose effect 
would be to impoverish Europe. This result he attributed to two things, the inadequacy of 
statesmen’s ideas, and the inadequacy of their characters. Skidelsky argues, ‘Keynes’ 
thesis, stated simply, is that the Big Three all gave politics precedence over economics.’14 
Keynes addressed this directly with what Skidelsky describes as his ‘revolt of economics 
against politics’. The war had been fought in the name of nation, state, and emperor. But, 
Keynes argued, these were false gods, from whom he sought to divert allegiance towards 
economic tasks. Skidelsky also argues this message helped form the outlook of a new 
generation where ‘the 1920s saw a new breed of economist-politician, who talked about 
the gold standard and the balance of trade as fluently as pre-war politicians had talked 
about the Two-Power standard and the balance of power.’15 In other words the economic 
problems faced by all countries at the end of the war required a new breed of politician 
who took an interest in economics in ways not done by their predecessors. 
Oswald Mosley (1896-1980) is an example of such an economist-politician. In 1925 
he decided to equip the Labour Party with modern economic policy. With his then new 
Labour Party friend John Strachey (1901-1963) he wrote a 24-page pamphlet Revolution 
by Reason (1925).16 Both had been dismayed by the failure of the Labour government to 
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make any impact on the stagnating economy. They campaigned together for a more 
radical, expansionist approach, and they secured local Labour Party and ILP support for 
their so-called ‘Birmingham Proposals’ in 1925. Mosley had been the more dominant 
personality in the campaign and it was he who wrote up the proposals into the short 
pamphlet. Strachey, however, provided a more thorough theoretical rationale for their 
ideas and he also wrote a book with the same title as the pamphlet. In this he argued, by 
combining increases in the money supply with economic redistribution and the 
establishment of a state planning body, it was possible both to provide an incentive to 
manufacturers and to help the working classes.  
Another example of an economist-politician during the 1920s is Winston Churchill 
(1874-1965) who was from 6 November 1924 to 4 June 1929 Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and as such intimately concerned with the economy.17 While in principle he was a 
Gladstonian Liberal in financial policy, committed to free trade, strict economy in public 
expenditure, and balanced budgets, he is best remembered during this period for 
restoring the gold standard. The Bank of England, the Treasury, and the Conservative 
Party were delighted when it was announced in the budget of April 1925 the gold 
standard was to be restored at the pre-war parity of $4.86 to the pound. Keynes and 
Beaverbrook had both warned Churchill against this step but Churchill, after conducting a 
thorough investigation into the arguments for and against, came to the conclusion a 
return to gold was inevitable and possibly right. However, the consequence, as 
forewarned by Keynes, was an overvalued pound, which had damaging effects on British 
export industries, including coal, and thus precipitated the general strike of 1926. In later 
years Churchill came to regard the restoration of the gold standard as a disastrous 
mistake. 
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Another politician who took an active interest in economics and enjoyed an 
eminent career in both politics and business was Robert Horne (1871-1940).18. In April 
1921 he was appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer but was engaged with a threatened 
national coal strike so his predecessor, Austen Chamberlain, had to introduce the budget 
statement for that year. At this time the economic downturn had become severe, and 
intense pressure had developed from business, taxpayers groups, the Conservative Party, 
and Conservative newspapers for reductions in government expenditure and taxation. 
Cabinet Meeting Minutes of 2nd August 1921 show how seriously Horne and his fellow 
cabinet members saw the situation. The meeting minutes recorded that virtually the 
entire meeting was taken up with discussion of the issue and Horne opened the meeting 
by recalling  
that the prospective revenue had already necessitated a demand that 
the Government Departments should cut down expenditure by 20%. 
The financial outlook, however, was such that in the near future 
further economies would be essential, and there was very little 
prospect of achieving this by ordinary departmental methods.19  
Horne recommended a ‘strong independent Committee’ be appointed to find options to 
the crisis, which met with sharp divisions within the Cabinet, although by the end of the 
discussion it had been resolved the Prime Minister would appoint an independent 
Committee, the composition of which would be left to him. The subsequent non-
ministerial economy committee became known as the ‘Geddes axe’ because under the 
chairmanship of Sir Eric Geddes the committee advocated economies totalling £87 million 
although Cabinet decided on savings amounting to £52 million.20 During his remaining 
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tenure Horne became the chancellor most associated with Treasury deflation and the 
financial constriction of reconstruction policies. 
The activities of all these politicians’ highlights how the economic concerns and 
turmoil of the 1920s meant an interest in economics was hard to separate from the 
political concerns of the day. But then, many political concerns were economic ones. In 
addition to politicians who took a particular interest in the economy, there were other 
non-economists such as Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot, well known and highly regarded literary 
figures, who Skidelsky argues took on the role of ‘economist-poets’.21 A number of 
scholars acknowledge the importance literary figures placed on the subject of economics 
even if they seriously question the soundness of their economic views.22 For example, 
DeLong attacks Pound’s views on usury on the basis it is ‘bad’ economics. If you are not 
able to change rates of interest, which compensate you for the risk you are taking, then, 
as a lender, you will only do business with people familiar to you, which means the typical 
working man is not going to find anyone who is prepared to lend to him. This means the 
working class is denied one of the principal luxuries of the capitalist class, the ability to 
make decisions about the timing of purchases of goods independently of the fixed timing 
of the arrival of one’s income. DeLong argues, ‘it turns out that this is a very valuable 
advantage to enjoy. Usury has been good in that regard.’23 
While the issue of usury also concerned T. S. Eliot, as a single issue it was not as 
important as the actual place of economics in people’s lives. For him economics depended 
on right ethics. This was a theme Eliot progressively promoted through The Criterion, 
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which he founded in 1922 and edited until it closed down in January 1939. According to 
Eliot the theme of right ethics and the impact of economics on people’s lives should take 
precedence over the issue of good or bad economics. Stevens argues this is what literary 
figures such as Pound and Eliot primarily concerned themselves with and adds, ‘whether 
poets ever made good economists is debatable, but one would certainly not turn to the 
milieu of the 1920s if one wanted to make an argument for the affirmative.’24 As diverse 
as economists, politicians and poets may appear to be from one another, the economic 
problems of the 1920s united these groups in their attempts to persuade opinions to take 
economics seriously. 
Economic Consequences left little doubt Keynes was serious and committed to 
tackling post-war economic problems head on. It has led many, such as Elizabeth Johnson, 
to ask the question, was Keynes a scientist or politician? She argues for Keynes as a 
scientist who used political means of persuasion, whereas O’Donnell argues for Keynes as 
a politician because of his effective rhetoric. O’Donnell argues Keynes believed the 
essence of politics was its persuasive appeal to reason. He argues: 
The central presuppositions of his view were centred on ideas, 
opinion, persuasion and reason, and that to effect lasting, non-violent 
social change it was sufficient to patiently disseminate reasonable 
views, which addressed and persuaded the intelligence of those who 
influenced affairs at whatever level.25 
This was Keynes’ constant motif. For example, in Economic Consequences he declared 
there was only one way of influencing ‘the hidden currents’ flowing beneath the surface 
of political history and this was ‘by setting in motion those forces of instruction and 
imagination which change opinion.’ The means were ‘the assertion of truth, the unveiling 
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of illusion, the dissipation of hate, and the enlargement and instruction of men’s hearts 
and minds.’26 
Johnson argues that the use of phrases and statements such as these shows 
Keynes was ‘a natural born and highly efficient, ever alert politician.’27 However, Johnson 
is anxious to point out, while Keynes behaved in public like a working politician, in private 
he was a committed scientist who applied himself to solving problems that existing theory 
would not explain. She argues, ‘at first, *Keynes] was content to dazzle by demonstrating a 
fuller knowledge of economic theory and statistics than his professional colleagues 
possessed. [He used this knowledge to] support different conclusions than their 
understanding of the economic orthodoxy led them to.’28 But eventually Keynes’ 
intellectual honesty and his concern for economic science led him to believe it was not the 
incompetence of the orthodox economists at fault, but the received theory itself. For 
Keynes, modifications within the framework of orthodox economics were not enough; a 
frontal attack on the framework was itself required. To this end his magnum opus the 
General Theory, published in 1936, was to herald this frontal attack. To this point Keynes’ 
published works supports Johnson’s view Keynes was both a politician and an economist, 
whose constituency was not electoral but intellectual. In short, in order to be a politician 
he had to be a scientist and this, as has been highlighted, meant he played the role of 
public intellectual with great success. This role was to continue for the remainder of his 
life. An examination of some of his selected works from the first half of the 1920s is 
illustrative of how Keynes cemented his place as a public intellectual. 
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8.2. Essays in Persuasion 
Essay in Persuasion, first published in 1931, included a selected variety of Keynes’ literary 
output published during the 1920s. They reflected particular concerns from this period 
and ones about which he explicitly sought to persuade public opinion. The essays are all of 
a non-technical nature and include some of Keynes’ most famous polemics of the period, 
including “The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill” and “Can Lloyd George do it?” 
Contemporaries and pupils remembered most vividly these and other pamphlets and 
excerpts of Keynes’ works included in Essays, such as “The End of Laissez-Faire,” and 
excerpts from Economic Consequences.29 He grouped his selected essays under three 
headings: The Treaty of Peace; Inflation and Deflation; and The Return to the Gold 
Standard. 
In his introduction to the book Keynes made clear the intention of this particular 
collection of works: ‘It was in a spirit of persuasion that most of these essays were written, 
in an attempt to influence opinion.’ On reflection in 1931 he knew he was swimming 
against the tide of economic orthodoxy ‘for I wrote many of these essays painfully 
conscious that a cloud of witnesses would rise up against me and very few in my support, 
and that I must, therefore, be at great pains to say nothing which I could not substantiate.’ 
30 Yet, despite his confidence his views were right, he also believed the ‘collected 
croaking’s of a Cassandra’ had not been able to influence the course of events in time. The 
title he wanted to use was Essays in Prophecy because, he believed, prophecy had been 
more successful than persuasion. 
Perhaps his own perception was formed from the generally hostile reviews he 
received from reviewers who bristled at the ‘I told you so’ tone, which many of his essays 
displayed. For example, MacFadyen opened his review in International Affairs with: ‘books 
                                                             
29
 Keynes, (CW, IX, p. xv). 
30
 Keynes, (CW, IX, p. xvii). 
 Page 343 
8-Jun-11 
of the “I told you so” variety threaten to become the fashion’.31 W. L. H. in Pacific Affairs 
commented, the twenty-five essays that make up the book ‘make up this most stimulating 
and readable volume of “I told you so.”’32 The tone also caused some reviewers to bristle 
and ruffled the feathers of some close contemporaries and friends. For example, Leonard 
Woolf thought Keynes displayed his cleverness too recklessly; Harold Laski accused Keynes 
of being an eighteenth century rationalist who ignored the fact that capitalism was 
unreformable, a criticism echoed by John Strachey.33 Ohlin had another view as to why 
others were suspicious of Keynes. In his review of Essays Ohlin argued, ‘if the directors of 
the Bank of England and other bankers have refused to listen to Mr. Keynes’ advice, the 
reason is, I think, to some extent this instinctive suspicion of the truly brilliant mind.’34 
In the same review Ohlin probably spoke for many readers when he asked: 
I do not think that anybody can read Mr. Keynes’ essays without 
asking: How can it be that a man whose power to analyse the pressing 
problems of to-day is so imposing, has been able to exercise so little 
influence on actual policy? Why has a man with so much success in 
prophecy – the real proof of his analytical ability – been so 
unsuccessful in persuasion?35 
But Ohlin hastens to add, he does not believe this to be the case: ‘I do not think that Mr. 
Keynes’ writings have failed to influence the thoughts and ideas of men in power. He has 
set their minds to work in his direction, but too slowly to influence their action.’ Ohlin 
argued that the thinking Keynes stimulated in the 1920s would influence economic 
thought and policy in the coming 1930s: 
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I feel certain that this influence, which is already evident, will be 
considerable. To take one example, only the general willingness to-
day even among bank managers to consider a managed paper 
currency as a real substitute for the gold standard must be no small 
extent due to the discussions around some of Mr. Keynes’ essays. I 
think they will in the next 20 years work hand in hand with his 
Treatise on Money in preparing the ground for monetary reform.36 
Reviewers of a later generation now look back and see Keynes’ attempts at 
persuasion were every bit as successful as the prophecy. For example Skidelsky argues, ‘in 
saying that his prophecy had been more successful than his persuasion, Keynes was selling 
himself short.’37 The work of Keynes’ pen had ‘played its part in undermining old 
prejudices.’ There was no serious attempt after 1931 to revive the gold standard, which is, 
argues Skidelsky, a tribute to Keynes’ persuasion in the early 1920s. While The Times, 
champion of monetary orthodoxy, defended their position in 1925 as ‘honour was at stake 
and worth the effort’ but ‘British industry failed to make the necessary adjustment,’ from 
this point onwards Keynes found The Times open to him with his most important policy 
suggestions during the 1930s appearing in its columns.38 
A brief examination of a few of the economic policy prescriptions used in 1930s 
Britain highlights why his stocks were higher as a result of his efforts at persuasion in the 
1920s. For example, the deflationary constraint of the gold standard had ended in the 
early 1930s and a decade of cheap money followed. The Keynesian agenda of the 1920s, 
applied in the 1930s, enabled Britain to escape the worst of the world depression.39 
Keynes endorsed, and partly inspired, the cheap-money policy and its corollary, managing 
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sterling at a low rate of exchange with the dollar, which followed the gold-standard era. 
He applauded Chamberlain’s conversion of £2 billion of 5 per cent war loan to 3.5 per cent 
as ‘a constructive measure of the very first importance,’ not on budget-saving grounds, 
but for its effect on the long-term interest rate. Cheap money also facilitated a boom in 
private house building, which helped revive economic activity. Finally, he no doubt felt 
vindicated when reparations were finally cancelled at the Lausanne Conference in July 
1932. After the Second World War, the victorious Allies made sure they did not repeat the 
mistakes of 1919 and as Skidelsky states, ‘Keynes’ persuasion prevailed.’40 
 
 
8.3. A Revision of the Treaty 
The first three chapters of Essays in Persuasion came from Economic Consequences and 
covered the “Paris Conference” (Chapter 1, Introduction), “The Capacity of Germany to 
Pay Reparations” (Chapter 5, Reparation), and “Proposals for the Reconstruction of 
Europe” (Chapter 7, Remedies). The next two chapters came from A Revision of the Treaty 
and dealt with “The Change of Opinion” (Chapter 1, The State of Opinion) and “War Debts 
and the United States” (Chapter 6, Reparation, Inter-Ally Debt and International Trade, 
and Chapter 7, The Revision of the Treaty and the Settlement of Europe). In terms of 
argument there was little difference between Economic Consequences and A Revision. In 
his sequel Keynes had brought up to date what had occurred with the continuing 
reparation debate and the workings of the commission appointed to set, oversee and 
amend the terms of the Treaty as circumstances changed. The sequel also provided 
additional legal material around the Treaty and the Commission’s terms but Keynes’ core 
arguments remained: the imposition of the reparation terms was morally, legally and 
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economically wrong; Germany did not have the economic capacity to pay anything but a 
token form of reparation and the bulk of that should only go to the worst affected 
countries, France, Belgium and Serbia;41 by attempting to economically emasculate 
Germany the whole of Europe was on the cusp of further disruption and revolution; the 
debt burden between the Allies, if not forgiven or reduced to a minimum would act as a 
brake on economic development, trade and growth, all necessary for restoring Europe to 
prosperity. The one exception to this covering of old, albeit updated ground was the 
introductory chapter in which Keynes outlined how he believed the process of influencing 
public opinion worked. It is not entirely clear why Keynes chose this particular book to 
outline these views but in any event the chapter on its own has served as a useful synopsis 
for future scholars in their understanding of how he subscribed so firmly to the 
importance of rhetoric and persuasion. 
In this first chapter of The Revision Keynes gives a clear explanation for the 
importance he attached to public opinion and the political and journalistic processes 
helped mould opinion. In Keynes’ view reform and change were products of discussion 
through which public opinion was formed and guided. This formation and guidance came 
through the persuasion of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ opinion, which has been discussed in Chapter 
Three. Keynes also saw that ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ opinion ‘can function as policy.’42 
Evidence of this can be found in two letters Keynes wrote to President Roosevelt at the 
time of the implementation of the New Deal, the first in December 1933, the other in June 
1934. Houck argues a close reading of the text reveals  
a highly nuanced integration of scientific principles with rhetorical 
practices – an integration upon which “economic recovery” is 
constructed and premised. More specifically, Keynes discursively 
constructs an economic recovery by combining scientific terminology 
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with an economic logic premised on the strategic use of presidential 
rhetorical practices.43  
Houck argues that one example is ‘highly rhetorical,’ when Keynes confidently asserts the 
mere act of the President’s speech will engender recovery and on the subject of 
controlling the dollar’s exchange rate, he advises 
You can announce that you will control the dollar exchange by buying 
and selling gold and foreign currencies at a definite figure … with a 
right to shift the parities at any time, but with a declared intention 
only so to do either to correct a serious want of balance in America’s 
international receipts and payments or to meet a shift in your 
domestic price level relative to price levels abroad.44 
In the concluding paragraph to his letter Keynes confidently claims 
With these adaptations or enlargements of your existing policies, I 
should expect a successful outcome with great confidence. How much 
that would mean, not only to the material prosperity of the United 
States and the whole world, but in comfort to men’s minds through a 
restoration of their faith in the wisdom and power of government!45 
Although there is no record of Roosevelt’s reaction to these letters, Keynes’ 
correspondence seemed to have had an impact on US Treasury policy. The journalist 
Walter Lippmann wrote to Keynes on 17 April 1934 and informed him, ‘I don’t know 
whether you realize how great an effect that letter had, but I am told that it was chiefly 
responsible for the policy which the Treasury is now quietly but effectively pursuing.’46 
Houck also argues Keynes’ ideas would have appealed greatly to the newly elected 
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President. Rhetoric, particularly presidential rhetoric, addressed to a mass audience, can 
‘enliven the “animal spirits” and thereby provide a vital impetus to economic activity and 
economic recovery.’47 
Moggridge argues, Keynes’ opening in The Revision with his views on ‘inner’ and 
‘outer’ opinion has not received as much attention from scholars as might be expected, 
especially in light of Keynes’ subsequent meetings with officials, ministers and MPs, public 
speeches, articles in the quality and popular press, all of which were designed to persuade 
the élite.48 O’Donnell is interested in explanations for the keen interest Keynes took in the 
forming of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ opinion. He argues, the source of Keynes’ views and actions 
in regard to the forming of opinion is to be found in his political philosophy. But, as 
O’Donnell points out, ‘providing a detailed account of Keynes’ political philosophy is a 
difficult task, for he set no explicit scheme of thought down in this area.’49 While political 
theory formed part of his early reflections, it never dominated in the way that ethics, logic 
and probability did. Nor did he have a contemporary mentor in politics analogous to 
Moore in philosophy or Marshall in economics. Nevertheless his ethical philosophy 
generated a specific conception of politics, and he was politically active over many years, 
assisting Liberal campaigns in many elections, including those of 1906, 1910, 1923, 1924, 
1928 and 1945, but refusing offers to stand as Liberal candidate in 1920 and 1928 in order 
to concentrate on writing. As with much of his political activity a great deal of this writing 
was focused on forming opinion, whether of the ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ variety. Furthermore 
the bulk of this shaping and forming of opinion occurred as part of his supplementary 
career as a journalist. O’Donnell explains, ‘journalism, with its ‘daily task of persuasion’ 
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figured prominently, not only through newspapers and radio but also through the 
establishment and direction of political weeklies and journals.’50 
This supplementary journalistic career began in 1921 and helped shape the way in 
which he presented his views in The Revision. The background to this career lay in the 
series of meetings between European premiers and their officials to sort out the 
unfinished business of the Peace Treaties. Between 1920 and 1922 there were over 
twenty such meetings. A large part of The Revision is taken up with the detail from these 
meetings. As 1920 progressed these meetings spent more and more time on the 
reparation issue, which the Treaty had left unclear in several ways. For example, the size 
of Germany’s ultimate liability for reparations required a decision by the Reparations 
Commission. Also, although Germany had to provide a payment of £ 1,000 million in cash 
or kind before 1 May 1921, there were the problems of devising a scheme for the 
payment of her remaining liabilities under the Treaty, of devising the means and channels 
whereby the payments might be made, and, given that Germany’s payments would be 
less than her potential liabilities under the Treaty, of settling the distribution of payments. 
Following a conference of experts meeting in Brussels in December 1920, which came up 
with a proposal for reparations payments, another meeting took place in Paris at the end 
of January 1921 to try to decide the ultimate size of the payments. Once the results of the 
Paris Conference were known, C. P. Scott of the Manchester Guardian, ‘which had become 
something of a liberal conscience on such matters, asked Keynes for a signed article.’51 
Keynes wired an article to Manchester the next day, critical of the scheme 
whereby Germany would make a series of payments of £ 100 million a year in the first two 
years, rising to £ 300 million after 11 years, where they were to remain for another 31 
years, plus the equivalent of 12 per cent of her export earnings. In case of default, the 
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scheme allowed the Reparations Commission to intervene in the conduct of Germany’s 
public finances. Keynes’ remarks were widely quoted and commented upon in England, 
and extracts from the article were immediately cabled to the US by the press services. 
Following this first experience of journalism, Keynes started to take the idea of further 
excursions more seriously. In the course of negotiations for Lytton Strachey’s move from 
the publishers Putman to Harcourt Brace for Strachey’s new book Queen Victoria, Keynes 
asked Alfred Harcourt about placing future articles in the American press. At this stage he 
was thinking of articles ‘about questions arising from the peace treaty or reparation, 
about the foreign exchanges, or about such general financial and economic topics as the 
present industrial depression … of a type intended for the general reader.’52 By the spring 
of 1921 he was placing most of his articles overseas as well as in Britain and ‘the next year 
would see even more elaborate arrangements as his relationship with the Manchester 
Guardian developed.’53 
During 1921 Keynes’ journalistic forays tended to be set around the successive 
stages in the reparations saga: Germany’s counter-proposals to the Paris scheme made at 
the London Conference at the beginning of March; the subsequent Allied ultimatum; the 
French statement of intent over the occupation of the Ruhr; the Reparations 
Commission’s decision as to Germany’s liabilities under the Treaty; and the Allied 
reparation scheme presented as an ultimatum at the second London Conference in May. 
However the highlight of his journalistic output in 1921 was a series of five widely 
syndicated articles for The Sunday Times, which appeared between 21 August and 18 
September under the title “Europe’s Economic Outlook.” Keynes had been asked to do the 
articles in May, but, despite the temptations of £ 600 for a week’s work, ‘he was 
determined to put them off until he was through with Probability.’54 The articles dealt 
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with Germany’s ability to pay the new, imposed, reparations settlement; the effects of the 
settlement on world trade; the causes of the current depression; and the prospects for 
wages and the settlement of war debts. At the end of the year Keynes was to use these 
reparations articles in The Revision. 
Between publication of Economic Consequences and A Revision fallout by way of 
critical comment, correspondence, and reference to a ‘Keynes’ view of the ‘reparation 
problem,’ first raised in Economic Consequences , rumbled on throughout 1920 and 1921. 
For example the Swedish economist Knut Wicksell wrote to Keynes on 15th October 1921, 
following a newspaper article written by Keynes on reparations and Germany’s capacity to 
pay. While agreeing with Keynes it was impossible for Germany to pay reparations in the 
near future without some special assistance, he disagreed with his estimation of 
Germany’s general capacity to pay. Wicksell wrote:  
of course I do not understate the noble-mindedness of your attitude 
towards a former enemy but I think it has carried you too far. 
Somebody must pay for the war, it would hardly be a moral right if, as 
the consequences of a too great liberality, France and England were 
ruined by the war and Germany thriving.55 
Keynes replied 11 days later: 
In the particular articles in question I was intending to deal with the 
near future. But you are quite right in supposing that I do not limit my 
general argument to the near future, and that in my book I was 
speaking of Germany’s capacity to pay in general. This topic, however, 
as times goes on, needs fuller arguments and arguments of rather a 
different character from those which apply to the very near future; 
and in my short newspaper articles I had not space to embark on such 
large topics.56 
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For some time Keynes had been thinking of the ‘fuller arguments’ he had mentioned to 
Wicksell. In June 1921 he had proposed a revised edition of Economic Consequences to 
Alfred Harcourt. Harcourt suggested a sequel instead and the outcome of their 
correspondence through the summer and autumn was a plan for a new book. The title 
Keynes eventually decided on was A Revision of the Treaty being a sequel to The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace.  
On January 10, 1922 Keynes’ Sequel was published. This was, argues Moggridge, ‘a 
much less impassioned book than Economic Consequences of the Peace.’57 In Keynes’ 
estimation the book was not another Economic Consequences and on the day he wrote 
the last words he thought it ‘honourable and workmanlike, but not sensational.’58 The 
spectacular success of Economic Consequences assured The Revision a ready audience. 
Reviewers, remarking on the sober tone and the ‘lack of pyrotechnics’ compared to its 
predecessor, prophesied that the book would have fewer readers, but on the whole were 
more approving.59 There was, of course, a mixed reception to the book, as there would be 
for all Keynes’ subsequent works. The response from The Times provides an example of 
this mixed reception. On the one hand the editorial, published on the same day as the 
book, under the heading “A Revision of the Treaty; Mr. Keynes’ View; Is Germany 
Guiltless?” praises Keynes’ gift 
of interesting his readers in problems that are at once vital and 
obscure. Few people can think in millions; fewer still can make 
intelligible and attractive to others the play of their ideas amid the 
noughts that trail off from intelligible units into the vague. Mr. Keynes 
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can, and that is one of the secrets of the success of his first book on 
the Peace. He suggested a point of view.60  
Many reviewers echoed The Times’ praise of Keynes’ abilities with argument and 
numbers, but many would also concur with the conclusion to the review that  
stated barely, the proposed revision (suggested by Keynes in his book) 
is based on a full admission by the Allies that they have been 
economically defeated by the obstructive tactics of Germany. If we 
have really come to that, then those who will may take comfort in Mr. 
Keynes’ plausible arguments that will obscure with their iridescence 
our sad condition. The peace he promises is subtly suggestive of 
greater perils to come.61  
Furthermore, in the same editorial The Times explicitly suggested the wide 
readership of The Revision was due more to Keynes’ personality and style than ‘the 
soundness of his arguments.’ Both books offered a ‘brilliant performance’ but 
again one is baffled by the interesting problem of Mr. Keynes’ 
personality. Is he an economist, an artist, a politician, or a detached 
philosopher? He is all these in turn, perhaps all at once. Yet the new 
book explains something that was not clear when its predecessor was 
published. Then Mr. Keynes had a particular advantage. He had the 
distinction of a man opposing views that appeared to be 
commonplace. He has not that advantage now. The views he 
enunciated in “Economic Consequences of the Peace” have become 
commonplace, not only among the Germans and their friends, but in 
certain circles in this country. The sequel suffers from the success of 
its predecessor. Mr. Keynes has a horror of the banal. He is certainly 
anything but banal in the new book, but he has to move swiftly and 
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trippingly to escape from the reflection of banality that his own 
previous words have cast.62 
It is unlikely Keynes would have objected to The Times’ observation that he ‘had a horror 
of the banal.’ Keynes, after all, knew the linguistic “pyrotechnics” and the “flashy bits” he 
often resorted to, gained attention and once he received a reaction the chances of 
influencing public opinion were higher.  
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8.4. A Tract on Monetary Reform 
The productive relationship with the Manchester Guardian reached a point of maturity in 
1922 with the “Reconstruction Supplements” published by Keynes and other authors. 
Later the next year on 11th December 1923 Keynes published A Tract on Monetary 
Reform. In the Tract Keynes drew heavily on his own contributions to the Supplements. 
This publication of The Tract is important for two reasons. First, the reactions to Economic 
Consequences and Revision suggest Keynes had been effective in reaching out to ‘outer’ 
opinion as much as he had ‘inner’ opinion. On the other hand, reaction to A Tract received 
far more reaction from individuals who formed the ‘inner’ opinion. All belonged to élites 
and Keynes’ call for reform and change led to vigorous debate in élite circles. However, 
Keynes ensured he kept up his direct appeals to the public so that ‘outer’ opinion would 
more easily align with ‘inner’ opinion. The second important aspect of the publication of A 
Tract is, it marked a shift from international economic concerns to domestic issues Keynes 
felt needed attention.  
As already argued, following World War One countries that had previously formed 
the successful and stable group of nations operating fixed exchange rates under the gold 
standard found conditions at home greatly altered. Apart from the more obvious physical 
restoration difficulties outlined by Keynes, price levels, for example, were greatly 
misaligned from one country to another. The Bank of England had stood for firm 
leadership before the war but came out of it in a weakened state and with no contender 
capable of taking its place. Inflationary pressures had also become a significant problem 
for politicians and policy makers. Many economists and politicians believed the answer lay 
in a return to the gold standard, a return to a time when domestic and international 
stability had been taken for granted. Keynes however had other ideas.  
He had already argued the world could not return to the use of policies in play 
before the war since too much had changed. Keynes had come to believe the answer lay 
in fundamental monetary reform. He called for an end to any notion of a return to the 
gold standard but rather argued for the implementation of a managed paper currency 
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regime. Whereas prosperity had followed the successful management of fixed exchange 
rates in the gold standard era of the late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries, Keynes 
believed in the new world context the focus should be on a more rigorously managed 
domestic economic environment with the exchange rate set adrift to self-regulate 
international trading conditions. In his preface to A Tract Keynes outlined his reasons for 
this book: 
One is often warned that a scientific treatment of currency questions 
is impossible because the banking world is intellectually incapable of 
understanding its own problems. If this is true, the order of society, 
which they stand for, will decay. But I do not believe it. What we have 
lacked is a clear analysis of the real facts, rather than ability to 
understand an analysis already given.63 
For today’s economists the Tract is of interest for four reasons. First, it shows the 
state of Keynes’ thinking about monetary problems and the causes of inflation in the early 
1920s, and provides a starting point for his progress through the Treatise on Money to The 
General Theory. Second, it provides one of the clearest expositions ever written of the 
determination of forward exchange rates. Third, it shows Keynes already in the 1920s 
favouring flexible exchange rates as a means of allowing independence in national 
economic policy. And, finally it is illustrative of how Keynes played out his role as a public 
intellectual and highlights his motivation in seeking to ‘persuade’ and influence public 
opinion. 
But what is of most importance in The Tract are the links between theory and 
policy underpinning Keynes’ views on monetary policy. For example Moggridge and 
Howson argue, ‘for every change in the problem at hand came new proposals growing out 
of previous theory or, if previous doctrine could not accommodate the new situation, 
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shifts in theoretical position.’64 Patinkin agrees with this assessment of The Tract and 
suggests The Tract is not really a book. Rather it is a short and somewhat unsystematic 
revision and elaboration of the series of articles on post-war economic policy Keynes first 
published in 1922 in the “Reconstruction Supplements” of the Manchester Guardian 
Commercial.65 Not that this concerns Patinkin but rather reinforces his view that, as with 
much of his work in the area of monetary theory, Keynes is really concerned with practical 
policy problems and their related concern with the empirical aspects of these problems. 
Fodor takes a different view and argues ‘the view that the Tract is basically a collection of 
articles which Keynes had previously published in the Manchester Guardian is mistaken.’66 
Not only did Keynes add new material while writing the Tract, argues Fodor, but he 
also completely changed his standpoint on the main issues involved, from the desirability 
of returning to the gold standard to the possibility of improving the fate of mankind by 
abolishing unemployment. Fodor attaches such importance to this singular work of Keynes 
he believes we can date the time Keynes became a ‘Keynesian’ to the summer of 1923 
when he was transforming the Reconstruction Supplements into The Tract. While Keynes’ 
subsequent road to breaking with the ‘classical’ economists was a difficult process, Fodor 
argues, the publication of The Tract pinpoints the period when Keynes publicly departed 
from orthodox economists and began to defend opinions which, at the time, ‘were 
definitely associated with those of monetary cranks.’67 From this moment Fodor believes 
Keynes’ goal was clear: how to control the trade cycle. 
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The Tract, Skidelsky argues, has ‘the special atmosphere’ of all of Keynes’ 
economic journalism. It both reveals esoteric knowledge and profanes sacred wisdom.68 
As with Economic Consequences , the Tract was full of ‘blasphemies’ designed to amuse 
Bloomsbury and provoke the complacent. For example when he calls the gold standard a 
‘barbarous relic’ he knew the reaction such language would provoke from those who 
clung determinedly to the notion a return to gold was what was needed to restore 
economic stability. In an elaborate joke he bewails the afflictions of the virtuous saver, 
wiped out by inflation, ‘he who neither spent nor “speculated,” who made “proper 
provision” for his family, who sang hymns to security and observed most straightly the 
morals of the edified and the respectable injunctions of the worldly wise.69 But beneath 
the technical argument and ironic language of the Tract were a series of connected 
propositions that would inspire Keynes’ economic work for the rest of his life. For Keynes 
economic health was too important to be left to laissez-faire. Economic management 
must become part of the modern science of government, not a tool of vested interests. 
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8.5. The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill 
It has been highlighted Keynes argued against a return to the gold standard in the Tract 
but once it was reality he turned his attention to changes that could be made to the 
management of monetary policy, which underpinned the return without having to 
abandon the gold standard. Keynes wrote to the editor of The Times, Geoffrey Dawson, 
offering him a series of articles on the consequences of the return to gold. Dawson 
accepted, subject to seeing the final version. When he had he wrote back to Keynes: 
I am rather embarrassed by these articles. They are extraordinarily 
clever and very amusing; but I feel that, published in The Times at this 
particular moment they would do harm and not good. Whether you 
like it or not, the gold standard has now been restored beyond all 
hope of recall. This being so; it seems to me that the only thing to be 
done is to make the best of it. I do not in the least mind publishing 
criticism of the Government in this or any other respect; but three 
solid articles seem to me to be rather over-doing it. … I really am 
reluctantly driven to the conclusion that I cannot take them as they 
stand, and that you had better let them loose elsewhere.70 
Keynes had, as was to be expected in any of his writing, used a number of rhetorically 
flashy phrases to get the reader’s attention and it was these that no doubt caused Dawson 
some discomfort. For example Keynes sarcastically referred to the Prime Minister, Stanley 
Baldwin, as ‘Queen Baldwin’ in reference to ‘a furtive restriction of credit by the Bank of 
England [that] can be coupled with vague cogitations on the part of Mr Baldwin (who has 
succeeded to the position in our affections formerly occupied by Queen Victoria) as to 
whether social benevolence does not require him to neutralise the effects of this by a 
series of illogical subsidies.’71 While politicians are often seen as fair game for such 
attacks, most other individuals and sector interests Keynes deemed as being at fault did 
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not escape his colourful rhetoric. For example, when referring to his belief that Churchill’s 
experts misunderstood and underrated the technical difficulty of bringing about a general 
reduction of internal money values, Keynes accused them of dwelling in ‘the imaginary 
academic world, peopled by City editors, members of Cunliffe and Currency Committees 
et hoc genus omne, where necessary adjustments follow “automatically” from a “sound” 
policy by the Bank of England.’72 
But Keynes took Dawson’s advice and next wrote to Lord Beaverbrook, the 
proprietor of amongst other newspapers the Evening Standard, on 17 July 1925 offering 
Beaverbrook the rights to publish the three articles at a rate of £ 50 per article: 
If you are interested in the proposal in principle I can send you copies 
of the articles to-morrow morning. In my opinion they are good 
journalism and are matters of popular interest. … The thesis of the 
first article *under the general title of ‘Unemployment and Monetary 
Policy,’ I. The Diagnosis+ is that Winston’s policy has committed us to 
reducing everyone’s wages 2/- to the £. The thesis of the second 
article [II. The Policy of the Bank of England] is that the Bank of 
England’s policy of credit restriction is a policy of bringing about the 
above result of deliberately intensifying unemployment. The third 
article [III. The Alternative Courses of the Government] makes two 
suggestions for treating the situation in a different way, compatibly 
with remaining on the gold standard.73 
The Evening Standard published them on 22, 23 and 24 July. Keynes expanded the articles 
into a pamphlet, which the Hogarth Press, owned by Leonard Woolf, published less than a 
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week later under the title The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill. Chapters I, II and V 
correspond to the original articles. 
As with most of Keynes’ published works, The Economic Consequences of Mr. 
Churchill created considerable controversy and through a variety of correspondence, 
published reviews and political comments it is clear Keynes remained firm in his approach 
to the need for economic management and the need for forethought rather than 
instinctive reactions to economic problems: 
The truth is we stand mid-way between two theories of economic 
society. The one theory maintains that wages should be fixed by 
reference to what is ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ as between classes. The 
other theory – the theory of the economic juggernaut – is that wages 
should be settled by economic pressure, otherwise called ‘hard facts,’ 
and that our vast machine should crash along, with regard only to its 
equilibrium as a whole, and without attention to the chance 
consequences of the journey to individual groups. 
The gold standard, with its dependence on pure chance, its faith in 
‘automatic adjustments,’ and its general regardlessness of social 
detail, is an essential emblem and idol of those who sit in the top tier 
of the machine. I think that they are immensely rash in their 
regardlessness, in their vague optimism and comfortable belief that 
nothing serious ever happens. Nine times out of ten, nothing really 
serious does happen – merely a little distress to individuals or to 
groups. But we run a risk of the tenth time (and are stupid into the 
bargain), if we continue to apply the principles of an economics, 
which was worked out on the hypotheses of laissez-faire and free 
competition, to a society, which is rapidly abandoning these 
hypotheses.74 
In summary, from the time Economic Consequences appeared until the publication 
of The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill Keynes was better known as a publicist 
and passionate crusader than a scholar extending the ‘frontiers of the subject.’ Within his 
chosen specialisation, monetary economics, ‘in the Cambridge of the early 1920s A. C. 
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Pigou, Frederick Lavington and Dennis Robertson were more active, if less popularly 
known.’ 75 Keynes’ contribution to monetary economics in the first half of the 1920s had 
come from his journalism and his Tract, itself a reworking of his articles in the Manchester 
Guardian Commercial Reconstruction Supplements. Moggridge argues that to this point 
Keynes had not seriously begun to analyse the major issues in his field of specialisation. 
However, this period, perhaps best thought of as his “crusading” phase, when Keynes had 
‘a reputation as a publicist rather than a scientist – a balance of reputation that was to last 
for some time,’ an important foundation was laid for his later and substantial academic 
book on monetary theory, Treatise on Money (1930). 76 
                                                             
75
 Moggridge, (1992, p. 433). 
76
 Moggridge, (1992, p. 433). 
 Page 363 
8-Jun-11 
8.6. Summary: The Legacy of Economic Consequences  
If the first five years of the 1920s had laid an important foundation for Keynes’ later more 
scholarly and theoretical works, they had also served as an important period in Keynes’ 
life as he firmly cemented himself in the minds of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ opinion. Although 
at the end of the 1920s he felt he was more a prophet than a persuader of opinion, he 
was, by 1925, a public intellectual in every sense of the word, whose views always courted 
controversy and heated discussion, but more importantly paved the way for reform and 
fundamental change. 
Three years after Economic Consequences had so provocatively criticised and 
condemned the Treaty of Versailles, the Allied political leaders who presided over its 
framing, and the ways in which the document sowed the seeds for further civil revolution, 
The Times could only criticise The Revision as ‘anything but banal.’ The assertion was that 
what Keynes had so thoroughly condemned in late 1919 was now in 1923 accepted as 
commonplace opinion. 
Keynes himself did not quite see it this way. He still railed against the failure of 
politicians, economists and policy makers whom he accused of not understanding the 
heavy albeit continually changing burden of reparations that continued to divide and 
destabilise Europe. He also continued to take a dim view of the failure of leaders to deal 
effectively with the various sources of economic instability still plaguing post-war Europe. 
Inflation, a direct result of insufficient taxation during the war years, still hung like a 
spectre over many European countries; disparate price levels between trading nations 
proved resistant to correction and constituted a barrier to global equilibrium; and 
unemployment for many European countries remained stubbornly high and unstable with 
consequent labour and social unrest accompanying it. 
During this period Keynes came to be seen as a crusader for social justice and a 
publicist for his causes, labels he happily accepted. However, what really drove him to 
keep speaking out, was a belief things did not have to be the way they were. He had called 
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for a one-off, sensible reparation payment at the end of the war as a remedy to what he 
considered a hopeless and unworkable Treaty agreement. He also appealed to the Allies 
for the settlement of all inter-Allied war debts. If both had been acted on in a timely 
manner Keynes believed Europe, and the world, could quickly recover and return to 
prosperity, albeit under different terms and conditions than had existed before the war. 
But, having failed to persuade opinion on these issues, Keynes then spent the early 1920s 
trying to convince his ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ listeners that monetary reform was needed to 
address the economic instability caused by unresolved debt burdens, inflation, price 
disequilibrium, and unemployment. He counselled against a return to the pre-war gold 
standard, called for an abandonment of uncontrolled laissez-faire economic policies, and 
advised implementation of a managed money supply system. There was also an appeal for 
a return to firm leadership similar to that provided by the pre-war Bank of England. Before 
being weakened by the war the Bank of England had ensured a managed and controlled 
money supply system, tied to gold convertibility, and stable trading conditions. This time 
around Keynes argued against linking the money supply system to gold because he could 
see those wanting to return to a gold standard failed to grasp the need for corresponding 
monetary reform where the price level, volume of business activity and quantity of money 
itself should be determined by community spending and controlled by varying the interest 
rate. What mattered to him was the capacity for and management of credit creation that 
with or without gold convertibility needed strong central monetary management.  
That Keynes lived to see many of these 1920s unorthodox views become received 
economic orthodoxy demonstrates his powers of persuasion were every bit as potent as 
his prophecy. This is the most important legacy of Economic Consequences . It is hard to 
conceive what greater importance can be attributed to the activities of a public 
intellectual. 
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
Ideas communicated to the public by economists are often misunderstood. For example, 
Keynes consistently maintained many of his critics did not understand the central message 
of Economic Consequences and much of the reaction to the book supports what Solow 
calls “ideas that turn to mush.”1 Keynes claimed Economic Consequences was a serious 
work of economics that provided a set of economic solutions he believed could head off 
the economic apocalypse he foresaw if the terms of the Treaty were not changed, and 
governments did not put aside self-interested nationalistic and imperialist ambitions. 
Critics often judged the book as nothing more than political propaganda and accused 
Keynes of being a pro-German sympathiser, who exaggerated the extent of Germany’s 
problems and capacity to pay. These same critics also failed to grasp Keynes’ gravest 
concern that revenge and the economic weakening of Germany would lead to an 
economic dark age. Even to the present day there is a view Keynes exaggerated the extent 
of the problems facing Europe and there are critics who argue the central message of 
Keynes’ book is political rather than economic. 
If this criticism was taken as a measure of success, it could be argued Keynes was 
unsuccessful in communicating his ideas. However, this argument is flawed because the 
very nature of the information dissemination process in democratic societies encourages 
criticism and a process of falsification to ensure messages are transmitted in ways 
intended and best explained. While Keynes’ critics were many and vocal there were also 
others who did grasp Keynes’ central ideas and over time scholars such as Moggridge and 
Skidelsky have done much to provide explanations in support of Keynes. This dissertation 
builds on these explanations and supports the view that Economic Consequences was a 
serious work of economics and Keynes’ ideas have been successful in bringing about 
change and reform. 
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There are two parts to this conclusion. First is a summary of the dissertation’s main 
points, which addresses the primary subject, how economic ideas are communicated. The 
second part argues this dissertation makes an important contribution to a wider 
understanding of Keynes as a public intellectual as well as Economic Consequences as an 
economic text. The examination of the ways Keynes used statistics, a literary criticism of 
the book and an examination of the influences on Keynes’ writing style have previously 
not been undertaken to the depth undertaken in this dissertation. Furthermore, our 
knowledge of how economic ideas are communicated, especially to non-economists, can 
better be explained in light of this research. The author intends to build on this research 
by applying the tools of literary criticism to other important works of Keynes’, especially 
those where Keynes wrote for a broad audience. 
As a result of this analysis of Economic Consequences this dissertation also 
establishes a better understanding of how economic ideas can be communicated 
successfully. First, Keynes demonstrated economic ideas can be effectively communicated 
without undermining the scientific exactitude of his ideas. Second, Keynes’ activities as a 
public intellectual demonstrate written ideas require methods and means of 
dissemination to ensure ideas are communicated successfully. Third, Keynes argued there 
are different audiences for whom the message must be ‘tuned’ to ensure persuasion. 
Fourth, economic ideas can be communicated without an economist having to 
compromise his or her scientific principles. Finally, scientific exactitude notwithstanding, 
communication style is important in conveying a message.  
9.1. Chapter Summary 
The first part of this dissertation examines The Economic Consequences of the Peace and 
contemporary reactions to the book. A number of themes run through the text with the 
most important ones argued in considerable depth and often supported by a number of 
statistics. Keynes’ central economic argument was that the reparations figures proposed 
at Versailles were unrealistic and economically harmful for all Europe. Proposed figures 
ranged from £ 3,000 million to £ 24,000 million, which were in addition to a number of 
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measures already taken, such as immediate forfeiture of shipping capability, designed to 
reduce Germany’s economic capability for waging war again. Keynes proposed a total 
reparation of £ 2,000 million payment be made by Germany, the proceeds to go to the 
countries worst affected by the conflict, such as France and Belgium. Furthermore he 
proposed a complete forgiveness of all inter-Allied debts to would enable Europe to 
quickly restore itself to economic prosperity. Only Britain and the United States would 
have been faced with net debt write-offs and all countries would have been in a position 
to operate with balance sheets clear of an on-going weight of debt. 
Keynes, however, was pessimistic about these proposals being accepted. He had 
been appalled at the way in which the Allied leadership manipulated commitments made 
to honour the Armistice’s Fourteen Points and the incompetence, deception, and 
impotence of the Allied leaders to put in place a reparation scheme aimed at restoring 
Europe’s economic fortunes. He believed the way in which reparations were to be 
imposed was vengeful and went well beyond Germany’s capacity to pay. He argued this 
heralded a bleak and apocalyptic economic future for Europe and the wider world 
economy. 
Chapter Three examines Keynes’ role as a public intellectual and how he 
successfully communicated his ideas. First, there is a discussion about what it means to be 
a public intellectual and why Keynes meets most definitions. Second, the importance of 
cultural and environmental influences was discussed and how these helped shape Keynes’ 
style and method of communication. Finally, the processes and ways of communicating 
economic ideas are examined so as to better understand how some intellectuals are 
successful while others are not. The chapter closes with a synopsis of a selection of 
economists, Smith, Ricardo, Mill, Marx, and Marshall, who have established a tradition of 
economists as successful public intellectuals and highlights how Keynes stands on the 
shoulders of other eminent economists.  
The next chapter deals with the economic context within which Economic 
Consequences was written. Context is important because what may be applicable in one 
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environment or set of circumstances may be unworkable in another. The success of the 
gold standard from 1870 to the early twentieth century but its failure in the mid-1920s is 
illustrative of this. Keynes was especially cognisant of the importance of context to the 
point where his critics often accused him of changing his mind. His response was that this 
was necessary if the right economic solutions were to be applied to a problem. In 
Economic Consequences he provides an example of this when he dealt with European 
prosperity and issues of convergence before the war and the ways in which the economic 
dislocation of the war meant Europe could not return to its pre-1914 status. Rather, new 
and radical economic solutions had to be found if Europe was to return to stability and 
prosperity within a short time frame. 
Chapters Five to Seven analyse Keynes’ claim that Economic Consequences was a 
serious work of economics and examine the ways in which Keynes’ writing style enabled 
him to communicate successfully. The first of these chapters is an examination of how 
Keynes used statistics descriptively and rhetorically to support his arguments. Chapter Six 
is a literary criticism of Keynes’ prose and poetry, which shows how his use of metaphors, 
allusions and analogies had an economic point. Chapter Seven examines some of the 
influences that shaped Keynes’ unique and successful communication style. 
Chapter Eight examines how Keynes spent the first few years following publication 
of Economic Consequences establishing himself as a public intellectual calling for reform 
and change to areas of the economy that concerned him most. The primary legacy of 
Economic Consequences is that it brought to the forefront of public awareness Keynes and 
his ideas and enabled him to better persuade an alignment of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
opinion. 
9.2. Dissertation Contribution 
The contribution of this dissertation is an economic historical analysis combined with 
literary criticism, previously not attempted, of Economic Consequences. This has enabled a 
set of conclusions to be made that make it difficult to refute the central ideas of Keynes’ 
book and supports his claim that Economic Consequences was a serious work of 
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economics. Even the ‘flashy bits,’ as Keynes called them, were all developed in support of 
his primary economic concerns. Furthermore, the research in this dissertation has 
provided a set of insights that addresses how economic ideas are communicated. 
First, Keynes demonstrated economic ideas can be successfully communicated 
without undermining the scientific exactitude of those ideas. When using the tools of 
literary criticism, central ideas can be interpreted with confidence. Second, Keynes has 
shown through his activities as a public intellectual, written ideas require methods and 
means of dissemination, which enable the message to be transmitted as the writer 
intends. Keynes was explicit in his attempts at persuasion and as a student of the classics 
and rhetoric he understood the importance of metaphors and writing style as important 
means for communication.  
Third, there are different audiences within the public sphere for whom the 
message must be ‘tuned’ so as to ensure persuasion. Keynes dealt with this in his analysis 
of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ opinion. He was interested in reaching an educated audience and so 
drew on metaphors, allusions and analogies he knew would trigger the “imaginative 
cosmos” of his readers. Keynes believed in the importance and responsibility of the élite’s 
(‘inner’) leadership role, so he looked for any opportunity to communicate with 
politicians, officials and businessmen. In a democracy Keynes also knew how important it 
was to directly appeal to ‘outer’ opinion if the public were to be persuaded to change. This 
was also important because public opinion invariably influenced ‘inside’ opinion.  
The fourth finding is that ideas can be communicated without an economist having 
to compromise his or her scientific principles. Keynes relied heavily on official statistics in 
support of his arguments and it is this more than any other factor which addresses the 
more serious of the charges against Keynes, namely, he exaggerated the numbers. There 
is no doubt persuasion was foremost in his mind and his statistics were used to fit his 
rhetorical agenda. However, deliberate exaggeration, and certainly the possibility of 
fraudulent use of numbers, seems a remote possibility. Such suggestions would cast doubt 
on the activities of the Treasury and similar official bodies, whose members would need to 
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have been complicit in any deliberate attempts at exaggeration. Furthermore, apart from 
the complaints of Treasury colleagues at what they saw as an insider breaking ranks, there 
is no evidence the Treasury laid any official complaint for misuse of its numbers. 
The final research finding is, scientific exactitude notwithstanding, communication 
style is extremely important in conveying a message. Keynes brought together three 
important elements in his writing, enabling him to effectively communicate his ideas: he 
understood the importance of rhetoric and how it needed to be used so his audience 
could be persuaded; his use of metaphors, allusions and analogies demonstrates why he 
so successfully reached his target audience; and he absorbed a number of significant 
influences that led to the development of his own unique style. 
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